Epistemological Sources

Bayesian epistemology provides a popular and powerful framework for modeling rational norms on credences, including how rational agents should respond to evidence. The framework is built on the assumption that ideally rational agents have credences, or degrees of belief, that are representable by numbers that obey the axioms of probability. From there, further constraints are proposed regarding which credence assignments are rationally permissible, and how rational agents’ credences should change upon learning new evidence. While the details are hotly disputed, all (...) flavors of Bayesianism purport to give us norms of ideal rationality. This raises the question of how exactly these norms apply to you and me, since perfect compliance with those ideal norms is out of reach for human thinkers. A common response is that Bayesian norms are ideals that human reasoners are supposed to approximate – the closer they come to being ideally rational, the better. To make this claim plausible, we need to make it more precise. In what sense is it better to be closer to ideally rational, and what is an appropriate measure of such closeness? This article sketches some possible answers to these questions. (shrink)

In a recent issue of this journal, Miloud Belkoniene challenges explanationist accounts of evidential support in two ways. First, he alleges that there are cases that show explanatory virtues are not linked to the truth of hypotheses. Second, he maintains that attempts to show that explanatoriness is relevant to evidential support because it adds to the resiliency of probability functions fail. I contest both of Belkoniene’s claims.

We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise,models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge – e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations – and assertional knowledge – e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature (...) and their organization and takes track of the way they are experimentally acquired or intentionally elaborated. A model mainly represents the theoretical knowledge or hypotheses on a domain, while the theory of observations mainly represents the empirical knowledge and the given experimental practices. We propose a precise identity criterion for observations and we explore different links between models and observations by assuming a degree of independence between them. By exploiting some techniques developed in the field of social choice theory and judgment aggregation, we sketch some strategies to solve inconsistencies between a given set of observations and the assumed theoretical hypotheses. The solutions of these inconsistencies can impact both the observations – e.g., the theoretical knowledge and the analysis of the way observations are collected or produced may highlight some unreliable sources – and the models – e.g. empirical evidences may invalidate some theoretical laws. (shrink)

While the author cannot speak for churches of Christ, common among them are unique ways of understanding holy scripture, believed to have been written by apostles and prophets of the Lord before the destruction of Jerusalem (70 A.D.) and circulated among the early Christian communities (E.g. A letter called First Clement in about 95 A.D., refers to at least ten New Testament books), then collected as a volume by the self-identified Christian community of the second century A.D. or earlier, e.g. (...) the list of Marcion (140 A.D.). (shrink)

In charging argumentum ad hominem, we accuse someone of attacking the source of a claim. In charging argumentum ad verecundiam, we attack the source of a claim. This is reason for attending to "attacking the source." It is important to distinguish probabilistic reasons for doubting a claim and evidentiary reasons. Evidence that the source of a claim is likely to be wrong is not evidence against the claim. The tendency to overlook this is the essential feature of the ad hominem (...) fallacy. This is relevant in assessing the view that someone who regards his thinking as made possible by Godless arrangements of matter largely determined by chance is, in taking this attitude, advancing a hypothesis which undermines his theorizing about the world or himself. (shrink)

Laurence BonJour divides approaches to a priori justification into three kinds. Quine’s radical empiricism denies the existence of any special category of a priori justification; moderate empiricism attempts to explain a priori justification in terms of something like knowledge of meaning or grasp of concepts; and rationalism postulates an irreducible ‘rational insight’ into the nature of reality. The positions therefore form a familiar trio of eliminativism, reductionism and anti-reductionism concerning a priori justification. BonJour’s interesting and (in the present philosophical climate) (...) unusual project is to defend rationalism, the anti-reductionist position. Rationalism says that we have an ability to ‘directly or intuitively see or grasp or apprehend … a necessary fact about the nature or structure of reality’ (pp. 15-16). ‘An apparent rational insight,’ he says, ‘purports to be nothing less than a direct insight into the necessary character of reality’ (p. 107). Two clarifications will help to mark out the distinctive character of this view: first, that rational insight is fallible; and second, that although BonJour carefully distinguishes the concepts of necessity and apriority, he none the less claims that rational insight yields a priori knowledge of necessary truths only. On his view, the contingent a priori does not exist, although empirical necessities do... (shrink)

Intuition and introspection are very interesting terms in Elzenberg’s thought. The intuition is connected with the earlier phase of Elzenberg’s philosophy. Intuition is a form of world cognition. It is tool of selection of the contents. In Elzenberg’s philosophy introspection is a later term than intuition. It may lead intuition but is not a necessity. Process of cognition can finish with introspection which is a phase of information collection. In this meaning introspection creates circumstances for intuition. Introspection is a form (...) of analysis internal human world but intuition permits discovery of new worlds. According to Elzenberg we can find intuition in art and in mysticism. Introspection in ethical and aesthetical texts has often existed. Intuition has most spectacular character than introspection generally. Intuition is a form of discovery of different human worlds while introspection is form of research of them. (shrink)

I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.

In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic (...) account of the semantics of singular terms should be. (shrink)

Originally published in 1961. This book is a study of some important ways of knowledge and experience and of the symbols through which they become articulate. Both ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are interpreted in wide senses which are sanctioned by common use – though not always by the usage of philosophers and scientists. The four main fields considered are: the arts, religion, moral knowledge, and our knowledge of one another. These fields, though distinguishable, are nevertheless found to be interrelated in subtle (...) and interesting ways, and it is contended that increase of ‘wisdom’, or ‘educated understanding’, can be achieved only through acceptance and assimilation of all their many-sided disciplines into personal insight. The book deals in a new way with questions of perennial interest which, because they are fundamental, are difficult. Nevertheless, the writing is lucid and untechnical and addressed to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

This paper continues a recent exchange in this journal concerning explanationist accounts of epistemic justification. In the first paper in this exchange, Byerly argues that explanationist views judge that certain beliefs about the future are unjustified when in fact they are justified. In the second paper, McCain defends a version of explanationism which he argues escapes Byerly’s criticism. Here we contribute to this exchange in two ways. In the first section, we argue that McCain’s defense of explanationism against Byerly’s objection (...) is unsuccessful. Then, in the second section, we develop an independent objection to explanationism from a different direction. If our arguments in each section are sound, then not only do explanationist accounts of epistemic justification judge beliefs that are justified to be unjustified, but they judge beliefs that are unjustified to be justified. Explanationism faces problems on both sides. (shrink)

Originally published in 1961. This book is a study of some important ways of knowledge and experience and of the symbols through which they become articulate. Both ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are interpreted in wide senses which are sanctioned by common use – though not always by the usage of philosophers and scientists. The four main fields considered are: the arts, religion, moral knowledge, and our knowledge of one another. These fields, though distinguishable, are nevertheless found to be interrelated in subtle (...) and interesting ways, and it is contended that increase of ‘wisdom’, or ‘educated understanding’, can be achieved only through acceptance and assimilation of all their many-sided disciplines into personal insight. The book deals in a new way with questions of perennial interest which, because they are fundamental, are difficult. Nevertheless, the writing is lucid and untechnical and addressed to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

Introductions to the theory of knowledge are plentiful, but none introduce students to the most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that. Their book guides the reader through the standard theories of knowledge while simultaneously using these as a springboard to introduce current debates. Each chapter concludes with a “Current Trends” section pointing the reader to the best literature dominating current philosophical discussion. These include: the puzzle of reasonable disagreement; the so-called (...) “problem of easy knowledge”; the intellectual virtues; and new theories in the philosophy of language relating to knowledge. Chapters include discussions of skepticism, the truth condition, belief and acceptance, justification, internalism versus externalism, epistemic evaluation, and epistemic contextualism. Evans and Smith do not merely offer a review of existing theories and debates; they also offer a novel theory that takes seriously the claim that knowledge is not unique to humans. Surveying current scientific literature in animal ethology, they discover surprising sophistication and diversity in non-human cognition. In their final analysis the authors provide a unified account of knowledge that manages to respect and explain this diversity. They argue that animals know when they make appropriate use of the cognitive processes available to animals of that kind, in environments within which those processes are veridically well-adapted. _Knowledge_ is a lively and accessible volume, ideal for undergraduate and post-graduate students. It is also set to spark debate among scholars for its novel approaches to traditional topics and its thoroughgoing commitment to naturalism. (shrink)

The philosophy of necessity and possibility has flourished in the last half-century, but much less attention has been paid to the question of how we know what can be the case and what must be the case. Many friends of modal metaphysics and many enemies of modal metaphysics have agreed that while empirical discoveries can tell us what is the case, they cannot shed much light on what must be the case or on what non-actual possibilities there are. In this (...) paper, in contrast, I discuss and defend naturalistic approaches to discovering the facts about necessity and possibility. After some remarks about what methodological naturalism in philosophy might amount to, I argue that naturalistic method in modal investigations may not need to be particularly revisionary of much of what is currently being done in modal investigation. I then discuss a number of respects in which a naturalistic orientation in modal investigation may improve on our current epistemic situation. (shrink)

There has been a particular emphasis on knowledge and competence as increasingly important resources for successful enterprises. This notion of knowledge is based on “positive knowledge” that knowing is merely a constructive, linear and accumulative process. We will introduce the notion of “negative knowledge” that involves “giving up” or “bracketing” knowledge in certain situations. When experts encounter something that is incompatible with their knowledge, they should be sensitive enough to recognise a new situation by suspending their action. In addition to (...) exploring the idea of “unlearning”, the paper introduces three other aspects of negative knowledge: “to know what we do not know”, “to know what not to do” and the value of failures. Negative knowledge seems to be possible, useful, and even necessary in expert organisations since old ways of thinking or knowing something often prevent us to see new potentials. (shrink)

Discussions on the perception and knowledge are interspersed throughout the books written in Islamic sciences- whether philosophy or theology or logic or even the science of methodology . The problem of the knowledge has led to many other problems, which should be studied. These problems are as follows:1- A part of philosophy is the topic of categories , and among the high genera is the category of quality, which is divided into 4 general parts. The psychical qualities form a kind (...) of qualities. Muslim philosophers have regarded the knowledge as being included in this kind, and approached to the knowledge from an ontological point of view.2- One of the most important philosophical issues is the knowledge of the soul in which the perception is discussed. In this regard, the role played by the philosopher of the 5th century , Ibn Sina is the most significant role.3- Also among the philosophical issues is the problem of the "intelligence, intelligent and intelligible" which was interjected in the time of Fakhr Razi; and inAsfar, it is more than any other issue of the knowledge topic discussed.4- The mental existence, which is among the novel issues. Introducing this issue, the philosophers were to show the importance of the knowledge and the mind being representative of the object.5- The secondary intelligibles, which is another philosophical issue that is in relation with the topic of the knowledge and perception.6-"The criterion for the truth of the propositions" which suggests that the propositions have a relation with the fact-itself. Though including only the Judgments and propositions, and not the imaginations, at the same time, it examines a part of man's acquired knowledge from a particular point of view.7- "The quiddity and its statements". In this regard, issues such as the mentally positedness of the quiddities, and the question of the particular and universal are introduced. These issues are, in fact, a sort of knowledge of the mind.8- In logic we come to questions, which are in relation with the issue of knowledge; and from a point of view, the logic is in fact, description and explanation of the mind.9- A part of Islamic philosophy is theology in the particular senseof the term, in which, after affirming the existence of God and analyzing the Divine attributes and names, the attributes of the Truth are discussed individually. Among the Necessary's attributes is His knowledge, in whose analyzing, the knowledge of man is accordingly discussed.10- In the methodology we are confronted with issues such as universal and particular, absolute and restricted. In this science some of verbal issues provide subtle analysis of the world of the mind. (shrink)

In the modern philosophy the theory of knowledge has been among the main issues of philosophical researches, made by philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant. That is why they have to be, primarily, regarded as the epistemologist. If we classify the theory of knowledge under three categories: the range of knowledge, the sources of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge, difference between epistemologists' ideas will become clearer. In particular, as regards the range of knowledge, there is a wide (...) spectrum of various ideas, some of them opposing some other. At one end of this spectrum is skepticism claiming that our knowledge of the world is much less than what we usually think. Some extremist skeptics claim that our knowledge does not go beyond the sensible issues and the everyday experiences. At the other end of this spectrum are various kinds of realism, maintaining the possibility of man's knowledge of the internal and external world. Some other theories are centered in the spectrum. One of such theories is phenomenology.As regards the possible sources of knowledge also, the present philosophical ideas lead to a wide spectrum. At the one end, there are classical empiricists, such as Locke and Hume. At the other end we find Plato, who believes that the true knowledge cannot be found through experiment. In the middle of extremist rationality and extremist empiricism, there is a more moderate position, called classical rationality, which is supported by philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz.The nature of knowledge, also among the main axes in epistemology, is, since the olden times down to the present time, disputed on. Particularly, in the recent times, this axis has attracted the attentions of philosophers and caused them to analyze the knowledge to find its main constituent. (shrink)

Traditional epistemology has devoted much attention to the distinctions between perception and inference and between basic and non-basic beliefs. Hot, I develop a different and more general distinction, between what I call "privileged" and "nonprivileged" beliefs; privileged beliefs are justifiable by means of an otherwise substandard argument while nonprivileged beliefs require support by a generally adequate argument for their justification I argue that even coherentists are tacitly committed to this distinction and that one of the chief problems for simple reliabilist (...) theories is that they imply that all beliefs are privileged. Any adequate epistemology has to count some beliefs as privileged and some as nonprivileged, and I suggest a way to modify reliabilist theories to accommodate this result. ;The privileged/nonprivileged belief distinction suggests a framework theory about the structure of epistemic justification, a theory which improves on foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in certain respects. Yet it raises the question of which beliefs are privileged and which are nonprivileged. I argue that whether or not a belief is privileged is determined by the etiology of that belief, and in particular, by the intrinsic nature and the etiology of the psychological faculty that produced that belief. A belief, therefore, is privileged if and only if it is the output of a certain kind of cognitive faculty, or system. Consequently, the beliefs produced by these faculties are such that it is possible to be justified in holding them even in the absence of a generally adequate argument. This does not mean that all the outputs of all such faculties are justified, for such beliefs might still require inferential support or be subject to non-inferential requirements, like reliability And of course, all such beliefs are potentially subject to defeat from other justified beliefs. ;The kind of cognitive faculties I have in mind includes, but is not restricted to, "modules", in Jerry Fodor's sense. The etiological, faculty-oriented view defended hat argues for distinctive, versions of externalism and naturalism in epistemology and holds some promise of illuminating certain traditional epistemological problems. (shrink)

Implicitly grounded seemings are impulses to believe which arise from thought processes of which the subject is not conscious, and implicitly grounded beliefs are beliefs that are grounded in such seemings. Many epistemologists would say that argumentative support is not needed in order for basic perceptual, memory, introspective, or a priori beliefs to count as warranted. One can know directly, based merely in its seeming so, that it is sunny outside, that one had eggs for breakfast, that one has a (...) pain in one's shoulder, or that 2 + 1 = 3. I argue in this dissertation that some people in some circumstances can also know directly that it is unwise to give someone money, that a job applicant would not be an asset to the company, that a friend is upset, or that there is something wrong with their child. ;The first chapter addresses the kinds of inputs and influences that might contribute to the formation of a basic belief, and examines the nature and origin of implicitly grounded beliefs. The second chapter distinguishes IGSs from other kinds of seemings. The third chapter explores the notions of "belief," "basic belief," and finally "properly basic belief." The fourth chapter begins the examination of implicitly grounded beliefs by looking at them in light of the main qualities warranted beliefs are thought to have. I argue that believing in accordance with an IGS can be a good way of pursuing the epistemic truth goal, of fulfilling epistemic duty, of expressing intellectual virtue, and of exhibiting proper function. I answer objections to IGBs being considered warranted, including the objection that they are subject to unwieldy influences, that they don't issue from a faculty, and that accepting them as properly basic means one must consider warranted all manner of odd beliefs. In the fifth chapter I argue that those criteria for proper basicality which are plausible allow that IGBs can be properly basic in the right circumstances. The sixth chapter summarizes the arguments of the dissertation, and briefly suggests how its conclusions are relevant to some current debates in epistemology. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs by appealing to special revelation. Even if one thinks that belief in God is rationally warranted, it does not follow that one's distinctive religious doctrines are justified. Though theism may be justified, it remains an open question whether or not believers are entitled to believe, for example, that Jesus Christ is God Incarnate or that God is triune. Traditionally, religious believers have claimed that their doctrinal beliefs are justified because they have (...) been revealed by God. ;My assessment of this claim consists of three parts. First I examine the concept of special revelation and defend it against charges of incoherence. But if even it makes sense to say that God can reveal himself, the more philosophically interesting question concerns how we could know that he has in fact done so. Hence the second part of the dissertation assesses criteria for adjudicating revelation claims. Locke's claim that the veracity of revelation is vouchsafed through miracles is examined. I argue that it is preferable to understand our doctrinal beliefs as properly basic rather than attempt to authenticate revelation claims through appeals to miracles. Finally, in part three, I consider and respond to several objections against the claim that our doctrinal beliefs can be justified. The first objection says that the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs through appeals to special revelation is undermined by competing claims to revelation. The second criticism claims that appeals to special revelation fail to provide the degree of justification required to underwrite decisive assent to doctrinal beliefs. I argue that neither of these criticisms is effective. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that it is conceptually possible for non-linguistic creatures to possess second-order beliefs--that is, beliefs about their own beliefs and those of others. I defend this thesis against Donald Davidson and Jonathan Bennett who argue that the thesis is false on the grounds that non-linguistic creatures cannot manifest second-order beliefs. In reply, I present a case that I argue shows a non-linguistic creature manifesting second-order beliefs. Also, I examine and criticize two arguments of Davidson's that are designed (...) to show that non-linguistic creatures cannot possess any kind of belief, let alone second-order beliefs. Finally, I examine some important experiments on non-linguistic primates, and show that they provide no positive evidence that actual non-linguistic animals have second-order beliefs. (shrink)

The relationship between knowledge and ethics is one of the important issues that has always been discussed in epistemology. The effect of self-purity on the quality of knowledge acquisition is also one of the interesting and fundamental subjects in this regard. In this research, after a general study of the views of Muslim philosophers concerning knowledge and the quality of attaining perception, it becomes clear that the truth of knowledge is ontological in nature and is emanated from the world above (...) to man's heart . A study of Mulla Sadra's works reveals that perception is attained at three sense, imaginal, and rational stages through unity with imaginal forms and the immaterial intellect. In doing so, some obstacles such as the love of worldly affairs and soulish desires block the necessary potential for attaining true knowledge. Finally, the writer introduces the purification of the soul as the most important factor in attaining certainty. (shrink)

Epistemological criticism will be applied in those cases when the claims of certain constructs to represent a particular kind of knowledge are not legitimate. The communication of knowledge in society must be made in a correct way. We understand correctness as “justness and neutrality towards knowledge”. However, there may be political, ideological, religious, or other interests in promoting certain kind of knowledge, which weaken the foundations of a society based on knowledge. Certainly, The incompetence, the lack of culture, the existential (...) or value-engagements, the material interests extend from incorrect information to disinformation and cheating, and reach as far as manipulation and recruitment. Therefore the timeliness of the proposed research topic is supported, on the one hand, by the recognized value of knowledge in society, and on the other hand, by the parazite phenomena which accompany the presence of knowledge in society - imposture, deception, credulity, hidden interests - which ask for an immediat response of the community directly involved in cognitive actions: philosophers, scientists, theologists, etc. In a society based on knowledge the critical attitude towards everything that pretends to represent itself as knowledge, and implicitely towards the consequences of such claims is a deontological and ethical demand. (shrink)