About this topic
Summary Epistemic logics are logics that allow one to reason about knowledge in some way. The term ‘epistemic logic’ is often applied also to logics of related notions, such as logics of belief (more strictly, doxastic logics) and justification. Many epistemic logics are modal logics, whose language contains one or more knowledge operators and whose semantics is given in terms of relational Kripke models, containing epistemically possible worlds related to one another by epistemic accessibility relations. This modal approach to epistemic logic has been widely adopted in formal logic, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, economics and game theory. The sub-sategory ‘Doxastic and Epistemic Logic’ also includes formal work on belief revision. This category also includes inductive logics and non-monotonic logics, both of which add to the stock of valid inferences, beyond those valid in classical logic. (These logics are super-classical, containing inferences which are not deductively valid and hence, in some sense, less than certain. In such logics, there is no guarantee that truth will be preserved from premises to conclusions. Non-monotonic logics have the feature that an inference from premises X to conclusion A may be valid, and yet the inference to may fail if we add an addition premise B to X, so that XA but not X, B ⊢ A.
Key works Modern epistemic logic began with Hintikka 1962, who developed Kripke-style semantics for epistemic notions and discussed appropriate axioms for knowledge and belief. Hintikka proposes a solution to the logical omniscience problem, whereby agents are treated as automatically knowing all consequences of what they know, in Hintikka 1975. Hintikka's approach is developed and applied to problems in computer science in Fagin et al 1995. The leading theory of belief revision, the ‘AGM’ theory, was first presented in Alchourrón et al 1985. Key early works in inductive logic are Keynes 1929 and Carnap’s 1945, 19521950. Key early works in non-monotonic logic are Moore 1985
Introductions Hintikka 1962 is a great introduction to epistemic and doxastic logics; Hendricks 2008 briefly surveys the area. Huber 2013 introduces and discusses AGM theories of belief revision. Hawthorne 2011 and Huber 2007 are good encyclopaedia entries on inductive logic; Hacking 2001 is a book-length introduction. Antonelli 2008 is a good, brief introduction to non-monotonic logic; an excellent book-length treatment is Makinson 2005
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  1. Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Marton argues that that it follows from the standard antirealist theory of truth, which states that truth and possible knowledge are equivalent, that knowing possibilities is equivalent to the possibility of knowing, whereas these notions should be distinct. Moreover, he argues that the usual strategies of dealing with the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability are either not able to deal with his modal-epistemic collapse result or they only do so at a high price. Against this, I argue that Marton’s paper does (...)
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  2. Recapturing Dynamic Logic of Relation Changers Via Bounded Morphisms.Ryo Hatano & Katsuhiko Sano - 2021 - Studia Logica 109 (1):95-124.
    The present contribution shows that a Hilbert-style axiomatization for dynamic logic of relation changers is complete for the standard Kripke semantics not by a well-known rewriting technique but by the idea of an auxiliary semantics studied by van Benthem and Wang et al. A key insight of our auxiliary semantics for dynamic logic of relation changers can be described as: “relation changers are bounded morphisms.” Moreover, we demonstrate that this semantic insight can be used to provide a modular cut-free labelled (...)
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  3. Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness: A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles.Levi Spectre - 2009 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
    The principle of epistemic closure is the claim that what is known to follow from knowledge is known to be true. This intuitively plausible idea is endorsed by a vast majority of knowledge theorists. There are significant problems, however, that have to be addressed if epistemic closure – closed knowledge – is endorsed. The present essay locates the problem for closed knowledge in the separation it imposes between knowledge and evidence. Although it might appear that all that stands between knowing (...)
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  4. Induzione e fondazione. Un caso di studio sulla ricezione tedesca del tardo empirismo inglese.Francesco Pisano - 2020 - Archivio di Storia Della Cultura 1 (XXXIII).
    The paper aims at outlining the conceptual frame in which nineteenth-century German philosophy inherits and pursues the British debate on induction. It investigates this debate as a case study for a broader inquiry about the German reception of late British empiricism. The Mill-Whewell controversy on induction is central to the late British empiricism´s project of a logic of natural sciences. It becomes significant in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century, as a means of defining a theory of (...)
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  5. A Logic of Knowing Why.Chao Xu, Yanjing Wang & Thomas Studer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1259-1285.
    When we say “I know why he was late”, we know not only the fact that he was late, but also an explanation of this fact. We propose a logical framework of “knowing why” inspired by the existing formal studies on why-questions, scientific explanation, and justification logic. We introduce the Kyi\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {K}}{}\textit{y}}_i$$\end{document} operator into the language of epistemic logic to express “agent i knows why φ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} (...)
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  6. Predicate Change: A Study on the Conservativity of Conceptual Change.Corina Strößner - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1159-1183.
    Like belief revision, conceptual change has rational aspects. The paper discusses this for predicate change. We determine the meaning of predicates by a set of imaginable instances, i.e., conceptually consistent entities that fall under the predicate. Predicate change is then an alteration of which possible entities are instances of a concept. The recent exclusion of Pluto from the category of planets is an example of such a predicate change. In order to discuss predicate change, we define a monadic predicate logic (...)
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  7. Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief.Adam Bjorndahl & Aybüke Özgün - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):748-775.
    In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge 35. Building on Stalnaker’s core insights, and using frameworks developed in 11 and 3, we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker’s system rely intuitively on both of these notions. (...)
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  8. Short-Circuiting the Definition of Mathematical Knowledge for an Artificial General Intelligence.Samuel Alexander - forthcoming - Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
    We propose that, for the purpose of studying theoretical properties of the knowledge of an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (that is, the knowledge of an AGI), a pragmatic way to define such an agent’s knowledge (restricted to the language of Epistemic Arithmetic, or EA) is as follows. We declare an AGI to know an EA-statement φ if and only if that AGI would include φ in the resulting enumeration if that AGI were commanded: “Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you (...)
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  9. Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.Hasen Khudairi - manuscript
    This paper aims to provide a mathematically tractable background against which to model both modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. I argue that epistemic modal algebras comprise a materially adequate fragment of the language of thought. I demonstrate, then, how modal expressivism can be regimented by modal coalgebraic automata, to which the above epistemic modal algebras are dually isomorphic. I examine, in particular, the virtues unique to the modal expressivist approach here proffered in the setting of the foundations of mathematics, by (...)
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  10. Reusing Topological Nexttime Logic.Bernhard Heinemann - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (6):1207-1234.
    In this paper, a particular extension of the constitutive bi-modal logic for single-agent subset spaces will be provided. That system, which originally was designed for revealing the intrinsic relationship between knowledge and topology, has been developed in several directions in recent years, not least towards a comprehensive knowledge-theoretic formalism. This line is followed here to the extent that subset spaces are supplied with a finite number of functions which shall represent certain knowledge-enabling actions. Due to the corresponding functional modalities, another (...)
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  11. Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility.Giacomo Bonanno - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (5):1019-1061.
    We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator, while the latter is merely a classical operator. We then define belief, interpreted as “maximally plausible possibility”, in terms of these two notions: the agent believes \ if she cannot rule out \ ), she judges \ to be plausible and she does not judge \ to be plausible. We consider four interaction properties (...)
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  12. Jeffrey Meets Kolmogorov: A General Theory of Conditioning.Alexander Meehan & Snow Zhang - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):941-979.
    Jeffrey conditionalization is a rule for updating degrees of belief in light of uncertain evidence. It is usually assumed that the partitions involved in Jeffrey conditionalization are finite and only contain positive-credence elements. But there are interesting examples, involving continuous quantities, in which this is not the case. Q1 Can Jeffrey conditionalization be generalized to accommodate continuous cases? Meanwhile, several authors, such as Kenny Easwaran and Michael Rescorla, have been interested in Kolmogorov’s theory of regular conditional distributions as a possible (...)
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  13. Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1005-1039.
    A new formal model of belief dynamics is proposed, in which the epistemic agent has both probabilistic beliefs and full beliefs. The agent has full belief in a proposition if and only if she considers the probability that it is false to be so close to zero that she chooses to disregard that probability. She treats such a proposition as having the probability 1, but, importantly, she is still willing and able to revise that probability assignment if she receives information (...)
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  14. Probability Modals and Infinite Domains.Adam Marushak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1041-1055.
    Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of attempts to apply the mathematical theory of probability to the semantics of natural language probability talk. These sorts of “probabilistic” semantics are often motivated by their ability to explain intuitions about inferences involving “likely” and “probably”—intuitions that Angelika Kratzer’s canonical semantics fails to accommodate through a semantics based solely on an ordering of worlds and a qualitative ranking of propositions. However, recent work by Wesley Holliday and Thomas Icard has been widely thought to (...)
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  15. The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
    We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic of (...)
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  16. Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    On at least one of its uses, ‘higher-order evidence’ refers to evidence about what opinions are rationalized by your evidence. This chapter surveys the foundational epistemological questions raised by such evidence, the methods that have proven useful for answering them, and the potential consequences and applications of such answers.
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  17. The Logic of Sequence Frames.Fabio Lampert - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-44.
    This paper investigates and develops generalizations of two-dimensional modal logics to any finite dimension. These logics are natural extensions of multidimensional systems known from the literature on logics for a priori knowledge. We prove a completeness theorem for propositional n-dimensional modal logics and show them to be decidable by means of a systematic tableau construction.
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  18. Knowledge, Justification, and Adequate Reasons.Paul Égré, Paul Marty & Bryan Renne - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-42.
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  19. The Entropy-Limit (Conjecture) for $$Sigma _2$$ Σ 2 -Premisses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Studia Logica:1-20.
    The application of the maximum entropy principle to determine probabilities on finite domains is well-understood. Its application to infinite domains still lacks a well-studied comprehensive approach. There are two different strategies for applying the maximum entropy principle on first-order predicate languages: applying it to finite sublanguages and taking a limit; comparing finite entropies of probability functions defined on the language as a whole. The entropy-limit conjecture roughly says that these two strategies result in the same probabilities. While the conjecture is (...)
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  20. Two New Series of Principles in the Interpretability Logic of All Reasonable Arithmetical Theories.Evan Goris & Joost J. Joosten - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (1):1-25.
    The provability logic of a theory T captures the structural behavior of formalized provability in T as provable in T itself. Like provability, one can formalize the notion of relative interpretability giving rise to interpretability logics. Where provability logics are the same for all moderately sound theories of some minimal strength, interpretability logics do show variations.The logic IL is defined as the collection of modal principles that are provable in any moderately sound theory of some minimal strength. In this article (...)
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  21. Bilattice Logic of Epistemic Actions and Knowledge.Zeinab Bakhtiari, Hans van Ditmarsch & Umberto Rivieccio - 2020 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 171 (6):102790.
    Baltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further (...)
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  22. Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.
    We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a (...)
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  23. A Remark on Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Sergi Oms - 2020 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 61 (1):129-140.
    In recent years, some authors have proposed quantitative measures of the coherence of sets of propositions. Such probabilistic measures of coherence are, in general terms, functions that take as their argument a set of propositions and yield as their value a number that is supposed to represent the degree of coherence of the set. In this paper, I introduce a minimal constraint on PMC theories, the weak stability principle, and show that any correct, coherent, and complete PMC cannot satisfy it. (...)
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  24. From Concepts to Predicates Within Constructivist Epistemology.Farshad Badie - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
    In this research constructivist epistemology provides a ground for conceptual analysis of concept construction, conception production, and concept learning processes. Relying on a constructivist model of knowing, this research will make an epistemological and logical linkage between concepts and predicates.
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  25. Review of Bayesian Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Studia Logica 81:443-446.
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  26. The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa003.
    In this essay, I cast doubt on an apparent truism: namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it's always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this thesis Value of Information. I show that Value of Information conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent's evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view (...)
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  27. Pure Inductive Logic with Functions.Elizabeth Howarth & Jeffrey B. Paris - 2019 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 84 (4):1382-1402.
    We consider the version of Pure Inductive Logic which obtains for the language with equality and a single unary function symbol giving a complete characterization of the probability functions on this language which satisfy Constant Exchangeability.
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  28. Dynamic Graded Epistemic Logic.Minghui Ma & Hans van Ditmarsch - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):663-684.
    Graded epistemic logic is a logic for reasoning about uncertainties. Graded epistemic logic is interpreted on graded models. These models are generalizations of Kripke models. We obtain completeness of some graded epistemic logics. We further develop dynamic extensions of graded epistemic logics, along the framework of dynamic epistemic logic. We give an extension with public announcements, i.e., public events, and an extension with graded event models, a generalization also including nonpublic events. We present complete axiomatizations for both logics.
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  29. Small Infinitary Epistemic Logics.Tai-wei Hu, Mamoru Kaneko & Nobu-Yuki Suzuki - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):702-735.
    We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra-/interpersonal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL are presented for ordinal α up to a given αo so that GL is finitary KDn with n agents and GL allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL is small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulae Lα is increasing up (...)
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  30. Completeness for Counter-Doxa Conditionals – Using Ranking Semantics.Eric Raidl - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):861-891.
    Standard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of (...)
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  31. Non-Monotonic Logic and the Compatibility of Science and Religion.Marcin Trepczyński - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):457-466.
    The article aims to show how the acceptance of non-monotonic logic enables arguments to be held between science and religion in a way that does not exclude either of these two spheres. The starting point of the analyses is the idea of the 13th century Danish philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, who states that it is both acceptable that: a natural scientist negates that the world had a beginning, and a Christian theologian asserts that the world had a beginning, because each (...)
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  32. Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Hanna S. van Lee, Rasmus K. Rendsvig & Suzanne van Wijk - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1077-1118.
    In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is made concerning the types of agents, actions and dynamics representable. This paper investigates one such choice: An intensional protocol class for agent control in dynamic epistemic logic, called ‘DEL dynamical systems’. After illustrating how such protocols may be used in formalizing and analyzing information dynamics, the types of epistemic temporal models that they may generate are characterized. This facilitates a formal (...)
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  33. Intensional Protocols for Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Suzanne Wijk, Rasmus Rendsvig & Hanna Lee - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1077-1118.
    In dynamical multi-agent systems, agents are controlled by protocols. In choosing a class of formal protocols, an implicit choice is made concerning the types of agents, actions and dynamics representable. This paper investigates one such choice: An intensional protocol class for agent control in dynamic epistemic logic, called ‘DEL dynamical systems’. After illustrating how such protocols may be used in formalizing and analyzing information dynamics, the types of epistemic temporal models that they may generate are characterized. This facilitates a formal (...)
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  34. Epistemic Logic, Monotonicity, and the Halbach–Welch Rapprochement Strategy.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (4):669-693.
    Predicate approaches to modality have been a topic of increased interest in recent intensional logic. Halbach and Welch :71–100, 2009) have proposed a new formal technique to reduce the necessity predicate to an operator, demonstrating that predicate and operator methods are ultimately compatible. This article concerns the question of whether Halbach and Welch’s approach can provide a uniform formal treatment for intensionality. I show that the monotonicity constraint in Halbach and Welch’s proof for necessity fails for almost all possible-worlds theories (...)
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  35. Propositional Epistemic Logics with Quantification Over Agents of Knowledge (An Alternative Approach).Gennady Shtakser - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (4):753-780.
    In the previous paper with a similar title :311–344, 2018), we presented a family of propositional epistemic logics whose languages are extended by two ingredients: by quantification over modal operators or over agents of knowledge and by predicate symbols that take modal operators as arguments. We denoted this family by \}\). The family \}\) is defined on the basis of a decidable higher-order generalization of the loosely guarded fragment of first-order logic. And since HO-LGF is decidable, we obtain the decidability (...)
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  36. Harold Jeffreys. Scientific Inference. Second Edition of VII 175. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge1957, Viii + 236 Pp. [REVIEW]Abraham Robinson - 1964 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 29 (4):194-195.
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  37. Jaakko Hintikka. Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1962, X + 179 Pp. [REVIEW]Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1964 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 29 (3):132-134.
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  38. Hugues Leblanc. On so-Called Degrees of Confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10 Pp. 312–315. - K. R. Popper. Probabilistic Independence and Corroboration by Empirical Tests. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10 Pp. 315–318. [REVIEW]Harry V. Stopes-Roe - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):146.
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  39. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. Comments on ‘Degree of Confirmation’ by Professor K. R. Popper. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6 , Pp. 155–157. - Karl R. Popper. ‘Content’ and ‘Degree of Confirmation’: A Reply to Dr Bar-Hillel. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6 , Pp. 157–163. - Rudolf Carnap. Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7 , Pp. 243–244. - K. R. Popper. Reply to Professor Carnap. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7 , Pp. 244–245. - Y. Bar-Hillel. Further Comments on Probability and Confirmation. A Rejoinder to Professor Popper. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7 , Pp. 245–248. - K.R.Popper. Adequacy and Consistency: A Second Reply to Dr Bar-Hillel. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7 , Pp. 249–256. - Peter Achinstein. The Identity Hypothesis. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,. [REVIEW]Harry V. Stopes-Roe - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):142-146.
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  40. Rudolf Carnap. The Aim of Inductive Logic. Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Edited by Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and Alfred Tarski, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1962, Pp. 303–318. - Rudolf Carnap. Logical Foundations of Probability. Second Edition of XVI 205, with Added Preface and Supplementary Bibliography. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago1962, Xxvii + 613 Pp. - Rudolf Carnap. Remarks on Probability. Philosophical Studies , Vol. 14 , Pp. 65–75. [REVIEW]Richard C. Jeffrey - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (1):104-105.
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  41. David Greenwood. Quantitative Inductive Procedures. The Nature of Science and Other Essays, by David Greenwood, Philosophical Library, New York1959, Pp. 32–43. [REVIEW]Edward E. Dawson - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (3):494-496.
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  42. The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-30.
    We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the logical consequences (...)
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  43. Henry E. KyburgJr., Demonstrative Induction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21 No. 1 , Pp. 80–92.Peter Krauss - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):129.
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  44. Henry E. KyburgJr., Probability and Randomness. Theoria , Vol. 29 , Pp. 27–55.Peter Krauss - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):129.
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  45. Henry E. KyburgJr., Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1961, X + 350 Pp. [REVIEW]Peter Krauss - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127-128.
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  46. Max Black. Probability. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edited by Paul Edwards, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York, and Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1967, Vol. 6, Pp. 464–479. [REVIEW]William Craig - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (2):300-301.
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  47. E. J. Lemmon. On Sentences Verifiable by Their Use. Analysis , Vol. 22 No. 4 , Pp. 86–89. - Jaakko Hintikka. Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71 , Pp. 3–32. [REVIEW]James Cargile - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (4):615-616.
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  48. Arthur W. Burks. The Presupposition Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20 , Pp. 177–197. - Arthur W. Burks. On the Presuppositions of Induction. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 8 No. 4 , Pp. 574–611. [REVIEW]Jan Berg - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2):314-316.
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  49. Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Michael L.. General Introduction. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity. Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. Edited by Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Michael L.. The Odyssey Press Inc., New York 1966, Pp. 1–13.Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Michael L.. The Meaning of Probability. Introduction. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity. Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. Edited by Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Michael L.. The Odyssey Press Inc., New York 1966, Pp. 17–26.Carnap Rudolf. On Inductive Logic. A Reprint of XI19. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity. Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. Edited by Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Michael L.. The Odyssey Press Inc., New York 1966, Pp. 35–61.Barker Stephen F.. Enumerative Induction. A Reprint of Pp. 82–90 of XXVII 122. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity. Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. Edited by Foster Marguerite H. And Martin Micha. [REVIEW]David Miller - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3):451-454.
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  50. Samuel Goldberg. Probability. An Introduction. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960, Xiv + 322 Pp. [REVIEW]Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):543-544.
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