Epicurus

A brief survey of Deleuze’s writings on ancient atomism and on the concept of the atom in general. Deleuze’s treatment of atomism is significant because it makes clear Deleuze’s aim in shifting the mereological vocabulary from points to lines; it shows what, in Deleuze’s sense, it means to unground. In other words, it sets down the conditions for a successful Deleuzian critique of essentialist metaphysics of structure.

If death is a harm then it is a harm that cannot be experienced. The proponent of death's harm must therefore provide an answer to Epicurus, when he says that ‘death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not’. In this paper I respond to the two main ways philosophers have attempted to answer Epicurus, regarding the subject of death's harm: either directly or via analogy. The direct (...) way argues that there is a truth-maker (or difference-maker) for death's harm, namely in virtue of the intrinsic value the subject's life would have had if they had not died. The analogy argues that there are cases analogous to death, where the subject is harmed although they experience no pain as a result. I argue that both accounts beg the question against the Epicurean: the first by presupposing that one can be harmed while experiencing no displeasure as a result and the second by conflating a de re with a de dicto reading of death's harm. Thus, I argue, until better arguments are provided, one is best to agree with Epicurus and those who follow him that death is not a harm. (shrink)

Epicurus asked: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” This Socratic dialogue explores a popular version of the Argument From Evil. Suitable as an introduction to the topic.

Within the Critique of practical reason, Epicurus plays an important, even if very often neglected, role. First at all in the Analytic, where the Epicurean ethics appears as the more serious opponent to the Kantian foundation of the morality. The discussion becomes more cogent on the topic of the motivation, question which is again debated in the Dialectic.

Epicurus holds, in _Key Doctrine_ 31, that what is just according to nature is a _súmbolon_ or sign of the interest there is in neither harming one another nor being harmed. Certain readings of this maxim equivocate this legal sign with other signs found in nature, thereby failing to give sufficient weight to the role of reciprocity in its production. Other readings simply import a legal sense from outside of Epicurean doctrine, thereby failing to explain what makes Epicurean _súmbola_ legal. (...) A final set of readings attempt to find a legal rule as a kind of innate concept or Kantian ‘scheme’. This article identifies new sources for understanding _súmbolon_, drawn principally but not exclusively from Aristotle’s _Eudemian Ethics_. This article offers an original argument that Epicurus adopts Aristotle’s’ image of the tally stick (_symbolon_) as a meeting of often divergent interests which constitutes something new and particularly valuable to the Epicurean: friendship. A theoretical argument is also advanced to support this reading which claims that one person’s reflection on a ‘divine image’ of the end (_telos_) is insufficient to constitute a _súmbolon_; rather real (as opposed to abstract or ideal) individual interests are filtered via the mechanism of the tally, that is via the meeting of two given individuals who together generate a sign (_symbolon_) of reciprocal interest in neither harming nor being harmed. (shrink)

This paper examines the significance of Epicureanism for Nietzsche’s critique of Christian monotheism and his subsequent attempt to reanimate a kind of this-worldly, affirmative religiosity of immanence. After a brief overview of the pivotal role that Epicurus’ thought plays in the death of God, I focus on Epicurus’ own residual conception of the gods and the ways in which Nietzsche strategically retrieves it and puts it use in his writing. Nietzsche juxtaposes the distant, serene, indifferent Epicurean gods with the omniscient, (...) intrusive, jealous and needy God of middle-Eastern monotheisms. One might say that they constitute a ‘halfway house’ of sorts between Christianity and Nietzsche’s new Dionysian religion of the earth. But they also figure prominently in his own conflicted desire to intervene in the aleatory course of natural history and legislate the the future of humanity: Nietzsche finds he cannot simply look down with “the mocking and aloof eyes” of an Epicurean god upon the degeneration and diminution of the human being under Christian ascetic regimes of cultivation. Ultimately, Nietzsche fails to achieve the divine temperament of the Epicurean gods (looking down from afar on human ignorance, desire and suffering with a noble pathos of distance). Forthcoming 2022. (shrink)

Explores the role of eliminating fear in Epicurean ethics and physics, focusing on techniques to eliminate the fear of death and the fear of the gods.

The opponents of Epicureanism in antiquity, including Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius, succeeded in establishing a famous cliché: the theoretical and practical disinterest of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. However, this anti-Epicurean literature did not provide considerations of Epicurean political theory or the testimonies about Epicurean lifestyle. Therefore, the purpose of this book is to shed light on the contribution of Epicurean thought to political life in the ancient world. Incorporating the most up-to-date archaeological material, including papyri which have (...) been recovered from Herculaneum and the Greek epigraphy of the Roman Epicureans, this volume will bring to the foreground new testimonies surrounding the public activities of the Epicureans. In this way, the reader will learn that Epicurean political theory is, in fact, a crucial ingredient of its philosophy. As a result, this connection creates an ongoing dialogue with the Greek philosophical tradition, revealing the presence of Plato in the Epicurean political model. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to study the relationship between Epicureanism and pandemic priority-setting and to explore whether Epicurus's philosophy is compliant with the later developed utilitarianism. We find this aim interesting because Epicurus had a different way of valuing death than our modern society does: Epicureanism holds that death—understood as the incident of death—cannot be bad (or good) for those who die (self-regarding effects). However, this account is still consistent with the view that a particular death can be (...) bad for everyone else but those who die, such as family, friends, and society (other-regarding effects). During the pandemic, the focus has been on the number of deaths more than on the suffering and reduced well-being of those infected and the rest of society. However, since the pandemic requires prioritization, it is, on a utilitarian account, important to consider priorities that do the most good overall. In this article, we approach the harm of death from an Epicurean point of view, seeking to flesh out potential implications for pandemic priority-setting, and healthcare in general, using a case study of COVID-19 priority-setting. We also explore whether this would conflict with utilitarianism. We conclude that an Epicurean pandemic priority-setting approach would be different but, surprisingly, not radically different from many of the actual priority-setting decisions we saw under the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Positive review of Sellars' short introduction to Epicureanism considered as a way of life.

This paper offers a partial defence of the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies. Unlike Epicurus and his present-day advocates, this defence relies not on a hedonistic or empiricist conception of value but on the concept of ‘existential’ value. Existential value is agent-relative value for which it is constitutive that it can be truly self-ascribed in the first person and present tense. From this definition, it follows that death (post-mortem non-existence), while perhaps bad in (...) some respects, cannot be an existential harm for the one who dies. This paper argues that existential goods are central to any explanation of why life appears good to us from a self-interested perspective, which means that death is not bad in the very respect in which life is most saliently good (from that perspective). A corresponding error theory shows why this truth is easily overlooked and explains why we tend to think that death is significantly worse than it really is. (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo argumentamos que, el hecho de que hubo ciudadanos prominentes de diferentes ciudades griegas que adhirieron al epicureísmo, se sintieron epicúreos y fueron reconocidos como tales, muestra que slogans como “vive oculto” y “no participes en política”, que sugieren un completo apoliticismo por parte de Epicuro y los epicúreos, tergiversan el verdadero sentido del mantenerse alejado de la política contingente. Nuestro texto muestra la interacción entre Epicuro y los epicúreos y las ciudades griegas, a través del análisis (...) de documentos relacionados con distintas ciudades antiguas. Si lo que argumentamos es razonable, la idea habitual de que el epicureísmo recomienda la apoliticidad, debe ser desechada.: In this paper, we argue that the fact that there were prominent citizens of different Greek cities who adhered to Epicureanism, felt themselves Epicurean, and were recognized as such, shows that slogans such as “live unnoticed” and “do not participate in politics” misrepresent the true meaning of the Epicurean staying away from contingent politics. Our article shows the interaction between Epicurus and the Epicureans and the Greek cities through the analysis of documents related to different ancient cities. If what we argue is sound, the usual idea that Epicureanism recommends apoliticism must be discarded. (shrink)

In Living for Pleasure, philosopher Emily Austin offers a lively, jargon-free tour of Epicurean strategies for diminishing anxiety, achieving satisfaction, and relishing joys.

In this article, I raise an interpretive problem presented by Nietzsche's adulatory attitude toward Epicurus during his middle period. I make the case that Epicurus' ethics is in several major respects identical to that of Schopenhauer. This is problematic for interpreters of Nietzsche insofar as Schopenhauer's ethics provides the main grounds for Nietzsche's emphatic rejection of him as a life-denying ascetic. How is it then, I ask, that the middle Nietzsche felt he was able to embrace Epicurus? I argue that (...) the difference between Nietzsche's appraisals of Epicurus and Schopenhauer can be accounted for in terms of the difference in their respective responses to suffering in general and psychological conflict in particular. (shrink)

This study of the recruitment techniques used by the philosophical schools of Hellenistic Greece. Bernard Frischer focusses on the Epicureans, who are of special interest because their approach was at once extremely passive and extremely successful. Unlike other philosophical schools, which depended primarioly on public lectures and books, the Epicureans avoided contract with the dominant culture and attracted members by erecting statues of Epicurus and their other master in public places. These iconologically rich, "sculpted words" appealed to teh very people (...) most likely to be attracted to Epicureanism, those most likely to accept the philosophy of materialism, sensationalism, and the repression of feeling, and those who sought a way of life sperate from teh dominant culture. This book is an innovative application of an inter-disciplinary humanistic an social-scientific approach to ancient Greek philosophy and art. It will appeal to those interested in the history of these subjects and those interested in the sociology of knowledge and communication. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1982. (shrink)

Does our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. (...) I provide two arguments for this claim on the basis of postmortem harms and benefits as well as the lasting significance of death. I suggest two ways of underwriting posthumous wellbeing. (shrink)

Commentators usually understand the Epicureans to take friends and friendship to be worthwhile because they help us to eliminate and/or manage our bodily and/or mental pains and thus come closer to achieving tranquility. However, this understanding leaves unexplained why friends and friendship might be worthwhile to an advanced Epicurean with few or no pains to manage or eliminate. In this paper, I remedy this deficiency by offering three explanations for why friends and friendship could and maybe would remain worthwhile even (...) to the Epicurean who achieves tranquility. Along the way, I explore some problems with each explanation and consider ways to overcome them. Notwithstanding these problems, I conclude that friends and friendship could and perhaps would be worthwhile even to the Epicurean with few or no pains. (shrink)

This article deals with the notion of the godlike sage in Epicurus and with how the Epicurean assimilation to a mortal god on earth refers in thought and wording to the Euagoras of Isocrates. To provide the necessary framework for the analysis, the paper initially reviews the phenomenon of godlike Epicureans, Epicurus’ use of rhetoric and of other authors’ writings before presenting the striking parallels between texts of the founder of the Garden and Isocrates. Having established a genuine όμοίωσις θεῷ (...) in Isocrates’ thought, the paper will end with a short discussion of the relationship of the Euagoras to the famous Platonic notion and especially to the dialogue Theaetetus. (shrink)

Facing death has always been regarded as a main philosophical issue in human`s life. Major philosophical traditions have given it abundant attention and tried to analyze it as the most serious concern of humans. One of the main ancient philosophical traditions, Epicurean relying on human wisdom tries to address this issue. Death, since the Stone Age, has brought alterations to the context of societies so that fear of death is currently seriously investigated by philosophers and psychologists, specially the change in (...) the concept of death to an evil/despicable event. It was once presumed as a journey with this world or the other world nature in the pre-modern world, while now a social challenge with numerous effects. The current study aims to illustrate how it would be possible to re-interpret Epicurean`s doctrine in the modern world. This re-reading has its foundations on the hypothesis that argument therapy enables humans to face death in the modern world. (shrink)

This paper is a commentary on Epicurus’ Kuria Doxa 33, according to which “justice is not anything in itself [τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτό].” It explores what it means for something to exist ‘in itself’ in Hellenistic philosophy, speculating on the sources of Epicurean technical vocabulary and suggesting an ontological reading of KD 33.

This paper examines the classification of desires that the Epicureans offer in their writings. It surveys the extant textual evidence for the classification and discusses the relationship between natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires. It argues that while the practical significance of the Epicurean classification is clear, which desires fall into which class is not. The paper suggests the reason for this may be that the Epicureans acknowledge some variability in their concept of human nature, (...) arguing for a functional reading of the Epicurean classification of desires. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of (...) the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right. (shrink)

There is little agreement about Marx's aims, or even his basic claims, in his Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy and Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Marx has been read as an idealist, or as a materialist; as praising Epicurus, or as criticizing him. Some have read Marx as using ancient philosophers as proxies in a contemporary debate, without demonstrating how he does so in detail. I show that Marx's dialectical reading of Epicurus's atomism aims at transcending the (...) dichotomy between idealism and materialism; that on Marx's reading Epicurus deserves praise for thinking through atomism to its “highest” conclusion, but criticism for not embracing this conclusion; and that Marx's intervention in contemporary debates takes the form of revealing a dialectical relationship between “liberal” and “positive” philosophers. I conclude that the importance of these texts is to be located in their original stance on the problematic of the relation of thought to reality, common to what Marx finds in ancient philosophy and in his contemporary environment. (shrink)

This book deals with some Peripatetic philosophers of the Hellenistic age who were direct and indirect pupils of Aristotle. The main focus of the book is Aristotle's school in the Hellenistic period, a subject not particularly explored by the scholars. Three main issues are addressed in the chapters of the book: the problem of knowledge, the question of time, and the doctrine of the soul. More specifically the topics addressed are: the problem of sense-perception and the method of multiple explanations (...) in the field of meteorology in Aristotle, Theophrastus and Epicurus, the epistemology of Strato, the notion of time in Eudemus and Strato, the conception of sleep in Clearchus, the doctrine of divination in Cratippus. Finally, the Appendix examines the probable influence of the physics of Strato on the medicine of Asclepiades of Bithynia. These themes are investigated by comparing the positions of the Peripatetics with Aristotle's philosophy, but above all by contextualising the doctrines of the Peripatetics within the broader framework of Hellenistic philosophies. (shrink)

Epicurus posited that the best life involves the greatest pleasures. He also argued that it involves attaining tranquillity. Many commentators have expressed scepticism that these two claims are compatible. For, they argue, Epicurus’ tranquil life is so austere that it is hard to see how it could be maximally pleasurable. Here, I offer an Epicurean account of the pleasures of tranquillity. I also consider different ways of valuing lives from a hedonistic point of view. Benthamite hedonists value lives by the (...) sum of pleasures minus the sum of pains, weighted by intensity and duration. Meanwhile, Binmore proposes that Epicurus valued lives by their worst episode. In contrast, I offer an Epicurean argument for why the best life is one in which a person attains tranquillity and tastes its pleasures until death. (shrink)

Epicurus used an empirical and sensualistic approach to knowledge, creating a consistent, naturalistic, pragmatic and consequentialistic philosophy. The scientific observations of the last centuries have confirmed the basic principles of Epicurean physics, as well the psychotherapeutic approach of Epicurean ethics, which fits human nature. We know from the work “On Frank Criticism” of Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara, that the teaching methodology of Epicureans included psychoeducational counseling through therapeutic criticism based on friendly freedom of speech and aiming at τῆς ψυχῆς (...) θεραπείαν (psychotherapy) and at knowledge of maintaining mental health and well-being. The Epicureans called εὐστάθεια (eustatheia, “stability”) the psychosomatic balance (τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ψυχῆς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα), which today we call homeostasis (ὁμοιόστασις), and considered it the basis of true happiness. They recognized empirically the stress that disturbed psychosomatic homeostasis as an agitation of the psyche or a painful feeling of the body and used a number of mental and affective techniques (including the tetrapharmakos) to manage stress at its onset, so that it does not evolve into the particularly troublesome conditions of anxiety and/or depression, which may become chronic psychosomatic disorders with significant social consequences. The article discusses the relation of the main ethical teachings of Epicurus with the biological basis of human brain functions and with the management of stress by cognitive and behavioral psychotherapy. (shrink)

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created and implemented from November 2020 to February 2021 a monthly educational pilot program of philosophical management of stress based on Science, Humanism and Epicurean Pragmatism, which was offered to employees of 26 municipalities in the Prefecture of Attica, Greece. The program named “Philosophical Distress Management Operation System” (Philo.Di.M.O.S.) is novel and unique in its kind, as it combines a certain Greek philosophical tradition (Epicurean) that concurs with modern scientific knowledge. The (...) program was designed to be implemented in a period of crisis; therefore, it used a fast-paced, easy to learn and practice philosophical approach to stress management, based on cognitive psychotherapy. The philosophical approach to stress management has the advantage that it can be offered to most people, regardless of age and educational level. The pilot program was effective in achieving its objectives, shown by statistical comparisons of the trainees’ responses to anonymous questionnaires before and after the month-long training. The successful Philo.Di.M.O.S. program, thus, based on a solid scientific and philosophical basis, offers a paradigm of stress management during crises and could be useful in Greece and internationally. (shrink)

This article aims to examine the notion of pleasure as a telos of the happy life in Epicurus. Understood as the first good and inherent to the human being, pleasure is presented as the beginning and the ultimate end of a happy life. Indeed, it should be noted that it is not the pleasures of the common people that Epicurus considers as the telos of a happy life, but the pleasure that is the absence of suffering in body and soul, (...) which is named by Epicurus of katastematic pleasure or static/at rest pleasure. In this sense, two concerns guide the present work: i) that of presenting pleasure as a telos of a happy life; ii) to expose the strict meaning that the concept of pleasure assumes in Epicurean philosophy, paying attention to the distinction between pleasure in movement and pleasure at rest. The present study is based mainly on passages from the epistle to Meneceus, in some Main Maxims and Vatican Sentences, texts in which Epicurus exposes the foundations of his hedonism, as well as in the testimonies of later disciples, such as Tito Lucrécio Caro, Diogenes Laertius and Diogenes de Enoanda. (shrink)

에피쿠로스는 쾌락을 위해 욕망을 줄이는 삶의 방식을 제시한 쾌락주의자 혹은 윤리학자라는 지위에 여전히 머물러있다. 하지만 니체 철학과 에피쿠로스 철학이 주요한 지점에서 특징을 공유하고 있으며 이를 토대로 에피쿠로스 철학이 새로운 의미를 가질 수 있음을 충분히 밝혀낼 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 에피쿠로스 철학이 형이상학적 관점에서 초월 세계를 지향하는 삶과 경험 세계에서의 삶의 가치 전도를 시도했다는 점에서 니체 철학과 연관성이 있음을 드러내고자 한다. 이 작업은 먼저 니체가 에피쿠로스에 대해 긍정적으로 혹은 부정적으로 평가한 구절들을 검토한 뒤에, 에피쿠로스의 윤리학과 자연학, 특히 원자론에서 발견할 수 (...) 있는 에피쿠로스의 철학적 태도를 살펴보는 과정으로 이루어질 것이다. 이를 통해 니체 철학과 에피쿠로스 철학에서 함께 나타나는 특징이 무엇인지 확인하고, 그리고 에피쿠로스 철학이 니체의 관점에서 어떤 형이상학적 의미를 갖게 되는지를 밝혀낼 것이다. (shrink)

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility brings together nine substantial essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in antiquity by Susanne Bobzien. The essays present the main ancient theories on these subjects, ranging historically from Aristotle followed by the Epicureans, the early Stoics, several later Stoics, and up to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE. -/- The author discusses questions about rational and autonomous human agency and their compatibility with a large range of important philosophical issues, including their compatibility (...) with divine predetermination and other theological questions; with atomism and continuum theory and with the physical sciences more generally; with the determination of character and its development from childhood through nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with theories of necessity, possibility and contingency; with external or internal preceding causes and impediments; and with folk theories of fatalism. Room is also given to the questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, and to blame and praise. -/- Historically unified, philosophically profound, and methodologically rigorous, Bobzien’s essays show that in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy these topics were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or to a free will, and that the latter two notions were fully developed only later. The volume will be of interest both to philosophers and to historians of philosophy, with more than half of the essays accessible to advanced undergraduates. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to present the analogy between the thoughts of Epicurus de Samos and Friedrich Nietzsche regarding the notion of “freedom”. In Epicurus, the idea of “freedom” (eleuthería) is linked to the idea of “self-assertion” (autárkeia), since “freedom” for Epicurus means the “exercise of wisdom” through the autonomy of the “sage” (sophós, prhóneo) when it is free to act according to thought. In a similar way, in Nietzsche the idea of freedom (Freiheit) is linked to the (...) idea of “affirming life” (Lebensbejahung) – and “of oneself” – in acting, when the “superman” (Übermensch) is above of good and evil and being able to create and determine their own values. The discussion about freedom, according to the thought of Epicurus and Nietzsche, makes it possible to identify the analogy between them regarding the understanding of the importance of freedom in philosophical action, in addition to promoting a reflection on thinking and acting in the world. (shrink)

There seems to be universal agreement among Epicurean scholars that friendship characterized by other-concern is conceptually incompatible with Epicureanism understood as a directly egoistic theory. I reject this view. I argue that once we properly understand the nature of friendship and the Epicurean conception of our final end, we are in a position to demonstrate friendship’s compatibility with, and centrality within, Epicureanism’s direct egoism.

This book explores a distinctive feature of ancient philosophy: the close relation between ancient ethics and the study of the natural world. Human beings are in some sense part of the natural world, and they live their lives within a larger cosmos, but their actions are governed by norms whose relation to the natural world is up for debate. The essays in this volume, written by leading specialists in ancient philosophy, discuss how these facts about our relation to the world (...) bear both upon ancient accounts of human goodness and also upon ancient accounts of the natural world itself. The volume includes discussion not only of Plato and Aristotle, but also of earlier and later thinkers, with an essay on the Presocratics and two essays that discuss later Epicurean, Stoic, and Neoplatonist philosophers. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

Across several texts, Epicurus memorably and accessibly summarizes his doctrines. This study systematically analyzes Epicurus’ acts of summary, thereby closing a long-standing scholarly lacuna. To this end, a review of existing research is followed by an analysis of the terminology used in antiquity to designate philosophical and scientific compendia. The Epicurean sources are then surveyed chronologically. In two further chapters, Epicurean compendia are discussed in the broader context of ancient philosophical summaries. Their patterns of genre are illuminated not only on (...) the basis of Epicurus’ own remarks but through related texts, in which authors explain the principles undergirding their own ‘poetics of abridgement’. The concluding chapter advances an updated summary of Epicurus’ fragmentary "On Nature", interpreting his compendia not merely as sources for reconstructing the main treatise, but as texts with literary value in their own right. This monograph therefore provides the first complete presentation of Epicurean philosophical compendia, arguing for an interpretation of the rhetoric of philosophical texts while also being informed by metaliterary details afforded by other ancient sources. (shrink)

This paper explores how philosophy might be worthwhile on hedonic grounds for the Epicurean Sage who has achieved tranquility, reached the limit of pleasure, and thus for whom there is no further pleasure to pursue. I argue that philosophy might be worthwhile to the Epicurean Sage because it helps her maintain tranquility by preventing a painful boredom that could result without it.

Scholars have paid little attention to the classifications among goods that Epicureans posit. This paper remedies that deficiency. I argue for three claims. First, if we take instrumental goods to be those that are a means or causally lead to the intrinsic good and we take constitutive goods to be those that are part of or amount to the intrinsic good, then the Epicureans probably took reverence for a wise man and wisdom to be instrumental goods but self-sufficiency and phronesis (...) to be constitutive goods. Second, Epicurean personal goods are those that produce eudaimonia but are firmly up to us to achieve rather than owing to chance. Third, Epicurean immortal goods are those that bring about divinely resilient tranquility for those who cultivate them. I then show how positing these classifications enables the Epicureans to claim that godlike happiness is achievable through our own efforts no matter the external circumstances. (shrink)

"The book defends the thesis that the concept of self-cultivation philosophy is an informative interpretive framework for comprehending and reflecting on several philosophical outlooks in India, the Greco-Roman world and China. On the basis of an understanding of human nature and the place of human beings in the world, self-cultivation philosophies maintain that our lives can and should be substantially transformed from what is judged to be a problematic, untutored condition of human beings, our existential starting-point, into what is put (...) forward as an ideal state of being. We are to do this by undertaking a set of therapeutic or spiritual exercises guided by some philosophical analysis. The self-cultivation philosophies in India are expressed in: the Bhagavad Gītā; the Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Patañjali; and teaching of the Buddha and his followers Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva. The philosophies originating in Greece, with subsequent development in the Roman period, are the most prominent Hellenistic approaches: the Epicureanism of Epicurus, Lucretius and Philodemus; the Stoicism of Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca; and Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus. The self-cultivation philosophies from China are the early Confucian outlooks of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi; the classical Daoist perspectives of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi; and the Chan tradition of Bodhidharma, Huineng and Linji"--. (shrink)

This article considers the significance of the Blessed Isles in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. They are the isolated locale to which Zarathustra and his fellow creators retreat in the Second Part of the book. I trace Zarathustra’s Blessed Isles back to the ancient Greek paradisiacal afterlife of the makarōn nēsoi and frame them against Nietzsche’s Platonic conception of philosophers as “commanders and legislators,” but I argue that they represent something more like a modern Epicurean Garden. Ultimately, I suggest that Zarathustra’s (...) Epicurean impulse toward withdrawal (whether into a sequestered friendship community or mountain solitude) undermines his Platonic attempts at great politics. (shrink)

This is the first English translation of a compelling and highly original reading of Epicurus by Jean-Marie Guyau. This book has long been recognized as one of the best and most concerted attempts to explore one of the most important, yet controversial ancient philosophers whose thought, Guyau claims, remains vital to modern and contemporary culture. Throughout the text we are introduced to the origins of the philosophy of pleasure in Ancient Greece, with Guyau clearly demonstrating how this idea persists through (...) the history of philosophy and how it is an essential trait in the Western tradition. With an introduction by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Federico Testa, which contextualizes the work of Guyau within the canon of French thought, and notes on both further reading and on Epicurean scholarship more generally, this translation also acts as a critical introduction to the philosophy of Guyau and Epicurus. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Epicurus in his middle period of 1878–1882 is one of an inspiring figure and kindred spirit, which is then generally considered by commentators to change to a more ambivalent one in his later writings, particularly those from 1886 to 1888. In this article, I argue that this change in Nietzsche’s opinion of Epicurus can be explained by his gradual realization that Epicurus advocates a particular form of Greek decadence, that neither Nietzsche nor the secondary literature on him (...) ever actually formally name. As a consequence of this promotion of a life-inhibiting value that potentially undermines the flourishing of humanity, Nietzsche thinks Epicurus should be construed not just as a “decadent” but, in fact, a “typical” one, which I will argue is a distinct opprobrium that the secondary literature to date often cites, but does not fully expound. (shrink)

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural but non-necessary ones, and (...) the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

The Epicureans are hedonists who believe that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Since pleasure is the only intrinsic good, other things are only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure. Tranquility is the final Epicurean telos, i.e., all of our actions should aim for freedom from bodily and mental pain. According to the Epicureans, tranquility is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures so that there is no pleasure beyond tranquility. Once we free ourselves from all pain, there are no (...) further pleasures to pursue. This poses the following problem. Since hedonism is true and something is only worthwhile for the sake of pleasure, but there are no further pleasures for those who have achieved tranquility to pursue, then it seems that nothing is worthwhile to the tranquil. This poses a problem for Epicureans because they should reject this consequence and they seem to want to do so, but they cannot without contradicting themselves about the nature and limit of pleasure. I call this the Nothing is Worthwhile to the Tranquil Problem. This paper develops a strategy that Epicureans can adopt to solve NWP. I develop this strategy in three stages. First, I explain NWP: Epicurean claims about the limit and nature of pleasure suggest that nothing can be worthwhile to the tranquil. Second, I show that this problem is analogous to the Problem of Creation, which claims that an impassible God has no reasons to create. Third, I argue that a prominent solution to PoC can also solve NWP. That solution goes as follows. Some activities are worthwhile to the tranquil because these activities express tranquility, just as creating is worthwhile to God because it expresses God’s perfections. In the final section, I raise three objections to this solution. None of them is strong enough to defeat the solution for which I argue, and so I conclude that it merits consideration as a solution to NWP. (shrink)

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence on ἐπιβολαί in later (...) authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

If death is a harm then it is a harm that cannot be experienced. The proponent of death’s harm must therefore provide an answer to Epicurus, when he says that ‘death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not’. In this paper I respond to the two main ways philosophers have attempted to answer Epicurus, regarding the subject of death’s harm: either directly or via analogy. The direct (...) way argues that there is a truth-maker (or difference-maker) for death’s harm, namely in virtue of the intrinsic value the subject’s life would have had if they had not died. The analogy argues that there are cases analogous to death, where the subject is harmed although they experience no pain as a result. I argue that both accounts beg the question against the Epicurean: the first by presupposing that one can be harmed while experiencing no displeasure as a result and the second by conflating a de re with a de dicto reading of death’s harm. Thus, I argue, until better arguments are provided, one is best to agree with Epicurus and those who follow him that death is not a harm. (shrink)