Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology

Representing oneself as an existing entity and having intense fear of the unknown are human specificities. Self-consciousness and anxiety states are characteristics of our human minds. We propose that these two characteristics share a common evolutionary history during which they acted in synergy for the build-up of our human minds. We present that perspective by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness in which anxiety management plays a key role. Such evolutionary background can introduce new relations between philosophy of mind and (...) psychology. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts at the Pan-Homo split time (about 6my ago) when our pre-human ancestors were able to manage representations while also being able to partly identify with their conspecifics. These identifications allowed our ancestors to merge the representations they had of parts of themselves with the corresponding representations they had of their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that such merger has led our ancestors to progressively build up a representation of their own entity as existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. This evolutionary process is considered in the scenario as the source of an ancestral form of self-consciousness. The same process has also produced identifications with suffering or endangered conspecifics which have created in the minds of our ancestors some new anxieties coming in addition to the animal ones. The resulting psychological sufferings had to be limited for evolution to continue. The tools developed to that end by our ancestors (caring, collaboration, communication, ToM, ...) have also procured significant evolutionary benefits with positive feedbacks on identifications. Overall, the evolutionary scenario proposes that the combination of the anxiety management processes with the evolution toward self-consciousness has created an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the coming up of our human self-consciousness. As a result, our today human minds contain important anxieties interwoven with an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. Such perspective brings to consider that many of our mental states may be unconsciously guided by these evolutionary sourced anxieties (which are still to be clearly understood). Corresponding anxiety management processes are then key contributors to our human feelings and motivations, and to our interpersonal relationship. For instance, the role of Pascalian type diversions can be understood as keeping consciousness away from psychological sufferings produced by too anxious mental states. Also, part of our human sexuality developed during human evolution can be considered as a multidimensional escape and refuge from anxiety. This also brings to look at our psychological well-being and to our mental health as much more related to anxiety management than assumed so far. Dis-functioning of anxiety management processes can then be source of mental disorders and illnesses. On that subject the evolutionary scenario proposes that avoidances of too anxious mental states can lead to evil behaviors. These subjects need more developments. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

Current approaches in psychology have replaced the idea of a centralized, self-present identity with that of a diffuse system of contextually changing states distributed ecologically as psychologically embodied and socially embedded. However, the failure of contemporary perspectives to banish the lingering notion of a literal, if fleeting, status residing within the parts of a psycho-bio-social organization may result in the covering over of a rich, profoundly intricate process of change within the assumed frozen space of each part. In this paper (...) I show how Heidegger, Derrida and Gendlin help us think from this more intimate process to transform current views of metaphor, the unconscious, and the relation between affect and cognition. (shrink)

PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.

Previous research has demonstrated the influence of emotions during linguistic processing, indicating the interactivity of both processes in the brain. However, little is known regarding such interplay in a second language (L2). This study addressed this question by examining the reading effects of syntactic violations while processing L2 emotional and neutral statements. Forty-six Spanish-English bilinguals with various levels of L2 proficiency and emotional resonance (i.e. capability for emotional experience in L2) were presented with a self-paced sentence reading task. Sentences contained (...) positive (16), neutral (16) and negative (16) verbs, half of them presented in agreement and half in disagreement with the preceding pronoun. Analysis of verb reading times using linear mixed effects modelling revealed a significant interaction between syntactic violation, verb valence and emotional resonance, suggesting that stronger emotional L2 experience results in a higher saliency of negative verbs, reducing the impact of syntactic violations. (shrink)

Individuals high in depressive symptom severity show probability bias: they believe negative events are relatively probable, and positive events relatively improbable, compared to those with less severe symptoms. However, this has only ever been demonstrated using self-report measures, in which participants explicitly estimate events’ probabilities: this leaves open the risk that “probability bias” is merely an artefact of response bias. We tested the veracity of probability bias using an indirect behavioural measure, based on a sentence-reading task. Study 1 tested 112 (...) Turkish students; Study 2 tested 117 international users of online groups for people with depressive and anxiety disorders. As predicted, participants with higher depressive symptom scores responded relatively quickly to sentences stating negative events might occur, and relatively slowly to sentences stating positive events might occur, compared to those with lower scores. This effect was only marginal in Study 1, but reached significance in Study 2. However, contrary to predictions, this effect was not moderated by the probability level stated in the sentence. This makes our findings difficult to interpret, and we must present these studies as a failure to convincingly demonstrate depression-related probability bias. We hope this stimulates more work on the nature and veracity of probability bias. (shrink)

Aníbal Monasterio Astobiza y Jesús Ezquerro Martínez Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language, and Information, Universidad del País Vasco, España Desde … Read More →.

People often think about how things could have been better or worse. People make these upward and downward comparisons in different situations and with differing emotional consequences. We investigated whether the direction of counterfactual comparisons affects people’s judgements of counterfactual closeness. In four preregistered experiments (N = 2,142), participants saw vignettes where agents lost or won a luck-based game. In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, participants judged counterfactual closeness in two ways: if a counterfactual outcome almost happened, and if it (...) easily could have happened. These judgments were affected by different factors, but did not substantially differ based on the direction of comparison. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants predicted agents’ emotions – whether losers would be sad, winners would be happy, and whether both would be surprised by the outcome. Emotion predictions showed similar patterns regardless of whether agents lost or won. Participants predicted stronger emotional reactions when the prior probability of the counterfactual outcome was high rather than low, though this effect was somewhat stronger when agents lost. Together, these findings join recent work in suggesting that Almost and Easily judgments tap into distinct forms of counterfactual closeness, and also suggest this distinction is robust to the direction of counterfactual reasoning. (shrink)

Elliot-Kleerkoper, Marietta On the green glass wall of my shower recess...

Emotion malleability beliefs (EMB) have been shown to be a potential predictor of cognitive reappraisal use. However, the nature of the relationship between EMB and cognitive reappraisal use remains unclear. The present study manipulated EMB with an online intervention and measured participants’ EMB and cognitive reappraisal before the intervention as well as at three follow-ups. Eighty-six late adolescents who scored in the bottom 50% on EMB in a previous investigation were randomly assigned to the intervention group (increasing EMB) and the (...) control group. The intervention significantly increased EMB, and this effect remained one week and one month after the intervention. More importantly, the results showed that the lag paths from a previous measure of EMB on later cognitive reappraisal were positive and significant. The cross-lagged paths from cognitive reappraisal to EMB were not significant. The intervention to increase EMB showed significant indirect effects on cognitive reappraisal via EMB. The findings not only support that the intervention of EMB had a sustained effect but also evidenced that EMB had a causal effect on cognitive reappraisal. This suggests a promising way to enhance cognitive reappraisal for application in the treatment of clinical emotion disorders. (shrink)

Emotions can be insensitive to certain attributes of a situation: Fear of flying is not always reduced by remembering air crash probabilities. A large body of evidence shows that information on probabilities, large numerical counts, and intentions is frequently disregarded in the elicitation and regulation of emotions. To date, no existing theory comprehensively accounts for the features that tend to be overlooked by emotion. In this paper, I call attention to the common denominator of such features: they do not contribute (...) to the iconic representation of events. For instance, the exceedingly low probability of a plane crash does not affect its imagistic representation (i.e., the iconic representation of the event is silent about the event’s probability). This paper introduces the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis, positing that the prioritization of input in the iconic format by emotions can explain the neglect of information that is representationally silent in this format. Delving into the causes of this format prioritization, I argue that emotion might favour iconicity as it is the format of immediate information about our surroundings (perception) and of stored first-hand evidence (episodic memory). Lastly, the hypothesis's compatibility with philosophical theories of emotion causation and its implications for experimental research are examined. (shrink)

In fear differential conditioning, stimuli that resemble the conditioned stimulus (CS+) are more likely to trigger fear responses. Excessive fear responses on stimuli not like CS + are often associated with anxiety. However, the threat judgments process and how this process manifests itself differently in subgroups with different generalisation rule applications, is unclear. This study examines whether anxiety biases the threat decision process in fear generalisation paradigm and whether subgroups characterised by different generalisation gradients was interpreted differently by drift-diffusion model. (...) We gathered behavioural data through a binary fear generalisation judgment task and clustered participants based on their responses. Reaction time distributions and individual scale scores were analyzed using the hierarchical drift-diffusion model. The model results suggested that similarity and state anxiety facilitated evidence-gathering processes that favoured “threat” judgments, but at the same time, state anxiety weakened the effect of stimulus similarity as evidence. Further cluster analyses revealed that this effect of anxiety on threat judgments only held true for specific subgroups of participants. This pioneering computational modelling effort in fear generalisation underscores the significant role of strategy preference and its complex interaction with anxiety in shaping stimulus processing. (shrink)

The present study examined the relationship between emotion malleability beliefs and daily positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) in adolescents. 639 participants provided information about emotion malleability beliefs and emotion regulation strategies on the first day of the study and six daily measurements of PA and NA. Emotion malleability beliefs had a positive relationship with PA and a negative relationship with NA. Higher emotion malleability beliefs predicted lower carryover effects of PA and NA across assessment days. We also found (...) that cognitive reappraisal might affect the relationship between emotion malleability beliefs and daily affect, such that those who held high levels of malleability beliefs were more likely to engage in cognitive reappraisal and report lower NA and higher PA. The findings of the present study suggest that emotion malleability beliefs could predicate daily emotions and emotion dynamics across days in adolescents. (shrink)

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that (...) the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort. (shrink)