About this topic
Summary There seems to be at least some philosophical knowledge. For example, most philosophers, having read Gettier, take themselves to know that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. But how is philosophical knowledge possible? What are its features? Is philosophy (ever? always?) a priori? Are there grounds for skepticism about philosophy? What is the role of intuitions in philosophy?
Key works DePaul & Ramsey 1998 contains many essays probing and challenging the sources of philosophical knowledge; [BROKEN REFERENCE: BOOI] is a more contemporary treatment of the same issues. Weinberg et al 2001 give an influential empirical challenge to the use of intuitions in the normative realms of philosophy. Williamson 2007 defends an approach to philosophy that does not depend on intuitions in an evidential role.
Introductions The literature on metaphilosophy typically occurs at a relatively advanced level; unlike many other philosophical subdisciplines, the study of philosophy requires significant antecedent familiarity with much of philosophy, so it is not particularly well-suited to introductory treatments. However, Rosenberg 1984 is one influential introductory text.
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  1. Testing for the Phenomenal: Intuition, Metacognition, and Philosophical Methodology.Miguel Egler - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Recent empirical studies raise methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that have precisely this phenomenology to argue that the above reply fails. Furthermore, it shows that empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant (...)
  2. Armchair Knowledge and Modal Skepticism: A Rapprochement.Felipe Leon - 2009 - Dissertation,
    The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of (...)
  3. Was weiß die Philosophie?Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2017 - In Wenchao Li (ed.), Wissensformen - Vier Versuche. Hannover, Germany: Wehrhan. pp. 61-79.
  4. Théorie de la relativité de la constitution phénoménologique.Steven James Bartlett - 1970 - Dissertation, Universite de Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) (France)
    This is Vol. I in French. Vol. II in English is available separately from this website. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can serve to identify, eliminate, and avoid a certain widespread conceptual fault or misconstruction, called a "projective misconstruction" or "projection" by the author. -/- It is argued that this variety of error in our thinking (i) infects a great number of our everyday, scientific, and philosophical concepts, claims, and theories, (...)
  5. Philosophizing as Theorizing.Ulrich de Balbian - forthcoming - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    These words are about philosophy, the doing of philosophy and what philosophers do and what they think they do, so it is in fact meta-philosophical descriptions. They are intended as general statements about these things, generalizations, hypotheses, a model and pointers to a possible framework for a theory about what the doing of philosophy is like, what the process/es of philosophizing are like and what the processes of theorizing are like. The philosophical ‘methods’ that are referred to and described are (...)
  6. Myriad Philosophical Methodologies.Penelope A. Rush - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):679-695.
    This article offers an overview of philosophical methodologies. In an attempt to avoid a certain circularity, the article itself tries to avoid consciously or solely deploying and engaging with any current standard notion of what constitutes a philosophical method or philosophy itself. It hopes to find some of the possible places in which philosophy occurs, and this turns out to include such endeavours as literature, art, poetry, and linguistics. From here it considers how almost anything—for example, conversation, everyday life, and (...)
  7. Attention: Experimental and Critical.E. C. Sanford - 1897 - Psychological Review 4 (2):209-211.
  8. The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients.Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 129-141.
  9. Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tamar Gendler draws together in this book a series of essays in which she investigates philosophical methodology, which is now emerging as a central topic of philosophical discussions. Three intertwined themes run through the volume: imagination, intuition and philosophical methodology. Each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary--and they explore the implications of this for how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms (...)
  10. Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Concerns about philosophical methodology have emerged as a central issue in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this volume, Tamar Gendler draws together fourteen essays that together illuminate this topic. Three intertwined themes connect the essays. First, each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary. This theme is explored in a wide range of cases, including scientific thought experiments, early childhood pretense, thought experiments concerning personal identity, fictional (...)
  11. Mathematical Knowledge. [REVIEW]W. D. Hart - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):118-129.
  12. Reducibi1ity of Questions to Sets of Questions: Some Feasibility Results.Piotr Lesniewski & Andrzej Wisniewski - 2001 - Logique Et Analyse 44.
  13. Poetry and Dialectic. [REVIEW]M. J. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (4):674-674.
  14. The Art of Philosophizing and Other Essays. [REVIEW]A. J. W. - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (2):355-355.
  15. Philosophical Standardism: An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology.Nicholas Rescher - 2000 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    This study seeks to sidestep pretensions of necessity to allow a more modest and cautious perspective that asks what our experience of the world indicates to be the normal course of affairs.
  16. Meta-Ethics and Meta-Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 275--297.
  17. Clarifying Ostensible Definition by the Logical Possibility of Inverted Spectrum.C. Lu - 1989 - Modern Philosophy 2.
    How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative world. It (...)
  18. Das Helldunkel einheimischer Begriffe: Der wissenschaftliche Ort der Pädagogik in Herbarts System der Philosophie.Nadia Moro - 2014 - In R. Coriand & A. Schotte (eds.), Herbartstudien, Bd. 5: "Einheimische Begriffe" und Disziplinentwicklung. Garamond. pp. 173–186.
    Johann Friedrich Herbart bringt ein wissenschaftliches Verständnis von Philosophie auf, das sich prägend auf den Aufbau seines Systems sowie auf die Begründung von Psychologie, Ästhetik, Pädagogik und deren gegenseitige Beziehungen auswirkt. Ausgehend von neuen funktionalistischen Interpretationen seiner Philosophie wird gezeigt, wie durch eine relationale Methodologie eine pluralistische Wissenschaftsauffassung ermöglicht wird, welche einerseits die selbständige Entwicklung einzelner Disziplinen rechtfertigt, andererseits deren formalen Zusammenhang nachweist. Der systematische Bezug der Pädagogik wird aus Sicht der Philosophie festgelegt. Hinsichtlich ihrer Möglichkeit, Begründung und wissenschaftlichen Verortung (...)
  19. Kant's Dialectic.Nathan Rotenstreich - 1953 - Review of Metaphysics 7 (3):389 - 421.
  20. Scientists Out of Place.Paul Robert Shipman - 1903 - The Monist 13 (4):617-618.
  21. Armchair Philosopher or Poet in Slippers.Glenn Tiller - 2003 - Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 31 (96):13-20.
  22. Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):524-533.
  23. Conflicting Intuitions About Causality1.Patrick Suppes - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):151-168.
  24. Analyzing Philosophical Arguments.Ian Philip McGreal - 1967 - San Francisco, Chandler Pub. Co..
  25. Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analysis: Its Possibility, its Aim or Aims, and its Limit or Terminus.David Wiggins - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):73-109.
  26. Understanding Philosophy.Tom Regan - 1974 - Encino, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co..
  27. Philosophy-- A Myth?: And Other Metaphysical Stories.Ulrich Verster - 1992 - Academic Publications.
    philosophical reasoning, arguments https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Myth-Other-Stories/dp/1874440018/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8.
Epistemology of Philosophy, Misc
  1. Making Philosophically Relevant Ideas.Ulrich De Balbian - unknown
    How does anything become philosophy? How does anything become philosophically relevant? What is it that makes something, any thing, philosophically relevant? What are the ingredients or components of something philosophical? What must such a thing contain so as to be philosophically relevant? How can one make anything of relevance to the discourse of philosophy? What is it that makes anything and/or thought or idea of and about anything philosophical. and of philosophical relevance? What is the nature, the characteristics and components (...)
  2. Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3049-3067.
    Should philosophers prefer simpler theories? Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) argues that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.
  3. What We Can and May Know (of) REVISED: Meta-Philosophy and Meta-Epistemology.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Frankfurt: Create Space.
    Human, anthropo-centered and subject-oriented social and cultural practices, specialized disciplines such as sciences, humanities and arts, as well as everyday and common sense existence employ and are constituted by means of frames of reference (and the tools and techniques they employ) are intersubjectively These things enable consciousness, knowing that and know how skills and appitudes, but simultaneously impose conditions, restrictions, assumptions and pre-suppositions. These conditions,limits and their underlying paradigms are endlessly refined, altered, modified, extended, transformed and replaced.
  4. Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):595-612.
    The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...)
  5. Nihilism, Minarchism, Pyrrhonism Meta-Philosophy - Living Radical Scepticism.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    A Meta-Philosophy exploration of immanent and non-immanent features of first-order philosophy in terms of the values of non- values or negative values of Radical Scepticism, Nihilism and Minarchy, executed to show how philosophizing is done. -/- It misleadingly seems as if there is no progress in philosophy as, like in visual art, literature and music, each original thinker re-invents the entire discipline, its aims, purposes, values, methods, etc The nature of philosophical tools, methods, techniques and skills will be investigated and (...)
  6. Agent Intellect and Black Zones.Gavin Keeney - 2018 - P2p Foundation.
    This essay addresses arguments regarding the “place” or “non-place” in which ideas originate and whether they are wholly transcendental, wholly contingent, or a combination of transcendental and contingent. Far from a resuscitation or recitation of Medieval scholastic disputations, the essay seeks to situate these untimely concerns in the context of spent discursive and ideological systems that support capitalist exploitation of the knowledge commons, exploitation only made possible because of a decisive and historically determined reduction of knowledge to fully contingent status (...)
  7. Philosophizing is Theorizing.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - New York: Create Space.
    Philosophizing is part of the Process/es of TheorizingAbstract An illustration (by means of a number of articles, books, opinions, statements, hypotheses, theories, arguments, reasoning and comments) of doing philosophy or philosophizing and its methods, as aspects of the contexts, stages, steps and features of the process/es of theorizing. The methods and techniques of philosophizing is explored and the nature and purpose of theories are shown. It is indicated that and how the approaches and aims philosophizing form part of the stages (...)
  8. Philosophy and Wisdom Research.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - London: Create Space.
    ISBN-13: 978-1985686632 (CreateSpace-Assigned) ISBN-10: 1985686635 BISAC: Philosophy / Criticism A conceptual exploration of the umbrella notion Wisdom, as well as dimensions, characteristics and components of the idea of wisdom as suggested by experimental philosophy, neurosciences and other studies and a comparison of the notion of wisdom with those of knowledge, truth, insight and understanding and in different cultures and periods. Contemporary research and discussions of wisdom on a wisdom list by researchers.
  9. Meta-Philosophy Questioning Philosophizing.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Academic.
    Traditional philosophy is no longer viable,‭ ‬relevant and acceptable.‭ ‬It might be possible to continue doing philosophizing in traditional ways.‭ ‬It is possible to continue fabricating fictional realities in the manner of the Pre-Socratics,‭ ‬Spinoza,‭ ‬Leibniz,‭ ‬Husserl,‭ ‬Hegel,‭ ‬Plato,‭ ‬et al.‭ ‬It is possible to devise pictures of realities and depictions of‭ ‬human consciousness and cognition like Descartes or in the Kantian manner. -/- One of the major issues with traditional philosophy is its lack of self-awareness,‭ ‬the absence of meta-cognition.‭ (...)
  10. Wittgenstein's Anti-Scientistic Worldview.Jonathan Beale - 2017 - In Jonathan Beale & Ian James Kidd (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism. London: Routledge. pp. 59-80.
    This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in the above passage. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...)
  11. Grenzen des Wissens.Joachim Bromand - 2009 - Münster, Germany: Mentis.
    Diese Studie greift die klassische philosophische Frage nach den Grenzen unseres Wissens auf und analysiert kritisch aktuell diskutierte Argumente, welche die Begrenztheit unseres Wissens erweisen sollen. Im Zentrum stehen dabei drei Argumentationsansätze: Zunächst geht es um Komplexitätsgrenzen des Wissens, wie sie G. Chaitin mit seiner algorithmischen Informationstheorie aufzeigen will. Dann wird auf Präzisionsgrenzen des Wissens eingegangen, die sich aus der epistemischen Theorie der Vagheit (T. Williamson u.a.) ergeben. Schließlich werden Grenzen unserer Selbsterkenntnis erörtert. Dabei geht es um verschiedene Argumente für (...)
  12. Towards a Unified Concept of Reality.Steven James Bartlett - 1975 - ETC: A Review of General Semantics 32 (1):43-49.
    This is a study of the relativity of facts in relation to the frameworks of reference in terms of which those facts are established. In this early paper from 1975, intended for a less technical audience, the author proposes an understanding of facts and their associated frameworks in terms of complementarity. This understanding of facts leads to an integrated yet pluralistic concept of reality. In the Addendum, readers will find a partial listing of related publications by the author that extend (...)
  13. Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):58-70.
    Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is (...)
  14. The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy.Manuel Doria - 2017 - Philosophies 2 (3):17-0.
    I submit that epistemic progress in key areas of contemporary academic philosophy has been compromised by politically correct ideology. First, guided by an evolutionary account of ideology, results from social and cognitive psychology and formal philosophical methods, I expose evidence for political bias in contemporary Western academia and sketch a formalization for the contents of beliefs from the PC worldview taken to be of core importance, the theory of social oppression and the thesis of anthropological mental egalitarianism. Then, aided by (...)
  15. ¿Qué lugar ocupa la filosofía en el conjunto de las Humanidades?Miguel Angel Quintana Paz - 2001 - Diálogo Filosófico 49:75-92.
  16. Review of 'Ontology After Carnap' Edited by Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe. [REVIEW]Darren Bradley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):858-861.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com‘Carnap is not completely unknown to us’ comments Richard Creath in his contribution to this book. ‘We often know just enough to be baffled’. It will be no surprise to anyone when I say that this book will not unbaffle us. But it does give us a collection of rewarding papers that each wrestle with the legacy Carnap has (...)
  17. Philosophy - Aims, Methods, Rationale.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    In this meta-philosophical study I commence with an investigation of Wisdom. I then continue with an exploration of the institutionalization of the subject and the professionalization of those involved in it. This I contrast with original and creative philosophizing. In then sows that philosophizing resembles and attempts to do theorizing. The 9 questions, etc of the Socratic Method and details of the Philosophical Toolkit occur throughout different stages of theorizing as one level and one dimension of it. Linked books are (...)
  18. Історія поняття досвіду / History of the Concept of Experience.Mykhailo Minakov - 2007 - Kiev: Parapan.
    The book is a history of the concept of experience in philosophy. Minakov focuses mainly on Western 19-20th century philosophical movements and their use of the experience concept. Author uses topological method to describe growth of the conseptual content of experience, as well as decline in its use in the end of 20th century.
  19. Philosophy = Philo Sophos = Love of Wisdom.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - SSRN Electronic Journal 3025568 (1):01-85.
    A conceptual exploration of the umbrella notion Wisdom, as well as dimensions, characteristics and components of the idea of wisdom as suggested by experimental philosophy, neurosciences and other studies and a comparison of the notion of wisdom with those of knowledge, truth, insight and understanding. -/- Keywords: philosophy, knowledge, wisdom, truth, Gettier problem, ibnsights, truth, understanding, knowledge, Experimental philosophy, neuroscience of wisdom -/- Suggested Citation: -/- de Balbian, Ulrich, Philosophy = Philo Sophos = Love of Wisdom (August 24, 2017). Available (...)
  20. Similar to PHILOSOPHY = PHILO SOPHOS = LOVE OF WISDOM with Enlarged Appendices.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Exploration of the meanings, dimensions, levels of the umbrella-notion of wisdom. I added a discussion between the academics of the notion and research into it (on Wisdom list LISTSERV@JISCMAIL.AC.UK ) as second appendix. I added on 7/09/2017 a new appendix http://www.drrogerwalsh.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/What-is-Wisdom-Cross-Cultural-Cross-Disciplin ary-Syntheses-Roger-Walsh-2015-Review-of-General-Psychology.pdf . -/- Most people involved in this discourse will be aware of the meaning of the word philosophy. The love part might be familiar to many of the human beings, although each individual will probably have his/her own superficial notion (...)
  21. PHILOSOPHY = PHILO SOPHOS = LOVE OF WISDOM.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    A conceptual exploration of the umbrella notion Wisdom, as well as dimensions, characteristics and components of the idea of wisdom as suggested by experimental philosophy, neurosciences and other studies and a comparison of the notion of wisdom with those of knowledge, truth, insight and understanding. https://www.academia.edu/34339690/PHILOSOPHY_PHILO_SOPHOS_LOVE_OF_WISDOM.
  22. Armchair Disagreement.Marc Andree Weber - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):527-549.
    A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...)
  23. The Philosopher's Doom: Unreliable at Truth or Unreliable at Logic.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - In Ted Poston & Kevin McCain (eds.), tba. Brill.
    By considering the epistemology and relations among certain philosophical problems, I argue for a disjunctive thesis: either (1) it is highly probable that there are (i) several (ii) mutually independent philosophical reductios of highly commonsensical propositions that are successful—so several aspects of philosophy have succeeded at refuting common sense—or (2) there is enough hidden semantic structure in even simple sentences of natural language to make philosophers highly unreliable at spotting deductive validity in some of the simplest cases—so we are much (...)
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