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  1. From McGee's Puzzle to the Lottery Paradox.Lina Maria Lissia - manuscript
    Vann McGee (1985) presents a putative counterexample to modus ponens. After clarifying that McGee actually targets an epistemic version of such a principle, I show that, contrary to a view commonly held in the literature, assuming the material conditional as an interpretation of the natural language conditional “if … then …” does not dissolve the puzzle. Indeed, I provide a slightly modified version of McGee’s famous election scenario in which (1) the relevant features of the scenario are preserved and (2) (...)
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  2. Cut-Off Points for the Rational Believer.Lina Maria Lissia - manuscript
    I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a (probabilistic) Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the cut-off point problem” and contend that this problem, well known by students of the Sorites, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle.
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  3. Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes.Franca D’Agostini - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586.
    In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound arguments whose (...)
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  4. Do desacordo ao paradoxo epistêmico: uma análise da concepção de serviço de autoridade de Raz à luz da teoria do “ponto-cego” de R. Sorensen.Ramiro Ávila Peres - 2019 - Dissertatio 48:242-257.
    Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...)
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  5. R. A. Sharpe. Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. The Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 14 , Pp. 170–173. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251.
  6. Luís Washington Vita. Introduçāo À Filosofia. With a Preface by Miguel Reale. Edições Melhoramentos, São Paulo1964, 252 Pp. [REVIEW]Hugo Ribeiro - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1):112-112.
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  7. Frederic B. Fitch. A Theory of Logical Essences. The Monist, Vol. 51 , Pp. 104–109. - Frederic B. Fitch. A Complete and Consistent Modal Set Theory. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 32 , Pp. 93–103. [REVIEW]Bede Rundle - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):125.
  8. Frederic B. Fitch. A Theory of Logical Essences. The Monist, Vol. 51 , Pp. 104–109. - Frederic B. Fitch. A Complete and Consistent Modal Set Theory. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 32 , Pp. 93–103. [REVIEW]Bede Rundle - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1):125.
  9. Frederic B. Fitch. A Note on Recursive Relations. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 , P. 107.Robert A. DiPaola - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):758.
  10. Frederic B. Fitch. A Note on Recursive Relations. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 , P. 107.Robert A. DiPaola - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):758.
  11. Carl G. Hempel. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, by Carl G. Hempel, The Free Press, New York, and Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1965, Pp. 331–496. [REVIEW]Asa Kasher - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.
  12. Carl G. Hempel. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, by Carl G. Hempel, The Free Press, New York, and Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1965, Pp. 331–496. [REVIEW]Asa Kasher - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):747-749.
  13. Tennant Neil. Natural Logic. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1978, Ix + 196 Pp. [REVIEW]Wilfried Sieg - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1):215-217.
  14. Tennant Neil. Natural Logic. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1978, Ix + 196 Pp. [REVIEW]Wilfried Sieg - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1):215-217.
  15. No Justificatory Closure Without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.
    It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues (...)
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  16. Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:
    A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...)
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  17. The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):201-221.
    Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of (...)
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  18. A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
    Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – amongst them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform. In (...)
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  19. What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
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  20. Justification as Faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.
    According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals and strong necessity modals to make progress on a question that has received surprisingly little discussion in the literature, namely: ‘What’s the best version of a deontological approach?’ The two most obvious hypotheses are the Permissive View, (...)
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  21. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2010 - In Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 336-340.
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  22. Zebras and Cleverly Disguised Mules.Mylan Engel Jr - 2010 - In Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Oxford. pp. 788-793.
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  23. More paradoxical epistemics.Martin Hollis - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):217.
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  24. Paradoxes of Knowledge. [REVIEW]C. D. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (2):375-376.
    This book attacks an assortment of tendencies and assumptions that the author believes endemic to traditional epistemology. Perhaps the main target is what she sees as a tendency to sublimate the concepts of knowledge and belief, whose roles in everyday life are mundane and unsystematic, into rigid abstractions. This tendency is said to show itself in the allegedly false assumptions that propositions are the objects of knowledge and belief, and that there is a definite set of propositions that one knows (...)
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  25. A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
    There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.
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  26. Kripke and the Dogmatism Paradox.Kaave Lajevardi - manuscript
    I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of 'A is dogmatic with respect to p', and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement 'A should ignore all the evidence against p'. For the most part, I deal (...)
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  27. Preface.Uri Abraham, Lev Beklemishev, Paola D'Aquino & Marcus Tressl - 2016 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 167 (10):865-867.
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  28. Preface.Ofer Arieli & Anna Zamansky - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (3):221-223.
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  29. Preface.L. Magnani - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (6):879-881.
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  30. Fitch Frederic B.. A Demonstrably Consistent Mathematics. [REVIEW]R. M. Martin - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):268-269.
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  31. Tennant Neil. Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal. Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1987, Xii + 325 Pp. [REVIEW]W. D. Hart - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485-1486.
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  32. Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal.W. D. Hart & Neil Tennant - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1485.
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  33. The Knower's Paradox and Representational Theories of Attitudes.William J. Rapaport, Nicholas M. Asher & Johan A. W. Kamp - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):666.
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  34. Fitch Frederic B.. Algebraic Simplification of Redundant Sequential Circuits. Synthese, Vol. 15 , Pp. 155–166. Reprinted in Form and Strategy in Science, Dordrecht 1964, Pp. 191-202. [REVIEW]Ann S. Ferebee - 1975 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):615-615.
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  35. Between Analytic and Empirical, by J. W. N. Watkins. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):246-249.
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  36. Hempel Carl G.. A Logical Appraisal of Operationism. The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79 , Pp. 215–220.Henry Mehlberg - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):354-356.
  37. Burks Arthur W.. Symposium: Justification in Science. Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion , University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1953, Pp. 109–125. [REVIEW]A. R. Turquette - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):65-65.
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  38. Myhill John R.. Symposium: On the Ontological Significance of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion , University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1953, Pp. 57–70. [REVIEW]A. R. Turquette - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):64-64.
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  39. Fitch Frederic B.. A Simplification of Basic Logic. [REVIEW]Burton Dreben - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):81-81.
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  40. Berry George D. W.. Symposium: On the Ontological Significance of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion , University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1953, Pp. 39–55. [REVIEW]A. R. Turquette - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):63-63.
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  41. Fitch Frederic B.. Actuality, Possibility, and Being. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 3 No. 3 , Pp. 367–384.Alice Ambrose - 1953 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):89-90.
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  42. Myhill John R.. Note on an Idea of Fitch.Paul Bernays - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):260-261.
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  43. Heinemann F. H.. Truths of Reason and Truths of Fact. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 57 , Pp. 458–480.Max Black - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):182-182.
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  44. Miller David L.. Comments on “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15 , Pp. 348–349.Thomas Storer - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):133-133.
  45. Fitch Frederic B.. An Extension of Basic Logic.S. C. Kleene - 1949 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):68-69.
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  46. Fitch Frederic B.. On God and Immortality. English with Spanish Abstract. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 81 No. 4 , Pp. 688–693. [REVIEW]Alonzo Church - 1948 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):148-148.
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  47. Hempel Carl G.. A Note on the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Mind, N. S. Vol. 55 , Pp. 79–82.Max Black - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):124-124.
  48. Hempel C. G.. Geometry and Empirical Science. The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 52 , Pp. 7–17.Alonzo Church - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):100-100.
  49. Fitch Frederic B.. Self-Reference in Philosophy. Mind, N. S. Vol. 55 , Pp. 64–73.Andrzej Mostowski - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):95-96.
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  50. Fitch Frederic B.. Representations of Calculi. [REVIEW]George D. W. Berry - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):28-29.
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