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  1. Epistemic Options in the Face of Epistemic Barriers.Murat Arıcı - 2015 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):17.
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  2. The Inquiring Mind.N. Arne - 1961 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4 (1-4):162 – 189.
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  3. Normative Epistemology and the Bootstrap Theory.G. S. Axtell - 1992 - Philosophical Forum 23 (4):329-343.
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  4. Social Homeostasis and the Exceeding Normativity.Andrea Bardin - 2015 - In Epistemology and Political Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon. Springer Verlag.
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  5. Perspectives on What to Believe : The Information-Sensitivity of the Doxastic 'Should' and Its Implications for Normative Epistemology.Sebastian Becker - 2016 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’ and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are relativized to information-states. After a (...)
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  6. Truth Matters: Normativity in Thought and Knowledge.H. Bensusan & M. Pinedo - 2004 - Theoria 50:137-154.
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  7. Unsafe Assertions.M. J. Blaauw & G. J. De Ridder - unknown
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  8. Crombie's Defense of the Assertion-Status of Religious Claims.William T. Blackstone - 1963 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):220.
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  9. Review of Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Steffen Borge - 2006 - Disputatio 1 (20):361-368.
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  10. Epistemic Possibilities and the Sources of Belief.Karen Leigh Brown - 2002 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    I develop Stalnaker's ideas of a causal/pragmatic account of belief, refitting them to function in Situation Theory. Building on the semantics of perception reports, I make the case for the idealizing assumption of the veridicality of belief. I introduce as a requirement on a belief state a soundness condition adapted from information theory. The problem of error leads me to develop epistemic support as part of a revised soundness condition. ;I argue that a psychologically adequate model of belief will include (...)
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  11. How is Epistemic Reasoning Possible?Denis Bühler - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (4):7-20.
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  12. In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness.Alex Bundy - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):287-292.
    The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.
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  13. The Special Value of Epistemic Self‐Reliance.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):53-67.
    Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is (...)
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  14. Pragmatic Norms in Science: Making Them Explicit.Caamaño Alegre María - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3227-3246.
    The present work constitutes an attempt to make explicit those pragmatic norms successfully operating in empirical science. I will first comment on the initial presuppositions of the discussion, in particular, on those concerning the instrumental character of scientific practice and the nature of scientific goals. Then I will depict the moderately naturalistic frame in which, from this approach, the pragmatic norms make sense. Third, I will focus on the specificity of the pragmatic norms, making special emphasis on what I regard (...)
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  15. The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion.Robert L. Campbell - 2008 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 10 (1):85-170.
    The doctrine of the arbitrary assertion is a key part of Objectivist epistemology as elaborated by Leonard Peikoff. For Peikoff, assertions unsupported by evidence are neither true nor false; they have no context or place in the hierarchy of conceptual knowledge; they are meaningless and paralyze rational cognition; their production is proof of irrationality. A thorough examination of the doctrine reveals worrisomely unclear standards of evidence and a jumble of contradictory claims about which assertions are arbitrary, when they are arbitrary, (...)
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  16. Epistemic Self-Audit and Warranted Reasons. [REVIEW]Quassim Cassam - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):185-191.
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  17. Knowledge and Epistemic Obligation.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:211-233.
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  18. The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg.Matthew Chrisman - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 357-382.
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  19. Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem?Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2000 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 33 (82):45-56.
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...)
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  20. The Power Of Ignorance.Lorraine Code - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):291-308.
    Abstract Taking my point of entry from George Eliot's reference to ?the power of Ignorance?, I analyse some manifestations of that power as she portrays it in the life of a young woman of affluence, in her novel Daniel Deronda. Comparing and contrasting this kind of ignorance with James Mill's avowed ignorance of local tradition and custom in his History of British India, I consider how ignorance can foster immoral beliefs which, in turn, contribute to social-political arrangements of dominance and (...)
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  21. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Lorraine Code - 1989 - Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):829-831.
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  22. Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Lorraine Code - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8:398-401.
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  23. Belief Policies.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):736-738.
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  24. The Epistemic.Earl Conee - 2016 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):858-866.
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  25. The Practical Explication of Knowledge.Edward Craig - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:211 - 226.
  26. KK and the Knowledge Norm of Action.Michael Da Silva - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):321-331.
    This piece examines the purported explanatory and normative role of knowledge in Timothy Williamson‘s account of intentional action and suggests that it isin tension with his argument against the luminosity of knowledge. Only iterable knowledge can serve as the norm for action capable of explaining both why people with knowledge act differently than those with mere beliefs and why only those who act on the basis of knowledge-desire pairs are responsible actors.
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  27. Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay.D. Dall'Agnol - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):859-862.
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  28. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty.Marian David - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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  29. The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.
    Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...)
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  30. Ownership, Authorship and External Justification.Jennifer Duke-Yonge - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since they fail to (...)
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  31. Belief and Normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.
  32. What Liars Can Tell Us About the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.
    If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge-lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian (...)
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  33. Belief, Aim Of.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  34. ``Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology&Quot.Richard Feldman - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):405--419.
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  35. ``Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?&Quot.Roderick Firth - 1978 - In Alvin Goldman & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 215-229.
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  36. Working Without a Net: Essays in Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Avoiding treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action, Foley's approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the questions of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; and the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues.
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  37. Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2).
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  38. The Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):718-718.
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  39. Epistemic Indolence.Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):38-56.
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  40. ``Epistemic Indolence&Quot.Richard Foley & Richard Fumerton - 1982 - Mind 12:38-56.
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  41. Epistemic Bootstrapping1.Peter Forrest - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 53.
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  42. 1. Division of Epistemic Labour Versus the Ideal of Individual Epistemic Autonomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
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  43. Comments on the Will to Believe.Richard M. Gale - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):35 – 39.
    Kasher and Nishi interpret James as holding an expressivist theory about epistemic duties, as well as other normative sentences. On this interpretation, James's claim that we have a will-to-believe type option to believe an epistemic duty winds up being inconsistent. For one can believe only that which is either true or false; but, for the expressivist, normative claims are neither. It is argued that Feldman's essay is not only a wildly anachronistic account of Clifford and James but also is of (...)
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  44. Ontological Arguments and Belief in God.Richard M. Gale - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):715-719.
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  45. The Truth Norm and Guidance: A Reply to Steglich-Petersen.K. Gluer & A. Wikforss - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):757-761.
    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
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  46. Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
    We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to (...)
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  47. Epistemic Value.John Greco - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  48. Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology.John Greco & David Henderson (eds.) - unknown - Oxford University Press.
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  49. Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology.David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
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  50. Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation.David Henderson & John Greco - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
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