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  1. Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer's own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can't. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this (...)
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  2. Kornblith and His Critics.Luis Oliveira & Joshua DiPaolo (eds.) - forthcoming - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Hilary Kornblith is one of the world’s leading epistemologists, a champion of an innovative philosophical research program that is at once traditional and revisionary. In viewing the study of knowledge as inseparable from the empirical study of the mind, Kornblith aligns himself closely with the approach of the traditional empiricists of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet in taking contemporary empirical work seriously, Kornblith has developed views and arguments that shift the epistemological focus away from what is available first-personally _within_ (...)
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  3. A defense of the veritist account of the goal of inquiry.Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Veritists hold that the goal of inquiry is true belief, while justificationists contend that the goal of inquiry is justified belief. Recently, Christoph Kelp makes two new objections to both veritism and justificationism. Further, he claims that the two objections suggest that the goal of inquiry is knowledge. This paper defends a sophisticated version of veritism against Kelp's two objections.
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  4. Bioética e consenso. Uma análise da teoria principialista.Marta Dias Barcelos - 2022 - Cascais: Princípia Editora.
  5. The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.YiLi Zhou & Rhys Borchert - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (2):215-241.
    Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In (...)
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  6. Normativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines.Rik Peels, Nora Kindermann & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptualize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic (...)
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  7. Review of Daniel Whiting's The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology[REVIEW]Nathaniel Sharadin - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):461-465.
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  8. Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    In an influential recent paper, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (“HRS”) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they argue that the referent of believe in ordinary language is much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose; that one needs very little evidence to be entitled to believe a proposition in this sense; and that the referent of believe in ordinary language just is the ordinary concept of belief. I argue here to the contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests of weakness – the (...)
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  9. Good Guesses as Accuracy-Specificity Tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Guessing is a familiar activity, one we engage in when we are uncertain of the answer to a question under discussion. It is also an activity that lends itself to normative evaluation: some guesses are better than others. The question that interests me here is what makes for a good guess. In recent work, Dorst and Mandelkern have argued that good guesses are distinguished from bad ones by how well they optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and specificity. Here, I argue (...)
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  10. Ambiguous Statements about Akrasia.Luis Rosa - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):581-601.
    Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first (...)
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  11. Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required.David Christensen - 2022 - Noûs 1 (online first):1-22.
    It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does (...)
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  12. The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists.Alexandre Duval & Charles Cote-Bouchard - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show that (...)
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  13. How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation. Routledge. pp. 306-322.
    One of the main worries with machine learning model opacity is that we cannot know enough about how the model works to fully understand the decisions they make. But how much is model opacity really a problem? This chapter argues that the problem of machine learning model opacity is entangled with non-epistemic values. The chapter considers three different stages of the machine learning modeling process that corresponds to understanding phenomena: (i) model acceptance and linking the model to the phenomenon, (ii) (...)
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  14. Evidence and Epistemic Normativity.Daniel Buckley - 2022 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. For instance, we are told to apportion our beliefs to the evidence, to not believe a claim without seeking out countervailing evidence, and so on. But what accounts for the normativity of evidence? This dissertation is devoted to answering this question. In order to answer it, I develop a novel approach to the theory of epistemic normativity. According to my approach, epistemic norms structure a social practice of epistemic accountability. This (...)
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  15. Justification Without Excuses: A Defense of Classical Deontologism.Blake McAllister - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):353-366.
    Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. Moreover, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs. Call this the “classical deontologist” conception of justification. As the original conception, we ought to accept it unless proven untenable. Nowadays, however, most have abandoned classical deontologism as precisely that—untenable. It stands accused of requiring doxastic voluntarism and normative transparency. My goal is to rescue classical deontologism from these accusations. (...)
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  16. Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...)
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  17. Bad Concepts, Bilateral Contents.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:595-614.
    I argue that one need not be an inferentialist in order to model inconsistent concepts, contrary to what some have thought. Representationalists can do so by adopting a form of bilateralism about contents. It remains unclear, however, why conceptual inconsistency would constitute a defect to be eliminated, rather than a vindication of dialetheism to be embraced. I suggest some answers to explore that involve accepting a descriptive form of dialetheism but denying its normative forms.
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  18. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  19. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  20. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  21. Broome on Enkrasia and Akrasia.Byeong D. Lee - 2021 - Logique Et Analyse 254:175-189.
    John Broome defends what he calls ‘Enkrasia’, which is roughly this: Rationality requires of you that if you believe that you ought to do A, you intend to do A. He provides two arguments for Enkrasia. First, he argues for what he calls ‘enkratic reasoning’: ‘I ought to do A. So I shall do A’. Second, he also provides the following line of argument: Enkrasia is the requirement not to be akratic; akrasia is irrational; so Enkrasia is a rational requirement. (...)
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  22. Inquiring Further: Essays on Epistemic Normativity.Elise Woodard - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
    My dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms on what I call ‘inquiring further.’ Inquiring further is a familiar practice we engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Nonetheless, many philosophers have argued that norms governing further inquiry are at most practical or moral norms. Against this, I argue that norms on inquiring further are central to our understanding of responsible epistemic agency. I do this by appealing to both the roles of epistemic evaluations and (...)
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  23. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context.Mona Simion - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    This work is a manifesto for epistemic independence: the independence of good thinking from practical considerations. It presents a functionalist account of the normativity of assertion in conjunction with an integrated view of the normativity of constative speech acts.
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  24. The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.
    This paper has two aims: it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one’s conjecture that p is permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe that p. I argue for my account on three independent grounds: the Bach and Harnish account of the nature of communicative speech (...)
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  25. Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge.Paul Silva Jr - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...)
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  26. Да вярваш рационално. Изследване върху обосноваността в традиционната епистемология.Anna M. Ivanova - 2020
    Книгата е посветена на проблема за обосноваността от класическата интерналистка гледна точка на епистемологията. Тя преразглежда традиционните проблеми в интерналистката рамка в по-широкия контекст на развитието в тази област през последните петдесет години.Централните проблеми в изследването се отнасят до условията на обосноваността като резултат от епистемичната оценка на вярванията с помощта на свидетелства и основания. Сред тях са проблемът за характера на свидетелствата и мястото им в процедурата на епистемична оценка, проблемите за добрите и достатъчни основания и проблемът за регреса (...)
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  27. Epistemic Atonement.Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    When we think about agents who change a long-standing belief, we sometimes have conflicting reactions. On the one hand, such agents often epistemically improve. For example, their new belief may be better supported by the evidence or closer to the truth. On the other hand, such agents are often subject to criticism. Examples include politicians who change their minds on whether climate change is occurring or whether vaccines cause autism. What explains this criticism, and is it ever justified? To answer (...)
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  28. Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity.James Bernard Willoughby - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
    We are bombarded with epistemic norms. Respect your evidence. Don’t believe in contradictions. Don’t arbitrarily change beliefs. But how do such norms get their normative force? Why should we respect our evidence, for example? In this paper I offer a familiar type of answer, epistemic instrumentalism. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that epistemic norms get their normative force by being useful. You should respect your evidence because it will help you achieve some valuable ends. This answer, while familiar, is not very popular. (...)
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  29. Correction to: The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism.Carlo Burelli & Chiara Destri - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):415-415.
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  30. Mechanizmy predykcyjne i ich normatywność [Predictive mechanisms and their normativity].Michał Piekarski - 2020 - Warszawa, Polska: Liberi Libri.
    The aim of this study is to justify the belief that there are biological normative mechanisms that fulfill non-trivial causal roles in the explanations (as formulated by researchers) of actions and behaviors present in specific systems. One example of such mechanisms is the predictive mechanisms described and explained by predictive processing (hereinafter PP), which (1) guide actions and (2) shape causal transitions between states that have specific content and fulfillment conditions (e.g. mental states). Therefore, I am guided by a specific (...)
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  31. Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  32. Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.
    Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. (...)
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  33. Epistemic isomorphism.Sayid R. Bnefsi - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):543-554.
    This paper presents and defends a novel meta‐epistemological thesis, epistemic isomorphism, according to which our relations to others and to ourselves have the same pattern of relevance to our rationality. This means that correct epistemological theorizing will give formal parity to interpersonal and intrapersonal epistemic norms, such that what holds interpersonally also holds, mutatis mutandis, intrapersonally. In addition to arguing for epistemic isomorphism, the paper presents some epistemological case studies in which it is shown that the methodological and argumentative strategies (...)
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  34. Disagreement and suspended judgement.Filippo Ferrari - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):526-542.
    Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition <p> be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes <p> as well as with some- one who disbelieves <p>? This paper argues for an af- firmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition <p>. More specifically, the (...)
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  35. Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Noûs.
    Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims (...)
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  36. Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience.Savannah Pearlman & Williams Elizabeth - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).
    In this paper we argue that moral deference is prima facie obligatory in cases in which the testifier is a member of a marginalized social group that the receiver is not and testifies about their marginalized experience. We distinguish between two types of deference: epistemic deference, which refers to believing p in virtue of trusting the testifier, and actional deference, which involves acting appropriately in response to the testimony given. The prima facie duty we propose applies to both epistemic and (...)
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  37. Fichte and Kant on Reason’s Final Ends and Highest Ideas.Steven Hoeltzel - 2018 - Revista de Estudios Sobre Fichte 16.
    I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between their positions, I suggest, is simply that Fichte operates with a more abstract understanding of the transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently, he arrives at a conceptually more concentrated understanding of pure reason’s preeminent Idea. In section one, I supply some context for that comparison. In section two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of (...)
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  38. The Three Basic Principles (drei Grundsätze).Steven Hoeltzel - 2020 - In Marina F. Bykova (ed.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Fichte. pp. 327-35.
    Part One of Fichte’s 1794/95 Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre sets forth three basic principles (Grundsätze) as the founding claims of a ‘theory of science’ that should continue and consolidate Kant’s work by vindicating and integrating the theoretical and practical essentials of the Critical philosophy. These principles (my translations) are: (1) “The I originally absolutely posits its own being.” (2) “A not-I is absolutely opposed to the I”; ergo, “opposition in general is absolutely posited by the I.” (3) “In the (...)
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  39. Fichte’s Account of Reason and Rational Normativity.Steven Hoeltzel - 2019 - In The Palgrave Fichte Handbook. pp. 189-212.
    This essay argues for a unifying and clarifying analysis of Fichte’s diverse and unusual characterizations of the nature of reason and rational normativity. Fichte equates or closely associates reason with “I-hood,” “positing” (especially self-positing), “acting” (as opposed to being), “self-reverting activity,” and “subject-objectivity.” He also claims that reason, qua reason, harbors “an absolute tendency toward the absolute” – and even that, in the final analysis, “only reason is.” I argue that we can readily grasp the meaning, interconnection, and putative justification (...)
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  40. Totuuden arvon ja normatiivisuuden puolesta.Teemu Tauriainen - 2022 - In Hemmo Laiho (ed.), Valistuksen perinnöt: Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen kollokvion esitelmiä. Turku, Finland: pp. 163-179.
    Totuus on nykyisellään laaja-alaisen kritiikin kohteena niin akateemisessa, poliittisessa kuin vähemmän formaalissakin kontekstissa. Puolustan filosofisesti kestävää ja selitysvoimaista totuuskäsitettä tältä laaja-alaiselta kritiikiltä argumentoimalla sen arvon ja normatiivisuuden puolesta. Totuus on välineellisesti arvokas käsite, joka mahdollistaa todellisuuden erottamisen kuvitelmasta ja toiveajattelusta. Tämän lisäksi todet uskomukset ovat välineellisesti arvokkaita moninaisten hyötyjen, kuten onnistuneiden ennustusten ja navigoinnin saavuttamisessa. Toisaalta olemme joskus kiinnostuneita totuudesta pelkästään sen itsensä takia. Totuuden normatiivisuudesta kertoo taipumuksemme pitää sitä yleisenä tiedollisten pyrkimysten päämääränä ja yhtenä uskomuksen sekä väitettävyyden oikeellisuuden standardina, (...)
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  41. Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.
    I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to (...)
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  42. Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity.Reza Hadisi - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...)
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  43. Awareness, Epistemics, and Paradigm Repair: An epistemic lexicon of terms, with definitive explanations.Michael Lucas Monterey & Michael Lucas-Monterey - manuscript
    Abstract: This is necessarily an evolutionary work in progress. Its purpose and goal is enabling real progress of science, mathematics, society, and civilization. Thus, to accomplish the mission, upgrading the current sociocultural paradigm is essential. That makes holistic ontology and optimal epistemics essential to ongoing work and to further development of new theory and metatheory. Hence, the current listings of key terms, definitions, and explanations presented here provide some core concepts and supporting theorems, metatheorems, equations, and examples. That enables remedial (...)
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  44. From Explanation to Recommendation: Ethical Standards for Algorithmic Recourse.Emily Sullivan & Philippe Verreault-Julien - forthcoming - Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES’22).
    People are increasingly subject to algorithmic decisions, and it is generally agreed that end-users should be provided an explanation or rationale for these decisions. There are different purposes that explanations can have, such as increasing user trust in the system or allowing users to contest the decision. One specific purpose that is gaining more traction is algorithmic recourse. We first pro- pose that recourse should be viewed as a recommendation problem, not an explanation problem. Then, we argue that the capability (...)
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  45. Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In A. K. Flowerree & Baron Reed (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
    Bayesians standardly claim that there is rational pressure for agents’ credences to cohere across time because they face bad (epistemic or practical) consequences if they fail to diachronically cohere. But as David Christensen has pointed out, groups of individual agents also face bad consequences if they fail to interpersonally cohere, and there is no general rational pressure for one agent's credences to cohere with another’s. So it seems that standard Bayesian arguments may prove too much. Here, we agree with Christensen (...)
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  46. new problems for the argument view of thought experiments.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues & Roberto Schimitz Nitsche - 2021 - Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil: EDIPUCRS.
    Abstract: It is assumed that thought experiments are devices of imagination that can yield us beliefs constituting knowledge. Nevertheless, how thought experiments work to provide positive epistemic status is a controversial matter. One of the main approaches available in the literature to account for thought experiments is the so-called Argument View. Advocates of this view argue that thought experiments have no epistemic significance. They claim that there is not anything distinctive about thought experiments because they work just like arguments. In (...)
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  47. Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88.
    A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...)
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  48. A limitation on agency in judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.
    To many, judgment has seemed a locus of cognitive agency, a kind of cognitive mental act. In one minimal sense, judgment is something one does. I consider whether judgment is more robustly agential: is it a kind of action done with an aim? The most attractive version of this sort of position takes judging that p to affirming that p with an alethic aim, an aim such as affirming truly. I argue that such views have unacceptable consequences. Acts done with (...)
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  49. Verdad y violencia epistémica. Desafíos al conocimiento humanista sobre lo universal (a modo de prólogo).José Ramón Fabelo Corzo - 2020 - In Camilo Valqui Cachi, José Gilberto Garza Grimaldo, Ángel Ascencio Romero, Medardo Reyes Salinas, Jaime Salazar Adame & Daniel Mora Magallón (eds.), Epistemología crítica de la violencia del capital. Verdad y violencia epistémica. Chilpancingo de los Bravo, Gro., México: pp. 13-40.
    Incluido a modo de prólogo en el libro Epistemología crítica de la violencia del capital. Verdad y violencia epistémica, el trabajo “Verdad y violencia epistémica. Desafíos al conocimiento humanista sobre lo universal” busca analizar críticamente esa forma particular de violencia que, utilizando herramientas epistemológicas, se basa en el control monopólico de la verdad y en el secuestro de la universalidad humana por parte de aquellos que encarnan los intereses asociados a la lógica del capital y que, precisamente gracias a ese (...)
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  50. Practical reasons for belief without stakes☆.N. G. Laskowski & Shawn Hernandez - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):16-27.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 16-27, March 2022.
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