Endurantism is, roughly, the view that an object which persists through time is wholly present at all those times through which it persists. That is, for instance, according to the endurantist no part of me is missing from now just as no part of me was missing during my last birthday. However, there’s disagreement about how best to further detail endurantism. Many regard enduring objects as three-dimensional objects, spread out in space but not in time. Some think enduring objects sweep or move through time, while others argue that enduring objects must be multi-located at different times. Then there are those who think endurantists maintain nothing more than that persisting objects do not have temporal parts. Opponents of endurantism argue that as we fill in these details about the endurantist picture we reveal problems. For instance: how can an object be wholly present now and be hot, yet also be wholly present at a later time and cold—does this mean it has incompatible properties? How can an object be wholly present at one time and wholly present at another—if all of it is here, how can any of it be there? Endurantists, of course, argue that there are tenable replies to these and other challenges.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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