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Summary

Bas van Fraassen introduced the idea of a philosophical ‘stance’ as a solution to what he took to be a self-refutation worry for empiricism. According to the empiricist’s own position, all factual beliefs are contingent and a posteriori. It follows that if empiricism is a factual belief, it must itself be contingent and a posteriori, and thus, by the empiricist’s own lights, it may turn out to be false. But since this conclusion was reached by presupposing the truth of empiricism, empiricism threatens to be self-undermining, if construed as a factual belief. For the empiricist, empiricism seemingly must be both unquestioned presupposition, and vulnerable empirical hypothesis, which is an untenable situation. The solution, van Fraassen argued, is to construe empiricism as a ‘stance’: roughly, a cluster of attitudes, values, goals, and commitments. He then extended this to other philosophical positions, including materialism and naturalism. Stances are not true or false, like propositions, and are not believed or disbelieved. They are adopted, like an approach or policy, and are heavily value-laden.

Key works

Van Fraassen first developed the idea of empiricism as a stance in detail in Van Fraassen 2002. Teller 2004 and Chakravartty 2004 argued that stances should be understood as epistemic policies, or strategies for generating factual beliefs. Boucher 2014 argued that stances should be construed rather as perspectives or ways of seeing facts. Ladyman 2011 suggested that the empiricist and materialist stances, which van Fraassen thinks of as rivals, can be reconciled in the ‘scientistic stance’.

Introductions Van Fraassen 2004 van Fraassen 2004 Lipton 2004 Boucher 2014 Chakravartty 2004 McMullin 2007
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74 found
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1 — 50 / 74
  1. Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies.Tobias Henschen - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-22.
    In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for (...)
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  2. Stance Pluralism, Scientology and the Problem of Relativism.Ragnar van der Merwe - forthcoming - Foundations of Science: DOI: 10.1007/s10699-022-09882-w.
    Inspired by Bas van Fraassen’s Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty’s stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty’s stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be (...)
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  3. Epistemic Stances, Arguments and Intuitions.Dalila Serebrinsky - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (1):79-94.
    The debate between scientific realists and anti-realists is now a classic debate in the Philosophy of Science. Van Fraassen (2002) has suggested that the positions that take part in the debate involve not only different doxastic attitudes regarding some propositions, but different epistemic stances, that is, different sets of commitments, values and epistemic strategies. The formulation of this debate in terms of epistemic stances and the voluntarist epistemology it motivates make it plausible to think of it as a deep disagreement. (...)
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  4. Disagreement About Scientific Ontology.Bruno Borge - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-17.
    In this paper, I analyze some disagreements about scientific ontology as cases of disagreement between epistemic peers. I maintain that the particularities of these cases are better understood if epistemic peerhood is relativized to a perspective-like index of epistemic goals and values. Taking the debate on the metaphysics of laws of nature as a case study, I explore the limits and possibilities of a trans-perspective assessment of positions regarding scientific ontology.
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  5. A Thousand Flowers on the Road to Epistemic Anarchy: Comments on Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (1):1-13.
    I introduce the symposium on Anjan Chakravartty’s Scientific Ontology by summarizing the book’s main claims. In my commentary, I first challenge Chakravartty’s claim that naturalized metaphysics cannot be indexed to science simpliciter. Second, I argue that there are objective truths regarding what conduces to particular epistemic aims, and that Chakravartty is therefore too permissive regarding epistemic stances and their resultant ontologies. Third, I argue that it is unclear what stops epistemic stances from having unlimited influence. Finally, I argue that Chakravartty’s (...)
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  6. Epistemological anarchism meets epistemological voluntarism : Feyerabend's against method and van Fraassen's the empirical stance.Martin Kusch - 2021 - In Karim Bschir & Jamie Shaw (eds.), Interpreting Feyerabend: Critical Essays. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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  7. Portraying the relativist spectrum: Martin Kusch: Relativism in the philosophy of science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, 69 pp, £ 15. [REVIEW]Markus Seidel - 2021 - Metascience 30 (3):357-360.
  8. Stance empiricism and epistemic reason.Jonathan Reid Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):709-733.
    Some versions of empiricism have been accused of being neither empirically confirmable nor analytically true and therefore meaningless or unknowable by their own lights. Carnap, and more recently van Fraassen, have responded to this objection by construing empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. The resulting stance empiricism is not subject to the norms of knowledge, and so does not self-defeat as per the objection. In response to this proposal, several philosophers have argued that if empiricism is a stance, then (...)
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  9. Stances and Epistemology: Values, Pragmatics, and Rationality.Sandy Boucher - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):521-547.
    Van Fraassen has argued that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs. In this paper I discuss the vexed question of whether and how such stances can be rationally justified. Until this question has been satisfactorily answered, the otherwise promising stance approach cannot be considered a viable metaphilosophical option. One can find hints, and the beginnings of an answer to this question, in van Fraassen’s (and others’) writings, but no general, fully clear and convincing account (...)
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  10. An Empiricist Conception of the Relation Between Metaphysics and Science.Sandy C. Boucher - 2018 - Philosophia 47 (5):1355-1378.
    It is widely acknowledged that metaphysical assumptions, commitments and presuppositions play an important role in science. Yet according to the empiricist there is no place for metaphysics as traditionally understood in the scientific enterprise. In this paper I aim to take a first step towards reconciling these seemingly irreconcilable claims. In the first part of the paper I outline a conception of metaphysics and its relation to science that should be congenial to empiricists, motivated by van Fraassen’s work on ‘stances’. (...)
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  11. What is the Relation between a Philosophical Stance and Its Associated Beliefs?Sandy C. Boucher - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):509-524.
    Van Fraassen’s view that many philosophical positions should be understood as stances rather than factual beliefs with propositional content, has become increasingly popular. But the precise relation between a philosophical stance, and the factual beliefs that typically accompany it, is an unresolved issue. It is widely accepted that no factual belief is sufficient for holding a particular stance, but some have argued that holding certain factual beliefs is nonetheless necessary for adopting a given stance. I argue against this claim, along (...)
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  12. A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate.Curtis Forbes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3327-3346.
    It has become apparent that the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists has come to a stalemate. Neither view can reasonably claim to be the most rational philosophy of science, exclusively capable of making sense of all scientific activities. On one prominent analysis of the situation, whether we accept a realist or an anti-realist account of science actually seems to depend on which values we antecedently accept, rather than our commitment to “rationality” per se. Accordingly, several philosophers have attempted (...)
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  13. Physicalism as an empirical hypothesis.David Spurrett - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3347-3360.
    Bas van Fraassen claims that materialism involves false consciousness. The thesis that matter is all that there is, he says, fails to rule out any kinds of theories. The false consciousness consists in taking materialism to be cognitive rather than an existential stance, or attitude, of deference to the current content of science in matters of ontology, and a favourable attitude to completeness claims about the content of science at a time. The main argument Van Fraassen provides for saying that (...)
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  14. On What Empiricism Cannot Be.Alexander Paul Bozzo - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (2):181-198.
    Bas C. van Fraassen, in his Terry Lectures at Yale University, is concerned to elucidate what empiricism is, and could be, given past and current failures of characterization. He contends that naïve empiricism—the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of a thesis—is self-refuting, and he offers a reductio ad absurdum to substantiate this claim. Moreover, in place of naïve empiricism, van Fraassen endorses stance empiricism: the metaphilosophical position that characterizes empiricism in terms of certain attitudes and commitments. The present (...)
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  15. Pragmatist themes in Van Fraassen’s stances and Hegel’s forms of consciousness.Paul Giladi - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):95-111.
    The aim of this paper is to establish a substantial positive philosophical connection between Bas van Fraassen and Hegel, by focusing on their respective notions of ‘stance’ and ‘form of consciousness’. In Section I, I run through five ways of understanding van Fraassen’s idea of a stance. I argue that a ‘stance’ is best understood as an intellectual disposition. This, in turn, means that the criteria for assessing a stance are ones which ask whether or not a stance adequately makes (...)
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  16. Functionalism and structuralism as philosophical stances: van Fraassen meets the philosophy of biology.Sandy C. Boucher - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (3):383-403.
    I consider the broad perspectives in biology known as ‘functionalism’ and ‘structuralism’, as well as a modern version of functionalism, ‘adaptationism’. I do not take a position on which of these perspectives is preferable; my concern is with the prior question, how should they be understood? Adapting van Fraassen’s argument for treating materialism as a stance, rather than a factual belief with propositional content, in the first part of the paper I offer an argument for construing functionalism and structuralism as (...)
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  17. Are the Empirical and Materialist Stances Really Compatible?Sergio A. Gallegos - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):129-137.
    In a recent paper, Ladyman (2011) has argued that the empirical stance, which has been championed by Van Fraassen (2002), and the materialist stance are compatible with each other –a thesis which is important for Ladyman since it paves the way for the project of developing a ‘radically naturalized metaphysics’ that he has defended along with Ross (2007). Though Ladyman puts forth a compelling case for the thesis that the two stances are compatible, I find his argument for the thesis (...)
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  18. van Fraassen's Empirical Stance: a Dogmatic or Rationalistic Approach?Mansouri Alireza - 2014 - Persian Journal for the Methodology of Social Sciences and Humanities 20 (79):137-152.
    In his Empirical Stance, van Fraassen introduces a new version of empiricism and elaborates its relation with science and religion. van Fraassen's empirical stance, characterized by a negative attitude towards metaphysics, is to result in a coherent view alongside his new epistemology called voluntarism - a non-dogmatic approach to rationality. This paper aims to show that its coherency is unstable. Because traces of dogmatism still plague van Fraassen's account of empiricism, and attempts to eliminate them lead to critical rationalism, affecting (...)
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  19. What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms, policies and perspectives.Sandy C. Boucher - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2315-2332.
    Since van Fraassen first put forward the suggestive idea that many philosophical positions should be construed as ‘stances’ rather than factual beliefs, there have been various attempts to spell out precisely what a philosophical stance might be, and on what basis one should be adopted. In this paper I defend a particular account of stances, the view that they are pragmatically justified perspectives or ways of seeing the world, and compare it to some other accounts that have been offered. In (...)
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  20. Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism.Peter Baumann - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):27-36.
    Voluntarism about beliefs is the view that persons can be free to choose their beliefs for non-epistemic (truth-related) reasons (cf. Williams 1973). One problem for belief voluntarism is that it can lead to Moore-paradoxality. The person might believe that -/- a.) there are also good epistemic reasons for her belief, or that b.) there are no epistemic reasons one way or the other, or that c.) there are good epistemic reasons against her belief. -/- If the person is aware of (...)
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  21. A puzzle about voluntarism about rational epistemic stances.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):37-48.
    The philosophy of science has produced numerous accounts of how scientific facts are generated, from very specific facilitators of belief, such as neo-Kantian constitutive principles, to global frameworks, such as Kuhnian paradigms. I consider a recent addition to this canon: van Fraassen’s notion of an epistemic stance—a collection of attitudes and policies governing the generation of factual beliefs—and his commitment to voluntarism in this context: the idea that contrary stances and sets of beliefs are rationally permissible. I argue that while (...)
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  22. Being moved by a way the world is not.Ward E. Jones - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):131-141.
    At the end of Lecture 3 of The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen suggests that we see the change of view involved in scientific revolutions as being, at least in part, emotional. In this paper, I explore one plausible way of cashing out this suggestion. Someone’s emotional approval of a description of the world, I argue, thereby shows that she takes herself to have reason to take that description seriously. This is true even if she is convinced—as a scientific community (...)
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  23. The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled.James Ladyman - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):87-98.
    Abstractvan Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as (...)
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  24. Stance, feeling and phenomenology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):121-130.
    This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does (...)
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  25. But what then am I, this inexhaustible, unfathomable historical self? Or, upon what ground may one commit empiricism?Alan Richardson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):143 - 154.
    This essay examines the perspective from which Bas van Fraassen, in his book, The Empirical Stance, explains the project of empiricism. I argue that this perspective is a robustly transcendental perspective, which suggests that the tradition of empiricism lacks the resources to explain itself. I offer an alternative history of epistemic voluntarism in twentieth-century philosophy to the history van Fraassen himself provides, one that finds the novelty in van Fraassen's own views to be precisely his reintroduction of the knowing mind (...)
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  26. Stances and paradigms: a reflection.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):111-119.
    This paper compares and contrasts the concept of a stance with that of a paradigm qua disciplinary matrix, in an attempt to illuminate both notions. First, it considers to what extent it is appropriate to draw an analogy between stances and disciplinary matrices. It suggests that despite first appearances, a disciplinary matrix is not simply a stance writ large. Second, it examines how we might reinterpret disciplinary matrices in terms of stances, and shows how doing so can provide us with (...)
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  27. How to change it: modes of engagement, rationality, and stance voluntarism.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):7-17.
    We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change also maximizes one’s rationality.
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  28. Stance and rationality: a perspective.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):1-5.
    We offer an overview of some ways of examining the connections between stance and rationality, by surveying recent work on four central topics: the very idea of a stance, the relations between stances and voluntarism, the metaphysics and epistemology that emerge once stances are brought to center stage, and the role that emotions and phenomenology play in the empirical stance.
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  29. Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.
    This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, I raise doubts about the possibility (...)
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  30. On stance and rationality.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):155 - 169.
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  31. Metaphysics between the sciences and philosophies of science.Anjan Chakravartty - 2009 - In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New waves in philosophy of science. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Subsequent to the transition from the era of natural philosophy to what we now regard as the era of the modern sciences, the latter have often been described as independent of the major philosophical preoccupations that previously informed theorizing about the natural world. The extent to which this is a naïve description is a matter of debate, and in particular, views of the place of metaphysics in the interpretation of modern scientific knowledge have varied enormously. Logical positivism spawned a distaste (...)
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  32. Review: Bradley Monton: Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. [REVIEW]I. Douven - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):504-507.
  33. Postmetaphysical Thinking or Refusal of Thought? Max Horkheimer’s Materialism as Philosophical Stance.J. C. Berendzen - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):695 – 718.
    Frankfurt School critical theory has long opposed metaphysical philosophy because it ignores suffering and injustice. In the face of such criticism, proponents of metaphysics (for example Dieter Henrich) have accused critical theory of not fully investigating the questions is raises for itself, and falling into partial metaphysical positions, despite itself. If one focuses on Max Horkheimer's early essays, such an accusation seems quite fitting. There he vociferously attacks metaphysics, but he also develops a theory that pushes toward metaphysical questions. His (...)
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  34. Return of the repressed? An analysis of the subjective grounds for objective knowledge, with reference to van Fraassen's' Empirical Stance'.Filip Kolen & Gertrudis Van de Vijver - 2008 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 70 (2):317-338.
  35. Materialism, stances, and open-mindedness.Michel Bitbol - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  36. Six degrees of speculation : metaphysics in empirical contexts.Anjan Chakravartty - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-208.
    This chapter argues that the distinction between empiricism and metaphysics is not as clear as van Fraassen would like to believe. Almost all inquiry is metaphysical to a degree, including van Fraassen's stance empiricism. Van Fraassen does not make a strong case against metaphysics, since the argument against metaphysics has to happen at the level of meta-stances — the level where one decides which stance to endorse. The chapter maintains that utilizing van Fraassen's own conception of rationality, metaphysicians are rational. (...)
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  37. Van Fraassen on the nature of empiricism.Pierre Cruse - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (4):489-508.
    A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his (...)
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  38. Farewell to empiricism.Dien Ho - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  39. Must empiricism be a stance, and could it be one? how to be an empiricist and a philosopher at the same time.Anja Jauernig - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 271-318.
    In his recent book, The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen forcefully raises the question of what a philosophical position can or should be. He mainly discusses this question with regard to empiricism but his discussion makes it clear that he takes his proposed answer to be generalizable: not only empiricism but philosophical positions in general should be understood as stances rather than dogmata. The first part of this essay is devoted to an examination of van Fraassen’s critique of ‘naïve’ or (...)
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  40. The Epistemology of Constructive Empiricism.James Ladyman - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  41. Taking an empirical stance.Ernan McMullin - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  42. The dilemma of empiricist belief.Chad Mohler - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  43. Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen.Bradley John Monton (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 1 kapitel eller op til 5% af teksten.
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  44. An empiricist critique of constructive empiricism : the aim of science.Philip Percival - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  45. Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of Van Fraassen’s New Epistemology.Stathis Psillos - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 288-319.
    Over the last twenty years, Bas van Fraassen has developed a “new epistemology”: an attempt to sail between Bayesianism and traditional epistemology. He calls his own alternative “voluntarism”. A constant pillar of his thought is the thought that rationality involves permission rather than obligation. The present paper aims to offer an appraisal of van Fraassen’s conception of rationality. In section 2, I review the Bayesian structural conception of rationality and argue that it has been found wanting. In sections 3 and (...)
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  46. From a view of science to a new empiricism.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2007 - In Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. New York: Oxford University Press.
  47. Bas Van Fraassen on religion and knowledge: Is there a third way beyond foundationalist illusion and bridled irrationality?Lydia Jaeger - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):581-602.
    In his recent book, The Empirical Stance (2002), Bas van Fraassen elaborates on earlier suggestions of a religious view that has striking parallels withhis constructive empiricism. A particularly salient feature consists in the way in which he keeps a critical distance from theoretical formulations both in scienceand religion, thus preferring a mystical approach to religious experience. As an alternative, I suggest a view based on mediation by the word, both in the structureof reality and the encounter between persons. Without falling (...)
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  48. Bas van Fraassen on Religion and Knowledge: Is There a Third Way beyond Foundationalist Illusion and Bridled Irrationality?Lydia Jaeger - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):581-602.
    In his recent book, The Empirical Stance, Bas van Fraassen elaborates on earlier suggestions of a religious view that has striking parallels withhis constructive empiricism. A particularly salient feature consists in the way in which he keeps a critical distance from theoretical formulations both in scienceand religion, thus preferring a mystical approach to religious experience. As an alternative, I suggest a view based on mediation by the word, both in the structureof reality and the encounter between persons. Without falling prey (...)
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  49. The Empirical Stance.Elijah Millgram - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):404-408.
  50. Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance. [REVIEW]Elijah Millgram - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):404-408.
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