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  1. The Intuition of the Mind.Mirko Aćimović - 1996 - Theoria 39 (4):111-126.
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  2. Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):15-34.
    The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a (...)
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  3. Constructive Analysis: A Study in Epistemological Methodology.Kristoffer Ahlström - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    The present study is concerned the viability of the primary method in contemporary philosophy, i.e., conceptual analysis. Starting out by tracing the roots of this methodology to Platonic philosophy, the study questions whether such a methodology makes sense when divorced from Platonic philosophy, and develops a framework for a kind of analysis that is more in keeping with recent psychological research on categorization. Finally, it is shown that this kind of analysis can be applied to the concept of justification in (...)
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  4. Expertise and the Interpretation of Computerized Physiological Data: Implications Problems by Experts and Novices.E. Alberdi, J. C. Becher, K. Gilhooly, J. Hunter, R. Logie, A. Lyon, N. McIntosh & J. Reiss - 2001 - Cognitive Science 5:121-152.
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  5. A Metaphysics for the Future.Robert Elliott Allinson - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (298):629-632.
    This work is intended to serve not only as an expression of a new idea of a philosophy, but as an apologia for philosophy as a legitimate and independent discipline in its own right. It argues that in the 20th century, truth has not been abandoned, but merely modified. The text proposes a return to truth and suggests that it is only after apprehending the truths of consciousness that the philosopher's mirror may become a kaleidoscope through which reality may be (...)
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  6. 'Intuitions as Evidence'. [REVIEW]Michael J. Almeida - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):3.
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  7. Reading Water : Risk, Intuition, and Insight.Douglas Anderson - 2007 - In M. J. McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk, and Adventure Sports. London ;Routledge.
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  8. A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux.James Andow - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):183-195.
    Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as (...)
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  9. Intuitions.James Andow - unknown
    This is likely to be published in the Jan 2016 issue of Analysis. The notice can be accessed for free by anyone at the following link -- http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/anv062?ijkey=BcRDGACTppiH6OT&keytype=ref.
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  10. Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  11. Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics.James Andow - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (1):53-62.
    Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and doesn’t do what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.
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  12. Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology.James Andow - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):353-370.
    A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology that focuses almost exclusively on questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions (...)
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  13. Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
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  14. Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.
    Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve (...)
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  15. The Nature of Intuition O.A. Nfuropsythologital Approath - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 19.
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  16. 2. Weimar Psychology: Holistic Visions and Trained Intuition.Mitchell G. Ash - 2013 - In John P. McCormick & Peter E. Gordon (eds.), Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy. Princeton University Press. pp. 35-54.
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  17. Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...)
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  18. Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
    This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do (...)
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  19. Types of Intuition.Archie J. Bahm - 1961 - Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  20. Intuition and the Inexpressible.Renford Bambrough - 1978 - In Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. Oxford University Press.
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  21. The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  22. The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium.Jared Bates - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
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  23. Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology.Jared Bates - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue (...)
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  24. Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions?Avner Baz - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  25. The Origins of Modal Error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  26. Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
    The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism’s impact on modal arguments in the philosophy of mind -- for example, Yablo’s disembodiment argument and Chalmers’s zombie argument. A less (...)
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  27. A Priori Knowledge.George Bealer - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
    This paper is a condensed version of the author’s “A Theory of the A Priori” (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000) for the evidential status of intuitions, the incoherence of radical empiricism. the thesis of modal reliabilism, and the Autonomy of Philosophy Thesis (according to which the a priori disciplines are autonomous from empirical science).
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  28. A Theory of the A Priori.George Bealer - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1-30.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  29. A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):29-55.
    The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why rational intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism -- the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept (...)
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  30. Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240.
    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the (...)
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  31. A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):163-174.
    This paper contains replies to comments on the author's paper "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy." Several points in the argument of that paper are given further clarification: the notion of our standard justificatory procedure, the notion of a basic source of evidence, and the doctrine of modal reliabilism. The reliability of intuition is then defended against Lycan's skepticism and a response is given to Lycan's claim that the scope of a priori knowledge does not include philosophically central (...)
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  32. Intuition.George Bealer - 1996 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan. pp. 262-264.
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  33. On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.
    The paper elaborates upon various points and arguments in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1993), in which the author defends the autonomy of philosophy from the empirical sciences. It provides, for example, an extended defense of the modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence, including a new argument against evolutionary explanations of the reliability of intuitions. It also contains a fuller discussion of how to neutralize the threat of scientific essentialism to the autonomy of (...)
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  34. The Incoherence of Empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  35. The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
    Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a (...)
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  36. Intuition: Its Nature and Function.Leslie Belton - 1948 - Hibbert Journal 47:166.
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  37. How Philosophers Use Intuition and 'Intuition'.John Bengson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.
    Whither the philosophy of intuition?Herman Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions (PWI) is a novel study in philosophical sociology—or, as Cappelen at one point suggests, “intellectual anthropology” (96).All undated references are to Cappelen (2012). Its target is the thesis that intuition is central, in the descriptive sense that contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions for evidence—or, more generally, positive epistemic status. Cappelen labels the target thesis Centrality.If Centrality is true, then especially urgent are two questions in the rapidly growing field that is (...)
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  38. Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
  39. Désirer Connaître Par Intuition.Rudolf Bernet - 2001 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  40. So Much the Worse for Your Old Intuition; Start Working Up Some New Ones.Richard J. Bernstein - 2014 - Contemporary Pragmatism 11 (1):5-14.
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  41. The Limits of Intuition.Thomas G. Bever - 1972 - Foundations of Language 8 (3):411-412.
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  42. Intuitions: Their Nature and Epistemic Efficacy.C. Beyer & A. Burri - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien. Philosophical Knowledge-its Possibility and Scope.
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  43. Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa's a Virtue Epistemology.Paul Boghossian - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):111--119.
    Abstract I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities. I (...)
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  44. Elijah Chudnoff , Intuition . Reviewed By.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (2):59-62.
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  45. Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Laurence BonJour - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):151-158.
  46. In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.
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  47. Intuitions.Booth Anthony Robert & Rowbottom Darrell Patrick - unknown
    What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This book brings together leading early- to late-career philosophers, to tackle such questions. It presents state-of-the-art thinking on the topic. The chapters in the first part of the book discuss the epistemological and metaphysical standing of intuitions; the chapters in the second part look (...)
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  48. Intuition Première: La Force Étrange du Printemps Québécois.Érik Bordeleau - forthcoming - Theory and Event 15 (3).
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  49. A First Intuition: The Strange Force of the Québécois Spring.Érik Bordeleau & Brian Massumi - forthcoming - Theory and Event 15 (3).
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  50. Intuition: The Concept and the Experience.Marcie Boucouvalas - 1997 - In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge. pp. 39--56.
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