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  1. added 2020-02-16
    Making Conditional Speech Acts in the Material Way.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about these sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-22
    If P, Then P!Matthew Mandelkern - manuscript
    The Identity principle says that conditionals with the form 'If p, then p' are logical truths. Identity is overwhelmingly plausible, and has rarely been explicitly challenged. But a wide range of conditionals nonetheless invalidate it. I explain the problem, and argue that the culprit is the principle known as Import-Export, which we must thus reject. I then explore how we can reject Import-Export in a way that still makes sense of the intuitions that support it, arguing that the differences between (...)
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  3. added 2019-06-07
    For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW]Michael Morreau - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):540-546.
  4. added 2019-06-06
    Joseph Mendola, Review of For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning by Isaac Levi. [REVIEW]Joseph Mendola - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):725-726.
  5. added 2019-06-06
    In Defense of the Ramsey Test.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):522.
  6. added 2019-06-05
    Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, Glenn Pearce.Donald Nute - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):518-520.
  7. added 2018-11-04
    Credence for Epistemic Discourse.Paolo Santorio - manuscript
    Many recent theories of epistemic discourse exploit an informational notion of consequence, i.e. a notion that defines entailment as preservation of support by an information state. This paper investigates how informational consequence fits with probabilistic reasoning. I raise two problems. First, all informational inferences that are not also classical inferences are, intuitively, probabilistically invalid. Second, all these inferences can be exploited, in a systematic way, to generate triviality results. The informational theorist is left with two options, both of them radical: (...)
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  8. added 2018-09-18
    Indicative Conditionals.Anthony Gillies - 2012 - In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language.
    This is a handbook article about indicative conditionals.
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  9. added 2018-08-11
    McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test.John Cantwell, Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):154-168.
    Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not-p, then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue (...)
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  10. added 2018-07-22
    Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):424-436.
    Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Ramsey’s Test, Adams’ Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals.Richard Dietz & Igor Douven - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    Ramsey + Moore = God.David J. Chalmers & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):170-172.
    Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then q’ (...)
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  13. added 2017-09-03
    Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas Icard - 2017 - Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2017), Liverpool, UK, 24-26 July 2017.
    Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] semantic consequence relation for (...)
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  14. added 2017-02-15
    The Foundation of Human Evaluation in Democracies From Ramsey to Damasio.Werner Leinfellner - 2006 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 12:139-153.
  15. added 2017-02-15
    Peter Gärdenfors.G. James Jason - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2).
  16. added 2017-01-31
    Preservation and Postulation: Lessons From the New Debate on the Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):609–626.
    Richard Bradley has initiated a new debate, with Brian Hill and Jake Chandler as further participants, about the implications of a number of so-called triviality results surrounding the Ramsey test for conditionals. I comment on this debate and argue that ‘Inclusion’ and ‘Preservation’, which were originally introduced as postulates for the rational revision of factual beliefs, have little to recommend them in the first place when extended to languages containing conditionals. I question the philosophical method of postulation that was applied (...)
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  17. added 2017-01-27
    Ramsey’s “Note on Time”.Maria Galavotti - 2006 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 12:155-165.
  18. added 2017-01-27
    The Ramsey Test Revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2‐3):131-182.
  19. added 2017-01-26
    Ramsey's Theory of Belief and Truth.Brian Loar - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 49--69.
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  20. added 2017-01-19
    Two Notions of Epistemic Validity.Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
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  21. added 2017-01-18
    The Test of Belief.J. P. Gordy - 1894 - Philosophical Review 3 (3):257-277.
  22. added 2017-01-16
    An Evaluation of the Postulates Underlying the Babcock Deterioration Test.G. K. Yacorzynski - 1941 - Psychological Review 48 (3):261-267.
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  23. added 2017-01-15
    For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Isaac Levi - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  24. added 2017-01-14
    Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test.John N. Williams - unknown
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Indicative Conditionals:Factual or Epistemic?John Cantwell - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):157-194.
    It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing (...)
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  26. added 2016-12-08
    Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Rohit Parikh - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    Conditionals and Monotonic Belief Revisions: The Success Postulate.Horacio L. Arlo Costa - 1990 - Studia Logica 49 (4):557-566.
    One of the main applications of the logic of theory change is to the epistemic analysis of conditionals via the so-called Ramsey test. In the first part of the present note this test is studied in the “limiting case” where the theory being revised is inconsistent, and it is shown that this case manifests an intrinsic incompatibility between the Ramsey test and the AGM postulate of “success”. The paper then analyses the use of the postulate of success, and a weakening (...)
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  28. added 2016-03-18
    Semantika indikativnih kondicionala: Kontraprimer za Potkovicu.Duško Prelević - 2012 - Theoria: Beograd 55 (2):53–62.
    U radu se navodi kontraprimer za Potkovicu (teoriju po kojoj indikativni kondicionali imaju iste istinosne uslove kao i materijalna implikacija), koji je modifikovana verzija “kondicionala sa igrališta” koje je konstruisao Džejson Deker. Pokazuje se zašto Dekerov primer nije dobar ako se prikaže u izvornoj formi, a zatim se, uz pomoć misaonog eksperimenta sa inverznim spektrom, nudi poboljšana verzija Dekerovog primera. Na kraju rada se ukazuje da modifikovani primer “kondicionala sa igrališta” ne predstavlja problem za epistemičku verziju dvodimenzionalne semantike (E2-D), i (...)
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  29. added 2016-03-11
    Against the Ramsey Test.A. Morton - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):294-299.
    I argue against the Ramsey test connecting indicative conditionals with conditional probability, by means of examples in which conditional probability is high but the conditional is intuitively implausible. At the end of the paper, I connect these issues to patterns of belief revision.
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  30. added 2016-03-03
    On Indicative And Subjunctive Conditionals.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    At the center of the literature on conditionals lies the division between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, and Ernest Adams’ famous minimal pair: If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did. If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. While a lot of attention is paid to figuring out what these different kinds of conditionals mean, significantly less attention has been paid to the question of why their grammatical differences give rise to their semantic differences. In this paper, I articulate (...)
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  31. added 2015-09-02
    A Note on Gibbard’s Proof.Justin Khoo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):153-164.
    A proof by Allan Gibbard (Ifs: Conditionals, beliefs, decision, chance, time. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981) seems to demonstrate that if indicative conditionals have truth conditions, they cannot be stronger than material implication. Angelika Kratzer's theory that conditionals do not denote two-place operators purports to escape this result [see Kratzer (Chic Linguist Soc 22(2):1–15, 1986, 2012)]. In this note, I raise some trouble for Kratzer’s proposed method of escape and then show that her semantics avoids this consequence of Gibbard’s proof by denying (...)
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  32. added 2015-06-17
    Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results.Jake Chandler - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):579-602.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of Preservation for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of Commutativity, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of modus ponens —are problematic (...)
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  33. added 2015-04-05
    A Critical Investigation of Frank Ramsey's Theory of Value and Belief.John Michael Vickers - 1962 - Dissertation, Stanford University
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  34. added 2015-03-24
    Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show how relevant it is to (...)
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  35. added 2015-03-24
    Two Notions of Epistemic Validity-Epistemic Models for Ramsey's Conditionals.Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):217-262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in . 'If A, then B' must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. In this article we propose a formulation of , which unlike some of its predecessors, is compatible with our best theory of belief revision, the so-called AGM theory , chapters 1-5 for a survey). The new test, which, (...)
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  36. added 2015-03-24
    A State of Belief K If and Only If the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A Also Requires Accepting C. The Preservation Criterion Says That If a Prop-Osition B is Accepted in a Given State of Belief K and A is Consistent with the Beliefs in K, Then B is Still Accepted in the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A. It is Proved That, on Pain of Triviality, the Ramsey Test And.No Problem far Actualism - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (235).
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  37. added 2015-03-23
    Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning Reviewed By.William Seager - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (3):181-183.
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  38. added 2015-03-23
    Belief Revision, Non-Monotonic Reasoning, and the Ramsey Test.H. E. Kyburg Jr - 1990 - In Kyburg Henry E., Loui Ronald P. & Carlson Greg N. (eds.), Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 223.
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  39. added 2015-03-23
    Ramsey on Belief.John Skorupski - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 74.
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  40. added 2015-03-22
    In Defence of Ramsey's Test.D. H. Mellor - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):356-361.
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  41. added 2015-03-22
    Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test.Scott Sturgeon - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:215-232.
    Consider the frame S believes that—. Fill it with a conditional, say If you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke. what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances of S believes ? In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple. Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed (...)
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  42. added 2014-08-08
    Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context.Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...)
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  43. added 2014-04-03
    Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):195-237.
    Epistemic conditionals have often been thought to satisfy the Ramsey test : If A, then B is acceptable in a belief state G if and only if B should be accepted upon revising G with A. But as Peter Gärdenfors has shown, RT conflicts with the intuitively plausible condition of Preservation on belief revision. We investigate what happens if RT is retained while Preservation is weakened, or vice versa. We also generalize Gärdenfors' approach by treating belief revision as a relation (...)
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  44. added 2014-04-02
    Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Stephen Read & Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):47 - 86.
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  45. added 2014-03-31
    Undercutting and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals.André Fuhrmann & Isaac Levi - 1994 - Synthese 101 (2):157-169.
    There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out.
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  46. added 2014-03-27
    Conditional Propositions and Conditional Assertions.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
  47. added 2014-03-27
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.
  48. added 2014-03-21
    What If ? Questions About Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.
    Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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  49. added 2014-03-21
    The Probability of Conditionals: The Psychological Evidence.David E. Over & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.
    The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-21
    Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.Horacio Arló-Costa - 1999 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1-3):3-28.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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