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  1. Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, by Pritchard, Duncan: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, Pp. Xv + 239, US$35. [REVIEW]Scott Aikin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):819-822.
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  2. Knowledge Attribution Revisited: A Deflationary Account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.
    According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not (...)
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  3. Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is (...)
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  4. Rational Beliefs in Rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.
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  5. Comparing the Axiomatic and Ecological Approaches to Rationality: Fundamental Agreement Theorems in SCOP.Patricia Rich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):529-547.
    There are two prominent viewpoints regarding the nature of rationality and how it should be evaluated in situations of interest: the traditional axiomatic approach and the newer ecological rationality. An obstacle to comparing and evaluating these seemingly opposite approaches is that they employ different language and formalisms, ask different questions, and are at different stages of development. I adapt a formal framework known as SCOP to address this problem by providing a comprehensive common framework in which both approaches may be (...)
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  6. Knowledge Is Not Enough.Jennifer Nado - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):658-672.
    Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms (...)
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  7. Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:150-171.
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  8. Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard.Roberto di Ceglie - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (2):231-247.
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  9. Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
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  10. On How to Be a Moral Rationalist, a Contribution to a Symposium on C. Peacocke The Realm of Reason.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  11. On How to Be a Moral Rationalist, a Contribution to a Symposium on C. Peacocke The Realm of Reason.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
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  12. The Factive Turn in Epistemology.Veli Mitova (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are either facts, veridical experiences, or known propositions. This ground breaking volume (...)
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  13. Reasons and Causes of Beliefs.Kutschera Franz - unknown
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  14. Theories of Knowledge and Culture.L. A. Hirschfeld, S. Atran & A. Yengoyan - 1982 - Social Science Information 21 (2):161-198.
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  15. Knowledge-Based or Knower-Based?M. W. L. Eickemeyer - unknown
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  16. Knowledge as Justified Belief in a True, Justified Proposition.Robert K. Shope - 1979 - Philosophy Research Archives 5:35-72.
    When analyzing 'justified factual knowledge that h', we must speak of justified belief in h and also of h's being a justified proposition. Gettier-type problems can be dealt with by requiring that the belief in h be justified through its connection with a 'justification-explaining chain' related to h. The social aspects of knowledge can be encompassed by analyzing what it is for h to be a justified proposition in terms of h's relation to the rationality of an 'epistemic community'.The discussion (...)
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  17. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge.Ralph L. Slaght - 1977 - Philosophy Research Archives 3:367-503.
    This monograph is a critical survey and conceptual classification of recent work in the analysis of non- basic knowledge. The survey extends from the 1950's to Harman's Thought and Lehrer's Knowledge. Although the survey is not all-inclusive, I have examined at least twelve of what I believe to be important and interesting analyses. These analyses fall into three groups: Type I analyses, where the authors have concentrated their attention on the relation between the justifying evidence and false statements; Defeasibility-type analyses; (...)
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  18. Belief, Knowledge, and the Personal.Sung-Peng Hsu - 1972 - NTU Philosophical Review 2:95-110.
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  19. Susan Haack: Putting Philosophy to Work. Inquiry and Its Place in Culture. Essays on Science, Religion, Law, Literature, and Life. [REVIEW]Teodor Dima - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):113-118.
  20. Ian Evans, Nicholas D. Smith, Knowledge. [REVIEW]Corina Daba-Buzoianu - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):665-669.
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  21. Justified Believing is Tracking Your Evidential Commitments.Barry Lam - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):545-564.
    In this paper, I give an account of the conditions for rationally changing your beliefs that respects three constraints; 1) that rational believing is a matter ofrespecting your evidence, 2) that evidence seems to have both objective and subjective features, and that our set of beliefs seem to rationally commit us to certain propositions, regardless of the evidential support we have for these propositions. On the view I outline, rationally believing or giving up a belief is a matter of your (...)
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  22. Epistemic Justification, Rights, and Permissibility.Anthony Booth & Rik Peels - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):405-411.
    Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas (...)
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  23. The Logical Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Historical and Integrative Perspectives.Ettore De Monte & Antonino Tamburello - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):193-227.
    This work investigates some of the most important logical limits of scientific knowledge. We argue that scientific knowledge is based on different logicalforms and paradigms. The logical forms, which represent the rational structure of scientific knowledge, show their limits through logical antinomies. The paradigms, which represent the scientific points of view on the world, show their limits through the theoretical anomalies. When these limits arise in science and when scientists become fully and deeply aware of them, they can determine logical (...)
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  24. In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness.Alex Bundy - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):287-292.
    The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.
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  25. Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning.Rhys McKinnon - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and (...)
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  26. Literature and Knowledge. A New Version of an Old Story.Bogdan Creţu - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):7-19.
    This paper tries to discuss some of the theories concerning the relation between literature and knowledge. On the one hand, most of the time, philosophers donot believe in the force of literature to generate knowledge. On the other, litterateurs are more optimistic, considering that there is a specific kind of knowledge that literature is able to deliver. These are the two antagonistic theories I have to arbitrate in this paper. In my opinion, literature is an ally of science and philosophy (...)
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  27. No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental.Elia Zardini - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492.
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  28. Seeing is Not Believing.Hardt Stevens - unknown
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  29. Knowledge and Questions.Franck Lihoreau (ed.) - 2008 - Brill | Rodopi.
    This special volume of _Grazer Philosophische Studien_ features twelve original essays on the relationship between knowledge and questions, a topic of utmost importance to epistemology, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of language. It raises a great deal of issues in each of these fields and at their intersection, bearing, inter alia, on the theory of rational deliberation and inquiry, pragmatism and virtue epistemology, the problems of scepticism and epistemic justification, the theory of assertion, the possibility of deductive knowledge, the semantics (...)
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  30. Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.John Koethe & Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):136.
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  31. The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Alan Hajek & Isaac Levi - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):166.
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  32. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
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  33. Knowledge and Justification.Louis E. Loeb & John L. Pollock - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):455.
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  34. Reasons and Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith & Marshall Swain - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):460.
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  35. Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology.Frederick L. Will & Michael Williams - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):483.
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  36. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein & D. M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
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  37. Theory of Knowledge.J. M. Hinton & Roderick M. Chisholm - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (3):383.
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  38. Philosophical Reasoning.Edmund L. Gettier & John Passmore - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (2):266.
  39. The Problem of Knowledge.Willis Doney & A. J. Ayer - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (1):108.
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  40. Theory of Knowledge.Richard Taylor & A. D. Woozley - 1952 - Philosophical Review 61 (2):252.
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  41. The Problem of Knowledge.H. R. Smart, Ernst Cassirer, William Woglom & Charles W. Hendel - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (3):418.
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  42. The Analysis of Knowledge.Lewis White Beck & Ledger Wood - 1942 - Philosophical Review 51 (4):415.
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  43. A Theory of Knowledge.A. K. Rogers & Charles Augustus Strong - 1924 - Philosophical Review 33 (3):312.
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  44. The Problem of Knowledge.Evander Bradley McGilvary & Douglas Clyde Macintosh - 1916 - Philosophical Review 25 (4):623.
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  45. The Theory of Knowledge.J. E. Creighton & L. T. Hobhouse - 1898 - Philosophical Review 7 (1):77.
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  46. The Theory of Knowledge.J. E. C. & L. T. Hobhouse - 1896 - Philosophical Review 5 (5):556.
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  47. Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam.R. M. Frank & Franz Rosenthal - 1973 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 93 (1):108.
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  48. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy.Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.) - forthcoming - Bloomsbury Academic.
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  49. The Factive Turn in Epistemology.Veli Mitova (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    Contributions by: Maria Alvarez Jonathan Drake Daniel Fogal Mikkel Gerken Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Clayton Littlejohn Aidan McGlynn and Giada Fratantonio Veli Mitova Ram Neta Duncan Pritchard Patrick Rysiew John Turri Timothy Williamson -/- Abstract: Until recently, epistemologists took it for granted that good reasons for belief consist of psychological states rather than of facts. The turn of the twenty first century shook their confidence in this picture from three directions: John McDowell’s work on perception, Timothy Williamson’s theory of knowledge, and (...)
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  50. A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief, by Allan Hazlett. [REVIEW]Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):918-922.
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