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  1. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. [REVIEW]Clas Weber - 2008 - Disputatio 3 (25):59-65.
  2. Consciousness and the End of Materialism: Seeking Identity and Harmony in a Dark Era.Spyridon Kakos - 2018 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science 2 (2):17-33.
    “I am me”, but what does this mean? For centuries humans identified themselves as conscious beings with free will, beings that are important in the cosmos they live in. However, modern science has been trying to reduce us into unimportant pawns in a cold universe and diminish our sense of consciousness into a mere illusion generated by lifeless matter. Our identity in the cosmos is nothing more than a deception and all the scientific evidence seem to support this idea. Or (...)
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  3. Schizophrenia, Social Practices and Cultural Values: A Conceptual Introduction.Inês Hipólito, J. Pereira & J. Gonçalves - 2018 - In Inês Hipólito, Jorge Gonçalves & João G. Pereira (eds.), Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 1-15.
    Schizophrenia is usually described as a fragmentation of subjective experience and the impossibility to engage in meaningful cultural and intersubjective practices. Although the term schizophrenia is less than 100 years old, madness is generally believed to have accompanied mankind through its historical and cultural ontogeny. What does it mean to be “mad”? The failure to adopt social practices or to internalize cultural values of common sense? Despite the vast amount of literature and research, it seems that the study of schizophrenia (...)
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  4. Mirrors and Misleading Appearances.Vivian Mizrahi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    ABSTRACTAlthough philosophers have often insisted that specular perception is illusory or erroneous in nature, few have stressed the reliability and indispensability of mirrors as optical instruments. The main goal of this paper is to explain how mirrors can contribute to knowledge and at the same time be a source of systematic errors and misleading appearances. To resolve this apparent paradox, I argue that mirrors do not generate perceptual illusions or misperceptions, by defending a view of mirrors as transparent and invisible (...)
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  5. Empathy, Imagination, and Phenomenal Concepts.Kendall Walton - 2015 - In In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-16.
    I propose a way of understanding empathy on which it does not necessarily involve any-thing like thinking oneself into another’s shoes, or any imagining at all. Briefly, the empa-thizer uses an aspect of her own mental state as a sample, expressed by means of a phenomenal concept, to understand the other person. This account does a better job of explaining the connection between empathetic experiences and the objects of empathy than most traditional ones do. And it helps to clarify the (...)
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  6. Toward a Neuroethics of Belief - Selected Abstracts From the 2015 International Neuroethics Society Annual Meeting.Christian Carrozzo & James Giordano - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (2):W1-W18.
  7. Hedonic Rationality.Jennifer Corns - forthcoming - In The Philosophy of Suffering. Routledge.
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  8. Mens Rea Ascription, Expertise and Outcome Effects: Professional Judges Surveyed.Markus Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2017 - Cognition 169:139-146.
    A coherent practice of mens rea (‘guilty mind’) ascription in criminal law presupposes a concept of mens rea which is insensitive to the moral valence of an action’s outcome. For instance, an assessment of whether an agent harmed another person intentionally should be unaffected by the severity of harm done. Ascriptions of intentionality made by laypeople, however, are subject to a strong outcome bias. As demonstrated by the Knobe effect, a knowingly incurred negative side effect is standardly judged intentional, whereas (...)
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  9. Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:150-171.
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...)
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  10. Leonard Cohen and Philosophy: Various Positions Ed. By Jason Holt (Review). [REVIEW]Luke Stromberg - 2016 - The Hopkins Review 9 (2):292-300.
  11. What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge.Quassim Cassam - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):723-741.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which (...)
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  12. What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge.Quassim Cassam - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):723-741.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which (...)
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  13. V. Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds: Hanna Pickard.Hanna Pickard - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:87-103.
    Can consideration of the emotions help to solve the problem of other minds? Intuitively, it should. We often think of emotions as public: as observable in the body, face, and voice of others. Perhaps you can simply see another's disgust or anger, say, in her demeanour and expression; or hear the sadness clearly in his voice. Publicity of mind, meanwhile, is just what is demanded by some solutions to the problem. But what does this demand amount to, and do emotions (...)
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  14. Radical Epiphenomenalism: B.F. Skinner's Account of Private Events.Richard Creel - 1980 - Behavior and Philosophy 8 (1):31.
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  15. Commentary on Eric Morton’s “Empiricism, Naturalism, and Freedom: An Alternative Diagnostic Solution to McDowell’s Problem of Empirical Content”.Randall Auxier - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):7-10.
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  16. On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach.Larry Herzberg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):419-438.
    Human subjects seem to have a type of introspective access to their mental states that allows them to immediately judge the types and intensities of their occurrent emotions, as well as what those emotions are about or “directed at”. Such judgments manifest what I call “emotion-direction beliefs”, which, if reliably produced, may constitute emotion-direction knowledge. Many psychologists have argued that the “directed emotions” such beliefs represent have a componential structure, one that includes feelings of emotional responses and related but independent (...)
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  17. Subjectivism and the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):311-342.
    This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...)
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  18. Knowledge of the Mind and Knowledge of the Brain (3rd Brain & Mind Lecture, University of Copenhagen April 17th, 2007).Tim Crane - unknown
    The problem of consciousness – the problem of how the matter of our brains produces perception, sensation, emotion and thought – is often described as one of the outstanding remaining problems for science. Although a lot is known in detail about how the brain works it is widely believed that the explanation of consciousness is something which still eludes us. According to a recent survey in (of all places!) The Economist, ‘consciousness awaits its Einstein’.1 Consciousness researchers are looking for that (...)
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  19. Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense.Chauncey Maher - 2017 - Routledge.
    The idea that plants have minds can sound improbable, but some widely respected contemporary scientists and philosophers find it plausible. It turns out to be rather tricky to vindicate the presumption that plants do not have minds, for doing so requires getting clear about what plants can do and what exactly a mind is. By connecting the most compelling empirical work on plant behavior with philosophical reflection on the concept of minds, _Plant Minds _aims to help non-experts begin to think (...)
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  20. Knowledge of Actions.James D. Wallace & Betty Powell - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (1):117.
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  21. Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness.Johannes Roessler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):541-557.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts (...)
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  22. Is Self-Knowledge Compatible with Externalism?Pierre Jacob - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (1):59-75.
    Externalism is the view that the contents of many of a person’s propositional attitudes and perhaps sensory experiences are extrinsic properties of the person’s brain: they involve relations between the person’s brain and properties instantiated in his or her present or past environment. Privileged self-knowledge is the view that every human being is able to know directly or non-inferentially, in a way unavailable to anybody else, what he or she thinks or experiences. Now, if what I think is not in (...)
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  23. How Our Minds WorkSound Thinking.H. T. C., C. E. M. Joad & Peter Fireman - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):109.
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  24. Consciousness and Other Minds.Christopher Peacocke & Colin McGinn - 1984 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 58 (1):97-138.
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  25. III.—Other People's Sense-Data.Martin Shearn - 1950 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50 (1):15-26.
  26. XIII.—The Contact of Minds.C. Delisle Burns - 1923 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 23 (1):215-228.
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  27. Self-Consciousness, Self-Ascription, and the Mental Self.Chieh-Ling Cheng - unknown
    Galen Strawson argues that we have a sense of mental selves, which are entities that have mental features but do not have bodily features. In particular, he argues that there is a form of self-consciousness that involves a conception of the mental self. His mental self view is opposed to the embodied self view, the view that the self must be conceived of as an entity that has both mental and bodily features. In this paper, I will argue against Strawson’s (...)
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  28. Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge, Self‐Knowability and Personhood.Philip Pettit - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):3-26.
    If language is to serve the basic purpose of communicating our attitudes, we must be constructed so as to form beliefs in those propositions that we truthfully assert on the basis of careful assent. Thus, other things being equal, I can rely on believing those things to which I give my careful assent. And so my ability to assent or dissent amounts to an ability to make up my mind about what I believe. This capacity, in tandem with a similar (...)
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  29. For Oneself and Toward Another: The Puzzle About Recognition.Matthias Haase - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):113-152.
    The paper is devoted to a certain way of thinking of the action of another. The posture of mind is characteristically expressed by a specific use of what G. E. M. Anscombe calls stopping modals. On this use, the sentence, “You can’t do that; it is mine,” registers the necessity of justice. My question is: what is the relation between the status of a person, a bearer of rights, the recognition of others as persons, and the practice of addressing the (...)
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  30. Rödl on the Self-Conscious Power of Sensory Knowledge.D. Lüthi - unknown
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  31. Erratum To: Sellarsian Behaviorism, Davidsonian Interpretivism, and First Person Authority.Richard N. Manning - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):457-457.
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  32. Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless.Baron Reed - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):303-308.
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
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  33. The Case for Mind Perception.Somogy Varga - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).
    The question of how we actually arrive at our knowledge of others’ mental lives is lively debated, and some philosophers defend the idea that mentality is sometimes accessible to perception. In this paper, a distinction is introduced between “mind awareness” and “mental state awareness,” and it is argued that the former at least sometimes belongs to perceptual, rather than cognitive, processing.
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  34. Consciousness and the Self: New Essays.JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    'I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.' These famous words of David Hume, on his inability to perceive the self, set the stage for JeeLoo Liu and John Perry's collection of essays on self-awareness and self-knowledge. This volume connects recent scientific studies on consciousness with the traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke and Hume. Experts in the field offer contrasting perspectives on matters such as (...)
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  35. The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Person Authority.André Gallois - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. (...)
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  36. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  37. Samowiedza Czy Samokreacja? O Konsekwencjach Niefaktualności Pytań o Siebie Dla Problemu Samowiedzy.Joanna Luc - 2013 - Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 7 (1).
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  38. From Embodied and Extended Mind to No Mind.Vincent C. Müller - 2012 - In Anna Esposito, Antonietta M. Esposito, Rüdiger Hoffmann, Vincent C. Müller & Alessandro Viniciarelli (eds.), Cognitive Behavioural Systems. Springer. pp. 299-303.
    The paper discusses the extended mind thesis with a view to the notions of “agent” and of “mind”, while helping to clarify the relation between “embodiment” and the “extended mind”. I will suggest that the extended mind thesis constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the notion of ‘mind’; the consequence of the extended mind debate should be to drop the notion of the mind altogether – rather than entering the discussion how extended it is.
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  39. Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an (...)
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  40. The Emergence of Mind: Personal Knowledge and Connectionism.Jean Bocharova - 2014 - Tradition and Discovery 41 (3):20-31.
    At the end of Personal Knowledge, Polanyi discusses human development, arguing for a view of the human person as emerging out of but not constituted by its material substrate. As part of this view, he argues that the human person can never be likened to a computer, an inference machine, or a neural model because all are based in formalized processes of automation, processes that cannot account for the contribution of unformalizable, tacit knowing. This paper revisits Polanyi’s discussion of the (...)
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  41. Can Brain Imaging Breach Our Mental Privacy?Amihud Gilead - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):275-291.
    Brain-imaging technologies have posed the problem of breaching our brain privacy. Until the invention of those technologies, many of us entertained the idea that nothing can threaten our mental privacy, as long as we kept it, for each of us has private access to his or her own mind but no access to any other. Yet, philosophically, the issue of private, mental accessibility appears to be quite unsettled, as there are still many philosophers who reject the idea of private, mental (...)
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  42. Précis of Transparent Minds.J. Fernandez - unknown
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  43. Expressing Pain: Wittgenstein and the 'Problems of Other Minds'.Richard Hamilton - unknown
    Neurophenomena such as central sensitisation, hyperalgesia and allodynia, speak of a brain that is anything but hardwired. The brain's ability to self-organise in staggeringly complex ways forces us to look beyond what turn out to be perceptions of a body-mind reference, ie the idea of a mind is more a story than an actuality. There are mounting criticisms of body-mind dualism, , but with poor understanding of what philosophical narrative can replace it. Clearly, our human condition and pain's unique role (...)
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  44. Why I? A Redefinition and Description of the so-Called "First-Person Novel".Nomi Tamir - 1976
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  45. Simple Knowledge and Composite Knowledge.Dr G. Dinani - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 23.
    Thought and knowledge represent the most obvious aspects of man's identity. There are fundamental differences between human thought and what is called animal perception. In the meaning of thought, the1-There is another Nizam al-Din Ahmad mentioned in biographies, who is one of Fayd's grandchildren, and died in 1160 H. Care should be taken to not confuse thisNizam al-Din Ahmad with Mulla Sadra's son perception of perception and the knowledge of knowledge are also embedded and this is what we can call (...)
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  46. Arguments for Other Minds.Dolina Sylvia Dowling - unknown
    If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection How can I know that other people have minds? and How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other (...)
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  47. ISDOM'S Other Minds. [REVIEW]Bergmann Bergmann - 1953 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14:112.
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  48. Cartesian Privacy and the Problem of Other Minds.James Eadie White - 1968 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
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  49. The Other Minds Quandary.Ronald Vernon Kirkby - 1966 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
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  50. Zeno Vendler: "The Matter of Minds". [REVIEW]Augustin Riska - 1986 - The Thomist 50 (4):711.
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1 — 50 / 2134