About this topic
Summary This category describes works that explore the feeling components of emotions. Questions that such works ask include: Are emotions feelings (but see also the 'Somatic and Feeling Theories of Emotion' subcategory)? Do emotions have feelings as components? What is the nature of the feelings that characterize emotions? For instance, are emotional feelings bodily feelings or are they 'psychic' feelings? Do emotional feelings have intentional properties, can they be about things in the world? Is it possible to have an emotion and not feel anything?  
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  1. Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  2. Epistemic Feelings, Epistemic Emotions: Review and Introduction to the Focus Section.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):97-122.
    Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...)
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  3. Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”.Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
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  4. Feelings, Moods, and Introspection.Bruce Aune - 1963 - Mind 72 (April):187-208.
  5. Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion).Murat Aydede - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  6. The Experience of Emotion.Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.
    Experiences of emotion are content-rich events that emerge at the level of psychological description, but must be causally constituted by neurobiological processes. This chapter outlines an emerging scientific agenda for understanding what these experiences feel like and how they arise. We review the available answers to what is felt (i.e., the content that makes up an experience of emotion) and how neurobiological processes instantiate these properties of experience. These answers are then integrated into a broad framework that describes, in psychological (...)
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  7. Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  8. Emotions Are Not Feelings.A. Ben-Ze?ev - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  9. Emotional Feelings.Tim Bloser - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.
    Abstract What role do feelings, and specifically bodily feelings, play in our emotional responses? Many current philosophical theories of the emotions suggest that the role of bodily feelings is at best relatively minor compared to other important features of emotions, such as beliefs, or distinctively ?psychic? feelings. In this paper, I try to show that the most common arguments against the importance of bodily feelings, and specifically those offered by Martha Nussbaum in her influential book Upheavals of Thought, are not (...)
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  10. Review of 'Feeling and Emotion: The Amsterdam Symposium' by Manstead, Fridja & Fischer (Ed). [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1).
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
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  11. The Philosophy of Mind, Part I: The Privacy of Feelings.Douglas Browning - 1965 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 3:45-56.
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  12. The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
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  13. The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
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  14. Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve , Collective Emotions: Perspectives From Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):467-473.
    Review of OUP volume on collective emotions which provides a taxonomy of the different theories, raising potential objections for each.
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  15. Enactive Affectivity, Extended.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):445-455.
    In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo, that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also (...)
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  16. The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind.Giovanna Colombetti - 2013 - MIT Press.
    A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.
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  17. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  18. What Language Does to Feelings.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):4-26.
    This paper distinguishes various ways in which language can act on our affect or emotion experience. From the commonsensical consideration that sometimes we use language merely to report or describe our feelings, I move on to discuss how language can constitute, clarify, and enhance them, as well as induce novel and oft surprising experiences. I also consider the social impact of putting feelings into words, including the reciprocal influences between emotion experience and the public dissemination of emotion labels and descriptions, (...)
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  19. Enacting Emotional Interpretations with Feeling.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):200-201.
    This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis's hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
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  20. The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion.W. D. Commins - 1937 - New Scholasticism 11 (3):278-280.
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  21. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Antonio R. Damasio - 1999 - Harcourt Brace and Co.
  22. Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  23. Emotion und Verstand.Andreas Dorschel - 1999 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):18-40.
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  24. Empfindung, Gefühl und Emotion.Andreas Dorschel - 1994 - In Karl-Otto Apel & Matthias Kettner (eds.), Mythos Wertfreiheit? Neue Beiträge zur Objektivität in den Human- und Kulturwissenschaften. Campus. pp. 157-173.
    In book 3 of ‘De anima’, Aristotle distinguishes between sensations and feelings. On the level of sensation, we merely register that something is so and so; feeling, by way of contrast, takes that so and so to be agreeable or disagreeable. Emotion has to be distinguished from both sensation and feeling. One cannot have a sensation or feeling without noticing it. But others may be the first to realize that somebody is jealous or envious. Hence emotions like jealousy or envy (...)
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  25. Gefühl Als Argument?Andreas Dorschel - 1993 - In Andreas Dorschel, Matthias Kettner, Wolfgang Kuhlmann & Marcel Niquet (eds.), Transzendentalpragmatik. Ein Symposion für Karl-Otto Apel. Suhrkamp. pp. 167-186.
    Does having some feeling or other ever count as an argument – and, should it? As a matter of fact, not just do persons sometimes refer to their feelings to make a point in debate. Often, they even treat them as irrefutable arguments; for they are, of course, certain of their own feelings. To make a point in debate by reference to one’s feelings, one has got to articulate them. As language is the core medium of debate (though it can (...)
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  26. Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling.Travis Dumsday - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):817-819.
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  27. What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic.Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
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  28. More Than a Feeling.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  29. The Good of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-29.
    I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.
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  30. The Bright Side of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  31. The Phenomenology and Science of Emotions: An Introduction.Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):507-511.
    Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we relate (...)
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  32. Gefuhle.Eva-Maria Engelen & Verena Mayer - 2008 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):471.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
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  33. Feeling and Cognition.Barrie Falk - 1996 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-222.
    There is a common view that as well as being conscious of the world in virtue of having thoughts about it, forming representations of its various states and processes, we are also conscious of it in virtue of feeling it. What I have in mind is not the fact that we have feelings about the world—indignation at this, pleasure at that—but that we sensorily feel its colours, sounds, textures and so on. And this feeling form of consciousness, it's often thought, (...)
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  34. Emotion, Feeling and Religion.J. Cyril Flower - 1929 - Philosophy 4 (14):192-.
    I do not propose to attempt in this article to make any exact or exhaustive definition of religion, but rather to call attention to one of its outstanding psychological characteristics. At the outset, then, I take it for granted that religion is primarily a feeling experience. We make use of the term ‘religion,’ it is true, for many things in addition to immediate feeling experiences, and it is inevitable that we should do so. But it will be well to bear (...)
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  35. Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium.Nico Frijda & Agneta Fischer - unknown
    As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...)
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  36. Emotion, Emotional Feeling and Passive Body Change.William D. Gean - 1979 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
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  37. Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way.Peter Goldie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.
    I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings (feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.
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  38. Emotional Experience and Understanding.Peter Goldie - 2006 - In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto.
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  39. One's Remembered Past: Narrative Thinking, Emotion, and the External Perspective.Peter Goldie - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (3):301-319.
    Abstract Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives?in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a (...)
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  40. Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
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  41. Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Brookfield: Ashgate.
  42. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration.Peter Goldie - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Goldie opens the path to a deeper understanding of our emotional lives through a lucid philosophical exploration of this surprisingly neglected topic. Drawing on philosophy, literature and science, Goldie considers the roles of culture and evolution in the development of our emotional capabilities. He examines the links between emotion, mood, and character, and places the emotions in the context of consciousness, thought, feeling, and imagination. He explains how it is that we are able to make sense of our own (...)
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  43. Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions.Irwin Goldstein - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  44. The Phenomenology and Intentionality of Emotion.York H. Gunther - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):43-55.
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  45. Mark R. Wynn Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception, and Feeling. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Pp. XIV+202. £40.00 (Hbk); £16.99 (Pbk). ISBN 0521840562 (Hbk); 0521549892 (Pbk). [REVIEW]Christopher Hamilton - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):475-480.
  46. Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions?Gary Hatfield - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Rene Descartes and William James had "body first" theories of the passions or emotions, according to which sensory stimulation causes a bodily response that then causes an emotion. Both held that this bodily response also causes an initial behavioral response (such as flight from a bear) without any cognitive intervention such as an "appraisal" of the object or situation. From here they differ. Descartes proposed that the initial processes that produce fear and running are entirely mechanical. Even human beings initially (...)
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  47. Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...)
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  48. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony E. Hatzimoysis - 2003 - In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-111.
    Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
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  49. Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.Bennett W. Helm - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
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  50. Imagination and Affective Response.Robert Hopkins - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge. pp. 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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