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  1. added 2019-01-09
    Excuses, Exemptions, and Derivative Norms.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Ratio.
    Distinguishing between excuses and exemptions advances our understanding of a standard range of problem cases in debates about epistemic norms. But it leaves open a problem of accounting for blameless norm violation in ‘prospective agents’. By shifting focus in our theory of excuses from rational excellence to norms governing the dispositions of agents, we can account for a fuller range of normative phenomena at play in debates about epistemic norms.
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  2. added 2019-01-06
    Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):433-449.
    Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-30
    Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification.Gregory Stoutenburg - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-28
    Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
    The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...)
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  5. added 2018-12-28
    Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer. pp. 307-25.
    Evidentialism and Reliabilism are two of the main contemporary theories of epistemic justification. Some authors have thought that the theories are not incompatible with each other, and that a hybrid theory which incorporates elements of both should be taken into account. More recently, other authors have argued that the resulting theory is well- placed to deal with fine-grained doxastic attitudes (credences). In this paper I review the reasons for adopting this kind of hybrid theory, paying attention to the case of (...)
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  6. added 2018-12-22
    Sosa on Animal Knowledge and Emotions.Eros Moreira De Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2015 - Analytica (Rio) 19 (1):145-160.
    Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...)
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  7. added 2018-12-16
    Memory in Analytic Philosophy.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dmitri Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 298-315.
  8. added 2018-12-06
    Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon (...)
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  9. added 2018-11-30
    The a Priori Rules of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):113-131.
    Both these ideas are intuitively plausible: rationality has an external aim, such as forming a true belief or good decision; and the rationality of a belief or decision is determined purely by facts about the thinker’s internal mental states. Unlike earlier conceptions, the conception of rationality presented here explains why these ideas are both true. Rational beliefs and decisions, it is argued, are those that are formed through the thinker’s following ‘rules of rationality’. Some rules count as rules of rationality (...)
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  10. added 2018-11-21
    Understanding, Problem-Solving, and Conscious Reflection.Andrei Mărăşoiu - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-11.
    According to Zagzebski, understanding something is justified by the exercise of cognitive skills and intellectual virtues the knower possesses. Zagzebski develops her view by suggesting that “understanding has internalist conditions for success”. Against this view, Grimm raises an objection: what justifies understanding is the reliability of the processes by which we come to understand, and we need not be aware of the outcome of all reliable processes. Understanding is no exception, so, given that understanding something results from reliable processes, we (...)
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  11. added 2018-11-21
    Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
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  12. added 2018-11-16
    Knowledge, Justification, and Normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscript
    We think that there is much to like about Smith’s (2016) proposal that justification should be in terms of normic support. it does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view faces two serious challenges. The first (...)
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  13. added 2018-11-04
    On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscript
    Abstract: Scepticism about the normativity of rationality is often partially based on the assumption that normative reasons are normative. Starting from the assumption that normative reasons are normative, someone will argue that reasons and rationality can require different things from us and conclude that rationality must not be normative. We think that the assumption that normative reasons are normative is one that deserves more scrutiny, particularly if it turns out, as we shall argue, that no one has yet shown that (...)
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  14. added 2018-10-28
    The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism.Henry Schiller - forthcoming - History of Philosophy Quarterly.
    The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.
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  15. added 2018-10-15
    Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji.Paweł Zięba - 2016 - Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111.
    This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...)
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  16. added 2018-10-10
    On Reflection, by Hilary Kornblith. [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1319-1322.
  17. added 2018-10-01
    Counterexamples to Nozick's Account of Transmission of Knowledge Via Proof.Adam Thompson - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:261-265.
    This paper reveals and corrects a flaw in Nozick’s account of knowledge via inference. First, two counterexamples are provided by considering cases which would not typically be regarded as instances of knowledge although they are counted as such by Nozick’s theory. Then the general form of these counterexamples is given. From this it is apparent that the counterexamples show that Nozick’s theory fails to take account of cases in which the subject infers q from p, but in counterfactual situations some (...)
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  18. added 2018-09-29
    Externalism and Understanding: Toward a Unified Account of Epistemic Justification.Mark Allen Bross - 2003 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    Epistemologists have had two primary intuitions about epistemic justification: Epistemic justification has to do with epistemic obligations such that S is epistemically justified in believing that p iff S's belief that p is epistemically permissible. Epistemic justification has an objective connection to truth such that if S is epistemically justified in believing that p then S's belief that p is likely to be true. ;The first intuition is based upon the idea that epistemic justification is a normative property and that (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-29
    On the Need for a Metaphysics of Justification.D. E. Bradshaw - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):90-106.
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  20. added 2018-09-29
    Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence BonJour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.
  21. added 2018-09-27
    Justified Judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
    When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-22
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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  23. added 2018-09-22
    Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
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  24. added 2018-09-22
    Justification and the Truth-Connection By Clayton Littlejohn. [REVIEW]Peter Baumann - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):731-733.
    Review of Littlejohn, "Justification and the Truth Connection".
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  25. added 2018-09-22
    Ryle's Argument Against Cartesian Internalism.Agustin Arrieta & Fernando Migura - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  26. added 2018-09-22
    Reidian Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  27. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):363-368.
  28. added 2018-09-22
    Review: Bonjour's Dilemma. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
  29. added 2018-09-22
    Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic.Nanay Bence - 2005 - In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 41.
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  30. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
  31. added 2018-09-22
    Epistemic Desiderata.William P. Alston - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):527-551.
  32. added 2018-09-22
    A Reliability Theory of Epistemic Justification.Ralph Neil Baergen - 1990 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    The claim that the epistemic status of a belief corresponds to the reliability of the process by which it was formed is developed and defended. In the course of this, a variety of conceptual and methodological matters are addressed. Notably, the role of the sciences, particularly experimental psychology and cognitive science, in epistemology is explored, and the claim that factual disciplines can have no bearing upon a normative project is considered and rejected. Also, the suggestion that psychology should entirely replace (...)
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  33. added 2018-09-22
    Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):57-89.
  34. added 2018-09-22
    Spectrum Epistemology: The BonJour - Goldman Debate.Andrew Morgan - unknown
    Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in (...)
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  35. added 2018-09-21
    Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
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  36. added 2018-09-20
    Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification.Christos Georgakakis & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    THE PAPER IS UNDER REVIEW BY THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY. WE HAVE RE-SUBMITTED HOPEFULLY THE FINAL VERSION. -/- .
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  37. added 2018-09-17
    The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen’s :191–207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification (...)
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  38. added 2018-09-17
    Justification Without Awareness. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):570-573.
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  39. added 2018-09-14
    Two Notions of Scientific Justification.Matthias Adam - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):93 - 108.
    Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion. By discussing the conditions for the (...)
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  40. added 2018-09-14
    Audi on Structural Justification.Frederick Adams - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:493-498.
  41. added 2018-09-06
    Knowledgeable Assertion in the Image of Knowledgeable Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    I describe two ways of thinking about what constitutes a knowledgeable assertion – the ‘orthodox view’ and the ‘isomorphic view’. I argue that we should discard the orthodox view and replace it with the isomorphic view. The latter is more natural and has greater theoretical utility than the former.
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  42. added 2018-08-27
    The Possibility of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Barry Stroud - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):518-524.
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  43. added 2018-08-27
    Alston's Internalistic Externalism.Marshall Swain - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:461-473.
  44. added 2018-08-24
    Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge.Bill Brewer - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):259-275.
  45. added 2018-08-13
    Accessibilism Defined.Michael Hatcher - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):1-23.
    Accessibilism is a version of epistemic internalism on which justification is determined by what is accessible to the subject. I argue that misunderstandings of accessibilism have hinged on a failure to appreciate an ambiguity in the phrase ‘what is accessible to the subject’. I first show that this phrase may either refer to the very things accessible to the subject, or instead to the facts about which things are accessible to her. I then discuss Ralph Wedgwood’s (2002: 350-352) argument that (...)
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  46. added 2018-08-09
    Strong Internalism, Doxastic Involuntarism, and the Costs of Compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluations—evaluations of what we ought to believe or may not believe. Some philosophers endorse strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology on which agents can always access what determines the deontic status of their beliefs and degrees of belief. This paper articulates a new challenge for strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology. Any version of epistemic deontology must face William Alston’s argument. Alston combined a broadly voluntarist conception (...)
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  47. added 2018-08-03
    Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell (ed.) - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This is a unique collection of new and recently-published articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief. The readings all contribute to our understanding of the relative importance, for a theory of justified belief, of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and of the individuals responsibility in gathering and weighing evidence. Highlights of the readings include direct exchanges between leading exponents of this approach and their critics.
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  48. added 2018-07-10
    Liars, Tigers, and Bearers of Bad News, Oh My!: Towards a Reasons Account of Defeat.Emelia Miller - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    The standard reliabilist line on defeat is open to counterexamples regarding its necessity and sufficiency. In this paper, I present three problems for the standard reliabilist line from the recent literature on defeat before arguing that reliabilists can solve those problems by adopting an account of justification that ties defeat to the evidence possessed by the relevant agent. In doing so, I show that there is a conception of having evidence that reliabilists can adopt without giving up on the core (...)
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  49. added 2018-06-26
    Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    A tese central do fiabilismo é que uma crença verdadeira é conhecimento apenas se foi produzida por um mecanismo que tende a gerar crenças verdadeiras. Como tanto o processo que gera uma dada crença quanto sua propensão a produzir crenças verdadeiras podem não ser apreendidos pelo sujeito a quem se atribui o conhecimento, o fiabilismo é uma teoria externista. A principal fonte de críticas ao fiabilismo reside precisamente na desvinculação entre o que torna crenças meramente verdadeiras conhecimento e a perspectiva (...)
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  50. added 2018-06-20
    Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue‐Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. By John Greco.Guy Axtell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):208-211.
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