Related categories

374 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 374
  1. Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl.John Aach - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  2. Pensamientos de primer orden.Mariela Aguilera - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):55-81.
    Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” , defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
    Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Weak Inferential Internalism.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World * By JACK C. LYONS.Keith Allen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):391-393.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Externalism and Justification.Robert Almeder - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):465-469.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Knowledge Externalism.Marc Alspector-kelly - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   128 citations  
  11. An Internalist Externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
  12. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):179-221.
    Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13. Trading One Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams' Criticism of Agrippan Scepticism.Cíntora Armando - 2013 - Tópicos 44:9-34.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
    A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology - belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such beliefs as representations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. An Insubstantial Externalism.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):576-582.
    In one of his recent articles published in this JOURNAL, Alvin J. Goldman argues that since one must counts epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist i.e. intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct, and therefore, “independent of any and all minds” (p.9). Consequently, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  17. Causalist Internalism.Robert Audi - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (4):309 - 320.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  18. Recovering Responsibility.Guy Axtell - 2011 - Logos and Episteme (3):429-454..
    This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism.Guy Axtell - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge – Ernest Sosa.Guy Axtell - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):203-205.
    A review of Ernest Sosa’s book Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. While I think Sosa is quite right that knowledge lies on a spectrum, and that its higher but not its lower reaches require of knowers, when challenged, a strong degree of explanatory coherence (ability to understand and discursively defend the basis of their beliefs), I also point out problems with certain aspects of his account.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Expanding Epistemology: A Responsibilist Approach.Guy Axtell - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (1):51-87.
    The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  22. Two for the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.Guy Axtell - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):363 - 383.
    This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. The Present Dilemma in Philosophy.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):15-35.
    In opening the Lowell Lectures of 1906 with "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," William James confounded his audience with the initial thesis that "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of temperaments." This article revisits James's thesis, using the latitude afforded by his title to describe a different dilemma than he was concerned with in his lecture. Pragmatism can be applied to diagnose the apparently irreconcilable perspectives that give rise to a dilemma about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology.Guy Axtell - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
    Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  25. Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists bring (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  26. The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology.Guy Axtell - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):488-508.
  27. ``Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology".Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27.
  28. Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?Guy Axtell - 1996 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (3):172 - 198.
    This was my first paper on virtue epistemology, and already highlights the connections with epistemic value and axiology which I would later develop. Although most accounts were either internalist or externalist in an exclusive sense, I suggest an inquiry-focused version through connections with the American pragmatism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  29. Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
    Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need ?thick? evaluative concepts? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit commitment to what we argue to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  30. Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to Be Learned From Suspicious Externalism.Murat Baç - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (2):127-145.
    A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier’s original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Us. Virtues. [REVIEW]Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):363-368.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.Marina Bakalova - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:363-368.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Epistemic Externalism in the Philosophy of Religion.Max Baker-Hytch - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (4).
    Epistemic externalism is a view about what it takes for a belief to be epistemically justified or to be an item of knowledge. Externalism has grown considerably in popularity over the past few decades and this development has spilled over into the philosophy of religion, where we find externalist theories of justification and knowledge being employed to make the case for the positive epistemic status of religious beliefs. In §1, I offer an overview of epistemic externalism and its rival, internalism. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Knowledge’s Value: Internalism and Externalism.Shannon Balderson - unknown
    This thesis engages with epistemology’s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented—in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36. Comments and Criticism an Insubstantial Externalism.Axel Arturo Barcelo Aspeitia - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):576-582.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Justification Without Awareness - by Michael Bergmann.Gordon Barnes - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):163-164.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Is Memory Merely Testimony From One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
    A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Why Internalists Need an Enriched Theory of Perceptual and Conceptual Awareness to Escape From Bergmann's Dilemma.Benjamin Bayer - manuscript
    Michael Bergmann (2006) has argued that an internalistic view of justification faces a dilemma. Assuming as internalism does that to have a justified belief, subjects must be aware of the justifiers of the belief and of their relevance to the truth of the belief, Bergmann notes that one is either aware of this relevance conceptually or not. But, says Bergmann, if the required awareness is conceptual, internalism is encumbered with an infinite regress. If it is not-if it is only "weak (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness.Benjamin Bayer - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem.Umut Baysan - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):41-45.
    The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Phenomenal Conservatism, Reflection and Self-Defeat.Julien Beillard - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2): 187-199.
    Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form of internalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues.M. Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  46. Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   105 citations  
  47. Externalist Justification Without Reliability.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  48. Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.
    It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat---a requirement that many externalists impose on knowledge---guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49. Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  50. Internalism, Externalism and Epistemic Defeat.Michael Abram Bergmann - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Despite its recent prominence in the epistemological literature, the internalism-externalism debate is mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of the IE debate, one which fits well with the more entrenched views on the IE distinction and illuminates the fundamental issues on which internalists and externalists disagree. I argue that the debate should be construed in terms of warrant and not, as is usual, in terms of epistemic justification. And I note that there is an internal condition that (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 374