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  1. Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):423-442.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
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  2. Stigmatization in African Communalistic Societies and Habermas' Theory of Rationality.Jacob Ale Aigbodioh - 2011 - Cultura 8 (1):27-48.
    The phenomenon of widespread stigmatization of victims of deadly, or previously incurable, diseases in African traditional societies would appear to pragmatically contradict the humanistic values of communalism associated with those societies. However, the implied contradiction of the phenomenon, which borders on irrationality and injustice, seems amenable to a rational explanation when one considers the thick ontological underpinnings of African traditional communalism along with their epistemic significance. The justification of the proffered explanation, the paper avers, is made clearer when it is (...)
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  3. Epistemic Identities.Linda Martín Alcoff - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):128-137.
    This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?
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  4. Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice.Mark Alfano & Gus Skorburg - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Adam Carter (eds.), Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    We argue that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of the recognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. First, we explain the recognition heuristic as studied by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to, and outside the control of, the cognitive agent. We then connect the recognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, arguing that the recognition heuristic is best understood as an instance of (...)
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  5. Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions.Elizabeth Anderson - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):163-173.
    In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true (...)
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  6. “Listening Silence” and Its Discursive Effects.Barbara Applebaum - 2016 - Educational Theory 66 (3):389-404.
    While researchers have studied how white silence protects white innocence and white ignorance, in this essay Barbara Applebaum explores a form of white silence that she refers to as “listening silence” in which silence protects white innocence but does not necessarily promote resistance to learning. White listening silence can appear to be a constructive pedagogical tool for teaching white students about their implication in the perpetuation of racism. The truth of white students' listening may make it seem as if silence (...)
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  7. A Nonideal Theory of Justice.Marcus Arvan - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Arizona
    This dissertation defends a “non-ideal theory” of justice: a systematic theory of how to respond justly to injustice. Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John Rawls’ famous original position – the Non-Ideal Original Position – as a method with which to construct such a theory. Finally, Chapter 1 uses the Non-Ideal Original Position to argue for a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a principle that requires injustices to be (...)
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  8. The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Kristie Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression.Alison Bailey - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, No. 10.
    My engagement with Dotson’s essay begins with an overview of first- and second-order epistemic exclusions. I develop the concept of an "unlevel knowing field." I use examples from the epistemic injustice literature, and some of my own, to highlight the important distinction she makes between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. Next, I turn my attention to her account of third-order epistemic exclusions. I offer a brief explanation of why her sketch of at this level makes an important contribution (...)
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  9. Navigating Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2014 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 14 (1):3-7.
    My contribution to this conversation sets out to accomplish two things: First, I offer a definition of epistemic pushback. Epistemic pushback is an expression of epistemic resistance that occurs regularly in classroom discussions that touch our core beliefs, sense of self, politics, or worldv iews. Epistemic pushback is structural: It broadly characterizes a family of cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of engaging topics and questions that scare us. It can (...)
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  10. Strategic Ignorance.Alison Bailey - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 77--94.
    I want to explore strategic expressions of ignorance against the background of Charles W. Mills's account of epistemologies of ignorance in The Racial Contract (1997). My project has two interrelated goals. I want to show how Mills's discussion is restricted by his decision to frame ignorance within the language and logic of social contract theory. And, I want to explain why Maria Lugones's work on purity is useful in reframing ignorance in ways that both expand our understandings of ignorance and (...)
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  11. Book Review : The Concept of Injustice (Eric Heinze, Routledge, 2013). [REVIEW]Matthew J. Ball - unknown
    Given the level of debate and theorising in Western thought on the topic of justice, it is curious that the concept of injustice has not attracted the same attention. While many schools of thought have sought to address various injustices, most define injustice solely as the opposite of their vision of a just society – it seems they have not been interested in exploring injustice per se. With this as a starting point, Eric Heinze’s The Concept of Injustice addresses this (...)
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  12. Personal Narratives, Social Justice, and the Law.Samia Bano & Jennifer L. Pierce - 2013 - Feminist Legal Studies 21 (3):225-239.
    North American writer Joan Didion’s eloquent testimonial speaks to the significance of storytelling in our lives. Personal storiesmake our lives meaningful. Part of this is because our stories, wittingly or not, become the means through which we fashion our identities for listeners. Or, as scholars from many disciplines have argued, identity and selfhoodare narrative accomplishments. In this formulation, an individual constructs a sense of self by telling stories or “personal narratives,” which describe “the evolution of an individual life over time (...)
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  13. Epistemic Justice and Culpability.Eric Bayruns - unknown
    I argue that we ought to hold hearers, in testimonial exchanges, culpable for implicit bias caused undermining of speakers qua knowers. It may seem intuitive that hearers can only be held culpable if they consciously hold beliefs that motivate the undermining of speakers. Fricker takes up the issue of holding hearers culpable for holding systemic identity prejudices. She has much to say about hearers who have explicit-belief-driven sexist or racist affective reactions to minority speakers. It seems that Fricker does not (...)
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  14. Gender Justice V. The “Invisible Hand” of Gender Bias in Law and Society.Elizabeth Beaumont - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):668-686.
    How does so much gender inequality endure in an era when many laws and policies endorse principles of gender equality? This essay examines this dilemma by considering Susan Moller Okin's criticism of “false gender neutrality,” research on implicit bias, and the shifting relation of gender bias to American law. I argue that these are crucial elements of the modern cycle of gender inequality, enabling it to operate through a perverse “invisible-hand” mechanism. This framework helps convey how underlying gender bias influences (...)
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  15. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.Laura Beeby - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):479-486.
    Recent work at the junction of epistemology and political theory focuses on the notion of epistemic injustice, the injustice of being wronged as a knower. Miranda Fricker (2007) identifies two kinds of epistemic injustice. I focus here on hermeneutical injustice in an attempt to identify a difficulty for Fricker's account. In particular, I consider the significance of background social conditions and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms of disadvantage to achieve its status as an injustice. (...)
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  16. What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?Erin Beeghly - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):675-691.
    If someone says, “Asians are good at math” or “women are empathetic,” I might interject, “you're stereotyping” in order to convey my disapproval of their utterance. But why is stereotyping wrong? Before we can answer this question, we must better understand what stereotypes are and what stereotyping is. In this essay, I develop what I call the descriptive view of stereotypes and stereotyping. This view is assumed in much of the psychological and philosophical literature on implicit bias and stereotyping, yet (...)
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  17. The Epistemology of Prejudice.Endre Begby - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
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  18. Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? This volume contains fifteen state (...)
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  19. Epistemic Exploitation.Nora Berenstain - 2016 - Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3 (22).
    Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default (...)
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  20. Radical Moral Imagination: Courage, Hope, and Articulation.Mavis Biss - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (4):937-954.
    This paper develops the basis for a new account of radical moral imagination, understood as the transformation of moral understandings through creative response to the sensed inadequacy of one's moral concepts or morally significant appraisals of lived experience. Against Miranda Fricker, I argue that this kind of transition from moral perplexity to increased moral insight is not primarily a matter of the “top-down” use of concepts. Against Susan Babbitt, I argue that it is not primarily a matter of “bottom-up” intuitive (...)
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  21. Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology.James Bohman - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):175-187.
    With her conception of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker has opened up new normative dimensions for epistemology; that is, the injustice of denying one?s status as a knower. While her analysis of the remedies for such injustices focuses on the epistemic virtues of agents, I argue for the normative superiority of adapting a broadly republican conception of epistemic injustice. This argument for a republican epistemology has three steps. First, I focus on methodological and explanatory issues of identifying epistemic injustice and argue, (...)
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  22. Argumentative Injustice.Patrick Bondy - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
    The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to distrust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of stereotyped groups.
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  23. When Reasons Don’T Work.Patrick Bondy - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson ’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality. -/- *Note: this is an unpublished manuscript (...)
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  24. Identifying Current Uses of Philosophies of Critical Pedagogy in Religious Education.Thomas Ray Bower - 2003 - Dissertation, Union Theological Seminary & Presbyterian School of Christian Education
    This study explores religious education as interdisciplinary discourse between critical theory in philosophy, educational philosophy, and curriculum theory. The use of critical theory in contemporary philosophy is investigated through Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas, and Paulo Freire. For each the following is discussed: anthropological claims; social vision and critique; the ideal hermeneutical community. Four unifying characteristics are identified: knowledge is shaped by cultural location; culture is dynamic; assessment of cultural media is essential to understanding, and the basic human responsibility is to (...)
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  25. How Injustice Pays.Bernard R. Boxill - 1980 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (4):359-371.
  26. José Medina: The Epistemology of Resistance.Jeremy C. Bradley - 2014 - Feminist Legal Studies 22 (3):311-317.
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  27. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing • by Miranda Fricker.Michael Brady - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):380-382.
    Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Fricker's main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. In particular, she wishes to investigate the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices are socially (...)
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  28. Distributing Epistemic Authority: Refining Norton's Pragmatist Approach to Environmental Decision-Making.Evelyn Brister - 2012 - Contemporary Pragmatism 9 (1):185-203.
    Environmental pragmatists are committed to analyzing questions of environmental policy. Bryan Norton's pragmatic critique of environmental decision-making shows how an implicit commitment to the fact/value distinction has hindered productive environmental action. Nonetheless, Norton, as well as the majority of environmental ethicists, have devoted more attention to theorizing value disagreements as a primary cause of controversy than to examining epistemic structures. A case study demonstrates why and how Norton's procedural account may be supplemented with sensitive attention to the construction of epistemic (...)
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  29. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics.Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about (...)
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  30. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology.Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on implicit bias, including the effect of implicit bias on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics explores the (...)
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  31. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volumes 1 and 2: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. [REVIEW]Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Most people show unconscious bias in their evaluations of social groups, in ways that may run counter to their conscious beliefs. Volume 1 addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on this kind of implicit bias, while Volume 2 turns to the themes of moral responsibility and injustice.
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  32. Book Review: The Epistemology of Resistance, by Jose Medina. [REVIEW]V. Bufacchi - 2015 - Political Theory 43 (1):142-144.
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  33. Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child.Michael D. Burroughs & Deborah Tollefsen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):359-377.
    In Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against (...)
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  34. Deweyan Democracy and Reconciliation in Canada.Mary Stewart Butterfield - unknown
    This dissertation examines the injustices perpetrated against Indigenous people in Canada within the explicit framework of democratic theory. I examine the ability of Deweyan democracy as a purported problem-solving mechanism to deal with this problem of widespread social injustice. Deweyan democracy is distinctively epistemic, and depends upon diversity and inclusion in order to function effectively as a social and political mechanism for problem-solving. I argue that the inclusion within Deweyan democracy is insufficiently theorized to provide justice-based solutions to social problems, (...)
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  35. A Sense of Injustice.Edmond Nathaniel Cahn - 1964 - Indiana University Press.
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  36. The Sense of Injustice an Anthropocentric View of Law.Edmond Nathaniel Cahn - 1949 - New York University Press.
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  37. Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory.Campbell Sue (ed.) - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Essays by the late feminist philosopher Sue Campbell explore the entanglement of epistemic and ethical values in our attempts to be faithful to our pasts. Her relational conception of memory is used to confront the challenges of sharing memory and reconstituting selves even in contexts fractured by moral and political differences.
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  38. Removing Veils of Ignorance.Claudia Card - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):194-196.
    For more than two millennia the development of philosophy in what is called the West has been the province of men who trace their intellectual heritage to men in ancient Greece. Within “the development of philosophy” I include the training of philosophers as well as publishing and preserving philosophical work in libraries. Thus I regard philosophy as a very material as well as spiritual enterprise. My focus here is on the spiritual impact, actual and potential, of recent changes in the (...)
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  39. Democracy, Trust, and Epistemic Justice.Amandine Catala - 2015 - The Monist 98 (4):424-440.
    I analyze the relation between deliberative democracy and trust through the lens of epistemic justice. I argue for three main claims: (i) the deliberative impasse dividing majority and minority groups in many democracies is due to a particular type of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘hermeneutical domination’; (ii) undoing hermeneutical domination requires epistemic trust; and (iii) this epistemic trust is supported by the three deliberative democratic requirements of equality, legitimacy, and accountability. In arguing for those claims, I contribute to the (...)
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  40. Rethinking the Abortion Issue: The Problem of Normative Femininity and Hermeneutical Injustice.Millie Churcher - 2011 - Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
    To date the wealth of literature on abortion has been dedicated to resolving the question of its legal and moral permissibility in relation to the fetus and pregnant woman as subjects of moral standing. This has created a dichotomised way of talking about abortion chiefly in terms of conflicting rights; as a „wrongful‟ versus „legitimate‟ form of killing. The tension between this individualistic rights-based discourse and the „ethic of care‟ to which women are often expected to conform in their moral (...)
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  41. Argumentum Ad Verecundiam: New Gender-Based Criteria for Appeals to Authority.Michelle Ciurria & Khameiel Altamimi - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (4):437-452.
    In his influential work on critical argumentation, Douglas Walton explains how to judge whether an argumentum ad verecundiam is fallacious or legitimate. He provides six critical questions and a number of ancillary sub-questions to guide the identification of reasonable appeals to authority. While it is common for informal logicians to acknowledge the role of bias in sampling procedures and hypothesis confirmation , there is a conspicuous lack of discourse on the effect of identity prejudice on judgments of authority, even though (...)
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  42. The Epistemic Relevance of the Virtue of Justice.Stewart Clem - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):301-311.
    Recent literature on the relationship between knowledge and justice has tended to focus exclusively on the social and ethical dimensions of this relationship (e.g. social injustices related to knowledge and power, etc.). For the purposes of this article, I am interested in examining the virtue of justice and its effects on the cognitive faculties of its possessor (and, correspondingly, the effects of the vice of injustice). Drawing upon Thomas Aquinas’s account of the virtue of justice, I argue that in certain (...)
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  43. Critical Reply to'Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic'by Wayne Riggs.D. A. Coady - 2012 - Social Epistemology: Review and Reply Collective 1 (5):3-6.
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  44. Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
    I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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  45. Review of Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing[REVIEW]Lorraine Code - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
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  46. The Love That Does Justice: An Ethic of Involuntary Psychiatric Hospitalization and Treatment.Daniel Irvin Coleman - 1994 - Dissertation, Rice University
    Persons suffering from chronic and severe mental illnesses often refuse psychiatric treatment. This poses the question whether we as a society have any obligation toward mentally ill persons who refuse care, and, if so, the nature of this obligation and the condition under which it applies. ;The conclusion of this dissertation is that we, as a society, do have limited obligations toward severely mentally ill persons who refuse care. The principle of interpersonal reciprocity and an interpretation of justice based upon (...)
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  47. Wronged Beyond Words On the Publicity and Repression of Moral Injury.Matthew Congdon - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (8):815-834.
    In this article, I discuss cases in which moral grievances, particularly assertions that a moral injury has taken place, are systematically obstructed by received linguistic and epistemic practices. I suggest a social epistemological model for theorizing such cases of moral epistemic injustice. Towards this end, I offer a reconstruction of Lyotard’s concept of the differend, comparing it with Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, and considering it in light of some criticisms posed by Axel Honneth. Through this reconstruction and a (...)
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  48. Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons – Erratum.Matthew Congdon - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):427.
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  49. Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons.Matthew Congdon - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):75-93.
    In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, (...)
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  50. Taboo, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments.Charlie Crerar - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    In this paper I draw attention to a shortcoming in Miranda Fricker's 2007 account of hermeneutical injustice: that the only hermeneutical resource she acknowledges is a shared conceptual framework. Consequently, Fricker creates the impression that hermeneutical injustice manifests itself almost exclusively in the form of a conceptual lacuna. Considering the negative hermeneutical impact of certain societal taboos, however, suggests that there can be cases of hermeneutical injustice even when an agent's conceptual repertoire is perfectly adequate. I argue that this observation (...)
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