About this topic
Summary Epistemic logics are logics that allow one to reason about knowledge in some way. The term ‘epistemic logic’ is often applied also to logics of related notions, such as logics of belief (more strictly, doxastic logics) and justification. Many epistemic logics are modal logics, whose language contains one or more knowledge operators and whose semantics is given in terms of relational Kripke models, containing epistemically possible worlds related to one another by epistemic accessibility relations. This modal approach to epistemic logic has been widely adopted in formal logic, philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, economics and game theory. The sub-sategory ‘Doxastic and Epistemic Logic’ also includes formal work on belief revision. This category also includes inductive logics and non-monotonic logics, both of which add to the stock of valid inferences, beyond those valid in classical logic. (These logics are super-classical, containing inferences which are not deductively valid and hence, in some sense, less than certain. In such logics, there is no guarantee that truth will be preserved from premises to conclusions. Non-monotonic logics have the feature that an inference from premises X to conclusion A may be valid, and yet the inference to may fail if we add an addition premise B to X, so that XA but not X, B ⊢ A.
Key works Modern epistemic logic began with Hintikka 1962, who developed Kripke-style semantics for epistemic notions and discussed appropriate axioms for knowledge and belief. Hintikka proposes a solution to the logical omniscience problem, whereby agents are treated as automatically knowing all consequences of what they know, in Hintikka 1975. Hintikka's approach is developed and applied to problems in computer science in Fagin et al 1995. The leading theory of belief revision, the ‘AGM’ theory, was first presented in Alchourrón et al 1985. Key early works in inductive logic are Keynes 1929 and Carnap’s 1945, 19521962. Key early works in non-monotonic logic are Moore 1985
Introductions Hintikka 1962 is a great introduction to epistemic and doxastic logics; Hendricks 2008 briefly surveys the area. Huber 2013 introduces and discusses AGM theories of belief revision. Hawthorne 2011 and Huber 2007 are good encyclopaedia entries on inductive logic; Hacking 2001 is a book-length introduction. Antonelli 2008 is a good, brief introduction to non-monotonic logic; an excellent book-length treatment is Makinson 2005
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
774 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 774
Material to categorize
  1. M. Abraham, I. Belfer, D. M. Gabbay & U. Schild (2013). Future Determination of Entities in Talmudic Public Announcement Logic. Journal of Applied Logic 11 (1):63-90.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. T. Ågotnes, H. van Ditmarsch & T. French (2016). The Undecidability of Quantified Announcements. Studia Logica 104 (4):597-640.
    This paper demonstrates the undecidability of a number of logics with quantification over public announcements: arbitrary public announcement logic, group announcement logic, and coalition announcement logic. In APAL we consider the informative consequences of any announcement, in GAL we consider the informative consequences of a group of agents all of which are simultaneously making known announcements. So this is more restrictive than APAL. Finally, CAL is as GAL except that we now quantify over anything the agents not in that group (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Thomas Ågotnes, Philippe Balbiani, Hans van Ditmarsch & Pablo Seban (2010). Group Announcement Logic. Journal of Applied Logic 8 (1):62-81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Varol Akman, Situated Nonmonotonic Temporal Reasoning with BABY-SIT.
    gramming environment, BABY-SIT, which is based on situation theory. We then demonstrate how problems requir-.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan (2009). A Logic of Situated Resource-Bounded Agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):79-95.
    We propose a framework for modelling situated resource-bounded agents. The framework is based on an objective ascription of intentional modalities and can be easily tailored to the system we want to model and the properties we wish to specify. As an elaboration of the framework, we introduce a logic, OBA, for describing the observations, beliefs, goals and actions of simple agents, and show that OBA is complete, decidable and has an efficient model checking procedure, allowing properties of agents specified in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Dimitris Askounis, Costas D. Koutras & Yorgos Zikos (2016). Knowledge Means ‘All’, Belief Means ‘Most’. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (3):173-192.
    We introduce a bimodal epistemic logic intended to capture knowledge as truth in all epistemically alternative states and belief as a generalised ‘majority’ quantifier, interpreted as truth in most of the epistemically alternative states. This doxastic interpretation is of interest in knowledge-representation applications and it also holds an independent philosophical and technical appeal. The logic comprises an epistemic modal operator, a doxastic modal operator of consistent and complete belief and ‘bridge’ axioms which relate knowledge to belief. To capture the notion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Bruce Aune (1986). Formal Logic and Practical Reasoning. Theory and Decision 20 (3):301-320.
    In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is clearly the simplest, because it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard assertoric principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Iep Author (2016). Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
    Dynamic Epistemic Logic This article tells the story of the rise of dynamic epistemic logic, which began with epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge, in the 1960s. Then, in the late 1980s, came dynamic epistemic logic, the logic of change of knowledge. Much of it was motivated by puzzles and paradoxes. The number … Continue reading Dynamic Epistemic Logic →.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Elizabeth A. Behnke (1992). Announcement. Human Studies 15 (2-3):300-300.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Benthem Johan van & R. Velázquez-Quesada Fernando (2010). The Dynamics of Awareness. Synthese 177 (S1):5 - 27.
    Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference— and key axioms of the system merely postulate "deductive closure". In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and hence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  11. Alex Blum (1976). A Logic of Belief. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17 (3):344-348.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Alexander Bochman (2000). Belief Contraction as Nonmonotonic Inference. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2):605-626.
    A notion of an epistemic state is introduced as a generalization of common representations suggested for belief change. Based on it, a new kind of nonmonotonic inference relation corresponding to belief contractions is defined. A number of representation results is established that cover both traditional AGM contractions and contractions that do not satisfy recovery.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Ivan Boh (2014). Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages. Routledge.
    _Epistemic Logic_ studies statements containing verbs such as 'know' and 'wish'. It is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the present century. This is the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the rules for entailment between epistemic statements, the search for the conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems of substitutivity in intentional contexts, the relationship between epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Ivan Boh (2005). Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages. Routledge.
    _Epistemic Logic_ studies statements containing verbs such as 'know' and 'wish'. It is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the present century. This is the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the rules for entailment between epistemic statements, the search for the conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems of substitutivity in intentional contexts, the relationship between epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Herbert G. Bohnert (1969). Martin Richard M.. A Formalization of Inductive Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):137-138.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Giacomo Bonanno (2001). Branching Time, Perfect Information Games and Backward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior 36 (1):57-73.
    The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the con¯nes of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a di®erent branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by de¯ning the notion of prediction. A syntactic characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. R. Booth & J. B. Paris (1998). A Note on the Rational Closure of Knowledge Bases with Both Positive and Negative Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):165-190.
    The notion of the rational closure of a positive knowledge base K of conditional assertions | (standing for if then normally ) was first introduced by Lehmann (1989) and developed by Lehmann and Magidor (1992). Following those authors we would also argue that the rational closure is, in a strong sense, the minimal information, or simplest, rational consequence relation satisfying K. In practice, however, one might expect a knowledge base to consist not just of positive conditional assertions, | , but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Michael Caie (forthcoming). Doxastic Logic. Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. John Cantwell (2006). A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422.
    A semantics is presented for belief revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other’s beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal-structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. John Cantwell (2005). A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):303-329.
    A semantics is presented for belief-revision in the face of common announcements to a group of agents that have beliefs about each other's beliefs. The semantics is based on the idea that possible worlds can be viewed as having an internal structure, representing the belief independent features of the world, and the respective belief states of the agents in a modular fashion. Modularity guarantees that changing one aspect of the world (a belief independent feature or a belief state) has no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. James Cargile (1969). Lemmon E. J.. On Sentences Verifiable by Their Use. Analysis , Vol. 22 No. 4 , Pp. 86–89.Hintikka Jaakko. Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance? The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71 , Pp. 3–32. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (4):615-616.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Rudolf Carnap (1971). A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part I. In Richard Jeffrey & Rudolf Carnap (eds.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press: Los Angeles. pp. 34--165.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1964). Hintikka Jaakko. Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1962, X + 179 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 29 (3):132-134.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Jake Chandler & Richard Booth (forthcoming). The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one's initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Taolue Chen, Giuseppe Primiero, Franco Raimondi & Neha Rungta (2016). A Computationally Grounded, Weighted Doxastic Logic. Studia Logica 104 (4):679-703.
    Modelling, reasoning and verifying complex situations involving a system of agents is crucial in all phases of the development of a number of safety-critical systems. In particular, it is of fundamental importance to have tools and techniques to reason about the doxastic and epistemic states of agents, to make sure that the agents behave as intended. In this paper we introduce a computationally grounded logic called COGWED and we present two types of semantics that support a range of practical situations. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Meyer & Ka-Shu Wong (2008). Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):501-520.
    The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   67 citations  
  28. C. West Churchman (1946). Bergmann Gustav. Some Comments on Carnap's Logic of Induction. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13 Pp. 71–78. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):81.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Thomas Crumley (1934). Logic, Deductive and Inductive. New York: the Macmillan Company.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2013). Confirmation as Partial Entailment: A Representation Theorem in Inductive Logic. Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl (1997). On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Artificial Intelligence 89:1-29.
    We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   47 citations  
  32. James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak & Maurice Pagnucco (2005). Gricean Belief Change. Studia Logica 79 (1):97-113.
    One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. J. Demongeot (1988). Announcement. Acta Biotheoretica 37 (3-4):103-103.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Eliot Deutsch (1972). Announcement. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):i-i.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Sebastian Enqvist (2009). Interrogative Belief Revision in Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):527-548.
    The well known AGM framework for belief revision has recently been extended to include a model of the research agenda of the agent, i.e. a set of questions to which the agent wishes to find answers (Olsson & Westlund in Erkenntnis , 65 , 165–183, 2006 ). The resulting model has later come to be called interrogative belief revision . While belief revision has been studied extensively from the point of view of modal logic, so far interrogative belief revision has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Marcelo A. Falappa, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Maurício D. L. Reis & Guillermo R. Simari (2012). Prioritized and Non-Prioritized Multiple Change on Belief Bases. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):77-113.
    In this article we explore multiple change operators, i.e., operators in which the epistemic input is a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. We propose two types of change: prioritized change, in which the input set is fully accepted, and symmetric change, where both the epistemic state and the epistemic input are equally treated. In both kinds of operators we propose a set of postulates and we present different constructions: kernel changes and partial meet changes.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37. Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari (2013). Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the rejection of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. Don Fallis (2007). Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments. Studia Logica 86 (2):215-246.
    Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e. g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model-suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]-that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This is because this proper scoring rule (PSR) model captures a wider range of scientifically acceptable attitudes toward epistemic risk than the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Michael Fisher & Chiara Ghidini (2009). Exploring the Future with Resource-Bounded Agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):3-21.
    We here describe research into the formal specification and implementation of resource-bounded agents. In particular, we provide an overview of our work on incorporating resource limitations into executable agent specifications. In addition, we outline future directions, highlighting both their promise and their problems.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Michael Fisher, Munindar Singh, Diana Spears & Mike Wooldridge (2007). Logic-Based Agent Verification. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2):193-195.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Melvin Fitting (2011). Reasoning About Games. Studia Logica 99 (1-3):143-169.
    is used to give a formalization of Artemov’s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [ 4 , 5 ]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42. Lee Flax (2007). An Algebraic Approach to Belief Contraction and Nonmonotonic Entailment. Journal of Applied Logic 5 (3):478-491.
  43. Marilyn Ford (2005). Human Nonmonotonic Reasoning: The Importance of Seeing the Logical Strength of Arguments. Synthese 146 (1-2):71-92.
    Three studies of human nonmonotonic reasoning are described. The results show that people find such reasoning quite difficult, although being given problems with known subclass-superclass relationships is helpful. The results also show that recognizing differences in the logical strengths of arguments is important for the nonmonotonic problems studied. For some of these problems, specificity – which is traditionally considered paramount in drawing appropriate conclusions – was irrelevant and so should have lead to a “can’t tell” response; however, people could give (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Beth Forrest (2005). Announcement. Agriculture and Human Values 22 (3):373-374.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Peter Forrest (1986). The Dynamics of Belief: A Normative Logic. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  46. Paolo Galeazzi & Emiliano Lorini (2016). Epistemic Logic Meets Epistemic Game Theory: A Comparison Between Multi-Agent Kripke Models and Type Spaces. Synthese 193 (7):2097-2127.
    In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Peter Gärdenfors (1984). The Dynamics of Belief as a Basis for Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1):1-10.
  48. Jelle Gerbrandy & Willem Groeneveld (1997). Reasoning About Information Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):147-169.
    In this paper we introduce Dynamic Epistemic Logic, which is alogic for reasoning about information change in a multi-agent system. Theinformation structures we use are based on non-well-founded sets, and canbe conceived as bisimulation classes of Kripke models. On these structures,we define a notion of information change that is inspired by UpdateSemantics (Veltman, 1996). We give a sound and complete axiomatization ofthe resulting logic, and we discuss applications to the puzzle of the dirtychildren, and to knowledge programs.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  49. Bart Geurts, Logical Reasoning.
    In the psychological literature on reasoning it has always been assumed that if there is such a thing as mental logic, it must be a set of inference rules. This proof-theoretic conception of mental logic is compatible with but doesn’t do justice to what, according to most logicians, logic is about. Thus, the ongoing debate over mental logic is based on a too narrow notion of logic. Adopting the broader perspective suggested by the standard (Tarskian) view on logic helps to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Anna Gomolińska (1998). On the Logic of Acceptance and Rejection. Studia Logica 60 (2):233-251.
    The logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2) is a nonmonotonic formalism to represent states of knowledge of an introspective agent making decisions about available information. Though having much in common, AEL2 differs from Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) by the fact that the agent not only can accept or reject a given fact, but he/she also has the possibility not to make any decision in case he/she does not have enough knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 774