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  1. added 2020-06-16
    A Uniform Account of Regress Problems.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3).
    This paper presents a uniform general account of regress problems in the form of a pentalemma—i.e., a set of five mutually inconsistent claims. Specific regress problems can be analyzed as instances of such a general schema, and this Regress Pentalemma Schema can be employed to generate deductively valid arguments from the truth of a subset of four claims to the falsity of the fifth. Thus, a uniform account of the nature of regress problems allows for an improved understanding of specific (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-02
    Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):455-480.
    Reliabilism is an intuitive and attractive view about epistemic justification. However, it has many well-known problems. I offer a novel condition on reliabilist theories of justification. This method coherence condition requires that a method be appropriately tested by appeal to a subject’s other belief-forming methods. Adding this condition to reliabilism provides a solution to epistemic circularity worries, including the bootstrapping problem.
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  3. added 2020-01-28
    Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
    This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission failure and (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    VI.—The Logical Foundations of Our Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Proof.G. Cator - 1930 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 30 (1):127-142.
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  6. added 2019-06-05
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.William Roche - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):212-215.
    Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. By Atkinson David, Peijnenburg Jeanne.
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  7. added 2019-06-05
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  8. added 2019-03-11
    Sic Transitivity: Reply to McGrew and McGrew.John Post & Derek Turner - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:67-82.
    In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post’s objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post’s objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational ancestry. In reply, (...)
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  9. added 2019-02-24
    Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy by David Pears (2006)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 295-301.
    Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal psychology, I (...)
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  10. added 2019-02-23
    Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas: Reality Press. pp. 246-266.
    A superb effort, but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern dual systems of thought view, and no comprehensive logical structure of rationality, to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and (...)
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  11. added 2019-01-03
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  12. added 2018-12-30
    Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):121-138.
    Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Nevertheless, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account (...)
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  13. added 2018-12-20
    Alguma Luz para O fundacionismo?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2008 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 13 (1):35-65.
    The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justification and would require justification. My proposal is that perceptual (...)
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  14. added 2018-10-10
    On Reflection, by Hilary Kornblith. [REVIEW]Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1319-1322.
  15. added 2018-09-29
    The Bounds of Justification.G. Anthony Bruno - 2007 - Dissertation, Queen's University
    Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-28 11:57:18.196.
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  16. added 2018-09-29
    Justificação, coerência e circularidade.Júlio César Burdzinski - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):65-93.
    This paper has the following structure: in the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; in the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; in the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; in the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion of justification, non-linear inferential (...)
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  17. added 2018-09-29
    Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity.J. Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339-348.
  18. added 2018-09-29
    Moser, P., "Empirical Justification". [REVIEW]Laurence BonJour - 1987 - Mind 96:110.
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  19. added 2018-09-22
    Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
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  20. added 2018-09-22
    Reidian Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  21. added 2018-09-22
    Bonjour’s Dilemma. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.
  22. added 2018-09-22
    Experience Conceptualized: Between the Myth of the Given and Coherentism.Mohammad Azadpur - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
    My dissertation develops and defends a theory of how experience justifies perceptual beliefs. First, I situate the opposition, the coherentists, in the contemporary debate, and I do this partly by reference to their readings of Kant. According to the coherentists, perceptual beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs. They consider Kant as a predecessor who, in one way or another, did not quite succeed in freeing himself from the notion that perceptual beliefs are justified by our experience of the (...)
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  23. added 2018-09-22
    Chisholm and the Foundation Theory of Justification.Emmett C. Barcalow - 1981 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    According to Roderick Chisholm, every proposition one is justified in believing is justified, at least in part, by some relation that it bears to propositions which are epistemologically privileged. There are two categories of such "basic" of self-justifying propositions--the self-presenting and the directly evident. Justification is a matter of degree, and Chisholm establishes a five-fold ranking of epistemic privilege in terms of which the two concepts of the self-presenting and the directly evident are defined and in terms of which the (...)
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  24. added 2018-09-19
    Popper’s Critical Rationalism: A Philosophical Investigation.Darrell Rowbottom - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Popper’s Critical Rationalism_ presents Popper’s views on science, knowledge, and inquiry, and examines the significance and tenability of these in light of recent developments in philosophy of science, philosophy of probability, and epistemology. It develops a fresh and novel philosophical position on science, which employs key insights from Popper while rejecting other elements of his philosophy. Central theses include: Crucial questions about scientific method arise at the level of the group, rather than that of the individual. Although criticism is vital (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-17
    Real Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory.Linda Alcoff - 1996 - Cornell University Press.
    In provocative readings of major figures in the continental tradition, Alcoff shows that the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michel Foucault can help rectify key ...
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  26. added 2018-08-17
    Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):505-524.
    In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and resolving the “persistent interlocutor” problem. Though I find elements of Leite’s view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of (...)
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  27. added 2018-02-17
    Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):55-77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  28. added 2018-02-17
    30. There is No Good Reason to Be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  29. added 2017-10-27
    Reasoning Without Regress.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2263-2278.
    In this paper I explore alternative ways of addressing the infinite regress problem of inference, as it was depicted in Lewis Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Roughly put, the problem is that if a claim to the effect that one’s premises give support to one’s conclusion must itself be part of one’s premises, then an infinite regress of reasons ensues. I discuss some recent attempts to solve that problem, but I find all of them to be wanting. Those (...)
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  30. added 2017-10-05
    Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Brendan Balcerak Jackson & Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
    I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligence of the (...)
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  31. added 2017-09-28
    Newman and the “Problem of the Criterion” Revisited.Daniel J. Pratt Morris-Chapman - 2016 - Newman Studies Journal 13 (1):55-67.
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  32. added 2017-07-04
    Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.
    An infuential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for more specific category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.
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  33. added 2017-05-26
    Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):75-98.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...)
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  34. added 2017-04-27
    Sosa on Animal Knowledge and Emotions.Eros Moreira De Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2015 - Analytica (Rio) 19 (1):145-160.
    Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...)
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  35. added 2017-03-02
    Review of Ted Poston's Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism (2014, Palgrave Macmillan). [REVIEW]Roche William - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1-7.
    Ted Poston's book Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism is a book worthy of careful study. Poston develops and defends an explanationist theory of (epistemic) justification on which justification is a matter of explanatory coherence which in turn is a matter of conservativeness, explanatory power, and simplicity. He argues that his theory is consistent with Bayesianism. He argues, moreover, that his theory is needed as a supplement to Bayesianism. There are seven chapters. I provide a chapter-by-chapter summary along (...)
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  36. added 2017-02-08
    Infinite Regresses of Justification.Oliver Black - 1988 - International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):421-437.
    This paper uses a schema for infinite regress arguments to provide a solution to the problem of the infinite regress of justification. The solution turns on the falsity of two claims: that a belief is justified only if some belief is a reason for it, and that the reason relation is transitive.
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  37. added 2017-02-08
    Whither Infinite Regresses of Justification?Paul K. Moser - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):65-74.
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  38. added 2017-02-08
    Are Circular Arguments Necessarily Vicious?Douglas N. Walton - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):263-274.
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  39. added 2017-02-08
    A Benign Regress.John J. Haldane - 1983 - Analysis 43 (June):115-116.
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  40. added 2017-02-08
    A Note on T. G. Smith's “The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress”.F. F. Centore - 1970 - Dialogue 8 (4):678-679.
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  41. added 2017-02-08
    The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress.T. G. Smith - 1969 - Dialogue 8 (1):116-123.
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  42. added 2017-02-01
    Infinite Regresses of Justification and of Explanation.John F. Post - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):31 - 52.
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  43. added 2017-01-31
    Rational Doxastic Dispositions and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):589-607.
    In this paper, I deal with a version of the epistemic regress problem. After rejecting foundationalism as a solution to it, I consider two versions of infinitism. The first one is found to be unacceptable, for it fails both to cohere with certain attributions of justification and also to maintain its internal coherence. The second one avoids both problems, and it is found to be the best way of addressing the epistemic regress problem. As the successful version of infinitism makes (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-29
    On Too Common Ground: Collective Circularity, the Sextus Mill Paradox, and a Problem of Infinite Regress.Margaret A. Cuonzo - unknown
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  45. added 2017-01-27
    The Epistemic Regress Problem, the Problem of the Criterion, and the Value of Reasons.Andrew D. Cling - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):161-171.
    There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-25
    Practical Irrationality, Reflexivity and Sartre's Regress Argument.Alan Thomas - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3).
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  47. added 2017-01-23
    The Viciousness of Infinite Regresses.Claude Gratton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:25-29.
    Henry W. Johnstone (1996) attempts to use a notion of postponement to give a general account of viciousness of infinite regresses. Though some of his examples suggest that his notion applies to only beginningless regresses (...eRdRcRbRa), I will show that it also applies to endless ones (aRbRcRdRe...). Unfortunately, despite this expanded application, it does not apply to all vicious regresses, even to some of his own examples; it is cumbersome and unnecessary, and it fails to explain how some infinite regresses (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-23
    Circular Definitions, Circular Explanations, and Infinite Regresses.Claude Gratton - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):295-308.
    This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.
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  49. added 2017-01-22
    Experimental Reproducibility and the Experimenters' Regress.Hans Radder - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:63 - 73.
    In his influential book, "Changing Order", H.M. Collins puts forward the following three claims concerning experimental replication. (i) Replication is rarely practiced by experimentalists; (ii) replication cannot be used as an objective test of scientific knowledge claims, because of the occurrence of the so-called experimenters' regress; and (iii) stopping this regress at some point depends upon the enculturation in a local community of practitioners, who tacitly learn the relevant skills. In my paper I discuss and assess these claims on the (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-22
    Foundationalism, Conceptual Regress, and Reliabilism.Richard A. Fumerton - 1988 - Analysis 48 (4):178 - 184.
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