Epistemology of Miracles

Edited by Daniel Von Wachter (International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein)
About this topic
Summary If a miracle occurred, how could we find out?
Key works Swinburne 1989 discusses what kind of evidence would justify a belief that a miracle has occurred. Levine 1989 argues that it is possible that beliefes about miracles are justified through testimony or through experience.
Introductions Swinburne 1989.
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3 found
  1. Historical Inquiry.Lydia McGrew - 2013 - In Charles Taliaferro Victoria Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
    Two different types of objections to the historical investigation of miracles imply that such investigation is inappropriate or can never lead to rational belief that a historical miracle has occurred. The first objection concerns the alleged chasm between the rational realm of history and the realm of faith. The second objection alleges that God is, or would be if he existed, too much unlike ourselves for us reasonably to use Divine action as an explanatory hypothesis. Both objections involve a tacit (...)
  2. Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous.Lydia McGrew - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that occurred independently if (...)
  3. The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2012 - In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)