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  1. Grit.Sarah Paul & Jennifer Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.
    Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit." Philosophers have had little to say about grit, however, insofar as it differs from more familiar notions of willpower or continence. This leaves us ill-equipped to assess the social and moral implications of promoting grit. We propose that grit has an (...)
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  2. Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Logic.Nicolás Lo Guercio & Damian Szmuc - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):153-170.
    In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ¬A) both A and ¬A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason (...)
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  3. Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity.Michael Nielsen & Rush Stewart - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...)
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  4. Epistemic Environmentalism.Shane Ryan - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:97-112.
    I motivate and develop a normative framework for undertaking work in applied epistemology. I set out the framework, which I call epistemic environmentalism, explaining the role of social epistemology and epistemic value theory in the framework. Next, I explain the environmentalist terminology that is employed and its usefulness. In the second part of the paper, I make the case for a specific epistemic environmentalist proposal. I argue that dishonest testimony by experts and certain institutional testifiers should be liable to the (...)
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  5. Believing in Others.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95.
    Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A (...)
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  6. The Virtue of Curiosity.Lewis Ross - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    A thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? (...)
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  7. The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief.Thomas Kroedel - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):741–751.
    This paper defends the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox against an objection by Anna-Maria Asunta Eder. Eder argues that the permissibility solution should also be applicable to the preface paradox, but conflicts with a plausible principle about epistemic permissions when so applied. This paper replies by first criticizing Eder’s considerations in defense of her principle; in particular, it argues that the plausibility of her principle is to a large extent parasitic on the spurious plausibility of the principle of factual (...)
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  8. Deflating Truth About Taste.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...)
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  9. Normative Alethic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms: Truth and Logic. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168.
    Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what (...)
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  10. How to Be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.
    Epistemic consequentialists think that epistemic norms are about believing the truth and avoiding error. Recently, a number of authors have rejected epistemic consequentialism on the basis that it incorrectly sanctions tradeoffs of epistemic goodness. Here, I argue that epistemic consequentialists should borrow two lessons from ethical consequentialists to respond to these worries. Epistemic consequentialists should construe their view as an account of right belief, which they distinguish from other notions like rational and justified belief. Epistemic consequentialists should also make their (...)
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  11. How To Solve The Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage into a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the (...)
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  12. Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.
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  13. Disjuntivismo epistemológico e ceticismo radical - uma proposta anticética conciliatória.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2017 - Dissertation,
    This work aims to present and discuss recent developments in epistemology that seek for satisfactory formulations and responses to the problem of radical skepticism. Its main goal is to understand how the skeptical problem can be properly characterized, how it can be viewed as inserted in the traditional dispute in epistemology between externalism and internalism, and to which extent antiskeptical theories are situated within this dispute. After identifying their place in the dispute, another antiskeptical proposal is discussed, one that suggests (...)
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  14. Epistemologia da Virtude – Virtude Epistemology (SEP Translation).Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos, Pedro Merlussi, John Greco & John Turri - 2015 - Intuitio 1 (8):325-362.
    [From SEP]: Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These (...)
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  15. Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory.Charles Cote-Bouchard & Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Robin McKenna & Christos Kyriacou (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...)
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  16. True Enough.Catherine Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Science relies on models and idealizations that are known not to be true. Even so, science is epistemically reputable. To accommodate science, epistemology should focus on understanding rather than knowledge and should recognize that the understanding of a topic need not be factive. This requires reconfiguring the norms of epistemic acceptability. If epistemology has the resources to accommodate science, it will also have the resources to show that art too advances understanding.
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  17. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. (...)
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  18. Introduction.Daniel Star - forthcoming - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  19. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...)
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  20. The Epistemic.Earl Conee - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):858-866.
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  21. KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action.Michael Da Silva - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):321-331.
    This piece examines the purported explanatory and normative role of knowledge in Timothy Williamson‘s account of intentional action and suggests that it isin tension with his argument against the luminosity of knowledge. Only iterable knowledge can serve as the norm for action capable of explaining both why people with knowledge act differently than those with mere beliefs and why only those who act on the basis of knowledge-desire pairs are responsible actors.
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  22. Paradoxical Assertions: A Reply to Turri.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):239-241.
    In earlier work, I have argued that the self-referential assertion that “this assertion is improper” is paradoxical for the truth account of assertion, the view onwhich an assertion is proper if and only if it is true. In a recent paper in this journal, John Turri has suggested a response to the paradox: one might simply deny that in uttering “this assertion is improper” one makes a genuine assertion. In this paper, I argue that this ‘no assertion’ response does not (...)
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  23. In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness.Alex Bundy - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):287-292.
    The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.
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  24. Knowledge, Justification and the Norms of Assertion.Stuart Milne - unknown
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  25. Epistemic Options in the Face of Epistemic Barriers.Murat Arıcı - 2015 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):17.
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  26. The Maladroitness of Epistemic Tit for Tat.John Woods - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):324.
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  27. Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation.David Henderson & John Greco - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
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  28. Epistemic Inertia and Epistemic Isolationism.Neil Manson - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):291-298.
    Allen Buchanan argues that conventional applied ethics is impoverished and would be enriched by the addition of social moral epistemology. The aim here is to clarify this argument and to raise questions about whether such an addition is necessary about how such enrichment would work in practice. Two broad problems are identified. First, there are various kinds and sources of epistemic inertia, which act as an obstacle to epistemic change. Religion is one striking example and seems to pose a deep (...)
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  29. Belief, Aim Of.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  30. Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.
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  31. Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.Richard Rowland - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv070.
    Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.
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  32. Philosophical Issues: Epistemic Agency.Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva & Baron Reed - 2013 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.
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  33. Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology.David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
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  34. Social Homeostasis and the Exceeding Normativity.Andrea Bardin - 2015 - In Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon. Springer Verlag.
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  35. Narrating Truths Worth Living: Addiction Narratives.Doug McConnell & Anke Snoek - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):77-78.
    Self-narrative is often, perhaps primarily, a tool of self- constitution, not of truth representation. We explore this theme with reference to our own recent qualitative interviews of substance-dependent agents. Narrative self- constitution, the process of realizing a valued narrative projection of oneself, depends on one’s narrative tracking truth to a certain extent. Therefore, insofar as narratives are successfully realized, they have a claim to being true, although a certain amount of self-deception typically comes along for the ride. We suggest that, (...)
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  36. Beyond Epistemology: Nietzsche and the Need for Epistemic Criteria.Robert Hull - unknown
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  37. A Theory of Epistemic Appraisal Terms.Joseph Leonard Poetker - 1970 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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  38. Practical Implication: Some Problems in the Logic of Assertion.Sue Howard Larson - 1962 - Dissertation, Stanford University
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  39. Knowledge and Norms: A Defense of Epistemic Justification.Kevin Marshall Meeker - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that epistemic justification is necessary for knowledge and also provide a deontological theory about the nature of epistemic justification. To hone my own deontological account of epistemic justification, I look at various examples and arguments designed to show that one can have knowledge even if one has violated certain epistemic norms or duties. Particularly, I examine some prominent examples from William Alston and Alvin Plantinga. I conclude that these counterexamples do not show that (...)
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  40. In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Christoph Kelp Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.
    A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.
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  41. The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge. [REVIEW]R. J. - 1927 - New Scholasticism 1 (4):362-363.
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  42. A Study Of The Truth's Being Constitutive Or Non-Constitutive In The Sinan Definition Of Certain Judgmental Knowledge.Mas'ud Umid - 2011 - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 65.
    The present paper deals with the theory of Ibn Sina's certain judgmental knowledge in terms of determining its constituent parts. Given Ibn Sina's existing ideas, these constitutive elements include belief, bi-dimensionality of belief, stability, and existence of middle term . Nevertheless, regarding the notion of truth, we should say that Ibn Sina's considering it a constituent part creates several problems. The writer believes that since this point has not been directly stated in Ibn Sina's views, truth is necessary for a (...)
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  43. Epistemic Possibilities and the Sources of Belief.Karen Leigh Brown - 2002 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    I develop Stalnaker's ideas of a causal/pragmatic account of belief, refitting them to function in Situation Theory. Building on the semantics of perception reports, I make the case for the idealizing assumption of the veridicality of belief. I introduce as a requirement on a belief state a soundness condition adapted from information theory. The problem of error leads me to develop epistemic support as part of a revised soundness condition. ;I argue that a psychologically adequate model of belief will include (...)
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  44. Review of Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Steffen Borge - 2006 - Disputatio 1 (20):361-368.
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  45. Crombie's Defense of the Assertion-Status of Religious Claims.William T. Blackstone - 1963 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):220.
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  46. Scientific Rationality and Epistemic Goals.David Resnik - 1998 - ProtoSociology 12:258-289.
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  47. Epistemic Terrains and Epistemic Responsibility.Margaret Walshaw - 2002 - Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 16.
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  48. The Inquiring Mind. [REVIEW]S. F. L. - 1960 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (3):529-529.
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  49. The Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):718-718.
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  50. Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism.Andrea Kruse - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):675-680.
    The theory of epistemic deontologism is an area of normative epistemology. It is concerned with the application of deontic notions such as obligation, permission, blame and praise in epistemic contexts. Nottelmann’s book “Blameworthy Belief” deals with the applicability of one of the central notions of epistemic deontologism, namely the concept of epistemic blameworthiness.But the study goes beyond the analysis and introduction of this concept. By introducing this notion Nottelmann establishes a theory of epistemic deontologism that is build upon epistemic blame (...)
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