Epistemological Sources

Der Autor geht von der Frage nach der Brauchbarkeit der herkömmlichen wissenschaftstheoretischen Konzeptionen zur Lösung der tatsächlichen Pobleme einer rationalen Erkenntnispraxis aus. Er betrachtet unter diesem Gesichtspunkt nicht nur den Verifikationismus des Logischen Empirismus und auch den Falsifikationismus Poppers als unzureichend. Er hält darüber hinaus selbst die jüngeren Versuche einer Neubestim- mung der erkenntnistheoretischen Rationalitätsproblematik, wie sie von T.S. Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend u.a. unternommen wurden, bereits im Ansatz für verfehlt. Grimm entwirft die Skizze einer Erkenntnistheorie in strikt pragmatisch-handlungstheoretischer Perspektive und (...) greift dabei nicht nur auf ein reinterpretiertes Nutzenoptimierungsprinzip der theoretischen Ökonomie, sondern auch auf neuartige Wissensbebegriffe sowie auf zentrale Elemente der Erkenntnismetaphysik Kants zurück. (shrink)

Auf die metatheoretische Diskussion der deutschen Gegenwartspadagogik haben Kritische Theorie und Kritischer Rationalismus einen pragenden Einfluss. Die Untersuchung beleuchtet die Moglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Rationalitat anhand eines kritischen interparadigmatischen Vergleichs. Dieser ist thematisch konzentriert auf Probleme der erzieherischen Zielreflexion.".

本书根据马克思主义的哲学原理,就价值观念、道德观念、知识观念、人才观念等展开论述,在传统文化背景下对以上诸观念进行历史地沉思,力图揭示观念文化与时代发展的内在联系,揭示社会发展中观念更新的历史必然性。 .

The wisdom in traditional Chinese trickery.

本书汇集了古今中国人形形色色的计谋。其中包括:好点子、妙点子、笨点子、奸点子、鬼点子等15部分。.

[T. 1] Gnoseologija -- [T. 2] Filosofijos istorija. Kultūra.

Standpoint epistemology is committed to the view that some epistemic advantage can be drawn from the position of powerlessness. Call this the epistemic privilege thesis. This thesis stands in need of explication and support. I first distinguish between two readings of the thesis: the thesis that marginalized social locations confer some epistemic advantages (the epistemic advantage thesis) and the thesis that marginalized standpoints generate better, more accurate knowledge (the standpoint thesis). I then develop the former by appealing to the notion (...) of epistemic peers available in the disagreement literature. I next turn to the latter thesis, arguing that consciousness-raising plays an analogous role in the achievement of a standpoint as training does in the achievement of expertise. The upshot of this analysis is that it clarifies that while marginalization is necessary (though not sufficient) for epistemic advantage, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic privilege. (shrink)

This book addresses the European Court of Human Rights’ fairness standards in criminal appeal, filling a gap in this less researched area of studies. Based on a fair trial immediacy requirement, the Court has found several violations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights at the appellate level by at least eighteen States of the Council of Europe in a vast array of cases, particularly in contexts of first instance acquittals overturning and of sentences increasing on appeal. (...) -/- On the one hand, the book critically engages this case-law with the law revisions it has recently inspired in European countries, as well as with the critiques and difficulties that it continues to raise. On the other hand, it interweaves insight from criminal procedure theory with new discoveries in the field of cognitive sciences (neuroscience of memory, philosophy of knowledge, AI), shedding an interdisciplinary light on the (in)adequacy and limits of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. (shrink)

Are there any special reasons, in terms of epistemic reliability, that support the demand, advocated by the ECtHR, that personal evidence be provided again in Criminal Appeal, having the appeal court to hear the witnesses and the defendant directly? Namely, are there epistemic considerations to prefer direct contact with witnesses over accessing visual and audio recordings of their intervention in first instance? Can testimony and, with it, memory bring out information in a cognitive agent with complete security? Or are they (...) fallible? Or, even less, do they never give rise to information about reality? If they are fallible, in what extent do they fail? These are some—perhaps the most relevant—of the questions to be answered when one intends to discuss the value (the epistemic validity) of testimonial evidence in Criminal Procedure, having in mind the principle of immediacy. In this chapter, I will analyse, specifically, research in the Neurosciences of Memory, according to which the retrieval of stored information occurs with distortions (with addition, subtraction, or modification of information), and its implications to Criminal Appeal, as well as the main obstacles brought by the Philosophy of Knowledge to testimony reliability. (shrink)

Книга предназначена для специалистов в области философии, а также может служить источником для преподавания философии и истории философии, всех тех, кто интересуется проблемами философского и научного знания.

Рассматривается понимание как специфически человеческий способ существования, как первичный, исходный опыт освоения человеком мира, в котором отсутствует субъект-объективная разделенность, лежащая в основе познавательного отношения. Для специалистов.

Сборник предназначен ученым, аспирантам и студентам для использования в научной работе и учебной деятельности, а также для всех заинтересованных лиц.

Google Search is arguably one of the primary epistemic tools in use today, with the lion’s share of the search-engine market globally. Scholarship on countering the current scourge of misinformation often recommends “digital lit- eracy” where internet users, especially those who get their information from so- cial media, are encouraged to fact-check such information using reputable sources. Given our current internet-based epistemic landscape, and Google’s dominance of the internet, it is very likely that such acts of epistemic hygiene will take (...) place via Google Search. The question arises whether Google Search is fit for purpose, given the apparent misalignment the general epistemic goal of promoting true beliefs and the greater online commercial ecosystem in which it is embedded. I argue that Google Search is epistemically problematic as it stands, mainly due to the opacity related to the parameters it uses for personalising search results. I further argue that in as far as an ordinary internet user is legitimately ignorant of Google’s workings, uses it in an “ordinary manner”, and is generally unable to avoid using it in the current information environment, they are not ep- istemically blameworthy for any false beliefs that they acquire via it. I conclude that too much emphasis is currently placed on individual epistemic practices and not enough on our information environment and epistemic tools when it comes to countering misinformation. (shrink)

L’epistemologia (detta anche filosofia della conoscenza o gnoseologia) è la disciplina filosofica che studia come gli esseri umani si rapportano da un punto di vista cognitivo alla realtà che li circonda. Le questioni fondamentali che la interessano sono principalmente di natura normativa. Riguardano il modo in cui dovremmo regolare le nostre credenze alla luce dell’informazione in nostro possesso, e la natura della conoscenza umana ed i suoi limiti. Questo capitolo è organizzato in modo corrispondente. La prima sezione tratta della nozione (...) di giustificazione epistemica, la seconda quella di conoscenza, e la terza introduce il problema filosofico dello scetticismo. (shrink)

The paper investigates the distinction between form and matter in Kant’s theoretical philosophy – his adoption of an Aristotelian hylomorphism. This connection to Aristotle is sometimes recognized in Kant scholarship, though most proponents claim that against the backdrop of a structural analogy, Kant and Aristotle also differ in an important respect: according to them, while Aristotle puts forth a hylomorphic conception of being, Kant merely offers a hylomorphic conception of cognition in which sensibility provides the matter and understanding the form. (...) Against this, the paper claims that this “interiorization” of form cannot be squared with Kant’s actual views. Form is not internal for Kant, but neither is it external. Rather, it is “original form”. This interpretation ascribes a “hylomorphism all the way down” to Kant, meaning that the form and the matter of cognition are jointly actualized in virtue of each other. The understanding cannot be understood apart from its part in a hylomorphic unity with sensibility. Therefore, a proper appreciation of this unity enables us to see that it is impossible to distinguish the form that objects have as objects of cognition from the form they have in themselves. (shrink)