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  1. added 2018-09-30
    Модальности как фундаментальный элемент реальности: обзор книги «Williamson on Modality». [REVIEW]Lev Lamberov - 2018 - ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ 77:158-171.
    The paper provides a review of the collection of scientific works «Williamson on Modality» and contains a brief summary of the main ideas of the articles published in the book.
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  2. added 2018-09-19
    An Acquittal for Epistemicism.Hesam Mohamadi - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (4):905-928.
    Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (i) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (ii) (...)
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  3. added 2018-04-13
    How to Respond to Borderline Cases.Dan López de Sa - 2010 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
    Some philosophers seem to think that borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. My aim here is to argue against such a suggestion. I claim that with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view—unlike what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. I argue that my claim is indeed respected and actually accounted for by paradigm cases of semantic and epistemic views on the nature of vagueness. And I also (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-18
    Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions.Gary Ebbs - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):303-323.
  5. added 2018-01-11
    Peirce's Logic of Vagueness.Chiasson Phyllis - 2001 - The Commens Encyclopedia: The Digital Encyclopedia of Peirce Studies.
    Peirce’s “logic of vagueness” asserts that vagueness can have the paradoxical effect of “entirely destroying doubt.” Yet the ability to engage genuine doubt in the course of inquiry is the first requirement for critical thinking. A lack of awareness of the “invariable vagueness” of “acritically indubitable” beliefs and inferences breeds ignorance and absolutism. This presents us with an important ethical challenge: since a permanent state of vagueness seems to be the habit for much of humanity, one priority of a democratic (...)
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  6. added 2017-02-15
    On Indistinguishability and Prototypes.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2003 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 11 (5):531-545.
    Tolerance spaces are sets equipped with a reflexive, symmetric, but not necessarily transitive, relation of indistinguishability, and are useful for describing vagueness based on error-prone measurements. We show that any tolerance space can be embedded in one generated by comparisons using prototypical objects. As a result propositions, definable on a tolerance space can be translated into propositions behaving classically.
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  7. added 2017-02-15
    Vagueness and Bivalence.B. J. Copeland - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:193-200.
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  8. added 2017-01-16
    Discussions: Vagueness and Bivalence: A Discussion of Williamson and Simons.B. J. Copeland - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):193-200.
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  9. added 2017-01-15
    When to Think Like an Epistemicist.Matthew Mosdell - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):538-559.
    Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, (...)
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  10. added 2017-01-15
    Epistemicism and Nihilism About Vagueness: What’s the Difference?David Enoch - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):285-311.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the only difference between Epistemicism and Nihilism about vagueness is semantic rather than ontological, and second, that once it is clear what the difference between these views is, Nihilism is a much more plausible view of vagueness than Epistemicism. Given the current popularity of certain epistemicist views, this result is, I think, of interest.
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  11. added 2017-01-12
    Vague Disagreements and the Sorites Paradox.Ted Everett - forthcoming - In Otavio Bueno & Ali Abasnezhad (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 33: On the Sorites Paradox. New York: Springer.
    When you and I seriously argue over whether a man of seventy is old enough to count as an "old man", it seems that we are appealing neither to our own separate standards of oldness nor to a common standard that is already fixed in the language. Instead, it seems that both of us implicitly invoke an ideal, shared standard that has yet to be agreed upon: the place where we ought to draw the line. As with other normative standards, (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-12
    Wright on the Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):39-45.
    According to the epistemic conception of vagueness defended in Williamson 1994, what we use vague terms to say is true or false, but in borderline cases we cannot know which. Our grasp of what we say does not open its truth-value to our view. Crispin Wright 1995 offers a lively critique of this conception. A reply may help to clarify the issues.
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  13. added 2016-12-08
    Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-08
    Appropriateness Measures: An Uncertainty Model for Vague Concepts.Jonathan Lawry - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):255-269.
    We argue that in the decision making process required for selecting assertible vague descriptions of an object, it is practical that communicating agents adopt an epistemic stance. This corresponds to the assumption that there exists a set of conventions governing the appropriate use of labels, and about which an agent has only partial knowledge and hence significant uncertainty. It is then proposed that this uncertainty is quantified by a measure corresponding to an agent’s subjective belief that a vague concept label (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-05
    Knowledge Beyond the Margin for Error.R. A. Sorensen - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):717-722.
    Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence-we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.
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  16. added 2016-10-20
    Vagueness and Modality.Jon Erling Litland & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):1-39.
    How does vagueness interact with metaphysical modality and with restrictions of it, such as nomological modality? In particular, how do definiteness, necessity (understood as restricted in some way or not), and actuality interact? This paper proposes a model-theoretic framework for investigating the logic and semantics of that interaction. The framework is put forward in an ecumenical spirit: it is intended to be applicable to all theories of vagueness that express vagueness using a definiteness (or: determinacy) operator. We will show how (...)
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  17. added 2016-10-08
    Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Ali Abasnezhad & Otavio Bueno (eds.), Synthese Special Edition. Springer.
    Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.
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  18. added 2016-09-21
    Reply to Yli-Vakkuri.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):839-851.
  19. added 2016-09-21
    Epistemicism and Modality.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):803-835.
    What kind of semantics should someone who accepts the epistemicist theory of vagueness defended in Timothy Williamson’s Vagueness (1994) give a definiteness operator? To impose some interesting constraints on acceptable answers to this question, I will assume that the object language also contains a metaphysical necessity operator and a metaphysical actuality operator. I will suggest that the answer is to be found by working within a three-dimensional model theory. I will provide sketches of two ways of extracting an epistemicist semantics (...)
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  20. added 2016-08-27
    Fuzziness and the Sorites Paradox.Marcelo Vasconez - 2006 - Dissertation, Catholic University of Louvain
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  21. added 2015-07-04
    Como Explicar o Fenómeno da Vagueza?Domingos Faria - 2013 - Investigação Filosófica 1.
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  22. added 2015-06-18
    I—Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher-Order Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
    Most descriptions of higher-order vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn't is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, non-standard theories. However, there is no need for this.In this paper I introduce a theory of higher-order vagueness that is paradox-free and can be expressed in the first-order extension of a normal modal system that is complete with respect to single-domain Kripke-frame semantics. This is the system QS4M+BF+FIN. It corresponds (...)
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  23. added 2015-05-07
    4. Contradictorial Gradualism Vs. Discontinuism: Two Views On Fuzziness And The Transition Problem.Marcelo VÁsconez - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (195).
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  24. added 2015-04-06
    Vagueness, Ignorance and Law.Abigail Brett Krauser - 2002
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  25. added 2015-03-24
    Epistemicism, Paradox, and Conditional Obligation.Ivan Hu - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2123-2139.
    Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.
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  26. added 2015-03-24
    Minimalism, Epistemicism, and Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2008 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
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  27. added 2015-03-24
    Commentary: The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness'.R. Sorenson - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy: Spindel Issue on Vagueness 33 (Supplement):161-170.
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  28. added 2015-03-23
    The Fallacy of Epistemicism.James Cargile - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 33.
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  29. added 2015-03-20
    Epistemicism and the Problem of Arbitrariness for Vagueness.Christopher D. Kyle - 2012 - Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau 55 (1).
    This paper distinguishes between epistemic and metaphysical problems of arbitrariness for vagueness. It argues that epistemicism can resolve the epistemic problem of arbitrariness but not the metaphysical one.
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  30. added 2015-03-17
    Epistemicism and the Combined Spectrum.Alter Torin & Rachels Stuart - 2004 - Ratio 17 (3):241-255.
    Derek Parfit's combined-spectrum argument seems to conflict with epistemicism, a viable theory of vagueness. While Parfit argues for the indeterminacy of personhood, epistemicism denies indeterminacy. But, we argue, the linguistically based determinacy that epistemicism supports lacks the sort of normative or ontological significance that concerns Parfit. Thus, we reformulate his argument to make it consistent with epistemicism. We also dispute Roy Sorensen's suggestion that Parfit's argument relies on an assumption that fuels resistance to epistemicism, namely, that 'the magnitude of a (...)
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  31. added 2015-02-11
    Fuzzy Logics in Theories of Vagueness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2015 - In Petr Cintula, Christian Fermüller & Carles Noguera (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Fuzzy Logic - Volume 3. College Publications.
  32. added 2014-10-29
    Epistemicism and the Liar.Jamin Asay - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):679-699.
    One well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the (...)
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  33. added 2014-05-06
    Qu'est-ce qu'une montagne ? [What is a mountain?].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In Olivier Massin & Anne Meylan (eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes. Ithaque.
    The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bona fide boundaries. In reply to arguments advanced by Varzi (2001), Smith & Mark (2001, 2003) I argue that the lower limit of a mountain is neither vague nor fiat. Relying on early works by Cayley (1859), Maxwell (1870) and Jordan (1872), this lower limit consists in the lines of watercourse which are defined as the lines of slope starting at passes. Such lines are metaphysically (...)
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  34. added 2014-04-02
    Vague Objects with Sharp Boundaries.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):29-39.
    In this article I shall consider two seemingly contradictory claims: first, the claim that everybody who thinks that there are ordinary objects has to accept that they are vague, and second, the claim that everybody has to accept the existence of sharp boundaries to ordinary objects. The purpose of this article is of course not to defend a contradiction. Indeed, there is no contradiction because the two claims do not concern the same ‘everybody’. The first claim, that all ordinary objects (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-02
    The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):133-160.
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness: Comments on Wright.Roy A. Sorensen - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):161-170.
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    Definiteness and Knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):171-192.
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  38. added 2014-04-02
    Vagueness and Bivalence: A Discussion of Williamson and Simons.B. J. Copeland - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):193 - 200.
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  39. added 2014-03-31
    Two Problems for an Epistemicist View of Vagueness.Mario Gomez-Torrente - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:237-245.
    This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-31
    Imagination, Stipulation and Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:215-228.
    Russian translation of Williamson T. Imagination, Stipulation and Vagueness // Philosophical Issues, 8, 1997. Translated by Alisa Veruk, Nina Zubkova with kind permission of the author.
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  41. added 2014-03-31
    On the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.Michael Tye - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:247-253.
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  42. added 2014-03-31
    Easy Possibilities.R. M. Sainsbury - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.
  43. added 2014-03-30
    Timothy Williamson, Vagueness: London and New York: 1994. [REVIEW]Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1998 - Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2):221-235.
  44. added 2014-03-29
    Vagueness and Ignorance.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. Routledge. pp. 145 - 177.
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  45. added 2014-03-29
    What Makes It a Heap?Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):327 - 339.
    On the epistemic view of vagueness, a vague expression has sharp boundaries whose location speakers of the language cannot recognize. The paper argues that one of the deepest sources of resistance to the epistemic view is the idea that all truths are cognitively accessible from truths in a language for natural science, conceived as precise, in a sense explained. The implications of the epistemic view for issues about the relations between vague predicates and scientific predicates are investigated.
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  46. added 2014-03-27
    Episteme, Etc.- Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes.K. Ierodiakonou & B. Morison (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Sixteen authors, including some of the most distinguished scholars of our time, present essays which together reflect the impressive scope of Jonathan Barnes's contributions to philosophy, and in particular to the study of ancient philosophy. Six are on knowledge, five on logic and metaphysics, five on ethics.
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  47. added 2014-03-27
    Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness.Hud Hudson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):547-560.
    Anyone who endorses Universalism and Four Dimensionalism owes us an argument for those controversial mereological theses. One may put forth David Lewis’s and Ted Sider’s arguments from vagueness. However, the success of those arguments depends on the rejection of the epistemic view of vagueness, and thus opens the door to a fatal confrontation with one particularly troubling version of The Problem of the Many. The alternative for friends of Universalism and Four Dimensionalism is to abandon those currently fashionable arguments in (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-27
    A Vague Demonstration.Roy A. Sorensen - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (5):507-522.
    Poindexter points and asserts `That is Clinton''. But it is vague as to whether he pointed at Clinton or pointed at the more salient man, Gore. Since the vagueness only occurs at the level of reference fixing, the content of the identity proposition is precise. Indeed, it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood. Since Poindexter''s utterance has a hidden truth value by virtue of vagueness, it increases the plausibility of epistemicism. Epistemicism says that vague statements have hidden (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-26
    On the Psychology of Vague Predicates.Nicolao Bonini, Daniel Osherson, Riccardo Viale & Timothy Williamson - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (4):377–393.
    Most speakers experience unclarity about the application of predicates like tall and red to liminal cases. We formulate alternative psychological hypotheses about the nature of this unclarity, and report experiments that provide a partial test of them. A psychologized version of the ‘vagueness-as-ignorance’ theory is then advanced and defended.
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  50. added 2014-03-24
    Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
    ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness. In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made allowances (...)
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