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  1. Contre-espionnage - Communautés épistémiques en UE.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Le contre-espionnage est une activité conçue pour protéger l'activité de renseignement d'une organisation contre des agents étatiques ou non étatiques. Il comprend la collecte et l'analyse d'informations spécifiques, ainsi que des activités préventives et contre-offensives contre les intentions et les actions visant la sécurité nationale, y compris le terrorisme. Les communautés épistémiques sont des réseaux informels d'experts basés sur la connaissance, qui influencent les décideurs dans la définition des problèmes auxquels ils sont confrontés, l'identification de différentes solutions et l'évaluation des (...)
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  2. Motivating and Defending the Phenomenological Conception of Perceptual Justification.Philipp Berghofer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Perceptual experiences justify. When I look at the black laptop in front of me and my perceptual experience presents me with a black laptop placed on my desk, my perceptual experience has justificatory force with respect to the proposition that there is black laptop on the desk. The present paper addresses the question of why perceptual experiences are a source of immediate justification: What gives them their justificatory force? I shall argue that the most plausible and the most straightforward answer (...)
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  3. Knowledge by Imagination - How Imaginative Experience Can Ground Knowledge.Fabiab Dorsch - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of (...)
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  4. An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality.Derek Lam - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge.
    Imagination is a source of evidence for objective modality. It is through this epistemic connection that the idea of modality first gains traction in our intellectual life. A proper theory of modality should be able to explain our imagination’s modal epistemic behaviors. This chapter highlights a peculiar asymmetry regarding epistemic defeat for imagination-based modal justification. Whereas imagination-based evidence for possibility cannot be undermined by information about the causal origin of our imaginings, unimaginability-based evidence for impossibility can be undermined by information (...)
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  5. Disagreement & Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
  6. Democracy Naturalised.Walter Horn & Richard Marshall - 2021 - 3:16 8:1-12.
  7. Problems for Wright's Entitlement Theory.Luca Moretti - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. pp. 121-138.
    Crispin Wright’s entitlement theory holds that we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type––which Wright calls “cornerstones”––that enables us to acquire justification for believing other propositions––those that we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. Entitlement theory is meant by Wright to deliver a forceful response to the sceptic who argues that we cannot justify ordinary beliefs. I initially focus on strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described (...)
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  8. Non-Evidentialist Epistemology.Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2021 - Leiden: Brill.
    Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.
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  9. Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Synthese:1-27.
    I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...)
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  10. Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese:1-30.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or (...)
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  11. Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.
    The traditional epistemological approach towards judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE is that they are justified or known on the basis of understanding alone. In this paper, I develop an understanding-based account which takes understanding to be a sufficient source of epistemic justification for the relevant judgments. Understanding-based accounts face the problem of the rational revisability of almost all human judgments. Williamson has recently developed a reinforced version of this problem: the challenge from expert revisability. This (...)
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  12. Méthodes de recherche fondamentales : Guide de l'étudiant et du praticien-chercheur.Emerson Abraham Jackson - 2020 - Mauritius: Lambert Academic Publishing (LAP).
    Ce manuel a été préparé en tenant compte du parcours de l'auteur en tant que chercheur en enseignement à distance, et aussi pour aider les étudiants dans leur quête de connaissances sur les concepts/idées de recherche. Le livre aborde les concepts de base de la recherche et convient donc parfaitement aux étudiants de premier cycle et aux chercheurs diplômés dans la poursuite de leur processus épistémologique d'acquisition de connaissances. Le livre comprend six chapitres, chacun d'entre eux contenant des informations indépendantes (...)
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  13. Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy.Malcolm Keating - 2020 - London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing.
    Arthâpatti is a pervasive form of reasoning investigated by Indian philosophers in order to think about unseen causes and interpret ordinary and religious language. Its nature is a point of controversy among Mimamsa, Nyaya, and Buddhist philosophers, yet, to date, it has received less attention than perception, inference, and testimony. This collection presents a one-of-a-kind reference resource for understanding this form of reasoning studied in Indian philosophy. Assembling translations of central primary texts together with newly-commissioned essays on research topics, it (...)
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  14. Il visibile o l'invisibile? Dialoghi tra il serio e il faceto sulla conoscenza.Giorgio Marchetti & Pier Celeste Marchetti - 2020 - Rieti RI, Italia: Placebook Publishing & Writer Agency.
    Come in una partita a scacchi, i due protagonisti e per certi versi antagonisti, si interrogano sul ruolo del visibile e dell’invisibile nel raggiungimento della conoscenza, muovendo i loro pezzi uno dalla Finlandia, l’altro dall’Italia. È prevalente il visibile o l’invisibile? Si può penetrare l’invisibile attraverso il visibile o il visibile esiste grazie all’invisibile? Come in un’osteria del borgo ha preso inizio la partita, continuata poi in tutte le altre, così pure in un’osteria finisce la vicenda. È la ragione o (...)
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  15. Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs.Luca Moretti - 2020 - Cham: Springer.
    This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has (...)
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  16. EXPERIMENTOS MENTAIS COMO ARGUMENTOS: OBJEÇÕES À ABORDAGEM DE NORTON.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues & Roberto Schimitz Nitsche - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 46 (1):53-76.
    Entende-se que os experimentos mentais são dispositivos da imaginação que podem nos fornecer crenças que constituem conhecimento. John D. Norton apresentou uma abordagem que se tornou influente para explicar como os experimentos mentais científicos podem produzir novos conhecimentos so- bre o mundo. Ele afirma que não há nada distintivo nos experimentos men- tais, uma vez que sustenta que eles funcionam exatamente como argumen- tos. Neste artigo, contestamos sua abordagem. Examinamos aspectos essen- ciais de sua abordagem, que envolvem as noções de (...)
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  17. New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism.Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, including its relationship with perceptual disjunctivism, radical skepticism, (...)
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  18. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification.Christos Georgakakis & Luca Moretti - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...)
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  19. Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...)
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  20. How Art Teaches: A Lesson From Goodman.Markus Lammenranta - 2019 - Paths From the Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics.
    In “How Art Teaches: A Lesson from Goodman”, Markus Lammenranta inquires if and how artworks can convey propositional knowledge about the world. Lammenranta argues that the cognitive role of art can be explained by revising Nelson Goodman’s theory of symbols. According to Lammenranta, the problem of Goodman’s theory is that, despite providing an account of art’s symbolic function, it denies art the possibility of mediating propositional knowledge. Lammenranta claims that Goodman’s theory can be augmented by enlarging it with an account (...)
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  21. Knowledge From Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory.Federico Luzzi - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible – that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full (...)
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  22. ‘Data’ in the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions, 1665–1886.Chris Meyns - 2019 - Notes and Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science.
    Was there a concept of data before the so-called ‘data revolution’? This paper contributes to the history of the concept of data by investigating uses of the term ‘data’ in texts of the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions for the period 1665–1886. It surveys how the notion enters the journal as a technical term in mathematics, and charts how over time it expands into various other scientific fields, including Earth sciences, physics and chemistry. The paper argues that in these texts the (...)
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  23. You Will Respect My Authoritah!? A Reply to Botting.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Informal Logic 39 (1):106-122.
    In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expert’s judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance (...)
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  24. Das Zeugnis anderer.Nicola Mößner - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, Germany: Springer. pp. 136-144.
    This is a survey article about testimony. It discusses questions concerning the nature and the epistemology of the division of epistemic labour.
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  25. Defending Nonreductionism About Understanding.Michele Palmira - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):222-231.
    In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. To do so, I examine Paulina Sliwa’s recent (Sliwa 2015, 2017) defence of knowledge-based Reductionism (Reductionism for short). Sliwa claims that one understands why p if and only if one has a sufficient amount of knowledge why p. Sliwa also contends that Reductionism is supported by intuitive verdicts about our uses of ‘understanding why’ and ‘knowing why’. In reply, I first argue (...)
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  26. Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
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  27. Anthropocene: The philosophy of Biotechnology.Valentin Cheshko, Glazko Valery & Ivanitskaya Lida - 2018 - Moscow, Russia: Kurs INFRA-M.
    The theory of evolution of complex, including the humans system and algorithm for its constructing are a synthesis of evolutionary epistemology, philosophical anthropology and concrete scientific empirical basis in modern science,. In other words, natural philosophy is regaining the status bar element theoretical science in the era of technology-driven evolution. The co-evolutionary concept of 3-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path (...)
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  28. Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
    Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...)
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  29. Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments Can Deliver Knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.
    In a recent paper, Murali Ramachandran endorses a principle that he thinks can help us solve the surprise test puzzle and cause problems for a Williamsonian argument against KK principles. But in this paper I argue that his principle is false and as a result it cannot do either.
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  30. Arguments From Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):175-195.
    Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert (...)
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  31. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
    This paper criticizes phenomenal conservatism––the influential view according to which a subject S’s seeming that P provides S with defeasible justification for believing P. I argue that phenomenal conservatism, if true at all, has a significant limitation: seeming-based justification is elusive because S can easily lose it by just reflecting on her seemings and speculating about their causes––I call this the problem of reflective awareness. Because of this limitation, phenomenal conservatism doesn’t have all the epistemic merits attributed to it by (...)
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  32. Defeaters in Current Epistemology: Introduction to the Special Issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.
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  33. Trusting the Media? TV News as a Source of Knowledge.Nicola Mößner - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):205-220.
    Why do we trust TV news? What reasons might support a recipient’s assessment of the trustworthiness of this kind of information? This paper presents a veritistic analysis of the epistemic practice of news production and communication. The topic is approached by discussing a detailed case study, namely the characteristics of the most popular German news programme, called the ‘Tagesschau’. It will be shown that a veritistic analysis can indeed provide a recipient with relevant reasons to consider when pondering on the (...)
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  34. Trust: A Recipe.Shane Ryan - 2018 - Think 17 (50):113-125.
    Trust is relevant to discussions across a range of areas in philosophy, including social epistemology, ethics, political theory, and action theory. It’s also the sort of thing that tends to matter a lot in our personal lives. We want romantic partners, friends, employers, and others to trust us. I argue that trust requires belief on the part of the trustor in the competence of the trustee to perform the relevant action, as well as the trustor's approval of what she believes (...)
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  35. Swampman: A Dilemma for Proper Functionalism.Jeffrey Tolly - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1725-1750.
    Proper functionalism claims that a belief has epistemic warrant only if it’s formed according to the subject’s truth-aimed cognitive design plan. The most popular putative counter-examples to proper functionalism all involve agents who form beliefs in seemingly warrant-enabling ways that don’t appear to proceed according to any sort of design. The Swampman case is arguably the most famous scenario of this sort. However, some proper functionalists accept that subjects like Swampman have warrant, opting instead to adopt a non-standard account of (...)
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  36. Epistemic and Ethical Trade-Offs in Decision Analytical Modelling.Martin Vezer - 2018 - Climatic Change 147 (1):1-10.
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  37. Sur l’infini mathématique. Genèse des concepts et hétéronomie des mathématiques.Dominique Pradelle - 2017 - In Michel Fichant & Sophie Roux (eds.), Louis Couturat (1868-1914). Paris, France: Classiques Garnier. pp. 15-44.
    RESUMÉ – Situe historiquement au confluent de l’arithmétisation de l’analyse et de l’élaboration de la théorie des nombres transfinis, “De l’infini mathématique” s’attache à reconnaître à l’infini le statut de véritable objet mathématique ; mais le problème véritable, une fois mise en évidence l’insuffisance de la genèse arithmétique et algébrique des concepts et principes mathématiques, réside dans la possibilité de leur fondation philosophique sur des notions et principes rationnels et extramathématiques.
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  38. Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):95-112.
    We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexamples.
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  39. On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing, and Conceiving.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2016 - In Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  40. In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.
    According to proper functionalist theories of warrant, a belief is warranted only if it is formed by cognitive faculties that are properly functioning according to a good, truth-aimed design plan, one that is often thought to be specified either by intentional design or by natural selection. A formidable challenge to proper functionalist theories is the Swampman objection, according to which there are scenarios involving creatures who have warranted beliefs but whose cognitive faculties are not properly functioning, or are poorly designed, (...)
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  41. Age of Genetics and the age of biotechnology on the way to editing of, human genome.Valentin Teodorovich Cheshko (ed.) - 2016 - Moscow Russia: Kurs-INFRA-M.
    The book discusses some of the stages in the development of genetics, biotechnology in terms of basic strategy of humanity towards the formation of a modern agrarian civilization. Agricultural civilization is seen as part of the biosphere and primary user of its energy flows. Consistently a steps of creation of management tools for live objects to increasing the number of food security of mankind are outlines. The elements of the biosphere degradation started in the results of human activities, and the (...)
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  42. Why Arguments From Expert Opinion Are Still Weak: A Reply to Seidel.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (2):238-252.
    In this paper, I reply to Seidel’s objections against my argument from expert performance to the effect that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. I clarify what Seidel takes to be unclear points in my argument and show that it withstands Seidel’s objections.
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  43. Imagination Through Knowledge.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 207-226.
    Imagination seems to play an epistemic role in philosophical and scientific thought experiments, mindreading, and ordinary practical deliberations insofar as it generates new knowledge of contingent facts about the world. However, it also seems that imagination is limited to creative generation of ideas. Sometimes we imagine fanciful ideas that depart freely from reality. The conjunction of these claims is what I call the puzzle of knowledge through imagination. This chapter aims to resolve this puzzle. I argue that imagination has an (...)
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  44. Knowledge Through Imagination. [REVIEW]Margot Strohminger - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 12.
  45. Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
    Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.
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  46. A Epistemologia de Aristóteles.Jorge Ferigolo (ed.) - 2015 - São Leopoldo, RS, BRAZIL: UNISINOS University.
    Aristotle's epistemology is related to his dialectical method, whose steps are 1- collect the endoxa (accepted opinions of wise and philosophers), 2- contrast endoxa each other, 3- make his own observations over the objects/animals, 4- preserve the corrections and eliminate the errors, 5- conclusion. This method is very similar to what is today called "scientific method", based on the recollection of previous contributions, observations and experiments, and testing of hypotheses.
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  47. Kantian Conceptual Geography.Nathaniel Jason Goldberg - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a work in Kantian conceptual geography. It explores issues in analytic epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics by appealing to theses drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
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  48. L'empirisme introspectif: un coup d’œil sous le voile des phénomènes.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Philosophie 124 (1):53-79.
    Lorsque je me réveille le matin, je trouve ma femme à côté de moi et notre chien lové entre nous. Elle est calme et il est petit. Le faible bruit de leur respiration m’enveloppe tandis que je reprends progressivement conscience. Je repousse la couverture ; la fraîcheur de l’air me frappe. Je vais dans la cuisine et tourne le robinet pour me remplir un verre d’eau. Je suis l’aiguille des secondes sur...
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  49. Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
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  50. Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1271-1290.
    In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...)
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