Environmental Ethics

The Norwegian state-owned Petroleum Fund’s market value is more than one trillion US dollars, and the Norwegian state has become one of the world’s largest stockowners. The Fund was established in 1990 and in 2006 and renamed the ‘Government Pension Fund Global’, as savings for future generations. What kind of values form the basis for describing the Petroleum Fund in this way? This article shows that the idea that present generations should not empty the North Sea of oil and gas (...) without saving something for future generations has been stable since the 1970s. However, over time, the understanding of how to save has changed. More specifically experts, bureaucrats and politicians have shifted their arguments during four phases: moderation in oil extraction ; introduction of the national wealth model ; a financial fund for the present and the future ; and increased income and new protests. These four periods show that over time the idea of weak sustainability and value commensurability have increasingly come to dominate the argumentation in public documents about the Petroleum Fund. (shrink)

Increasingly there are calls for climate services to be “co-produced” with users, taking into account not only the basic information needs of users but also their value systems and decision contexts. What does this mean in practice? One way that user values can be incorporated into climate services is in the management of inductive risk. This involves understanding which errors in climate service products would have particularly negative consequences from the users’ perspective (e.g., underestimating rather than overestimating the change in (...) an impact variable) and then prioritizing the avoidance of those errors. This essay shows how inductive risk could be managed in climate services in ways that serve user values and argues that there are both ethical and practical reasons in favor of doing so. (shrink)

The anthropocentric destruction of nature can be viewed as a form of self-destruction, which affects individuals and also the human species. It entails active destruction of the natural surroundings that are vital for the preservation of the planet’s biodiversity. But should ecocide, or environmental self-destruction of the life of certain species, be considered an “interruption” to the life of such species, or it is part of their natural life course? Are ecocide and environmental destruction identical, or substantively different, phenomena? Prevention (...) of the death of biotic species, and of the massive destruction of abiotic species, constitutes the ultimate challenge for both environmental and animal ethics. Modern mass extinction of species can be understood as a form of speciesism, and the prevention of such extinction is the most urgent challenge for any ethics centered on the recognition of the value, or rights, of nonhuman species. (shrink)

The culture of global society commonly associates the word animal with vertebrates. Paradoxically, most of animal diversity is composed of small organisms that remain invisible in the global culture and are underrepresented in philosophy, science, and education. Twenty-first century science has revealed that many invertebrates have consciousness and the capacity to feel pain. These discoveries urge animal ethicists to be more inclusive and to reevaluate the participation of invertebrates in the moral community. Science also has warned of the disappearance of (...) small animal co-inhabitants that is occurring in the midst of the sixth mass extinction. This “invisible extinction” compels environmental philosophers to make visible invertebrates, whose existence is precious in itself and for the functioning of ecosystems on which biodiversity and human societies depend. With a biocultural approach that integrates the biophysical and cultural dimensions of biodiversity, I investigate the roots of taxonomic chauvinism associated with the under-representation and subordination of invertebrates in modern philosophy and science. The bad news is the confirmation of a marked vertebratism in animal imagery. The good news is that David Hume, Charles Darwin, and biocultural ethics provide conceptual foundations for cultivating an appreciation of the small co-inhabitants with whom we share our local habitats and the global biosphere. (shrink)

There are two strategies for engineering species for conservation purposes, de-extinction and gene drives. Engineering species for conservation purposes is not in principle wrong, and on common criteria for assessing conservation interventions there may well be cases in which de-extinction and gene drives are evaluated positively in comparison to other possible strategies. De-extinction is not as transformative a conservation technique as it initially appears. It is largely dependent, as a conservation activity, upon traditional conservation practices, such as captive breeding programs, (...) species reintroductions, and habitat improvement and protection. In contrast, gene drives have the potential to significantly restructure how conservation problems are framed and approached. Gene drives are therefore a much more disruptive technology for conservation philosophy and practice. (shrink)

Recently, I have been arguing for a global constitutional convention focused on protecting future generations. This deliberative body would be akin to the American constitutional convention of 1787, which gave rise to the present structure of government in the United States. It would confront the “governance gap” that currently exists surrounding concern for future generations. In particular, contemporary institutions tend to crowd out intergenerational concern, and thereby facilitate a “tyranny of the contemporary.” They not only fail to address a basic (...) standing threat to humanity and other species, but help that threat become manifest. Climate change is a prime example. In this paper, I sketch out a natural argumentative path toward the global constitutional convention and argue that is difficult to resist. I also insist that we should be evenhanded in the way we treat the proposal. Those who put their faith in alternatives must also confront standard complaints about naivety, urgency, threats to democratic values, and the like. Moreover, the global constitutional convention has the advantage of addressing the problem we face head on. (shrink)

Everyday life practices are one of the focuses of interest for so-called ‘sustainable transitions’. Efforts in making daily life more ecological have ranged from awareness-raising and behaviour change strategies to socio-technical innovations, but have produced limited results so far. In a present characterised by a prolonged and multifaceted crisis it is imperative that, as social scientists, we interrogate the sustainability of everyday practices from a more critical angle, linking them to reflections about capitalism’s ecological destructiveness. One fruitful way of doing (...) so is to interrogate the dimension of subjectivity as a space where collective discourses, practices and desires are embodied in concrete experience and actions. Drawing on ethnographic material on everyday energy use, I suggest that contemporary ways of living certainly contribute to the overall reproduction of capitalism and yet, in the juncture of the crisis, more sustainable livelihoods can be experimented with and prefigured. Subjectivity is one crucial dimension in which this process unravels. (shrink)

Roger Gottlieb's Morality and the Environmental Crisis is a philosophical overview of the choices that will shape our grandchildren's lives, as dramatized in his speculative sketch of two very different futures at the end of this book. Gottlieb more than once notes that he is in his seventh decade of life, appropriately designating this work as that of an elder passing on the knowledge derived from his long career as a scholar, teacher, activist linking environmentalist with spiritual communities, and the (...) father of a daughter with special needs. First on his list of potential actions for addressing the environmental crisis is writing a book such as this to encourage readers to share his conviction of the need for... (shrink)

In this paper I will examine a number of justifications for environmental concern, and show why all except for the (broadly) anthropocentric demonstrate problematic conservative logics that incline them towards socially conservative positions. Environmentalists would do best to take up an anthropocentric, or at least anthropogenic, defence of green values if they want to pair it with a progressive social politics.

The concept of wilderness has been variously conceived at different times and by different individuals. For some, wilderness has been viewed as a source of evil, or at least of chaos, which rightfully should be tamed or subdued, made subject to the controlling influence of human civilization. This attitude typically prevails in frontier or colonizing societies. Alternatively, wilderness has been viewed as a source of positive values, ranging from material resources, wildlife habitat, scientific interest, recreational opportunities, beauty, personal inspiration and (...) spiritual nourishment. A favorable attitude toward... (shrink)

Some earth scientists reckon our current geological epoch as the Holocene, a mild, perhaps interglacial period, in which fluctuations in the earth's temperatures have been hospitable to human beings. The Holocene witnessed advancements in agriculture, writing, technological and tool development, historical awareness, and civilizational and urban expansion. There is, however, an emerging recognition that Homo sapiens have become a planetary force in our own right through the technological, carbon-based economies that have flourished throughout the Holocene. This recognition has prompted the (...) invention of a new term, the "Anthropocene," literally the new age or time of the human (from the Greek anthropos, meaning... (shrink)

Much of the contemporary work on preservation centers on the ecosphere in the sense of its biological diversity: that is, much of it centers on plant and animal species, and their place within the surrounding areas, both from the standpoint of reproduction and that of the food chain. But an increasing number of lines of argument have been made about other parts of the planet's surface, and the special importance that might attach to rare areas—areas that in their overall structure (...) are especially evocative of the history of the earth.Canyons, those areas carved out of the surface by the action of water, wind and, in some cases, geological forces, are particularly important as sites of learning and education, and are... (shrink)

Twenty-five years ago, when Ethics and the Environment launched, I remember having engaging conversations with the late founding editor, Victoria Davion, about just how important feminist thinking was to ethical explorations of our vexed relationships with the more than human world. She promised to promote feminist philosophical scholarship in this journal and she kept that promise. Although I'm quite skeptical of "metrics" I did a search on the term "feminism" in the three prominent journals that publish on ethics and the (...) environment and was not surprised to find that this journal contains 147 results where there are 51 in Environmental Values and just 33 in Environmental Ethics, a journal that has been publishing... (shrink)

In 2016 a mouse-like creature by the name of Bramble Cay Melomys or Melomys rubicola went extinct.1 It was the "first recorded mammalian extinction due to anthropogenic climate change". The Bramble Cay Melomys lived in a small, reef island composed of coral rubble and sand that is part of the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. The report, which made headlines in the global media, described a domino-like chain of events that resulted in the Bramble Cay Melomys becoming extinct. According to (...) the same authors, the Bramble Cay Melomys died from starvation after their main source of food, herbaceous vegetation, saw a dramatic decrease as a result of repeated intrusions of seawater which... (shrink)

At the time that Vicky Davion conceived of and launched Ethics and the Environment twenty-five years ago, environmental philosophy was still struggling for acceptance and respectability as a philosophical subdiscipline. For most of the period since 1979 just one journal, Environmental Ethics, had been the primary beacon of the field, and a second, the United Kingdom-based Environmental Values, had only started up in 1992. Much of the surrounding professional atmosphere at the time was less than congenial, especially in relation to (...) any attempt to engage in philosophical radicalism via environmental thought, with much institutional pressure pushing towards seeing all the concerns of our nascent field as questions to... (shrink)

Ecological restoration and native landscaping are increasing, particularly in the American Midwest, where they form part of the area’s history and culture of conservation. But practitioners rarely pause to ask philosophical questions related to categories of native and invasive or human control and harmony with nature. This article brings philosophy into conversation with practice, using members of Wild Ones Native Landscaping, a non-profit headquartered in Neenah, WI, as a case study. Philosophers and ethicists who are studying Ecological Restoration and Native (...) Landscaping can learn valuable lessons – in practicality, aesthetics and flexibility – from practitioners such as the Wild Ones. (shrink)

This paper examines Allen Carlson’s influential view that knowledge from natural science offers the best framework for aesthetically appreciating nature for what it is in itself. Carlson argues that knowledge from the natural sciences can play a role analogous to the role of art-historical knowledge in our experience of art by supplying categories for properly ‘calibrating’ one’s sensory experience and rendering more informed aesthetic judgments. Yet, while art history indeed functions this way, Carlson’s formulation leaves out a second role played (...) by art-historical knowledge over the last century – namely, providing the context needed for interpretations of meaning. This paper explores whether natural science can also inform our aesthetic experience of nature in this second sense. I argue that a robust sense of meaning from our aesthetic experience of nature is indeed made possible by coupling our aesthetic experience of animals with knowledge from the natural science of animal ethology. By extending the scope of Carlson’s analogy to include interpretations of meaning, my argument shows that the cognitive, scientific model can accommodate a wider range of aesthetic engagement with nature than previously recognised. (shrink)

Although similar environmental issues are present across the globe, residents of different countries vary in the extent to which they are concerned about and act upon these issues. Drawing on data from the 2010 Environment module of the International Social Survey Programme, this study tests the structural comparability of environmental attitudes across 32 countries and examines how pro-environmental behaviours are linked to relevant attitudes. A confirmatory factor analysis from structural equation modelling helps identify three latent constructs of environmental attitudes: willingness (...) to sacrifice, biospheric orientation and environmental scepticism. Further regression analyses reveal that the linkages between pro-environmental behaviours and the constructs of environmental attitudes converge in some countries but are less consistent in others. The findings help pinpoint signs of global convergence and national disparities, which merit more extensive analyses amid the recent surge in the availability of diverse empirical data from around the world. (shrink)

The need for energy system change in order to address the energy 'trilemma' of security, affordability and sustainability is well documented and requires the active involvement of individuals, families and communities who currently engage with these systems and technologies. Alongside technical developments designed to address these challenges, alternative ways of living are increasingly being envisaged by those involved in low-impact development. This article draws on data from a qualitative longitudinal study involving residents of a low-impact ecovillage in West Wales, UK, (...) in order to consider how the successful meeting of their planning targets has not been without personal and social troubles, which are absent from official measures of the project's success. We argue that, in exploring issues pertaining to scaling up, policy timescales and the legacy of such projects, insights drawn from this study have a wider relevance beyond the specific case site. (shrink)

In this article, we reflect critically on how moral actions are categorised in some recent studies on moral spillovers. Based on classic concepts from moral philosophy, we present a framework to categorise moral actions. We argue that with a finer classification of moral values, associated behaviour is better understood, and this understanding helps to identify the conditions under which moral licensing takes place. We illustrate our argument with examples from the literature on pro-environmental behaviours. Moral spillovers are frequently studied in (...) this behavioural domain and to understand what causes their occurrence is highly relevant if we wish to promote sustainable behaviour. (shrink)

Though largely a theoretical endeavour, environmental ethics also has a practical agenda to help humans achieve environmental sustainability. Environmental ethicists have extensively debated the grounds, contents and implications of our moral obligations to nonhuman nature, offering up different notions of an 'environmental ethic' with the presumption that, if humans adopt such an environmental ethic, they will then engage in less environmentally damaging behaviours. We assess this presumption, drawing on psychological research to discuss whether or under what conditions an environmental ethic (...) might engender pro-environmental behaviour. We focus discussion on three lines of scholarship in the environmental ethics literature, on 1) intrinsic value, 2) care ethics, and 3) the land ethic. We conclude by commenting generally on both the limits and transformative potential of an environmental ethic in its larger sociocultural context. (shrink)

De-extinction technology aims to bring extinct species back into existence, often with the goal of releasing created organisms into natural environments. In this paper, I argue that there are aesthetic reasons to avoid engaging in de-extinction and release projects, even if they pass moral permissibility criteria. The strength of these reasons depends on conclusions regarding species authenticity – a problem that arises at the intersection of de-extinction technology and the ‘species problem’ in the philosophy of biology. Since species authenticity affects (...) the perceived naturalness of ‘natural’ environments, and thus the aesthetic judgments thereof, I contend that there will be negative aesthetic consequences of de-extinction efforts that ought to be further explored before such projects move forward. (shrink)

In this paper, we are interested in the effects of institutional context on public attitudes towards climate policies, where institutions are defined as the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of any given society. Building on a 2014 survey experiment, we conducted thirty qualitative interviews with car-owners in Oslo, Norway, to investigate the ways in which institutional context and political-value orientation affect public attitudes towards emissions policies. One context highlighted individual rationality, emphasising the ways in which local pollution impacts the (...) individual citizen; the other highlighted social rationality, emphasising the wider significance of carbon emissions and global responsibility for climate change. We analysed the effects of these contexts on attitudes, finding that institutional context influenced individuals’ perspectives as well as their attitudes towards climate policies. Groups with different value orientations differed in terms of their evaluations but not their interpretations of these contexts. (shrink)

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or well-being for them. (...) However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

In her analyses of human ecological alienation, Val Plumwood implies that the recalcitrant problem of human exceptionalism is sustained in part by a kind of imaginative failure, by a certain blind spot to the ecological edibility of the human body. Among the many assumptions responsible for the blind spot, Plumwood suggests, is the liberal conception of the body as something proprietary, as something one owns. Plumwood’s work therefore establishes a new, if counterintuitive, task for environmental philosophy: to find or create (...) models of human embodiment that do not preempt but rather enable access to edibility. One such model can be found in Emmanuel Levinas’s late concept of the pre-egoic ethical body. This otherwise elusive and frequently neglected concept ought to be understood as a boldly materialist appropriation of Plotinian emanationism. So understood, it provides a path beyond the blind spot that Plumwood identifies. Taking up Levinas in this way opens a new path for environmental philosophy into his idiosyncratic thought—a path distinct, that is, from the standard extensionist maneuver of seeking nonhuman applications for his ultra-humanist notion of the face. (shrink)

Despite the fact that their disagreement concerns the most basic metaethical and metaphysical questions regarding our relation to nature, it has become apparent that many anthropocentrists share with nonanthropocentrists a concern for the environment for its own sake, that is to say, a noninstrumental concern for nature. This concern is also present in practical spheres of environmental engagement. With regard to the philosophical task of justifying the claim that we ought to protect nature, this concern imposes on those that share (...) it at least three conditions: priority, independence of future interaction, and universality. Reasonably specified, these conditions are neutral between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism and should be attractive to both camps. Although there are reasons to think it would be difficult to meet all three conditions at the same time, with some modification a promising way to do it becomes apparent. (shrink)

Contrary to what writers such as Hans Jonas and Val Plumwood suggest, much of nature is indifferent to human interests. Mountains, glaciers, sun-baked salt pans—such entities care neither about what interests us humans nor about what is objectively in our interests. It might be hard to see how the property of being indifferent, in this sense, could add value. But it can. For those of us who inhabit highly technological, user-friendly environments, entities such as mountains can have therapeutic value precisely (...) because they so obviously do not care about what matters to us. (shrink)

Nonhuman animals play various roles in environmental ethics, often as charismatic symbols of wilderness or active participants in the natural dramas we seek to preserve. Sometimes, however, nonhuman animals do not fit into—and may even threaten—the “nature” that we value. There are two especially problematic animals: white-tailed deer and feral cats. Together, these creatures shine light on a number of important issues in environmental ethics, including the tensions between animal welfare and environmentalism, the ways human interests and categories pervade even (...) ecocentric perspectives, and the complex place of science in environmental ethics and advocacy. Thinking through the issues raised by debates about deer and cats can contribute to a more adequate treatment of nonhuman animals in environmental thought and advocacy. (shrink)

What responsibilities does each of us have to reduce or limit our greenhouse gas emissions? Advocates of individual emissions reductions acknowledge that there are limits to what we can reasonably demand from individuals. Climate ethics has not yet systematically explored those limits. Instead, it has become popular to suggest that such judgements should be ‘context-sensitive’ but this does not tell us what role different contextual factors should play in our moral thinking. The current approach to theory development in climate ethics (...) is not likely to be the most effective way to fill this gap. In existing work, climate ethicists use hypothetical cases to consider what can be reasonably demanded of individuals in particular situations. In contrast, ‘climate ethics with an ethnographic sensibility’ uses qualitative social science methods to collect original data in which real individuals describe their own situations. These real-life cases are more realistic, more detailed and cover a broader range of circumstances than hypothetical cases. Normative analysis of real-life cases can help us to develop a more systematic understanding of the role that different contextual factors should play in determining individual climate responsibilities. It can also help us to avoid the twin dangers of ‘idealization’ and ‘special pleading’. (shrink)

In production and consumption of food, several ethical values are at stake for different affected parties and value conflicts in relation to food choices are frequent. The aim of this article was to present an ethical framework for well-grounded decisions on production and consumption of food, guided by the following questions: Which are the affected parties in relation to production and consumption of food? What ethical values are at stake for these parties? How can conflicts between the identified values be (...) handled from different ethical perspectives? Four affected parties, relevant for both production and consumption of food, were identified, namely animals, nature, producers and consumers. Working form a bottom-up perspective, several values for these parties were identified and discussed. For animals: welfare, not being exposed to pain and natural behavior; for nature: low negative impact on the environment and sustainable climate; for producers: fair salaries and safe working conditions; and for consumers: access to food, autonomy, health and food as part of a good life. As several of these values can come into conflict when choices of what to eat should be made, the article argues for the need of weighing values from four different perspectives in food ethics dilemmas, namely duties, consequences, virtues and care. The suggested ethical framework can provide moral guidance to both producers of food and to consumers in a supermarket. Thereby, it can contribute to more well-grounded decisions concerning what to eat and make people feel a little bit more secure when reflecting over the question: What shall we eat? (shrink)

To tackle zoonotic disease threats, a One Health approach is currently commonplace and generally understood as an integrated effort of multiple disciplines to promote the health of humans, animals and the environment. To implement One Health strategies in zoonotic disease control, many countries set up early warning systems, in which human and veterinary health professionals cooperate. These systems, like the Dutch Zoonoses Structure, can be successful to detect emerging disease threats. However, these systems are not well equipped to handle moral (...) dilemmas that can arise in zoonotic disease control, like the culling of healthy animals. This research studies the role of normative presuppositions of professionals involved in zoonotic disease control policies in the Netherlands. We found that these professionals in general adhered to a holistic view of the One Health concept, however, in practice an anthropocentric approach was dominant. Public health was identified as the trumping moral value, which reveals an inherent field of tension with the core of One Health thinking. The lack of ethical expertise in control systems for zoonotic diseases can lead to misconception of ethical principles, like the precautionary principle which is frequently evoked to justify disease control measures. (shrink)

There is public support in the United States and Europe for accounting for animal welfare in national policies on food and agriculture. Although an emerging body of research has measured animals’ capacity to suffer, there has been no specific attempt to analyze how this information is interpreted by the public or how exactly it should be reflected in policy. The aim of this study was to quantify Americans’ preferences about farming methods and the suffering they impose on different species to (...) generate a metric for weighing the trade-offs between different approaches of promoting animal welfare. A survey of 502 residents of the United States was implemented using the online platform Mechanical Turk. Using respondent data, we developed the species-adjusted measure of suffering-years, an analogue of the disability-adjusted life year, to calculate the suffering endured under different farming conditions by cattle, pigs, and chickens, the three most commonly consumed animals. Nearly one-third of respondents reported that they believed animal suffering should be taken into account to a degree equal to or above human suffering. The 2016 suffering burden in the United States according to two tested conditions was approximately 66 million SAMYs for pigs, 156 million SAMYs for cattle, and 1.3 billion SAMYs for chickens. This calculation lends early guidance for efforts to reduce animal suffering, demonstrating that to address the highest burden policymakers should focus first on improving conditions for chickens. (shrink)

The idea of cooperation has been recently used with regard to human–animal relations to justify the application of an associative theory of justice to animals. In this paper, I discuss some of these proposals and seek to provide a reformulation of the idea of cooperation suitable to human–animal relations. The standard idea of cooperation, indeed, presupposes mental capacities that probably cannot be found in animals. I try to disentangle the idea of cooperation from other cognate notions and distinguish it from (...) exploitation, use, and relationship. The upshot is a minimal taxonomy of human–animal relations that covers most possibilities, from the worst type of relation to that which is most favourable to animals’ welfare. In this taxonomy, cooperation is a form of relation where animals are used to produce a valuable good in a way that is compatible with their ethological features and without being harmed. (shrink)

Touch pools are popular open-topped fish tanks often found in aquariums where visitors may interact with animals, by touching and sometimes even feeding them, for educational and recreational purposes. However, although animal interactions are becoming increasingly popular in recent years, the welfare impact on the animals and the educational effectiveness of such interactions is under debate. Awareness concerning the different, and sometimes controversial, aspects connected with such interactions has spread. The aim of this paper is to investigate the ethical issues (...) arising from the presence of touch pools in aquariums and facilities alike. In particular, possible sources of moral conflicts between five interested parties will be identified and discussed: biodiversity; aquariums; staff involved with touch pools; individual animals used in the touch pools; visitors interacting with animals in touch pools. In order to assess the framework of ethical demands from different parties, it will be used an analytical tool provided by a revised version of the Ethical Matrix. (shrink)

In this article I respond to the obligation to institute the policy of decoupled crop subsidies as is provided in Pilchman’s article “Money for Nothing: Are decoupled Crop Subsidies Just?” With growing problems of poor nutrition in the United States there have been two different but related phenomenon that have appeared. First, the obesity epidemic that has ravaged the nation and left an increasing number of people very unhealthy; and second, the phenomenon of food deserts where individuals are unable to (...) access fresh fruits and vegetables. A possible solution to this problem, as has been proposed by some, is to institute a decoupled crop subsidy that would increase the production of fruits and vegetables in the United States. In this paper I explore the possible unintended consequences of this policy and how it may violate liberal international conceptions of justice. I conclude that there must be further empirical research before anyone can call decoupled crop subsidies an obligation to justice. (shrink)

This article calls for an end to the use of the term ‘invasive species’, both in the scientific and public discourse on wildlife conservation. There are two broad reasons for this: the first problem with the invasive species narrative is that this demonisation of ‘invasives’ is morally wrong, particularly because it usually results in the unjust killing of the animals in question. Following on from this, the second problem is that the narrative is also incoherent, both from scientific and philosophical (...) perspectives. At the heart of both of these issues is the problem that the invasive species narrative oversimplifies what are in fact very complex biological processes. As a result, the policies carried out with the stated aim of ‘controlling’ these animals are often unethical. In light of the current global species decline, this article asserts that the way we think and talk about these animals should be changed and the term ‘invasive species’ should be discontinued, in the hope that this leads to changes in practice. (shrink)

The purpose of den trials is to assess innate ability and preparedness of dachshunds and terriers to work in natural beds in order to control fox numbers. International earthdog trials within the period 2009–2018 were evaluated in Slovakia, in which 1812 dogs participated, of which terriers represented 61.36% and dachshunds 38.64%. Depending on the way of work, dogs of these breeds work as bayer, bolter or hard dog. The test rules were compared in terms of animal protection, principles of ethics (...) and welfare requirements in the Visegrad countries. We investigated the extent to which animals used in trials are exposed to suffering in the countries under review. During the den trials in Slovakia, there is a direct physical contact between the dog and the fox, where the foxes are unnecessarily exposed to excessive stress, injury and pain and violated by Five Animal Welfare Needs, in particular the need to protect against pain, injury and disease. Due to non-compliance with the welfare, we propose a change in the examination rules in the earthdog work in Slovakia. Non-parametric Chi square statistic to analyse group differences when the dependent variable is measured at nominal level was used. (shrink)