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  1. An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the (...)
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  2. A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2018 - Synthese.
    The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. (...)
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  3. Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  4. Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.
    Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of (...)
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  5. How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292.
    It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain (...)
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  6. Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):29-41.
    The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement (...)
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  7. Why We Shouldn't Reason Classically, and the Implications for Artificial Intelligence.Douglas Campbell - 2016 - In C. Vincent Müller (ed.), Computing and Philosophy: Selected Papers From Iacap 2014. Springer Verlag. pp. 151--165.
    In this paper I argue that human beings should reason, not in accordance with classical logic, but in accordance with a weaker ‘reticent logic’. I characterize reticent logic, and then show that arguments for the existence of fundamental Gödelian limitations on artificial intelligence are undermined by the idea that we should reason reticently, not classically.
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  8. Self-Referential Probability.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2016 - Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
    This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confidence in something can affect whether it is (...)
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  9. How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean Proposal.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):680-704.
    We present a semantics for a language that includes sentences that can talk about their own probabilities. This semantics applies a fixed point construction to possible world style structures. One feature of the construction is that some sentences only have their probability given as a range of values. We develop a corresponding axiomatic theory and show by a canonical model construction that it is complete in the presence of the ω-rule. By considering this semantics we argue that principles such as (...)
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  10. Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.
    The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude. More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of (...)
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  11. Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways Out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.
    The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including (...)
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  12. Preface Writers Are Consistent.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which (...)
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  13. C. I. Lewis: History and Philosophy of Logic.John Corcoran - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):1-9.
    C. I. Lewis (I883-I964) was the first major figure in history and philosophy of logic—-a field that has come to be recognized as a separate specialty after years of work by Ivor Grattan-Guinness and others (Dawson 2003, 257).Lewis was among the earliest to accept the challenges offered by this field; he was the first who had the philosophical and mathematical talent, the philosophical, logical, and historical background, and the patience and dedication to objectivity needed to excel. He was blessed with (...)
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  14. Forget and Forgive: A Practical Approach to Forgotten Evidence.Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem (...)
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  15. A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
    The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will (...)
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  16. How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?Simone Duca & Hannes Leitgeb - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):1-36.
    The so-called Paradox of Serious Possibility is usually regarded as showing that the standard axioms of belief revision do not apply to belief sets that are introspectively closed. In this article we argue to the contrary: we suggest a way of dissolving the Paradox of Serious Possibility so that introspective statements are taken to express propositions in the standard sense, which may thus be proper members of belief sets, and accordingly the normal axioms of belief revision apply to them. Instead (...)
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  17. Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.
    Many philosophers have argued that "degree of belief" or "credence" is a more fundamental state grounding belief. Many other philosophers have been skeptical about the notion of "degree of belief", and take belief to be the only meaningful notion in the vicinity. This paper shows that one can take belief to be fundamental, and ground a notion of "degree of belief" in the patterns of belief, assuming that an agent has a collection of beliefs that isn't dominated by some other (...)
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  18. Two Paradoxes of Semantic Information.Thomas Macaulay Ferguson - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3719-3730.
    Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolph Carnap’s classical theory of semantic information entails the counterintuitive feature that inconsistent statements convey maximal information. Theories preserving Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s modal intuitions while imposing a veridicality requirement on which statements convey information—such as the theories of Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi—avoid this commitment, as inconsistent statements are deemed not information-conveying by fiat. This paper produces a pair of paradoxical statements that such “veridical-modal” theories must evaluate as both conveying and not conveying information, although Bar-Hillel and (...)
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  19. Rationally Held ‘P, but I Fully Believe ~P and I Am Not Equivocating’.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):309-313.
    One of Moore’s paradoxical sentence types is ‘P, but I believe ~P’. Mooreans have assumed that all tokens of that sentence type are absurd in some way: epistemically, pragmatically, semantically, or assertively. And then they proceed to debate what the absurdity really is. I argue that if one has the appropriate philosophical views, then one can rationally assert tokens of that sentence type, and one can be epistemically reasonable in the corresponding compound belief as well.
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  20. The Paradox of the Surprise Test.Joseph S. Fulda - 1991 - The Mathematical Gazette 75 (474):419-421.
    Presents a /simple/ epistemic solution to the paradox of the surprise test, suitable for undergraduates. Given the Gazette's audience, recalcitrant versions, such as Sorenson's, would have been inappropriate to even mention. It is also classified under "logical paradoxes," because it can be argued that given the existence of logical, rather than epistemic, solutions, so also the paradox is logical, rather than epistemic. -/- The author was not sent proofs, because the /Gazette/ was then run on a "shoestring budget"; the 2009 (...)
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  21. Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and issues of knowability raised by Fitch’s paradox. The references (...)
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  22. Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Jaakko Hintikka. Springer.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  23. On Being in an Undiscoverable Position.Wesley H. Holliday - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):33-40.
    The Paradox of the Surprise Examination has been a testing ground for a variety of frameworks in formal epistemology, from epistemic logic to probability theory to game theory and more. In this paper, I treat a related paradox, the Paradox of the Undiscoverable Position, as a test case for the possible-worlds style representation of epistemic states. I argue that the paradox can be solved in this framework, further illustrating the power of possible-worlds style modeling. The solution also illustrates an important (...)
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  24. Question Closure to Solve the Surprise Test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.
    This paper offers a new solution to the Surprise Test Paradox. The paradox arises thanks to an ingenious argument that seems to show that surprise tests are impossible. My solution to the paradox states that it relies on a questionable closure principle. This closure principle says that if one knows something and competently deduces something else, one knows the further thing. This principle has been endorsed by John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson, among others, and I trace its motivation back to (...)
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  25. The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
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  26. Lotteries and Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either or and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.
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  27. Can the Lottery Paradox Be Solved by Identifying Epistemic Justification with Epistemic Permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present two (...)
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  28. This Paper Surely Contains Some Errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.
    The preface paradox can be motivated by appealing to a plausible inference from an author’s reasonable assertion that her book is bound to contain errors to the author’s rational belief that her book contains errors. By evaluating and undermining the validity of this inference, I offer a resolution of the paradox. Discussions of the preface paradox have surprisingly failed to note that expressions of fallibility made in prefaces typically employ terms such as surely, undoubtedly, and bound to be. After considering (...)
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  29. How to Expect a Surprising Exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.
    In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...)
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  30. Two Paradoxes of Knowledge.Saul A. Kripke - 2011 - In Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers Vol I. Oxford University Press.
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  31. The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief.Thomas Kroedel - 2017 - Erkenntnis:1-11.
    This paper defends the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox against an objection by Anna-Maria Asunta Eder. Eder argues that the permissibility solution should also be applicable to the preface paradox, but conflicts with a plausible principle about epistemic permissions when so applied. This paper replies by first criticizing Eder’s considerations in defense of her principle; in particular, it argues that the plausibility of her principle is to a large extent parasitic on the spurious plausibility of the principle of factual (...)
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  32. Why Epistemic Permissions Don't Agglomerate – Another Reply to Littlejohn.Thomas Kroedel - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (4):451–455.
    Clayton Littlejohn claims that the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox requires an implausible principle in order to explain why epistemic permissions don't agglomerate. This paper argues that an uncontentious principle suffices to explain this. It also discusses another objection of Littlejohn's, according to which we’re not permitted to believe lottery propositions because we know that we’re not in a position to know them.
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  33. The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-16.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called Entitlement, a (...)
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  34. Reply to Professor Cross.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):99-101.
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  35. Don't Know, Don't Believe: Reply to Kroedel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38.
    In recent work, Thomas Kroedel has proposed a novel solution to the lottery paradox. As he sees it, we are permitted/justified in believing some lottery propositions, but we are not permitted/justified in believing them all. I criticize this proposal on two fronts. First, I think that if we had the right to add some lottery beliefs to our belief set, we would not have any decisive reason to stop adding more. Suggestions to the contrary run into the wrong kind of (...)
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  36. Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1⁄3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1⁄2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...)
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  37. Minds Vs. Machines. On Saka's Basic Blindspot Theorem.Laureano Luna - 2015 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (4):483-486.
    Under the name of ‘Basic Blindspot Theorem’, Paul Saka has proposed in the special issue on mind and paradox of this journal a Gödelian argument to the effect that no cognitive system can be complete and correct. We show that while the argument is successful as regards mechanical and formal systems, it may fail with respect to minds, so contributing to draw a boundary between the former and the latter. The existence of such a boundary may lend support to Saka’s (...)
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  38. Safety, The Lottery Puzzle, and Misprinted Lottery Results.Mark McEvoy - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:47-49.
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  39. Disagreement, Peerhood, and Three Paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.
    Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.
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  40. A Case Against Closure.Doris Olin - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):235-247.
    Este artigo examina a objeção ao fechamento [dedutivo] que surge no contexto de certos paradoxos epistêmicos, paradoxos cuja conclusão é que a crença justificada pode ser inconsistente. É universalmente aceito que, se essa conclusão é correta, o fechamento deve ser rejeitado, para que se evite a crença justificada em enunciados contraditórios (P, ~P). Mas, mesmo que os argumentos desses paradoxos – o paradoxo da falibilidade (do prefácio) e o paradoxo da loteria – sejam mal-sucedidos, eles, ainda assim, sugerem a existência (...)
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  41. How to Embed Epistemic Modals Without Violating Modus Tollens.Joe Salerno - manuscript
    Epistemic modals in consequent place of indicative conditionals give rise to apparent counterexamples to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Familiar assumptions of fa- miliar truth conditional theories of modality facilitate a prima facie explanation—viz., that the target cases harbor epistemic modal equivocations. However, these explana- tions go too far. For they foster other predictions of equivocation in places where in fact there are no equivocations. It is argued here that the key to the solution is to drop the assumption that (...)
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  42. On What You Cannot Be Mistaken About?Igor Sedlar - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3):351-362.
    The paper sketches an analysis of the notion of a self-fulfilling belief in terms of doxastic modal logic. We point out a connection between self-fulfilling beliefs and Moore’s paradox. Then we look at self-fulfilling beliefs in the context of neighborhood semantics. We argue that the analysis of several interesting self-fulfilling beliefs has to make essential use of propositional quantification.
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  43. Safety and the Preface Paradox.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.
    In the preface paradox the posited author is supposed to know both that every sentence in a book is true and that not every sentence in that book is true. But, this result is paradoxically contradictory. The paradoxicality exhibited in such cases arises chiefly out of the recognition that large-scale and difficult tasks like verifying the truth of large sets of sentences typically involve errors even given our best efforts to be epistemically diligent. This paper introduces an argument designed to (...)
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  44. Solving the Surprise Examination and Designated Student Paradoxes.Ted Shear - manuscript
    The Designated Student Paradox, first offered by Sorensen (1982), is commonly thought to show that the error in the student’s reasoning in the Surprise Examination Paradox is not the result of any temporal feature of the case. In this paper, I will suggest that Sorensen is mistaken and that both the Surprise Examination Paradox and the Designated Student Paradox are generated as a result of the unsoundness of the temporal retention principle (R). R is a standard formalization of the monotonicity (...)
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  45. The Arbitrariness of Belief.Martin Smith - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    In Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne offers a diagnosis of our unwillingness to believe, of a given lottery ticket, that it will lose a fair lottery – no matter how many tickets are involved. According to Hawthorne, it is natural to employ parity reasoning when thinking about lottery outcomes: Put roughly, to believe that a given ticket will lose, no matter how likely that is, is to make an arbitrary choice between alternatives that are perfectly balanced given one’s evidence. It’s (...)
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  46. What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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  47. Jesus' Return as Lottery Puzzle: A Reply to Donald Smith.P. Roger Turner - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (3):305-313.
    In his recent paper, “Lottery Puzzles and Jesus’ Return,” Donald Smith says that Christians should accept a very robust skepticism about the future because a Christian ought to think that the probability of Jesus’ return happening at any future moment is inscrutable to her. But I think that Smith’s argument lacks the power to rationally persuade Christians who are antecedently uncommitted as to whether or not we can or do have any substantive knowledge about the future. Moreover, I think that (...)
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  48. Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution.R. Weintraub - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):8-10.
    I defend the suggestion that the rational probability in the Sleeping Beauty paradox is one third. The reasoning in its favour is familiar: for every heads-waking, there are two tails-wakings. To complete the defense, I rebut the reasoning which purports to justify the competing suggestion – that the correct probability is half – by undermining its premise, that no new information has been received.
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  49. The Lottery: A Paradox Regained And Resolved.R. Weintraub - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):439-449.
    The lottery paradox shows seemingly plausible principles of rational acceptance to be incompatible. It has been argued that we shouldn’t be concerned by this clash, since the concept of (categorical) belief is otiose, to be supplanted by a quantitative notion of partial belief, in terms of which the paradox cannot even be formulated. I reject this eliminativist view of belief, arguing that the ordinary concept of (categorical) belief has a useful function which the quantitative notion does not serve. I then (...)
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  50. A Solution to the Cable Guy Paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):355-359.
    The Cable Guy will definitely come between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and I can bet on one of two possibilities: that he will arrive between 8 and 12, or between 12 and 4. Since I have no more information, it seems (eminently) plausible to suppose the two bets are equally attractive. Yet Hajek has presented a tantalising argument that purports to show that the later interval is, initial appearances to the contrary, more choice-worthy. In this paper, I rebut the (...)
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