Related categories

399 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 399
  1. On the Pragmatic and Epistemic Virtues of Inference to the Best Explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.
    In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes’ Rule really is the only rational way to respond to your evidence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Intellectual Humility and Political Conviction.Michael Hannon & Ian James Kidd - manuscript
    In the literature on intellectual humility, the standard view is that intellectual humility and political conviction do not conflict. As Michael Lynch says, “[i]ntellectual humility is not an opponent of conviction” (2019: 150) and is “not antithetical to critical political engagement” (ibid: 151). Yet, the standard view arguably ignores empirical and theoretical work indicating that intellectual humility does result in apathy or lack of political conviction. In this paper, we explore three ways in which intellectual humility may threaten political conviction: (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Believing in Love: Intellectual Humility and Well-Being.Reuben L. Lillie - manuscript
    In this project, I claim that intellectual humility requires love. Recent discussions within epistemology consider intellectual humility as a virtue, but many leave room for vice—even violence. I argue that any view of intellectual humility must also account for love. Otherwise, at best, one is flirting with another virtue, say, intellectual temperance or intellectual diligence. I conclude that, to count as genuine humility, one must hold and express one’s beliefs in love. -/- Funding for this project is provided by Olivet (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) [Long Version, Draft].Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
  5. Nietzsche's Virtues: Curiosity, Courage, Pathos of Distance, Sense of Humor, and Solitude.Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Felix Timmermann (ed.), Handbook of Virtue and Virtue Ethics. Springer.
  6. Moral Encroachment, Wokeness, and the Epistemology of Holding.J. Spencer Atkins - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.
    Hilde Lindemann argues that personhood is the shared practice of recognizing and responding to one another. She calls this practice holding. Holding, however, can fail. Holding failure, by stereotyping for example, can inhibit others’ epistemic confidence and ability to recall true beliefs as well as create an environment of racism or sexism. How might we avoid holding failure? Holding failure, I argue, has many epistemic dimensions, so I argue that moral encroachment has the theoretical tools available to avoid holding failures. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Educating for Intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology to Educational Theory and Practice.Jason Baehr (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The (Virtue) Epistemology of Political Ignorance.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    One typical aim of responsibilist virtue epistemology is to employ the notion of intellectual virtue in pursuit of an ameliorative epistemology. This paper focuses on “political inquiry” as a case study for examining the ameliorative value of intellectual virtue. My main claim is that the case of political inquiry threatens to expose responsibilist virtue epistemology in a general way as focusing too narrowly on the role of individual intellectual character traits in attempting to improve our epistemic practices.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. Intellectual Humility, Testimony, and Epistemic Injustice.Ian M. Church - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, USA: Routledge.
    In this exploratory paper, I consider how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might contribute to the failure of testimonial exchanges. In §1, I will briefly highlight four broad ways a testimonial exchange might fail. In §2, I will very briefly review the nature of epistemic injustice. In §3, I will explore how both epistemic injustice and intellectual humility can lead to failures in testimonial exchange, and I’ll conclude by suggesting how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might be related.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Real Life Collective Epistemic Virtue and Vice.Boudewijn de Bruin & Barend de Rooij - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. New York: pp. 396-423.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Wise Collectives.Abrol Fairweather - forthcoming - The Epistemic Life Of Collectives.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. "Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Agent Based Knowledge".Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - forthcoming - In Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue.
    “Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Epistemic Virtue” by Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor: A modification of F.P. Ramsey’s success semantics supports a naturalized theory of epistemic virtue that includes motivational components and can potentially explain both epistemic reliability and responsibility with a single normative-explanatory principle. An “epistemic Ramsey success” will also provide a better account of the “because of” condition central to virtue-reliabilist accounts of knowledge from Greco, Sosa and Pritchard. Ramsey said that the truth condition of a belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Fake News and Epistemic Vice: Combating a Uniquely Noxious Market.Megan Fritts & Frank Cabrera - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-22.
    The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for fake news. Specifically, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Social Virtue Epistemology.
    I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social positions. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. The Banality of Vice.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Alfano Mark, Colin Klein & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology.
    Ian James Kidd investigates how social forces shape epistemic character. I outline his proposed 'critical character epistemology' and I critically assess his discussion of the roles of salience in sustaining epistemic vice. -/- I emphasise how patterns of salience affect how social position—race, gender, class, and so on—shapes epistemic character. I dispute Kidd’s claim that all epistemic vices are salient. Instead, I argue, epistemic vice is camouflaged by ubiquity. Similarly, I dispute his claim that ‘normed-vices’ are particularly salient. -/- .
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  18. Pathocentric Epistemic Injustice and Conceptions of Health.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - forthcoming - In Benjamin Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 00-00.
    In this paper, we argue that certain theoretical conceptions of health, particularly those described as ‘biomedical’ or ‘naturalistic’, are viciously epistemically unjust. Drawing on some recent work in vice epistemology, we identity three ways that abstract objects (such as theoretical conceptions, doctrines, or stances) can be legitimately described as epistemically vicious. If this is right, then robust reform of individuals, social systems, and institutions would not be enough to secure epistemic justice: we must reform the deeper conceptions of health that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Introduction: From Epistemic Vices to Vice Epistemology.Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly - forthcoming - In Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly (eds.), Vice Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    We provide an overview of contemporary vice epistemology, the history of philosophical study of epistemic vices, and the chapters in the volume.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness by herself; that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Knowledge, Justification, Belief, and Suspension.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    In this paper, I want to discuss a problem that arises when we try to understand the connections between justification, knowledge, and suspension. The problem arises because some prima facie plausible claims about knowledge and the justification for judging and suspending are difficult to reconcile with the possibility of a kind of knowledge or apt belief that a thinker cannot aptly judge to be within her reach. I shall argue that if we try (as we should) to accommodate the possibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Individual and Structural Interventions.Alex Madva - forthcoming - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind.
    What can we do—and what should we do—to fight against bias? This final chapter introduces empirically-tested interventions for combating implicit (and explicit) bias and promoting a fairer world, from small daily-life debiasing tricks to larger structural interventions. Along the way, this chapter raises a range of moral, political, and strategic questions about these interventions. This chapter further stresses the importance of admitting that we don’t have all the answers. We should be humble about how much we still don’t know and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Intuitions About the Epistemic Virtues of Majority Voting.Hugo Mercier, Martin Dockendorff, Yoshimasa Majima, Anne-Sophie Hacquin & Melissa Schwartzberg - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning:1-19.
    The Condorcet Jury Theorem, along with empirical results, establishes the accuracy of majority voting in a broad range of conditions. Here we investigate whether naïve participants (in the U.S. and...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Epistemic Obligations of the Laity.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Very often when the vast majority of experts agree on some scientific issue, laypeople nonetheless regularly consume articles, videos, lectures, etc., the principal claims of which are inconsistent with the expert consensus. Moreover, it is standardly assumed that it is entirely appropriate, and perhaps even obligatory, for laypeople to consume such anti-consensus material. I maintain that this standard assumption gets things backwards. Each of us is particularly vulnerable to false claims when we are not experts on some topic – such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem.Lisa Miracchi - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.
    I extend my direct virtue epistemology to explain how a knowledge-first framework can account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked by externalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate lacks justification, the other tracked by internalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate has justification, and moreover that such justification is not enjoyed by the vicious duplicate. It also explains what these kinds of epistemic standing have to do with each other. I argue that all justified beliefs are good (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  26. Dual Processes, Dual Virtues.Jakob Ohlhorst - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic norm that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony.Christopher Ranalli - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. The Diversity-Ability Trade-Off in Scientific Problem Solving.Samuli Reijula & Jaakko Kuorikoski - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science (Supplement).
    According to the diversity-beats-ability theorem, groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. We argue that the model introduced by Lu Hong and Scott Page is inadequate for exploring the trade-off between diversity and ability. This is because the model employs an impoverished implementation of the problem-solving task. We present a new version of the model which captures the role of ‘ability’ in a meaningful way, and use it to explore the trade-offs between diversity and ability (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Humility in Personality and Positive Psychology.Peter Samuelson & Ian M. Church - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, USA: Routledge.
    A case could be made that the practice of philosophy demands a certain humility, or at least intellectual humility, requiring such traits as inquisitiveness, openness to new ideas, and a shared interest in pursuing truth. In the positive psychology movement, the study of both humility and intellectual humility has been grounded in the methods and approach of personality psychology, specifically the examination of these virtues as traits. Consistent with this approach, the chapter begins with a discussion of the examination of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Uncertainty Phobia and Epistemic Forbearance in a Pandemic.Nicholas Shackel - forthcoming - In Anneli Jefferson, Orestis S. Palermos, Panos Paris & Jonathan Webber (eds.), Values and Virtues for a Challenging World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this chapter I show how challenges to our ability to tame the uncertainty of a pandemic leaves us vulnerable to uncertainty phobia. This is because not all the uncertainty that matters can be tamed by our knowledge of the relevant probabilities, contrary to what many believe. We are vulnerable because unrelievable wild uncertainty is a hard burden to bear, especially so when we must act in the face of it. -/- The source of unrelievable wild uncertainty is that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Philosophy for Girls: Book Proposal.Melissa Shew & Kim Garchar - forthcoming
    This forthcoming edited volume is written by expert women in philosophy for younger women and girls ages 16-20. It features a range of ethical, metaphysical, social and political, and other philosophical chapters divided into four main sections. Each chapter features an opening anecdote involving women and/or girls from historical, literary, artistic, scientific, mythic, and other sources to lead into the main topic of the chapter.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Moral Virtues with Epistemic Content.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp, Cameron Boult & Johanna Schnurr - forthcoming - In C. Kelp & J. Greco (eds.), Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
    The investigation of epistemic virtues, such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual humility is a growing trend in epistemology. An underexplored question in this context is: what is the relationship between these virtues and other types of virtue, such as moral or prudential virtue? This paper argues that, although there is an intuitive sense in which virtues such as intellectual courage and open-mindedness have something to do with the epistemic domain, on closer inspection it is not clear to what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Review of John Greco, Achieving Knowledge. [REVIEW]John Turri - forthcoming - Mind.
    A review of "Achieving Knowledge" by John Greco.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Diversity, Trust, and Conformity: A Simulation Study.Sina Fazelpour & Daniel Steel - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):209-231.
    Previous simulation models have found positive effects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but have not explored effects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even when social identities are not associated with distinctive task-related cognitive resources, demographic diversity can, in certain circumstances, benefit collective performance by counteracting two types of conformity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Demystifying Humility's Paradoxes.Derick Hughes - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):1-18.
    The utterance “I am humble” is thought to be paradoxical because a speaker implies that they know they are virtuous or reveals an aim to impress others – a decidedly non-humble aim. Such worries lead to the seemingly absurd conclusion that a humble person cannot properly assert that they are humble. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate three purported paradoxes of humility concerning its self-attribution, knowledge and belief about our own virtue, and humility's value. I argue that humility is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Closed-Minded Belief and Indoctrination.Christopher Ranalli - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):61-80.
    What is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of closed-minded belief caused by “epistemically insulating content.” This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one's belief is reprehensible, whether morally or epistemically. As such, it does not demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent's rational evaluation. In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. When Do Non-Epistemic Values Play an Epistemically Illegitimate Role in Science? How to Solve One Half of the New Demarcation Problem.Alexander Reutlinger - 2022 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 92:152-161.
    Solving the “new demarcation problem” requires a distinction between epistemically legitimate and illegitimate roles for non-epistemic values in science. This paper addresses one ‘half’ (i.e. a sub-problem) of the new demarcation problem articulated by the Gretchenfrage: What makes the role of a non-epistemic value in science epistemically illegitimate? I will argue for the Explaining Epistemic Errors (EEE) account, according to which the epistemically illegitimate role of a non-epistemic value is defined via an explanatory claim: the fact that an epistemic agent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Norms of Inquiry, Student-Led Learning, and Epistemic Paternalism.Robert Mark Simpson - 2022 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York, NY, USA: pp. 95-112.
    Should we implement epistemically paternalistic measures outside of the narrow range of cases, like legal trials, in which their benefits and justifiability seem clear-cut? In this chapter I draw on theories of student-led pedagogy, and Jane Friedman’s work on norms of inquiry, to argue against this prospect. The key contention in the chapter is that facts about an inquirer’s interests and temperament have a bearing on whether it is better for her to, at any given moment, pursue epistemic goods via (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Does Philosophical Knowledge Presuppose a Moral Attitude? A Discussion of Max Scheler’s Metaphilosophical Thesis.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2022 - Philosophical Inquiries 10 (1).
    This paper explores Max Scheler’s metaphilosophical views. In particular, the paper seeks to reconstruct and assess Scheler’s thesis according to which philosophical knowledge presupposes a moral attitude which he describes as an “act of upsurge” on the part of the whole person of the philosopher toward the essential, an act which cannot be found in either the natural worldview or the sciences. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper explores how Scheler approaches the question about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Courageous Arguments and Deep Disagreements.Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1205-1212.
    Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. Virtue Theory of Mathematical Practices: An Introduction.Andrew Aberdein, Colin Jakob Rittberg & Fenner Stanley Tanswell - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10167-10180.
    Until recently, discussion of virtues in the philosophy of mathematics has been fleeting and fragmentary at best. But in the last few years this has begun to change. As virtue theory has grown ever more influential, not just in ethics where virtues may seem most at home, but particularly in epistemology and the philosophy of science, some philosophers have sought to push virtues out into unexpected areas, including mathematics and its philosophy. But there are some mathematicians already there, ready to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Introduction: Symposium on Stichter’s The Skillfulness of Virtue.Noell Birondo - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):545-547.
    The ‘skill model’ of virtue has received increasing levels of attention over the past decade, at least partly due to its prominence in the work of Julia Annas. Building on this earlier work, some of which is his own, Matt Stichter now delivers a bold and empirically grounded new book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, an extended defense of the skill model of virtue that utilizes the available psychological research on self-regulation and practical expertise. Stichter examines the idea (familiar in antiquity) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Routledge.
    Group polarization—roughly, the tendency of groups to incline towards more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members— has been rigorously studied by social psychol- ogists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions about this phenomenon which remain unexplored. Two such salient questions are metaphysical and epistemological, respectively. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.
    In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Intellectually Humble, but Prejudiced People. A Paradox of Intellectual Virtue.Matteo Colombo, Kevin Strangmann, Lieke Houkes, Zhasmina Kostadinova & Mark J. Brandt - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):353-371.
    Intellectual humility has attracted attention in both philosophy and psychology. Philosophers have clarified the nature of intellectual humility as an epistemic virtue; and psychologists have developed scales for measuring people’s intellectual humility. Much less attention has been paid to the potential effects of intellectual humility on people’s negative attitudes and to its relationship with prejudice-based epistemic vices. Here we fill these gaps by focusing on the relationship between intellectual humility and prejudice. To clarify this relationship, we conducted four empirical studies. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Intellectual Humility and the Curse of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Michael Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), Arrogance and Polarisation. Routledge.
    This chapter explores an unappreciated psychological dimension of intellectual humility. In particular, I argue there is a plausible connection between intellectual humility and epistemic egocentrism. Epistemic egocentrism is a well-known cognitive bias – often called ‘the curse of knowledge’ – whereby an agent attributes his or her own mental states to other people. I hypothesize that an individual who exhibits this bias is more likely to possess a variety of traits that are characteristic of intellectual humility. This is surprising because (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.
    Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Misinformation and the Limits of Individual Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (12):8-21.
    The issue of how best to combat the negative impacts of misinformation distributed via social media hangs on the following question: are there methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact that encountering misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their beliefs? If the answer is “yes,” then presumably individuals bear significant responsibility for those negative impacts; and, further, presumably there are feasible educational remedies for the problem of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Between Vulnerability and Resilience: A Contextualist Picture of Protective Epistemic Character Traits.Alice Monypenny - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (2):358-370.
    In this paper, I argue that focusing on resilience education fails to appropriately reflect the socio-political nature of character. I define protective epistemic character traits (PECTs) as epistemic character traits which aid students in avoiding, limiting or mitigating harm in the classroom. I argue that the relationship between epistemic character and protection in hostile classrooms is importantly influenced by context in two main ways: (1) the exercise and development of some PECTs may carry significant cost for some students and (2) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Deslimitando a Sosa. Diacronía y Colectividad del Juicio Doxástico.Jesus Navarro & Dani Pino - 2021 - In Modesto Gómez-Alonso & David Perez Chico (eds.), Ernesto Sosa. Conocimiento y Virtud. Zaragoza, España: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza. pp. 211-244.
    Ernesto Sosa tiene el mérito de haber sido pionero en lo que podría describirse, quizás sin demasiada exageración, como un cambio de paradigma en la epistemología contemporánea: el que supuso el tránsito desde una epistemología centrada en el problema de la estructura de la justificación hasta una nueva concepción del conocimiento enfocada en la naturaleza del agente epistémico. Un aspecto de este cambio que conviene no tratar con negligencia es el cambio de las analogías fundamentales, que pasaron de ser arquitectónicas (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 399