About this topic
Summary This category describes works that explore the feeling components of emotions. Questions that such works ask include: Are emotions feelings (but see also the 'Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion' subcategory)? Do emotions have feelings as components? What is the nature of the feelings that characterize emotions? For instance, are emotional feelings bodily feelings or are they 'psychic' feelings? Do emotional feelings have intentional properties, can they be about things in the world? Is it possible to have an emotion and not feel anything?  
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138 found
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  1. added 2020-05-27
    Clotilde Calabi, Passioni e ragioni. Un itinerario nella filosofia della psicologia,. [REVIEW]Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1997 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 89 (4):690-691..
    A review of Calabi's work on the emotions. The author chooses to remain neutral with respect to the theoretical options currently adopted in the philosophy of mind: reductionism and functionalism. This choice makes it easier to stress the intentional dimension of emotions and to shed light on the bodily dimension of the emotional life.
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  2. added 2020-01-30
    The New LeDoux: Survival Circuits, and the Surplus Meaning of ‘Fear’.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    LeDoux’s (1996) pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’s (1997) argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet (2002) to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning (de Sousa 1987, Damasio 1994). LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread (2012, 2016, 2017, 2019). He argues (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-30
    On the Possibility of Emotional Robots.Godwin Darmanin - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).
    In this article, I examine whether the possibility exists that in the foreseeable future, robot technology will permit the development of emotional robots. As the title suggests, the content is of a technological as well as of a philosophical nature. As a matter of fact, my aim in writing this paper was that of bridging two distinctive fields in a world where humanity has become accustomed to technological innovations while overlooking any consequential complications arising from such inventions. To this end, (...)
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  4. added 2019-12-11
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  5. added 2019-11-29
    Reasonable Doubt as Affective Experience: Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder, Epistemic Anxiety and the Feeling of Uncertainty.Juliette Vazard - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992; Reed, 1985; Tolin et al., 2003). I (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-13
    Darker Sides of Guilt: The Case of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.Juliette Vazard & Julien Deonna - 2019 - In Bradford Cokelet & Corey Maley (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Guilt.
    Why do thoughts involving harm and damage trigger guilt in certain individuals and not in others? The significance of this question comes into view when considering the medical and psychological literature on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD feel guilt in response to having certain recurring, negative thoughts whose content evoke scenarios of harm and damage. This, however—at least in most readings of what those thoughts consist of—is puzzling. The transition from having a thought about being the source (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-13
    Passions et Psychopathologie.Juliette Vazard - 2018 - In Gloria Origgi (ed.), Dictionnaire des Passions Sociales. Paris, France:
    Les termes que nous utilisons pour décrire notre vie affective ont changé au fil des siècles. Un changement notoire est celui qui a mené d’une conception de l’affectivité centrée autour des “passions” à un discours basé sur l' “émotion” comme catégorie psychologique centrale (Dixon 2003, Rorty 1982). Ainsi, alors que la référence à des désordres émotionnels est omniprésente dans les manuels de psychopathologie, le concept de passion a largement disparu du glossaire psychiatrique. Certains auteurs défendent pourtant l’idée selon laquelle ces (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-08
    This Is Not Here.Katherine J. Morris - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (3):281-283.
  9. added 2019-08-20
    Atmosphere.Friedlind Riedel - 2019 - In Jan Slaby & ‎Christian von Scheve (eds.), Affective Societies: Key Concepts. New York: Routledge. pp. 85-95.
    This chapter traces the genealogy of the term atmosphere in the German language, identifies historical semantic shifts, and points to its grammatical specifics. The state of research on atmospheres is briefly summarized and an overview is offered of the various definitions of the term in different disciplines. Drawing on Timothy Morton’s theory of ambient poetics, and on Hermann Schmitz’s “new phenomenology,” four key characteristics of atmospheres are discussed and elaborated: their mereological constitution, their modal structure, their intensification at affective thresholds, (...)
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  10. added 2019-08-07
    Is Profound Boredom Boredom?Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman - 2019 - In Christos Hadjioannou (ed.), Heidegger on Affect. Palgrave.
    Martin Heidegger is often credited as having offered one of the most thorough phenomenological investigations of the nature of boredom. In his 1929–1930 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, he goes to great lengths to distinguish between three different types of boredom and to explicate their respective characters. Within the context of his discussion of one of these types of boredom, profound boredom [tiefe Langweile], Heidegger opposes much of the philosophical and literary tradition on boredom insofar (...)
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  11. added 2019-07-15
    Hunger for Being Born Completely. Plasticity and Desire.Guido Cusinato - 2017 - Philosophical News 14:65-77.
    The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-15
    The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-13
    Unfelt Feelings in Pain and Emotion.Stephen R. Leighton - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):69-79.
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding. [REVIEW]Travis Dumsday - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    What is an Emotion?William James - 1884 - Mind 9:188.
    A perfectly matched layer (PML) absorbing material composed of a uniaxial anisotropic material is presented for the truncation of finite-difference time-domain (FDTD) lattices. It is shown that the uniaxial PML material formulation is mathematically equivalent to the perfectly matched layer method published by Berenger (see J. Computat. Phys., Oct. 1994). However, unlike Berenger's technique, the uniaxial PML absorbing medium presented in this paper is based on a Maxwellian formulation. Numerical examples demonstrate that the FDTD implementation of the uniaxial PML medium (...)
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  16. added 2019-05-06
    Cognitive Emotion and the Law.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Law and Psychology Review 41.
    Many wrongly believe that emotion plays little or no role in legal reasoning. Unfortunately, Langdell and his “scientific” case method encourage this error. A careful review of analysis in the real world, however, belies this common belief. Emotion can be cognitive, and cognition can be emotional. Additionally, modern neuroscience underscores the “co-dependence” of reason and emotion. Thus, even if law were a certain science of appellate cases (which it is not), emotion could not be torn from such “science.” -/- As (...)
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  17. added 2019-05-06
    Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and FeelingMark R. Wynn New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, Xiv + 202 Pp., $70.00, $28.99 Paper. [REVIEW]Travis Dumsday - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
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  18. added 2019-05-06
    Mark R. Wynn Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, and Feeling. . Pp. Xiv+202. £40.00 ; £16.99 . ISBN 0521840562 ; 0521549892. [REVIEW]Christopher Hamilton - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.
  19. added 2019-04-04
    Precis of The Emotional Mind (2018).Tom Cochrane - manuscript
    This is a precis of The Emotional Mind (2018, Cambridge University Press), summarising the key claims of the book chapter by chapter. It covers the theories of mental content (valent representation), pleasure and pain, emotions, emotional bodily feelings, social emotions, the relationship between reason and emotion, the model of character, and the general model of mental architecture presented in the book.
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  20. added 2019-04-03
    The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
    On the face of it, suffering from the loss of a loved one and suffering from intense pain are very different things. What makes them both experiences of suffering? I argue it’s neither their unpleasantness nor the fact that we desire not to have such experiences. Rather, what we suffer from negatively transforms the way our situation as a whole appears to us. To cash this out, I introduce the notion of negative affective construal, which involves practically perceiving our situation (...)
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  21. added 2019-03-01
    Philosophy of Suffering.Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.) - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
    A collection, edited by David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns, originating in our Value of Suffering Project. Table of Contents: Michael Wheeler - ‘How should affective phenomena be studied?’; Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni – ‘Pleasures, unpleasures, and emotions’; Hilla Jacobson – ‘The attitudinal representational theory of painfulness fleshed out’; Tim Schroeder – ‘What we represent when we represent the badness of getting hurt’; Hagit Benbaji – ‘A defence of the inner view of pain’; Olivier Massin – ‘Suffering pain’; (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-10
    The Emotional Mind : A Control Theory of Affective States.Tom Cochrane - 2018 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Tom Cochrane develops a new control theory of the emotions and related affective states. Grounded in the basic principle of negative feedback control, his original account outlines a new fundamental kind of mental content called 'valent representation'. Upon this foundation, Cochrane constructs new models for emotions, pains and pleasures, moods, expressive behaviours, evaluative reasoning, personality traits and long-term character commitments. These various states are presented as increasingly sophisticated layers of regulative control, which together underpin the architecture of (...)
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  23. added 2018-08-29
    Oops, Scratch That! Monitoring One’s Own Errors During Mental Calculation.Ana L. Fernandez Cruz, Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Kirsten G. Volz - 2016 - Cognition 146:110-120.
    The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...)
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  24. added 2018-08-15
    Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis.Arnaud Dewalque - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):27-40.
    In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In (...)
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  25. added 2018-07-26
    The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
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  26. added 2018-07-25
    Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin.Giovanna Colombetti, Joel Krueger & Tom Roberts - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-2.
  27. added 2018-07-14
    Anger as a Political Emotion: A Phenomenological Perspective.Celine Leboeuf - 2017 - In Myisha Cherry & Owen Flanagan (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Anger. pp. 15-30.
    My essay discusses the politics of anger from a phenomenological perspective. Philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum have examined the importance of emotions for achieving social justice. In Anger and Forgiveness, Nussbaum criticizes most forms of anger for including the desire to retaliate, but identifies a species of anger, “Transition-Anger,” which can motivate us to respond to wrongdoing. In a similar vein, I claim that anger can help the oppressed respond to their oppression. To defend this claim, I consider cases in (...)
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  28. added 2018-07-04
    Moral Psychology of the Fading Affect Bias.Andrew J. Corsa & W. Richard Walker - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):1097-1113.
    We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. (...)
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  29. added 2018-05-16
    Happiness, Pleasures, and Emotions.Mauro Rossi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):898-919.
    In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...)
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  30. added 2018-05-08
    Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...)
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  31. added 2018-03-18
    Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge.
  32. added 2018-01-20
    Musical Scaffolding and the Pleasure of Sad Music: Comment on “An Integrative Review of the Enjoyment of Sadness Associated with Music".Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...)
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  33. added 2017-11-20
    Concerns and the Seriousness of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):181-207.
    Some philosophers have claimed that emotions are states of mind where an object is taken seriously. Seriousness, as this paper understands it, involves both a phenomenological change in attention and non-indifference towards an object. The paper investigates how contemporary theories of emotion can explain the seriousness of emotion. After rejecting explanations based on feeling, desire, and concern, the paper argues that the seriousness of an emotion can be explained as the manifestation of a concern in an outwardly directed feeling. Given (...)
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  34. added 2017-10-24
    Modeling Semantic Emotion Space Using a 3D Hypercube-Projection: An Innovative Analytical Approach for the Psychology of Emotions.Radek Trnka, Alek Lačev, Karel Balcar, Martin Kuška & Peter Tavel - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    The widely accepted two-dimensional circumplex model of emotions posits that most instances of human emotional experience can be understood within the two general dimensions of valence and activation. Currently, this model is facing some criticism, because complex emotions in particular are hard to define within only these two general dimensions. The present theory-driven study introduces an innovative analytical approach working in a way other than the conventional, two-dimensional paradigm. The main goal was to map and project semantic emotion space in (...)
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  35. added 2017-10-21
    Fears as Conscious Perceivings.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):747-760.
    Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology, but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a (...)
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  36. added 2017-09-07
    The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1454-1475.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
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  37. added 2017-04-29
    The Good of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):323-351.
    I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.
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  38. added 2017-04-05
    MIND‭ & ‬CONSCIOUSNESS THINKING,‭ ‬SENSATION,‭ ‬UNDERSTANDING,‭ ‬REASON,‭ ‬ARGUMENTATION,‭ ‬EMOTIONS,‭ ‬EXPERIENCE,‭ ‬WISDOM.de Balbian Ulklrich - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center -/- MIND‭ & ‬CONSCIOUSNESS -/- THINKING,‭ ‬SENSATION,‭ ‬UNDERSTANDING,‭ ‬REASON,‭ ‬ARGUMENTATION,‭ ‬EMOTIONS,‭ ‬EXPERIENCE,‭ ‬WISDOM -/- Do not talk about or use the misleading,‭ ‬umbrella-word like mind and consciousness,‭ ‬or mental processes and phenomena.‭ ‬Even Hume realized this and emphasized the need for accurate definitions of those words and processes we wish to investigate.‭ ‬Talk about and investigate specific processes or‭ ‬‘notions and activities‭’‬ like thinking,‭ ‬reasoning,‭ ‬sensing and experience/ing,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬.I intend to (...)
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  39. added 2017-03-08
    Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory.Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...)
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  40. added 2016-12-12
    Unexpected Pleasure.Timothy Schroeder - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 255-272.
    As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-12
    Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    The Experience of Emotion.Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.
    Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological (...)
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  43. added 2016-12-08
    Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    Emotions, Feelings, and Contexts.Robert C. Solomon - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):653-654.
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  45. added 2016-11-07
    Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve , Collective Emotions: Perspectives From Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology: Oxford University Press, 2014, 447 Pages, ISBN 9780199659180, £55.00. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):467-473.
    Review of OUP volume on collective emotions which provides a taxonomy of the different theories, raising potential objections for each.
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  46. added 2016-10-06
    Epistemic Emotions: A Natural Kind?Anne Meylan - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):173-190.
    The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epistemic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as (...)
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  47. added 2016-08-15
    Über Gefühlsempfindungen.C. Stumpf - 1907 - Philosophical Review 16:346.
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  48. added 2016-02-28
    The Affective 'We': Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions.Joel Krueger - 2015 - In Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the 'We'. Routledge. pp. 263-277.
    What does it mean to say that an emotion can be shared? I consider this question, focusing on the relation between the phenomenology of emotion experience and self-regulation. I explore the idea that a numerically single emotion can be given to more than one subject. I term this a “collective emotion”. First, I consider different forms of emotion regulation. I distinguish between embodied forms of self-regulation, which use subject-centered features of our embodiment, and distributed forms of self-regulation, which incorporate resources (...)
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  49. added 2016-02-28
    Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
    In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that the phenomenological structure of some early infant–caregiver dyadic exchanges (...)
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  50. added 2015-11-02
    Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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