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  1. Uri Abraham, Lev Beklemishev, Paola D'Aquino & Marcus Tressl (2016). Preface. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 167 (10):865-867.
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  2. Alice Ambrose (1953). Fitch Frederic B.. Actuality, Possibility, and Being. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 3 No. 3 , Pp. 367–384. Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):89-90.
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  3. Ofer Arieli & Anna Zamansky (2016). Preface. Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (3):221-223.
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  4. Sergei Artemov (2009). Preface. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (3):251-252.
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  5. Guido Bacciagaluppi, David Miller & Huw Price (2008). Preface. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (4):705-708.
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  6. John A. Barker (1974). Paradox Without Knowledge. Synthese 28 (2):261 - 270.
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  7. Paul Bernays (1950). Myhill John R.. Note on an Idea of Fitch. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):260-261.
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  8. Paul Bernays (1939). Fitch Frederic B.. The Consistency of the Ramified Principia. Journal of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):97-98.
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  9. George D. W. Berry (1946). Fitch Frederic B.. Representations of Calculi. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):28-29.
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  10. George D. W. Berry (1946). Fitch Frederic B.. A Minimum Calculus for Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):127-128.
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  11. George D. W. Berry (1943). Fitch Frederic B.. A Basic Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):30.
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  12. Jean-Yves Béziau (2007). Preface. Logica Universalis 1 (1):1-2.
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  13. Jean-Yves Beziau & Gillman Payette (2008). Preface. Logica Universalis 2 (1):1-1.
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  14. Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008). Preface. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):487-488.
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  15. Cristina Bicchieri & Jason McKenzie Alexander (2007). Preface. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):559-560.
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  16. Max Black (1949). Heinemann F. H.. Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 57 , Pp. 458–480. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):182.
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  17. Max Black (1946). Hempel Carl G. And Oppenheim Paul. A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 12 , Pp. 98–115. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):18-19.
  18. Max Black (1946). Hempel Carl G.. A Note on the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Mind, N. S. Vol. 55 , Pp. 79–82. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):124.
  19. Max Black (1945). Whiteley C. H.. Hempel's Paradoxes of Confirmation. Mind, N. S. Vol. 54 , Pp. 156–158. Journal of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):104.
  20. Max Black (1944). Hempel. Carl G. A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation. Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):47.
  21. Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic, Which Logic for the Radical Anti-Realist ?
    Since the ground-breaking contributions of M. Dummett (Dummett 1978), it is widely recognized that anti-realist principles have a critical impact on the choice of logic. Dummett argued that classical logic does not satisfy the requirements of such principles but that intuitionistic logic does. Some philosophers have adopted a more radical stance and argued for a more important departure from classical logic on the basis of similar intuitions. In particular, J. Dubucs and M. Marion (?) and (Dubucs 2002) have recently argued (...)
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  22. Robert Brumbaugh (1953). Preface to Cosmography. Review of Metaphysics 7 (1):53 - 63.
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  23. John Brunero (2005). Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):557-569.
    Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just (...)
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  24. M. W. Bunder & Jonathan P. Seldin (1978). Some Anomalies in Fitch's System QD. Journal of Symbolic Logic 43 (2):247-249.
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  25. Tyler Burge (1984). Epistemic Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):5-29.
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  26. Tyler Burge (1978). Buridan and Epistemic Paradox. Philosophical Studies 34 (1):21 - 35.
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  27. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio, Reductionism and Perfectibility of Science.
    Nicholas Rescher, in The Limits of Science (1984), argued that: «perfected science is a mirage; complete knowledge a chimera» . He reached the above conclusion from a logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability. The argument, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, proves that every truth is also actually known and, given that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. Prima facie, this argument seems to seriously (...)
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  28. Fred Chernoff (1980). Goldman on Epistemic Conjunction. Analysis 40 (1):45 - 47.
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  29. Leo K. C. Cheung (2013). On Two Versions of 'the Surprise Examination Paradox'. Philosophia 41 (1):159-170.
    In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a (...)
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  30. David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  31. Alonzo Church (2009). Referee Reports on Fitch's "Definition of Value". In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 13--20.
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  32. Alonzo Church (1948). Fitch Frederic B.. On God and Immortality. English with Spanish Abstract. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 81 No. 4 , Pp. 688–693. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):148.
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  33. Alonzo Church (1946). Hempel C. G.. Geometry and Empirical Science. The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 52 , Pp. 7–17. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):100.
  34. Jon Cogburn (2003). Manifest Invalidity: Neil Tennant's New Argument for Intuitionism. Synthese 134 (3):353 - 362.
    In Chapter 7 of The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant provides a new argument from Michael Dummett's ``manifestation requirement'' to the incorrectness of classical logic and the correctness of intuitionistic logic. I show that Tennant's new argument is only valid if one interprets crucial existence claims occurring in the proof in the manner of intuitionists. If one interprets the existence claims as a classical logician would, then one can accept Tennant's premises while rejecting his conclusion of logical revision. Thus, (...)
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  35. Mark Colyvan (2006). Naturalism and the Paradox of Revisability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):1–11.
    This paper examines the paradox of revisability. This paradox was proposed by Jerrold Katz as a problem for Quinean naturalised epistemology. Katz employs diagonalisation to demonstrate what he takes to be an inconsistency in the constitutive principles of Quine's epistemology. Specifically, the problem seems to rest with the principle of universal revisability which states that no statement is immune to revision. In this paper it is argued that although there is something odd about employing universal revisability to revise itself, there (...)
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  36. Earl Conee (1994). Against an Epistemic Dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):475 – 481.
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  37. Roy T. Cook (2014). Should Anti-Realists Be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism? Erkenntnis 79 (2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, the strongest (...)
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  38. Thierry Coquand, Maria Emilia Maietti, Giovanni Sambin & Peter Schuster (2016). Preface. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 167 (9):725.
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  39. John Corcoran (1989). Argumentations and Logic. ARGUMENTAION 3 (1):17-43.
    Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic (...)
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  40. Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous? rule - following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule? the applications of which are potentially infinite? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule - following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical (...)
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  41. C. D. (1978). Paradoxes of Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 32 (2):375-376.
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  42. Lindley Darden (1996). Preface. Philosophy of Science 63 (S1):v-vi.
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  43. Robert Demolombe & Risto Hilpinen (2000). Preface. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):63-64.
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  44. A. A. Derksen (1978). The Alleged Lottery Paradox Resolved. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):67 - 74.
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  45. Keith DeRose, I. The Problem.
    In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's (...)
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  46. Robert A. DiPaola (1972). Fitch Frederic B.. A Note on Recursive Relations. Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):758.
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  47. Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.
    Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...)
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  48. Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
    There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.
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  49. Igor Douven (2003). Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox. Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.
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  50. Igor Douven (2003). The Preface Paradox Revisited. Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
    The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version (...)
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