About this topic
Summary The epistemology of logic focuses on issues concerning the normative status of our beliefs about logical truth and logical validity. It seems that we know that certain claims are logically true and that certain arguments are logically valid. What explains this knowledge? This question is an instance of a more general question about what explains our knowledge of (apparent) a priori truths. It is also closely connected to issues in the epistemology of modality, since logical truths are necessarily true. A long tradition in the epistemology of logic has it that logical truths are analytic -- that is, "true in virtue of meaning". In the middle of the twentieth century, Quine challenged this view. He argued that logical and mathematical claims are empirical claims that can in principle be revised on empirical grounds. In recent years, there have been a number of different proposals put forward about our knowledge of logic. Some philosophers follow Quine in viewing logic as empirical. Other philosophers have tried to rehabilitate the analytic theory of our knowledge of logic. Still other philosophers have appealed to intuitions or rational seemings to explain our knowledge of logic.
Key works For Quine's critique of the analytic theory of logical knowledge, see Quine 1936 and Quine 1960Putnam 1968 argues that logic is empirically reviseable.  Haack 1996 discusses Quine's views, in the context of a discussion of alternative logics. BonJour 1998 presents a theory of a priori knowledge based on rational insight. Boghossian 2000 and Boghossian 2001 are part of a sequence of papers trying to rehabilitate the analytic theory of logical knowledge. See Wright 2001 and Wright 2004 for a discussion of the role of intuitions in logical knowledge. Also see the key works for "Deductive Reasoning".
Introductions Boghossian 2000 provides an opinionated introduction to views in the epistemology of logic. BonJour 1998 provides an in depth discussion of theories of the apriori that is highly relevant to the case of logical knowledge. Field 2005 discusses some recent debates concerning the a priori in general and logical and mathematical knowledge in particular.
Related categories

158 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 158
  1. added 2020-05-22
    Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.
    How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic attitudes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. added 2020-03-21
    Naturalizing Logic: A Case Study of the Ad Hominem and Implicit Bias.Madeleine Ransom - 2019 - In Dov Gabbay, Lorenzo Magnani, Woosuk Park & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (eds.), Natural Arguments: A Tribute to John Woods. London: College Publications. pp. 575-589.
    The fallacies, as traditionally conceived, are wrong ways of reasoning that nevertheless appear attractive to us. Recently, however, Woods (2013) has argued that they don’t merit such a title, and that what we take to be fallacies are instead largely virtuous forms of reasoning. This reformation of the fallacies forms part of Woods’ larger project to naturalize logic. In this paper I will look to his analysis of the argumentum ad hominem as a case study for the prospects of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-02-24
    Towards a More General Concept of Inference.Ivo Pezlar - 2014 - Logica Universalis 8 (1):61-81.
    The main objective of this paper is to sketch unifying conceptual and formal framework for inference that is able to explain various proof techniques without implicitly changing the underlying notion of inference rules. We base this framework upon the so-called two-dimensional, i.e., deduction to deduction, account of inference introduced by Tichý in his seminal work The Foundation’s of Frege’s Logic (1988). Consequently, it will be argued that sequent calculus provides suitable basis for such general concept of inference and therefore should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-01-20
    Logical Expressivism and Carroll’s Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.
    In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-01-20
    Knowledge of Logical Generality and the Possibility of Deductive Reasoning.Corine Besson - 2019 - In Timothy Chan & Anders Nes (eds.), Inference and consciousness. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 172-196.
    I address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-12-10
    Skeptical Symmetry: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Scientific Reasoning.Erik Nelson - 2015 - Gnosis 14 (2):14-19.
    Many philosophers have wrongly assumed that there is an asymmetry between the problem of induction and the logocentric predicament (the justification of deductive inferences). This paper will show that the demand for justification, for the very inferences that are required for justification, is deeply problematic. Using a Wittgensteinian approach, I will argue that justification has an internal relation with deductive and inductive inferences. For Wittgenstein, two concepts are internally related if my understanding of one is predicated on my understanding of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-11-22
    Soames on the Logical Empiricists on Truth, Meaning, Convention, and Logical Truth.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1357-1365.
    In the first part of this paper, I express doubts that Tarski and Carnap were guilty of some confusions about the relations between truth and meaning, attributed to them by Soames. In the second part, I consider Quine's Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth, discussed only briefly and approvingly by Soames, and I explore the question whether some not obviously incorrect forms of conventionalism about logical truth, such as what I call "finitary conventionalism", are immune to Quine's argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-11-15
    Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Synthese.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-09-19
    Logical Normativity and Rational Agency—Reassessing Locke's Relation to Logic.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2018 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (1):75-99.
    There is an exegetical quandary when it comes to interpreting Locke's relation to logic.On the one hand, over the last few decades a substantive amount of literature has been dedicated to explaining Locke's crucial role in the development of a new logic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Yolton names this new logic the "logic of ideas," while James Buickerood calls it "facultative logic."1 Either way, Locke's Essay is supposedly its "most outspoken specimen" or "culmination."2 Call this reading the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. added 2019-09-14
    The Metaphysical Basis of Logic.Michaela McSweeney - 2016 - Dissertation, Princeton University
  11. added 2019-09-10
    Following Logical Realism Where It Leads.Michaela McSweeney - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):117-139.
    Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. added 2019-09-05
    Braucht die Logik Objekte? Die Ontologie logischer Gegenstände im Tractatus und Erfahrung und Urteil.Miguel Ohnesorge - 2019 - Bulletin D’Analyse Phénoménologique 15 (2):1-32.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Edmund Husserl’s Experience and Judgement (Erfahrung und Urteil) are based on remarkably different conceptual frameworks and methodologies. After analyzing their respective accounts on the foundations of (formal) logic, I map out their common aims and different conclusions. I hold that Husserl and Wittgenstein both use the epistemic necessity of the existence of logical relations among things as an argument against philosophical scepticism, but their different epistemological convictions lead them to decisively diverging accounts of the nature (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-06-06
    The Right Order of Concepts: Graßmann, Peano, Gödel and the Inheritance of Leibniz's Universal Characteristic.Paola Cantù - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18 (1):157-182.
    L'article aborde la question suivante : est-ce que le bon ordre des concepts peut être considéré un élément essentiel de rigueur scientifique dans la logique et les mathématiques de xixe et xxe siècle, en particulier quand il s'agit d'auteurs qui ont été influencés profondément par le projet leibnizien de la caractéristique? L'article prend en considération trois exemples : Hermann Graßmann, Giuseppe Peano et Kurt Gödel. Selon notre thèse, le choix des concepts primitifs dans les théories hypothético-déductives n'était pas seule­ment une (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-06-06
    Reconsidering the Epistemology of Deductive-Inferential Validity.Florian Demont - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):44-56.
    Until quite recently, the epistemology of logical laws has not been much discussed and neither has how one can be justified in claiming that a particular inference is valid. The transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion in modus ponens will be examined in the paper through assessing Paul Boghossian's inferentialist proposal of assuming 'blind reasoning'. It will be argued that merely being justified in inferring according to a logical law a priori is worthless unless one can also be justified (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. added 2019-06-06
    Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
    The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  16. added 2019-06-06
    The Contemporary Relevance of Ancient Logical Theory.John Corcoran - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (126):76.
    This interesting and imaginative monograph is based on the author’s PhD dissertation supervised by Saul Kripke. It is dedicated to Timothy Smiley, whose interpretation of PRIOR ANALYTICS informs its approach. As suggested by its title, this short work demonstrates conclusively that Aristotle’s syllogistic is a suitable vehicle for fruitful discussion of contemporary issues in logical theory. Aristotle’s syllogistic is represented by Corcoran’s 1972 reconstruction. The review studies Lear’s treatment of Aristotle’s logic, his appreciation of the Corcoran-Smiley paradigm, and his understanding (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  17. added 2019-06-05
    Russell on Logicism and Coherence.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2011 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31 (1):89-106.
    According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell's logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as a prioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell's explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2019-03-20
    Against Logical Generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2019-03-20
    Logical Particularism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 277-299.
    Logics—that is to say logical systems—are generally conceived of as describing the logical forms of arguments as well as endorsing cer- tain principles or rules of inference specified in terms of these forms. From this perspective, a correct logic is a system which captures only (and perhaps all) of the correct principles, and good—i.e. logical— reasoning is reasoning which at the level of logical form conforms to the principles of a correct logic. In contrast, as logical particularists we reject the (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2019-03-03
    Laws of Thought and Laws of Logic After Kant.Lydia Patton - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 123-137.
    George Boole emerged from the British tradition of the “New Analytic”, known for the view that the laws of logic are laws of thought. Logicians in the New Analytic tradition were influenced by the work of Immanuel Kant, and by the German logicians Wilhelm Traugott Krug and Wilhelm Esser, among others. In his 1854 work An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities, Boole argues that the laws of thought acquire (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2019-02-21
    Tichý's Two-Dimensional Conception of Inference.Ivo Pezlar - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):54-65.
    In this paper we revisit Pavel Tichý’s novel distinction between one-dimensional and two-dimensional conception of inference, which he presented in his book Foundations of Frege’s Logic (1988), and later in On Inference (1999), which was prepared from his manuscript by his co-author Jindra Tichý. We shall focus our inquiry not only on the motivation behind the introduction of this non-classical concept of inference, but also on further inspection of selected Tichý’s arguments, which we see as the most compelling or simply (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2019-02-11
    The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Suki Finn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):231.
    Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2019-02-11
    Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical Virtue in the Epistemology of Logic.Gillian Russell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):548-563.
    This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well-defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. added 2019-02-11
    Husserl’s Foundation of the Formal Sciences in His “Logical Investigations”.Henning Peucker - 2012 - Axiomathes 22 (1):135-146.
    This article is composed of three sections that investigate the epistemological foundations of Husserl’s idea of logic from the Logical Investigations . First, it shows the general structure of this logic. Husserl conceives of logic as a comprehensive, multi-layered theory of possible theories that has its most fundamental level in a doctrine of meaning. This doctrine aims to determine the elementary categories that constitute every possible meaning (meaning-categories). The second section presents the main idea of Husserl’s search for an epistemological (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. added 2019-02-11
    Revisiting the Question About Proof: Philosophical Theory, History, and Mathematical Practice.Norma Goethe - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (1):361-386.
    This paper revisits some of Chateaubriand’s critical considerations with regard to representing our reasoning practices in logic and mathematics by means of “idealized syntax”. I focus on the persistently critical side of these considerations which aim to prepare the ground for “an interesting epistemology of logic and mathematics” that ought to make room for understanding the pragmatic dimensions of proofs as explanatory rational displays. First, I discuss the 20th century “syntactic conception” of the logical and the underlying set of values (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2019-02-11
    A Proposal for a Naturalised Epistemology of Logic.Stephen George Watson - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2019-02-11
    J. HINTIKKA and M. HINTIKKA "The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic: Selected Essays". [REVIEW]H. A. Lewis - 1991 - History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):253.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2019-02-11
    The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic.Jaakko Hintikka & Merrill Hintikka - 1990 - Studia Logica 49 (4):605-607.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. added 2019-02-11
    Hintikka, J. and Hintikka, Merrill B., The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic. [REVIEW]J. Maeyaert - 1989 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51:392.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2019-02-11
    The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic: Selected Essays.Jaakko HINTIKKA - 1989 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31. added 2019-01-29
    The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.
    Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in esoteric areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. -/- While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. added 2019-01-23
    Epistemology of Logic - Logic-Dialectic or Theory of the Knowledge.Epameinondas Xenopoulos - 1998 - Dissertation,
    1994.Επιστημολογία της Λογικής. Συγγραφέας Επαμεινώνδας Ξενόπουλος Μοναδική μελέτη και προσέγγιση της θεωρίας της γνώσης, για την παγκόσμια βιβλιογραφία, της διαλεκτικής πορείας της σκέψης από την λογική πλευρά της και της μελλοντικής μορφής που θα πάρουν οι διαλεκτικές δομές της, στην αδιαίρετη ενότητα γνωσιοθεωρίας, λογικής και διαλεκτικής, με την «μέθοδο του διαλεκτικού υλισμού». Έργο βαρύ με θέμα εξαιρετικά δύσκολο διακατέχεται από πρωτοτυπία και ζωντάνια που γοητεύει τον κάθε ανήσυχο στοχαστή από τις πρώτες γραμμές.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2018-10-11
    Skeptics and Unruly Connectives: A Defence of and Amendment to the Non-Factualist Justification of Logic.Oliver Oxton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo
    This thesis attempts to positively solve three problems in the foundations of logic. If logical connectives are defined by their introduction and elimination rules, then how might one prohibit the construction of dysfunctional rules, i.e. rules which let us infer anything from anything else? How might one be held accountable to the consequences of those logical rules that they accept in an argument? And, how might one who, for whatever reason, doubts those logical rules regularly taken for granted, be convinced (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2018-10-01
    Review of David Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief[REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  35. added 2018-09-13
    Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):319.
    I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2018-08-11
    Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):325-347.
    There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. added 2018-08-11
    Epistemology Versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf.Peter Dybjer, Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren & B. Göran Sundholm - 2012 - Springer.
    This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2018-04-04
    Linguistic Convention and Worldly Fact: Prospects for a Naturalist Theory of the a Priori.Brett Topey - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1725-1752.
    Truth by convention, once thought to be the foundation of a uniquely promising approach to explaining our access to the truth in nonempirical domains, is nowadays widely considered an absurdity. Its fall from grace has been due largely to the influence of an argument that can be sketched as follows: our linguistic conventions have the power to make it the case that a sentence expresses a particular proposition, but they can’t by themselves generate truth; whether a given proposition is true—and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2018-03-05
    Conditionals in Interaction.James Trafford - 2017 - Studia Humana 6 (1):39-49.
    There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2018-03-05
    Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!Fabien Schang & James Trafford - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (2):225-251.
    This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motivations for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to logic, which is formalized in a Question–Answer Semantics. We develop a generalized account of rejectivism through close consideration of Mark Textor's arguments against rejectivism that the negative expression ‘No’ is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force indicators.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2018-02-17
    Feasibility In Logic.Jacques Dubucs - 2002 - Synthese 132 (3):213-237.
    The paper is a defense of a strict form of anti-realism, competing the "in principle" form defended by Michael Dummett. It proposes to ground anti-realism on the basis of two principles ("immanence" and "implicitness") and to develop the consequences of these principles in the light of sub-structural logics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  42. added 2018-02-17
    Epistemological Nonfactualism and the a Prioricity of Logic.Hartry Field - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (1):1-24.
  43. added 2018-02-10
    Priest's Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakīrti and Paraconsistency.Koji Tanaka - forthcoming - In Can Bașkent & Thomas Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Dordrecht: Springer.
  44. added 2018-02-06
    Meaning in Dialogue: An Interactive Approach to Logic and Reasoning.James Trafford - 2017 - New York: Springer.
    This book argues for a view in which processes of dialogue and interaction are taken to be foundational to reasoning, logic, and meaning. This is both a continuation, and a substantial modification, of an inferentialist approach to logic. As such, the book not only provides a critical introduction to the inferentialist view, but it also provides an argument that this shift in perspective has deep and foundational consequences for how we understand the nature of logic and its relationship with meaning (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2018-02-04
    Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non‐Contradiction Against its Contrary?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):39-59.
    In his Metaphysics Γ.4, Aristotle defends the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC says that all contradictions are false. So if some contradictions are true, then PNC is false. Even if PNC’s contrary is false, PNC’s contradictory might still be true. But it’s been noted in the literature for over a century that Aristotle seems to be exclusively interested in attacking PNC’s contrary (‘All contradictions are true’) rather than PNC’s contradictory (‘Some contradictions are true’). So his defense of PNC seems (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2018-01-17
    Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. added 2018-01-17
    Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion.Jack Woods - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):58-68.
    I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and a recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts, as extensionally inadequate, is unwarranted by developing an account which is plausibly extensionally adequate and more philosophically motivated. This is important for recent anti-exceptionalist treatments of logic since syntactic accounts require less theoretical baggage than semantic accounts.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. added 2018-01-08
    The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2018-01-06
    Analogy: Justification for Logic.William Sacksteder - 1979 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 12 (1):21 - 40.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. added 2018-01-06
    Thalberg's Challenge to Justification Via Deduction.John Turk Saunders - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (5):358 - 364.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 158