Epistemic Fallibilism

Edited by Silvia De Toffoli (University School of Advanced Studies IUSS Pavia)
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  1. A valid conjunction principle for fallible knowledge.Jude Arnout Durieux - manuscript
    The multi premise closure principle states that the logical conjunction of known facts yields again a known fact. For absolute knowledge this principle holds. We show that for fallible knowledge, assuming knowing requires a minimum level of statistical certainty (whatever else it requires), and that there is a sufficient number of known facts above a given level of uncertainty, it does not hold, for simple statistical reasons. We present a modified version, the dependent conjunctive closure principle, that does hold.
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  2. Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscript
    In this paper it will be attempted to dissolve the lottery problem based on fallibilism, probabilism and the introduction of a so far widely neglected second context of knowledge. First, it will be argued that the lottery problem is actually an exemplification of the much wider Humean "future knowledge problem" (ch. 1). Two types of inferences and arguments will be examined, compared and evaluated in respect to their ability to fittingly describe the thought processes behind lottery/future knowledge propositions (ch. 2). (...)
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  3. Induction without fallibility, deduction without certainty.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    There is no strict alignment between induction and fallibility, nor between deduction and certainty. Fallibility in deductive inferences, such as failed mathematical theorems, demonstrates that deduction does not guarantee certainty. Similarly, inductive reasoning, typically seen as weaker and more prone to uncertainty, is not inherently tied to fallibility. In fact, inductive generalizations can sometimes lead to certainty, especially in mathematical contexts. By decoupling induction from fallibility and deduction from certainty, we preserve the distinct nature of each form of reasoning, allowing (...)
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  4. Seeing inferences through a metaphysical lens.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that inductive inferences can be reinterpreted as deductive through a metaphysical lens of modal necessity. Instead of viewing deduction as a limit case of induction where the conclusion is certain rather than probable, we can rethinking inductive inferences as a particular type of deductive inferences where the conclusion is necessitated by premises in specific modal ranges.
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  5. Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.
    This book takes purism about knowledge as the default position and defends it from the challenges of pragmatic encroachment. The book is divided into two parts, a negative and a positive one. The negative part critically examines existing purist strategies in response to pragmatic encroachment. The positive part provides a new theory of how practical factors can systematically influence our confidence and explores some implications of such influence.
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  6. Relevant Alternatives and Missed Clues: Redux.Peter Hawke - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy 121 (5):245-276.
    I construe Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) as an abstract combination of anti-skepticism and epistemic modesty, then re-evaluate the challenge posed to it by the missed clue counterexamples of Schaffer. The import of this challenge has been underestimated, as Schaffer’s specific argument invites distracting objections. I offer a novel formalization of RAT, accommodating a suitably wide class of concrete theories of knowledge. Then, I introduce ‘abstract missed clue cases’ and prove that every RA theory, as formalized, admits such a case. This (...)
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  7. Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check.Michele Palmira - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):799-824.
    The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher‐order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double‐checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher‐order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which (...)
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  8. Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):243-272.
    The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificitya respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass (...)
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  9. Corroboration.Georgi Gardiner - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):131-148.
    Corroborating evidence supports a proposition that is already supported by other initial evidence. It bolsters or confirms the original body of evidence. Corroboration has striking psychological and epistemic force: It potently affects how people do and should assess the target proposition. This essay investigates the distinctive powers of corroborating evidence. Corroboration does not simply increase the quantifiable probability of the adjudicated claim. Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that corroboration winnows remaining uneliminated error possibilities. This illuminates the independence, (...)
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  10. Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.
    Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with (...)
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  11. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
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  12. Fallibilism and Consequence.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (4):214-226.
    Alex Worsnip argues in favor of what he describes as a particularly robust version of fallibilism: subjects can sometimes know things that are, for them, possibly false (in the epistemic sense of 'possible'). My aim in this paper is to show that Worsnip’s argument is inconclusive for a surprising reason: the existence of possibly false knowledge turns on how we ought to model entailment or consequence relations among sentences in natural language. Since it is an open question how we ought (...)
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  13. Knowing Fallibly and it's Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Implications: Fallibilism Revisited.Chrysogonus M. Okwenna - 2021 - Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities 7 (3):73-90.
    This paper revisits the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism and discusses its overarching consequences to the whole structure of human knowledge and its extended applications. Fallibilism claims that we can never have absolute certainty to justify our knowledge claims. That means, knowledge needs not have an absolute, definitive warrants. Consequently, using the discursive method of enquiry, the paper argues that, if fallibilism is true, then, the concept of knowledge is redefined. Hence, knowledge would no longer mean the preclusion of error but (...)
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  14. Peirce's Fallibilism: A Thematic Analysis and the Revisitation of the Origins of Fallibilism.Chrysogonus M. Okwenna - 2021 - Amamihe: Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (4):18-35.
    This paper thematically analyzes Charles Sanders Peirce’s doctrine of fallibilism. Peirce’s fallibilism is best construed as an epistemic thesis that tries to correct the excesses of and mediate between Cartesian dogmatism and skepticism. Hence, as a theory of epistemic justification, it is neither overly confident like foundationalism nor overarchingly cynic like skepticism. It grants the possibility for knowledge, yet, this knowledge is not foregrounded on absolute warrants. The paper therefore argues that, it is at this juncture that the theory runs (...)
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  15. Skeptical Invariantism, Considered.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 80-101.
    In this paper I consider the prospects for a skeptical version of infallibilism. For the reasons given above, I think skeptical invariantism has a lot going for it. However, a satisfactory theory of knowledge must account for all of our desiderata, including that our ordinary knowledge attributions are appropriate. This last part will not be easy for the infallibilist invariantist. Indeed, I will argue that it is much more difficult than those sympathetic to skepticism have acknowledged, as there are serious (...)
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  16. (1 other version)Fallibilism versus Relativism in the Philosophy of Science.David J. Stump - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52:1-13.
    In response to a recent argument by David Bloor, I argue that denying absolutes does not necessarily lead to relativism, that one can be a fallibilist without being a relativist. At issue are the empirical natural sciences and what might be called “framework relativism”, that is, the idea that there is always a conceptual scheme or set of practices in use, and all observations are theory-laden relative to the framework. My strategy is to look at the elements that define a (...)
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  17. Mill's Social Epistemic Rationale for the Freedom to Dispute Scientific Knowledge: Why We Must Put Up with Flat-Earthers.Ava Thomas Wright - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (14).
    Why must we respect others’ rights to dispute scientific knowledge such as that the Earth is round, or that humans evolved, or that anthropogenic greenhouse gases are warming the Earth? In this paper, I argue that in On Liberty Mill defends the freedom to dispute scientific knowledge by appeal to a novel social epistemic rationale for free speech that has been unduly neglected by Mill scholars. Mill distinguishes two kinds of epistemic warrant for scientific knowledge: 1) the positive, direct evidentiary (...)
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  18. Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism.Danny Frederick - 2020 - Yeovil, UK.: Critias Publishing.
    This is a collection of nineteen essays in the tradition of critical rationalism (as advocated by Karl Popper). All but one of the essays is previously unpublished and the one previously published paper has undergone significant revisions. The first four essays tackle topics in the philosophy of science, the first being an exposition of Popper's views, the others discussing falsifiability, truth, the aim of science, and ceteris-paribus law-statements. Five essays follow concerned with Reason, reasoning and reasons, in which faulty conceptions (...)
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  19. Falsifiability and the Duhem Problem.Danny Frederick - 2020 - In Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism. Yeovil, UK.: Critias Publishing. pp. 15-19.
    It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicable to scientific theories. I explain why the claim is false.
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  20. Why Purists Should Be Infallibilists.Michael Hannon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):689-704.
    Two of the most orthodox ideas in epistemology are fallibilism and purism. According to the fallibilist, one can know that a particular claim is true even though one’s justification for that claim is less than fully conclusive. According to the purist, knowledge does not depend on practical factors. Fallibilism and purism are widely assumed to be compatible; in fact, the combination of these views has been called the ‘ho-hum,’ obvious, traditional view of knowledge. But I will argue that fallibilism and (...)
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  21. The Limitations of the Open Mind. [REVIEW]Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):887-889.
    The Limitations of the Open Mind. By Fantl Jeremy.
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  22. The Toxin and the Dogmatist.Bob Beddor - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):727-740.
    According to the dogmatist, knowing p makes it rational to disregard future evidence against p. The standard response to the dogmatist holds that knowledge is defeasible: acquiring evidence against something you know undermines your knowledge. However, this response leaves a residual puzzle, according to which knowledge makes it rational to intend to disregard future counterevidence. I argue that we can resolve this residual puzzle by turning to an unlikely source: Kavka’s toxin puzzle. One lesson of the toxin puzzle is that (...)
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  23. Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary.Rodrigo Borges - 2019 - In Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. Springer Verlag.
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  24. Wenn ich mich nicht irre. Ein Versuch über die menschliche Fehlbarkeit.Geert Keil - 2019 - Stuttgart: Reclam.
    Jeder Mensch irrt – ausgenommen der Papst, wenn er Glaubenssätze verkündet. So jedenfalls befand einst das erste Vatikanische Konzil. Nun waren die Kardinäle, so bemerkt Keil frech, selbst keineswegs Träger der päpstlichen Unfehlbarkeit. »Woher wussten sie dann, dass der Papst unfehlbar ist?« Niemand weiß vorher, wann und wo er sich irren wird. Viele Philosophen haben daraus geschlossen, dass Menschen nichts wissen, sondern immer nur vermuten. Das ist aber ein Irrtum, den dieser kluge und kurzweilige Essay aufklärt.
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  25. Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1395-1402.
    Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by BrownJessica. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xii + 197.
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  26. Jessica Brown: Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):637-644.
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  27. Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.
    This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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  28. Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (3):333-4.
    This is a comment on Moti Mizrahi's paper ' You Can't Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty'. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion about certainty.
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  29. Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):445-447.
    This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
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  30. Advice for Infallibilists: DIVORCE and RETREAT!Anthony Robert Booth - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3773-3789.
    This paper comprises a defence of Infallibilism about knowledge. In it, I articulate two arguments in favour of Infallibilism, and for each argument show that Infallibilism about knowledge does not lead to an unpalatable Scepticism if justified belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge, and if Fallibilism about justified belief is true.
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  31. (1 other version)Fallibility for Infallibilists.Jason Leddington - 2018 - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Morten Overgaard (eds.), In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 161-185.
    Infallibilism is the view that knowledge requires conclusive grounds. Despite its intuitive appeal, most contemporary epistemology rejects Infallibilism; however, there is a strong minority tradition that embraces it. Showing that Infallibilism is viable requires showing that it is compatible with the undeniable fact that we can go wrong in pursuit of perceptual knowledge. In other words, we need an account of fallibility for Infallibilists. By critically examining John McDowell’s recent attempt at such an account, this paper articulates a very important (...)
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  32. Defeating pragmatic encroachment?Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7).
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  33. What Is Fallibilist About Audi’s Fallibilist Foundationalism?Jochen Müller & Markus Seidel - 2018 - In Johannes Müller-Salo (ed.), Robert Audi: Critical Engagements. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 43-69.
    In this paper we show that Audi’s fallibilist foundationalism is beset by three unclarities. First, there is a conceptual unclarity in that Audi leaves open if and how to distinguish clearly between the concepts of fallibility and defeasibility. Second, there is a general unclarity: it is not always clear which fallibility/defeasibility-theses Audi accepts or denies. Finally, there is an unclarity of self-application because Audi does not specify his own claim that fallibilist foundationalism is an inductivist, and therefore itself fallible, thesis. (...)
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  34. Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    A tese central do fiabilismo é que uma crença verdadeira é conhecimento apenas se foi produzida por um mecanismo que tende a gerar crenças verdadeiras. Como tanto o processo que gera uma dada crença quanto sua propensão a produzir crenças verdadeiras podem não ser apreendidos pelo sujeito a quem se atribui o conhecimento, o fiabilismo é uma teoria externista. A principal fonte de críticas ao fiabilismo reside precisamente na desvinculação entre o que torna crenças meramente verdadeiras conhecimento e a perspectiva (...)
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  35. At the threshold of knowledge.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):449-460.
    We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s :277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins (...)
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  36. A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629.
    This paper is about the ‘threshold problem’ for knowledge, namely, how do we determine what fixes the level of justification required for knowledge in a non-arbitrary way? One popular strategy for solving this problem is impurism, which is the view that the required level of justification is partly fixed by one’s practical reasoning situation. However, this strategy has been the target of several recent objections. My goal is to propose a new version of impurism that solves the threshold problem without (...)
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  37. Fallibilismus.Jan Voosholz - 2017 - Wörterbuch der Sprach- Und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Vol. 15 Sprachphilosophie.
    Definiensposition: erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Position, nach der Wissen vorläufigen Charakter hat und sich nicht endgültig verifizieren lässt. Englische Definiensposition: position in epistemology and philosophy of science, according to which knowledge has a preliminary nature and cannot be conclusively verified.
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  38. Epistemology Without Certainty or Necessity.Kelly Becker - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research:285-319.
    In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty presents powerful arguments against traditional epistemology, conceived as a quest both for empirical grounds that provide certainty and for necessary truths that provide a conceptual framework within which to couch empirical findings. Rorty finds traditional epistemology in general, and specifically any appeal to representation that might ground knowledge, to be an unmitigated failure. In this paper, I show that Rorty at least considered but ultimately rejected the possibility of a type of (...)
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  39. How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
    When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...)
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  40. Simon on Realism, Fallibilism, and the Power of Reason.R. Scott Kretchmar - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):41-49.
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  41. The Certainty of Faith: A Problem for Christian Fallibilists?Brandon Dahm - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:130-146.
    According to epistemic fallibilism, we cannot be certain of anything. According to the Christian tradition, faith comes with certainty. I develop this dilemma from recent accounts of fallibilism and various representatives of the Christian tradition. I then argue that on John Henry Newman's account of faith the dilemma is merely apparent. Finally, I develop Newman's account of the certainty that accompanies faith and is compatible with fallibilism.
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  42. Possibly false knowledge.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.
    Many epistemologists call themselves ‘fallibilists’. But many philosophers of language hold that the meaning of epistemic usages of ‘possible’ ensures a close knowledge- possibility link : a subject’s utterance of ‘it’s possible that not-p’ is true only if the subject does not know that p. This seems to suggest that whatever the core insight behind fallibilism is, it can’t be that a subject could have knowledge which is, for them, possibly false. I argue that, on the contrary, subjects can have (...)
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  43. LA EPISTEMOLOGÍA DEL RIESGO Y LA RELACIÓN CIENCIA-FILOSOFÍA.Miguel Acosta - 2014 - Naturaleza y Libertad (3):25-55.
    Los sótanos del universo plantea la necesidad de cambiar la epistemología del conocimiento apodíctico científico-filosófico basado en la certidumbre por la “epistemología del riesgo”. Asimismo, sugiere un mayor acercamiento entre ciencia y filosofía para superar la actual confusión y estancamiento que afectan a estos saberes. Este artículo analiza ambos temas. -/- Los Sótanos del Universo proposes the necessity of changing the epistemology of apodictic scientific-philosophical knowledge, based on certainty, for the “epistemology of risk”. Furthermore, it suggests a better approach between (...)
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  44. Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.
    This paper defends the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism from recent objections. In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence BonJour argues that we should reject fallibilism for two main reasons: first, there is no adequate way to specify what level of justification is required for fallible knowledge; second, we cannot explain why any level of justification that is less than fully conclusive should have the significance that makes knowledge valuable. I will reply to these challenges in a way that allows me to (...)
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  45. (1 other version)Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  46. Libraries and fallible knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Think 11 (31):65-72.
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  47. Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
    Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is (...)
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  48. Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully (...)
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  49. In Gettier's Wake.John Turri - 2012 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology: The Key Thinkers. New York: Continuum.
    A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem".
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  50. Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism?Gabriele Gava - 2011 - Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (1):133-151.
    The aim of this paper is to apply Charles S. Peirce's pragmatic method to establishing if proponents of transcendental arguments could hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. I will thus propose a pragmatic clarification of the concepts of a priority, necessity, and infallibility in order to ascertain if these concepts are unavoidably related or not. I will argue that an a priori knowable necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable, whereas a proposition infallibly known is so. (...)
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