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  1. added 2020-08-04
    Notes From Inside the COVID-19 Museum : A Satirical Soliloquy.Srajana Kaikini - 2020 - Barefoot Philosophers.
    "We are curious about our social behavior in a post COVID-19 future. A future where the social can’t be taken for granted; a future where we humans hope to reclaim some sense of control over the world currently ruled by a virus.".
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  2. added 2020-08-02
    Locating Epistemic Value.Brian William Pollex - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin
    Many epistemologists are attracted to the idea that knowledge is valuable in a way that stands out when compared to the value of other doxastic attitudes. Some philosophers, including Linda Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig, Richard Swinburne, and Duncan Pritchard have objected to contemporary theories of knowledge on the grounds that the analyses these theories offer fail to sufficiently distinguish knowledge from mere true belief. One particularly clear instance of this is the Swamping Problem for Process Reliabilism. Goldman and Olsson try to (...)
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  3. added 2020-07-20
    The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - 2020 - Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
    This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. -/- The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such (...)
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  4. added 2020-07-13
    Mario Bunge. L’épistémologie est là pour de bon.Ricardo J. Gómez - 2020 - Mεtascience 1:177-198.
    Cette étude défend l’idée que, contrairement à l’opinion de Latour sur la nécessité de laisser de côté l’épistémologie pour traiter de tout ce qui a de la valeur pour la science, Mario Bunge a systématiquement construit une épistémologie détaillée et approfondie. La stratégie argumentative consistera à montrer (a) qu’il est faux que nous n’avons jamais été modernes (b) que l’épistémologie est là pour de bon et (c) que Mario Bunge soutient un réalisme scientifique fort, une version du matérialisme, du systémisme (...)
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  5. added 2020-07-12
    Kierkegaard on Imitation and Ethics: Towards a Secular Project?Wojciech T. Kaftanski - 2020 - Journal of Religious Ethics 48 (4):557-577.
    This essay demonstrates the prominence of imitation in Kierkegaard’s ethics. I move beyond his idea of authentic existence modeled on Christ and explore the secular dimension of Kierkegaard’s insights about human nature and imitation. I start with presenting imitation as key to understanding the ethical dimension of the relationship between the universal and individual aspects of the human self in Kierkegaard. I then show that Kierkegaard’s moral concepts of “primitivity” and “comparison” are a response to his sociological and psychological observations (...)
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  6. added 2020-07-10
    Default Reasonableness and the Mathoids.Sharon Berry - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3695-3713.
    In this paper I will argue that (principled) attempts to ground a priori knowledge in default reasonable beliefs cannot capture certain common intuitions about what is required for a priori knowledge. I will describe hypothetical creatures who derive complex mathematical truths like Fermat’s last theorem via short and intuitively unconvincing arguments. Many philosophers with foundationalist inclinations will feel that these creatures must lack knowledge because they are unable to justify their mathematical assumptions in terms of the kind of basic facts (...)
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  7. added 2020-06-29
    The Value of Knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as (...)
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  8. added 2020-06-29
    Virtue Epistemology.John Greco & John Turri - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary Virtue epistemology (hereafter 'VE') research program. These include novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use.
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  9. added 2020-06-26
    The Value of Truth: Introduction to the Topical Collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - forthcoming - Synthese:1-8.
  10. added 2020-06-24
    La contingenza dei fatti e l'oggettivita dei valori.Giancarlo Marchetti, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Sharyn Clough, David Coop & Ruth Anna Putnam (eds.) - 2013 - Sesto San Giovanni, Milano: Mimesis.
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  11. added 2020-06-19
    Evidentialism and Belief Polarization.Emily C. McWilliams - forthcoming - Synthese:1-32.
    Belief polarization occurs when subjects who disagree about some matter of fact are exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on that dispute. While we might expect mutual exposure to common evidence to mitigate disagreement, since the evidence available to subjects comes to consist increasingly of items they have in common, this is not what happens. The subjects’ initial disagreement becomes more pronounced because each person increases confidence in her antecedent belief. Kelly aims to identify the mechanisms that (...)
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  12. added 2020-06-18
    Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.
    This chapter enhances and extends a powerful and promising research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents that one can identify in contemporary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Performance-based epistemology offers at least three outstanding benefits: it explains the distinctive value that knowledge has, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of performance-based (...)
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  13. added 2020-06-16
    Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
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  14. added 2020-06-07
    Just Following the Rules: Collapse / Incoherence Problems in Ethics, Epistemology, and Argumentation Theory.Patrick Bondy - 2020 - In J. Anthony Blair & Christopher Tindale (eds.), Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen. Windsor, ON, Canada: pp. 172-202.
    This essay addresses the collapse/incoherence problem for normative frameworks that contain both fundamental values and rules for promoting those values. The problem is that in some cases, we would bring about more of the fundamental value by violating the framework’s rules than by following them. In such cases, if the framework requires us to follow the rules anyway, then it appears to be incoherent; but if it allows us to make exceptions to the rules, then the framework “collapses” into one (...)
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  15. added 2020-05-22
    Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.
    How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic attitudes (...)
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  16. added 2020-05-11
    2012 Draft - 'The Foundations of Epistemic Kantianism'.Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
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  17. added 2020-05-08
    On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism (...)
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  18. added 2020-04-24
    Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa006.
    Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means–end rationality, ruling out too many natural ways of taking risk into account. In this paper, we investigate what belief-revision procedures are supported (...)
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  19. added 2020-04-22
    Anything but the Truth.Joseph Bjelde - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Fundamental epistemic values are values that best explain some epistemic evaluations. But there are, I argue, no epistemic evaluations which are best explained by positing truth as an epistemic value. So truth is not a fundamental epistemic value.
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  20. added 2020-04-16
    Late 2012 Draft - 'From Teleology to Rationality's Insignificance (and Back)'.Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
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  21. added 2020-04-16
    Early 2013 Draft - 'Internalist Values and the Fundamental Epistemic Value'.Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
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  22. added 2020-04-14
    Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation,
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  23. added 2020-03-27
    Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value.Kareem Khalifa & Jared A. Millson - 2020 - In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 87-106.
    Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background (...)
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  24. added 2020-03-10
    Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.
    Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences (...)
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  25. added 2020-01-29
    New Boundary Lines.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - manuscript
    Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...)
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  26. added 2020-01-29
    Reflection, Epistemic Value and Human Flourishing.Waldomiro Silva Filho & Felipe Rocha - 2016 - Analytica 19 (1):129-144.
    In this paper, we discuss two recurring themes in Sosa’s work, reexamined in Judgment and Agency (SOSA, 2015) from a new angle, i.e. the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic agent, and epistemic value. Regarding the latter, Sosa suggests that knowing full well, which necessarily involves reflection, has value because it contributes to human flourishing. Although Sosa’s “new virtue epistemology” appears very promising in explaining different intuitions regarding epistemology and demonstrating that it is possible (...)
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  27. added 2020-01-05
    Knowing People.Vrinda Dalmiya - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press.
    Makes a case for redirecting epistemology by basing it on a virtue approach and the method of care. According to virtue epistemology, what confers epistemic value are properties of the epistemic subject: his or her epistemic character, belief‐forming habits, and cognitive dispositions. The method of care is a complex, interactive process of acquiring justified beliefs or knowledge, a process that integrates the subject into a social and ethical context. Starting out with a discussion of knowledge of other minds, the writer (...)
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  28. added 2020-01-03
    Epistemic Paternalism, Personal Sovereignty, and One’s Own Good.Michel Croce - forthcoming - In Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Rowman & LIttlefield.
    A recent paper by Bullock (2018) raises a dilemma for proponents of epistemic paternalism. If epistemic paternalists contend that epistemic improvements contribute to one’s wellbeing, then their view conflates with general paternalism. Instead, if they appeal to the notion of a distinctive epistemic value, their view is unjustified, in that concerns about epistemic value fail to outweigh concerns about personal sovereignty. In this chapter, I address Bullock’s challenge in a way that safeguards the legitimacy of epistemic paternalism, albeit restricting its (...)
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  29. added 2020-01-03
    Epistemic Paternalism and the Service Conception of Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):305-327.
    Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that in some circumstances we are justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for their own epistemic good without consulting them on the issue. In this paper, I address the issue of who is rationally entitled to undertake paternalistic interferences, and in virtue of which features one has this entitlement. First, I undermine the view according to which experts are the most apt people to act as paternalist interferers. Then, I argue that epistemic authorities (...)
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  30. added 2020-01-03
    Epistemic Value, Edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard.Mark T. Nelson - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):609-612.
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  31. added 2020-01-02
    Evidentialism and Belief Polarization.Emily C. McWilliams - forthcoming - Synthese:1-32.
    Belief polarization occurs when subjects who disagree about some matter of fact are exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on that dispute. While we might expect mutual exposure to common evidence to mitigate disagreement, since the evidence available to subjects comes to consist increasingly of items they have in common, this is not what happens. The subjects’ initial disagreement becomes more pronounced because each person increases confidence in her antecedent belief. Kelly aims to identify the mechanisms that (...)
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  32. added 2019-12-16
    Why Can’T What is True Be Valuable?Jim Hutchinson - 2019 - Synthese:1-20.
    In recent discussions of the so-called “value of truth,” it is assumed that what is valuable in the relevant way is not the things that are true, but only various states and activities associated with those things: knowing them, investigating them, etc. I consider all the arguments I know of for this assumption, and argue that none provide good reason to accept it. By examining these arguments, we gain a better appreciation of what the value of the things that are (...)
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  33. added 2019-12-16
    The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
    Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is (...)
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  34. added 2019-11-20
    What Epistemic Reasons Are For: Against the Belief-Sandwich Distinction.Daniel J. Singer & Sara Aronowitz - forthcoming - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard.
    The standard view says that epistemic normativity is normativity of belief. If you’re an evidentialist, for example, you’ll think that all epistemic reasons are reasons to believe what your evidence supports. Here we present a line of argument that pushes back against this standard view. If the argument is right, there are epistemic reasons for things other than belief. The argument starts with evidentialist commitments and proceeds by a series of cases, each containing a reason. As the cases progress, the (...)
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  35. added 2019-10-30
    Depth, Value, and Context.Jumbly Grindrod - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    In this paper, I will consider the repercussions that epistemic contextualism has on capturing the distinctive value of knowledge. I will argue that the way that contextualist views capture the value of knowledge depends on the depth of the contextualism involved. To do so, I distinguish between superficial and deep contextualism, and I show how the latter is forced to contextualist epistemic value in a way the former is not. However, I then argue that if the superficial contextualist view does (...)
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  36. added 2019-10-30
    Reviews The Nature and Value of Knowledge. By Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock. Oxford University Press, 2010 288 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-958626-4. Hb £37. [REVIEW]Peter Tramel - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (4):618-623.
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  37. added 2019-10-21
    In What Sense is Understanding an Intellectual Virtue?Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.
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  38. added 2019-10-20
    L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 143:357-370.
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  39. added 2019-10-20
    Passing the Epistemic Buck.Anne Meylan & Davide Fassio - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Daniel Whiting & Jonathan Way (eds.), Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain. Oxford, Royaume-Uni: pp. 46-66.
    While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative (...)
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  40. added 2019-10-05
    Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
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  41. added 2019-09-19
    Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit.Jason Kawall - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):463-477.
    It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue (...)
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  42. added 2019-09-01
    Veritism Refuted? Understanding, Idealizations, and the Facts.Tamer Nawar - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Elgin offers an influential and far-reaching challenge to veritism. She takes scientific understanding to be non-factive and maintains that there are epistemically useful falsehoods that figure ineliminably in scientific understanding and whose falsehood is no epistemic defect. Veritism, she argues, cannot account for these facts. This paper argues that while Elgin rightly draws attention to several features of epistemic practices frequently neglected by veritists, veritists have numerous plausible ways of responding to her arguments. In particular, it is not clear that (...)
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  43. added 2019-08-27
    Exploring Epistemic Vices: A Review of Cassam's Vices of the Mind. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson, Valerie Joly Chock, Benjamin Beatson & Jamie Lang - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8):48-55.
    In Vices of the Mind, Cassam provides an accessible, engaging, and timely introduction to the nature of epistemic vices and what we can do about them. Cassam provides an account of epistemic vices and explores three broad types of epistemic vices: character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking. Regarding each, Cassam draws insights about the nature of vices through examining paradigm instances of each type of vice and exploring their significance through real world historical examples. With his account of vices (...)
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  44. added 2019-08-24
    Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done (...)
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  45. added 2019-08-16
    Aiming at Aptness.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):438-452.
    This paper discusses Ernest Sosa's account of knowledge and epistemic normativity. The paper has two main parts. The first part identifies places where Sosa's account requires supplementation if it is going to capture important epistemic phenomena. In particular, additional theoretical resources are needed to explain the way in which epistemic aims are genuinely good aims, and the way in which some forms of reasoning can be epistemically better than others even when they are equally conducive to attaining the truth. The (...)
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  46. added 2019-08-12
    All Swamping, No Problem.Joseph Bjelde - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):205-211.
    The swamping problem is to explain why knowledge is epistemically better than true belief despite being no more true, if truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. But Carter and Jarvis argue that the swamping thesis at the heart of the problem ‘is problematic whether or not one thinks that truth is the sole epistemic good’. I offer a counterexample to this claim, in the form of a theory of epistemic value for which the swamping thesis is not problematic: evidence (...)
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  47. added 2019-08-07
    Critical Notice of Epistemic Consequentialism (Eds. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn). [REVIEW]Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - Analysis.
  48. added 2019-07-21
    Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):143-158.
    The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that (...)
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  49. added 2019-07-11
    Sinoplu Filozof Diogenes (Diyojen) ve Etik Anlayışı.Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2018 - Berikan Yayınevi.
    Diogenes of Sinope, bilinen adıyla Diogenes ya da Sinoplu Diyojen’e yönelik yapılan bu çalışmada amacım, Dioegenes’in yaşamının, felsefi duruşunun ve benimsediği etik kuralların kapsamlı ve belgelenmiş bir şekilde sunulmasıdır. Diogenes’in hayatını ve öğretilerini güvenilir bir şekilde aktarmak aşırı derecede zordur, çünkü diğer antik filozoflardan ayrı olarak, onun yaşamına ilişkin güvenilir kaynaklar bulmak oldukça sınırlıdır. Ayrıca, fıçının içinde yaşayan bir Kinikli’ye yönelik ortaya konulmuş birçok kurmaca anekdot ile uğraşılması gerekmektedir. Güvenilir bilginin azlığı ve belgesiz atıfların yarattığı zorluklara rağmen, yine de birçok (...)
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  50. added 2019-07-03
    Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 304-332.
    On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...)
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