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Endurantism is, roughly, the view that an object which persists through time is wholly present at all those times through which it persists. That is, for instance, according to the endurantist no part of me is missing from now just as no part of me was missing during my last birthday. However, there’s disagreement about how best to further detail endurantism. Many regard enduring objects as three-dimensional objects, spread out in space but not in time. Some think enduring objects sweep or move through time, while others argue that enduring objects must be multi-located at different times. Then there are those who think endurantists maintain nothing more than that persisting objects do not have temporal parts. Opponents of endurantism argue that as we fill in these details about the endurantist picture we reveal problems. For instance: how can an object be wholly present now and be hot, yet also be wholly present at a later time and cold—does this mean it has incompatible properties? How can an object be wholly present at one time and wholly present at another—if all of it is here, how can any of it be there? Endurantists, of course, argue that there are tenable replies to these and other challenges. 

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103 found
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  1. Réflexions leibniziennes sur le temps, le changement et l'identité dans les années 1680.Jean-Pascal Anfray - 2003 - Studia Leibnitiana 35 (1):79 - 101.
    This article bears on the topic of the temporal persistence of particulars in Leibniz's philosophy. It is focused on an analysis of some passages from definitional notes from the early 1680's where Leibniz sets out his main metaphysical theses. The paper contends that Leibniz analysed the identity of substances within a broadly Aristotelian framework, i. e. in terms of enduring metaphysical items (which are identical and wholly present at each moment of the particular's existence). It thus opposes an explanation in (...)
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  2. Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski.Yuri Balashov - unknown
    I examine the issue of persistence over time in the context of the special theory of relativity (SR). The four-dimensional ontology of perduring objects is clearly favored by SR. But it is a different question if and to what extent this ontology is required, and the rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by this theory. In addressing this question, I take the essential idea of endurantism, that objects are wholly present at single moments of time, and argue that it commits one (...)
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  3. Special Relativity, Coexistence And Temporal Parts: A Reply To Gilmore.Yuri Balashov - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):1-40.
    In two earlier works (Balashov, 2000a: Philosophical Studies 99, 129–166; 2000b: Philosophy of Science 67 (Suppl), S549–S562), I have argued that considerations based on special relativity and the notion of coexistence favor the perdurance view of persistence over its endurance rival. Cody Gilmore (2002: Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263) has subjected my argument to an insightful three fold critique. In the first part of this paper I respond briefly to Gilmore’s first two objections. I then grant his observation that anyone who (...)
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  4. Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):129-166.
    I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. (...)
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  5. Persistence and Space-Time.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):321-340.
    Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being "wholly present" at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct "temporal segments" confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three-dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four-dimensional spacetime "worms"? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns (...)
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  6. Relativity and Persistence.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):562.
    The nature of persistence of physical objects over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as "endurantism" (or "three-dimensionalism") and "perdurantism" ("four-dimensionalism"). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having "temporal parts," no part being present at more than (...)
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  7. Endurance is Paradoxical.Stephen Barker & Phil Dowe - 2005 - Analysis 65 (285):69-74.
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  8. Reposicionando o Endurantismo Na Actual Metafísica da Persistência, Segundo a Analogia Do Ser.Ricardo Barroso Batista - 2013 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 69 (2):215-240.
    Resumo Na actual metafísica, no âmbito da Filosofia Analítica, mantém-se intenso o debate acerca do Problema da Persistência. Actualmente, o Endurantismo sendo alvo de várias críticas, é acusado de ser insustentável, pelo que prevalece a teoria Perdurantista. O autor do artigo irá percorrer o actual debate, mostrando que este decorre implicitamente numa perspectiva monista e unívoca do ser e que, sob este enquadramento, o Perdurantismo encontra-se melhor posicionado para responder à questão da Persistência do que o Endurantismo. Contudo, surgem dois (...)
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  9. Endurance, Dualism, Temporal Passage, and Intuitions.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):851-862.
    Endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism, is supposed to be the intuitive view. But the ‘endurantist intuition’ – roughly, that objects persist through time by being numerically identical and wholly located at all times at which they exist – is behind more than just endurantism. Indeed, it plays an important role in the motivation of some theories about the passage of time, and some theories about the nature of the subject. As we shall see, the endurantist intuition is often taken in (...)
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  10. New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
    In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more (...)
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  11. Endurance and Time Travel.Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):65-72.
    Suppose that you travel back in time to talk to your younger self in order to tell her that she (you) should have done some things in her (your) life differently. Of course, you will not be able to make this plan work, we know that from the many versions of 'the grandfather paradox' that populate the philosophical literature about time travel. What will be my centre of interest in this paper is the conversation between you and ... you – (...)
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  12. Endurance, Perdurance, and Metaontology.Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy (2):159-177.
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  13. Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology.Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - SATS 12 (2).
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  14. Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie.Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are more (...)
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  15. On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism.Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
    Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. (...)
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  16. Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds.Jiri Benovsky - 2006 - Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
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  17. Endurants and Perdurants in Directly Depicting Ontologies.Thomas Bittner, Maureen Donnelly & Barry Smith - 2004 - AI Communications 13 (4):247–258.
    We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the enduring entities that participate therein. For this purpose we introduce the notion a directly depicting ontology. Directly depicting ontologies are based on relatively simple languages and fall into two major categories: ontologies of type SPAN and ontologies of type SNAP. These represent two complementary perspectives on reality and employ distinct though compatible systems of categories. A SNAP (snapshot) ontology comprehends enduring entities such as (...)
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  18. Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics.Andrew Botterell - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23.
    In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP provides (...)
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  19. The Loneliness of Stages.D. Braddon-Mitchell & K. Miller - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):235-242.
    Harold Noonan has recently argued (2003) that one of Lewis’s (1983: 76– 77) arguments for the view that objects persist by perduring is flawed. Lewis’s argument can be divided into two main sections, the first of which attempts to show that it is possible that there exists a world of temporal parts or stages, and the second, which attempts to show that our world is such a world. Noonan claims that there is a flaw in each of these two stages.We (...)
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  20. Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics.J. E. Brower - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):883-905.
    It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally (...)
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  21. Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  22. Multilocation, Fusions and Confusions.Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):25-33.
    The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.
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  23. Enduring States.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - In Christian Kanzian (ed.), Persistence. Ontos.
    The problem of how a concrete individual survives changes of its properties has long divided the philosophical community into ‘enduratists’ and ‘perduratists’. Enduratists take the idea of a surviving individual ontologi-cally seriously. They claim that many objects we encounter in our every-day (and for that matter also scientific) life endure in time, which means that these entities are wholly present at any time at which they exist. For those who are in principle happy with the conceptual framework of our ‘everyday’ (...)
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  24. Comments on Varzi.Fabrice Correia - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):499–502.
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  25. The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...)
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  26. In Defence of Transcendentism.Damiano Costa & Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):225-234.
    How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and do not have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.
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  27. 'Wholly Present' Defined.Thomas M. Crisp & Donald P. Smith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.
    Three-dimensionalists , sometimes referred to as endurantists, think that objects persist through time by being “wholly present” at every time they exist. But what is it for something to be wholly present at a time? It is surprisingly difficult to say. The threedimensionalist is free, of course, to take ‘is wholly present at’ as one of her theory’s primitives, but this is problematic for at least one reason: some philosophers claim not to understand her primitive. Clearly the three-dimensionalist would be (...)
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  28. The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Vivarium 55 (1-3):199-216.
    I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.
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  29. Sweeping Endurantism is a Mischaracterization of Endurantism.Paul R. Daniels - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    One way endurantism is commonly characterized is as a sweeping thesis, according to which enduring objects persist by sweeping or moving through time. I argue that the endurantist should resist this characterization as it makes her view incompatible with eternalism, the moving spotlight theory, and the growing block theory. Moreover, even the presentist endurantist should resist this characterization as it undermines the modal analogy. As a result, those who argue against endurantism should avoid characterizing endurantism in this way. Through this (...)
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  30. Occupy Wall: A Mereological Puzzle and the Burdens of Endurantism.Paul Richard Daniels - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):91-101.
    Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...)
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  31. Endurantism and Paradox.Paul Richard Daniels - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1173-1179.
    Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) (...)
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  32. Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence.Maureen Donnelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):27 - 51.
    In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects' dimensions and not on the (...)
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  33. Presentism/Eternalism and Endurantism/Perdurantism: Why the Unsubstantiality of the First Debate Implies That of the Second.Mauro Dorato - 2012 - Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):25-41.
    The main claim that I want to defend in this paper is that the there are logical equivalences between eternalism and perdurantism on the one hand and presentism and endurantism on the other. By “logical equivalence” I mean that one position is entailed and entails the other. As a consequence of this equivalence, it becomes important to inquire into the question whether the dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is authentic, given that Savitt (2006) Dolev (2006) and Dorato (2006) have cast (...)
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  34. Multiple Location Defended.Antony Eagle - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2215-2231.
    The notion of multiple location plays an important role in the characterization of endurantism. Several authors have recently offered cases intended to demonstrate the incoherence of multiple location. I argue that these cases do not succeed in making multiple location problematic. Along the way, several crucial issues about multiple location and its use by endurantists are clarified.
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  35. Persistence, Vagueness, and Location.Antony Eagle - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (10):507-532.
    This article discusses two arguments in favor of perdurance. The first is Sider’s argument from vagueness, “one of the most powerful” in favor of perdurantism. I make the observation that endurantists have principled grounds to claim that the argument is unsound, at least if endurance is formulated in locative rather than mereological terms. Having made this observation, I use it to emphasize a somewhat neglected difference between endurantists and perdurantists with respect to their views on material objects. These views, in (...)
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  36. Endurantism and Timeless Worlds.N. Effingham & J. Melia - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):140-147.
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  37. Endurantism and Timeless Worlds.N. Effingham & J. Melia - 2007 - Analysis 67 (294):140–147.
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  38. Endurantism and Perdurantism.Nikk Effingham - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. pp. 170.
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  39. A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism.Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
    In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is (...)
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  40. In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism.Kit Fine - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):1-16.
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  41. Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
    In attempting to understand personal identity, it is common practice to imagine a person existing at some time t and a person existing at a time t* , and then to ask, What does it take for person x at t to be the same person as person y at t*?The Psychological Continuity Approach answers: there is a relation, R, of psychological continuity such that person x at t is the same person as person y at t* if and only (...)
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  42. Endurance and Discernibility.Robert Francescotti - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204.
    How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a (...)
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  43. Passing Through: Why Intrinsic‐to‐a‐Time Endurantism Should Not Persist.Daniel Giberman - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):89-101.
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  44. From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Alessandro Giordani & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):210-220.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...)
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  45. Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity.Steven D. Hales & Timothy A. Johnson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539.
    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a relativistic (...)
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  46. Names Introduced with the Help of Unsatisfied Sortal Predicates.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (4):511-514.
    In this paper I answer Aranyosi’s (Axiomathes 19(2):223–224, 2009) criticism of my “Is Phosphorus Hesperus?” (Axiomathes 19(1):101–102, 2009).
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  47. The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):267-280.
    In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: that if (...)
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  48. Endurance Per Se in B-Time.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (2):175-183.
    Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevolds enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269-283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe's paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106-114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69-74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
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  49. Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2009 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...)
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  50. The Problem(s) of Change Revisited.Tobias Hansson - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):265–274.
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
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