Epistemology of Miracles

Edited by Daniel Von Wachter (International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein)
About this topic
Summary If a miracle occurred, how could we find out?
Key works Swinburne 1989 discusses what kind of evidence would justify a belief that a miracle has occurred. Levine 1989 argues that it is possible that beliefes about miracles are justified through testimony or through experience.
Introductions Swinburne 1989.
Related categories

6 found
  1. added 2018-07-29
    Does It Matter Whether a Miracle-Like Event Happens to Oneself Rather Than to Someone Else?Luc Bovens - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria S. Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-75.
    Let a miracle-like event be an event that is seemingly indicative of the existence of an all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful being, and yet might occur in a naturalistic world, though this would be very improbable. Suppose that a third-person report is equally as reliable as a first-person experience of such a miracle-like event — which avoids Hume’s objection to the evidential value of reports of miracles. The question addressed in this chapter is: Is it the case that, under the assumption (...)
  2. added 2018-07-28
    The Epistemology of Social Facts: The Evidential Value of Personal Experience Versus Testimony.Luc Bovens & Stephen Leeds - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Frankfurt A. M.: Dr. Haensel-Hohenhausen. pp. 43-51.
    "The Personal is Political": This was an often-heard slogan of feminist groups in the late sixties and early seventies. The slogan is no doubt open to many interpretations. There is one interpretation which touches on the epistemology of social facts, viz. the slogan claims that in assessing the features of a political system, personal experiences have privileged evidentiary value. For instancte, in the face of third person reports about political corruption, I may remain unmoved in my belief that the political (...)
  3. added 2018-07-03
    The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural is Unjustified.Lawrence Shapiro - 2016 - New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press.
    There are many who believe Moses parted the Red Sea and Jesus came back from the dead. Others are certain that exorcisms occur, ghosts haunt attics, and the blessed can cure the terminally ill. Though miracles are immensely improbable, people have embraced them for millennia, seeing in them proof of a supernatural world that resists scientific explanation. -/- Helping us to think more critically about our belief in the improbable, The Miracle Myth casts a skeptical eye on attempts to justify (...)
  4. added 2013-11-04
    Historical Inquiry.Lydia McGrew - 2013 - In Charles Taliaferro Victoria Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
    Two different types of objections to the historical investigation of miracles imply that such investigation is inappropriate or can never lead to rational belief that a historical miracle has occurred. The first objection concerns the alleged chasm between the rational realm of history and the realm of faith. The second objection alleges that God is, or would be if he existed, too much unlike ourselves for us reasonably to use Divine action as an explanatory hypothesis. Both objections involve a tacit (...)
  5. added 2013-11-04
    The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2012 - In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
  6. added 2013-11-01
    Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous.Lydia McGrew - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that occurred independently if (...)