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  1. added 2019-01-15
    Why the Dialectical Tier is an Epistemic Animal.Scott Aikin - 2018 - In S. & Maillat Oswald (ed.), rgumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, UK: pp. 11-22.
    Ralph Johnson has proposed a “two tiered” conception of argument, comprising of the illative core and the dialectical tier. This paper's two-part thesis is that (i) the dialectical tier is best understood as an epistemic requirement for argument, and (ii) once understood epistemically, the dialectical tier requirement can be defended against the leading objections.
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  2. added 2019-01-15
    Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement.Scott Aikin - 2018 - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):173-179.
    Scott F. Aikin ABSTRACT: In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement...
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  3. added 2018-11-25
    Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element examines what we can learn from religious disagreement, focusing on disagreement with possible selves and former selves, the epistemic significance of religious agreement, the problem of disagreements between religious experts, and the significance of philosophy of religion. Helen De Cruz shows how religious beliefs of others constitute significant higher-order evidence. At the same time, she advises that we should not necessarily become agnostic about all religious matters, because our cognitive background colors the way we evaluate evidence. This allows (...)
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  4. added 2018-11-22
    How To Solve The Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage into a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the (...)
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  5. added 2018-11-22
    Philosophical Equilibrism, Rationality, and the Commitment Challenge.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):377-385.
    Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is ‘to find what equilibria there are that can withstand examination’ (Beebee 2018, p. 3). In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that (...)
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  6. added 2018-11-14
    The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements.Frederick Choo - forthcoming - Topoi:1-9.
    Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers have argued that religious disagreements call for religious skepticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs. In order to figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, two questions need to be answered. First, what kind of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how should one respond to such disagreements? In this paper, I argue that many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, where parties have good reason to think they are not epistemic (...)
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  7. added 2018-11-14
    Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  8. added 2018-11-09
    Uniqueness and Permissiveness in Epistemology.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies — Philosophy.
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  9. added 2018-11-06
    On Difference-Splitting and the Equal Weight View.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peer--in particular, defers to the fellow agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her own--and updates by split-the-difference is prone to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable response to ``generic" peer update. (...)
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  10. added 2018-11-03
    Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness.Jon Matheson - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):215-225.
    In this paper, I develop and respond to a novel objection to Conciliatory Views of disagreement. Having first explained Conciliationism and the problem of divine hiddenness, I develop an objection that Conciliationism exacerbates the problem of divine hiddenness. According to this objection, Conciliationism increases God’s hiddenness in both its scope and severity, and is thus incompatible with God’s existence (or at least make God’s existence quite improbable). I respond to this objection by showing that the problem of divine hiddenness is (...)
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  11. added 2018-10-31
    Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
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  12. added 2018-10-30
    On Being Dogmatically Conciliatory.Clayton M. Littlejohn - manuscript
    A familiar complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’. This complaint seems to be influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves (...)
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  13. added 2018-10-30
    What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian (...)
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  14. added 2018-10-21
    Deep Disagreement and Hinge Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper explores the application of hinge epistemology to deep disagreement. Hinge epistemology holds that there is a class of commitments—hinge commitments—which play a fundamental role in the structure of belief and rational evaluation: they are the most basic general ‘presuppositions’ of our world views which make it possible for us to evaluate certain beliefs or doubts as rational. Deep disagreements seem to crucially involve disagreements over such fundamental commitments. In this paper, I consider pessimism about deep disagreement, the thesis (...)
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  15. added 2018-10-08
    How Do Jurors Argue with One Another?Joshua Warren, Deanna Kuhn & Michael Weinstock - 2010 - Judgment and Decision Making 5 (1):64-71.
    We asked jurors awaiting trial assignment to listen to a recorded synopsis of an authentic criminal trial and to make a choice among 4 verdict possibilities. Each participant juror then deliberated with another juror whose verdict choice differed, as a microcosm of a full jury's deliberation. Analysis of the transcripts of these deliberations revealed both characteristics general to the sample and characteristics for which variation appeared across participants. Findings were interpreted in terms of a model of juror reasoning as entailing (...)
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  16. added 2018-10-04
    Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
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  17. added 2018-10-04
    ‘Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):379-402.
    What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence against one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to adjust one’s belief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up with depends, in part, on (...)
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  18. added 2018-09-25
    Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure, there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-21
    Armchair Disagreement.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):527-549.
    A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...)
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  20. added 2018-09-21
    Epistemic Peerhood, Likelihood, and Equal Weight.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (3):307-344.
    Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...)
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  21. added 2018-09-20
    Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-20
    Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
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  23. added 2018-09-19
    Carnap, Explication, and Social History.James Pearson - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):741-774.
    A.W. Carus champions Rudolf Carnap’s ideal of explication as a model for liberal political deliberation. Constructing a linguistic framework for discussing social problems, he argues, promotes the resolution of our disputes. To flesh out and assess this proposal, I examine debate about the social institutions of marriage and adoption. Against Carus, I argue that not all citizens would accept the pragmatic principles underlying Carnap’s ideal. Nevertheless, explication may facilitate inquiry in the social sciences and be used to create models that (...)
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  24. added 2018-09-14
    Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-04
    How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence. One way for intrapersonal permissivism to be true is if there are epistemic supererogatory beliefs – beliefs that go beyond the call of epistemic duty. Despite this, there has been almost no discussion of epistemic supererogation in the permissivism literature. This paper shows that this is a mistake. It does this by (...)
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  26. added 2018-08-23
    Religious Conversion, Transformative Experience, and Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):265-276.
    Religious conversion gives rise to disagreement with one’s former self and with family and friends. Because religious conversion is personally and epistemically transformative, it is difficult to judge whether a former epistemic peer is still one’s epistemic peer post-conversion, just like it is hard for the convert to assess whether she is now in a better epistemic position than prior to her conversion. Through Augustine’s De Utilitate Credendi (The Usefulness of Belief) I show that reasoned argument should play a crucial (...)
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  27. added 2018-08-20
    Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy.Diego E. Machuca (ed.) - 2011 - Springer.
    In recent years, there has been renewed interest in Pyrrhonism among both philosophers and historians of philosophy. This skeptical tradition is complex and multifaceted, since the Pyrrhonian arguments have been put into the service of different enterprises or been approached in relation to interests which are quite distinct. The diversity of conceptions and uses of Pyrrhonism accounts for the diversity of the challenges it is deemed to pose and of the attempts to meet them. The present volume brings together twelve (...)
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  28. added 2018-08-16
    Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  29. added 2018-08-06
    The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
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  30. added 2018-07-28
    De doctrinale paradox.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 97 (1):XX.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  31. added 2018-07-14
    Evaluation of Research(Ers) and its Threat to Epistemic Pluralisms.Marco Viola - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (2):55-78.
    While some form of evaluation has always been employed in science (e.g. peer review, hiring), formal systems of evaluation of research and researchers have recently come to play a more prominent role in many countries because of the adoption of new models of governance. According to such models, the quality of the output of both researchers and their institutions is measured, and issues such as eligibility for tenure or the allocation of public funding to research institutions crucially depends on the (...)
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  32. added 2018-06-24
    Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
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  33. added 2018-06-19
    Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement: Reply to Robin McKenna.Ian M. Church - 2012 - Philosophical Writings:100-103.
    There are two issues I want to very briefly raise in response to Robin McKenna’s paper, “Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement.” First, I want to question whether or not the disagreement problem faced by indexical contextualism is truly a problem. Secondly, I want to consider whether or not McKenna’s solution is really in keeping with indexical contextualism.
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  34. added 2018-06-11
    Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay (...)
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  35. added 2018-06-08
    Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - forthcoming - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. London, UK:
    We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality.
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  36. added 2018-06-06
    The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
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  37. added 2018-06-02
    Disagreement and the Division of Epistemic Labor.Bjørn Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this article we discuss what we call the deliberative division of epistemic labor. We present evidence that the human tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in defense of our beliefs can facilitate the occurrence of divisions of epistemic labor in deliberations among people who disagree. We further present evidence that these divisions of epistemic labor tend to promote beliefs that are better supported by the evidence. We show that promotion of these epistemic benefits stands in tension with what extant (...)
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  38. added 2018-06-02
    Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements.Fabienne Peter - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic peer? A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others? Answering the epistemic trust question is (...)
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  39. added 2018-05-20
    The Epistemic Significance of Political Disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. (...)
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  40. added 2018-05-09
    Is the Equal-Weight View Really Supported by Positive Crowd Effects?Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2015 - In Uskali Mäki, Ioannis Votsis, Stephanie Ruphy & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 87-98.
    In the debate of epistemic peer disagreement the equal-weight view suggests to split the difference between one's own and one's peer's opinions. An argument in favour of this view---which is prominently held by Adam Elga---is that by such a difference-splitting one may make some use of a so-called wise-crowd effect. In this paper it is argued that such a view faces two main problems: First, the problem that the standards for making use of a wise-crowd effect are quite low. And (...)
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  41. added 2018-04-30
    Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Michael Titelbaum (2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, if it cannot be rational to have akratic beliefs of the form “p, but I shouldn't believe that p,” then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum’s argument, and argue that neither version is sound. The first (...)
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  42. added 2018-04-30
    Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation.Jan Albert van Laar & Erik C. W. Krabbe - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (3):329-350.
    Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into (...)
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  43. added 2018-04-17
    Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
    It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is (...)
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  44. added 2018-04-17
    Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.
    Given the role consensus is supposed to play in the social aspects of inquiry and deliberation, it is important that we may always identify a consensus as the basis of joint inquiry and deliberation. However, it turns out that if we think of an agent revising her beliefs to reach a consensus, then, on the received view of belief revision, AGM belief revision theory, certain simple and compelling consensus positions are not always available.
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  45. added 2018-04-04
    The Self-Undermining Arguments From Disagreement.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.
    Arguments from disagreement against non-skeptical moral realism begin by noticing (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. I argue that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the (...)
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  46. added 2018-03-28
    The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral (...)
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  47. added 2018-02-24
    Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson & Bryan Frances - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This article examines the central epistemological issues tied to the recognition of disagreement.
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  48. added 2018-02-18
    Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-17
    Disagreement About Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth (...)
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  50. added 2018-02-17
    Escepticismo y Desacuerdo.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):81-97.
    Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...)
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