About this topic
Summary There seems to be at least some philosophical knowledge. For example, most philosophers, having read Gettier, take themselves to know that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. But how is philosophical knowledge possible? What are its features? Is philosophy (ever? always?) a priori? Are there grounds for skepticism about philosophy? What is the role of intuitions in philosophy?
Key works DePaul & Ramsey 1998 contains many essays probing and challenging the sources of philosophical knowledge; [BROKEN REFERENCE: BOOI] is a more contemporary treatment of the same issues. Weinberg et al 2001 give an influential empirical challenge to the use of intuitions in the normative realms of philosophy. Williamson 2007 defends an approach to philosophy that does not depend on intuitions in an evidential role.
Introductions The literature on metaphilosophy typically occurs at a relatively advanced level; unlike many other philosophical subdisciplines, the study of philosophy requires significant antecedent familiarity with much of philosophy, so it is not particularly well-suited to introductory treatments. However, Rosenberg 1984 is one influential introductory text.
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  1. Meta-Ethics and Meta-Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 275--297.
  2. Théorie de la relativité de la constitution phénoménologique.Steven James Bartlett - 1970 - Dissertation, Universite de Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) (France)
    This is Vol. I in French. Vol. II in English is available separately from this website. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can serve to identify, eliminate, and avoid a certain widespread conceptual fault or misconstruction, called a "projective misconstruction" or "projection" by the author. -/- It is argued that this variety of error in our thinking (i) infects a great number of our everyday, scientific, and philosophical concepts, claims, and theories, (...)
  3. Philosophizing as Theorizing.Ulrich de Balbian - forthcoming - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    These words are about philosophy, the doing of philosophy and what philosophers do and what they think they do, so it is in fact meta-philosophical descriptions. They are intended as general statements about these things, generalizations, hypotheses, a model and pointers to a possible framework for a theory about what the doing of philosophy is like, what the process/es of philosophizing are like and what the processes of theorizing are like. The philosophical ‘methods’ that are referred to and described are (...)
  4. Testing for the Phenomenal: Intuition, Metacognition, and Philosophical Methodology.Miguel Egler - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Recent empirical studies raise methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that have precisely this phenomenology to argue that the above reply fails. Furthermore, it shows that empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant (...)
  5. Mathematical Knowledge. [REVIEW]W. D. Hart - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):118-129.
  6. Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):524-533.
  7. Was weiß die Philosophie?Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2017 - In Wenchao Li (ed.), Wissensformen - Vier Versuche. Hannover, Germany: Wehrhan. pp. 61-79.
  8. Poetry and Dialectic. [REVIEW]M. J. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (4):674-674.
  9. The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients.Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. pp. 129-141.
  10. Armchair Knowledge and Modal Skepticism: A Rapprochement.Felipe Leon - 2009 - Dissertation,
    The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of (...)
  11. Reducibi1ity of Questions to Sets of Questions: Some Feasibility Results.Piotr Lesniewski & Andrzej Wisniewski - 2001 - Logique Et Analyse 44.
  12. Clarifying Ostensible Definition by the Logical Possibility of Inverted Spectrum.C. Lu - 1989 - Modern Philosophy 2.
    How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative world. It (...)
  13. Analyzing Philosophical Arguments.Ian Philip McGreal - 1967 - San Francisco, Chandler Pub. Co..
  14. Das Helldunkel einheimischer Begriffe: Der wissenschaftliche Ort der Pädagogik in Herbarts System der Philosophie.Nadia Moro - 2014 - In R. Coriand & A. Schotte (eds.), Herbartstudien, Bd. 5: "Einheimische Begriffe" und Disziplinentwicklung. Garamond. pp. 173–186.
    Johann Friedrich Herbart bringt ein wissenschaftliches Verständnis von Philosophie auf, das sich prägend auf den Aufbau seines Systems sowie auf die Begründung von Psychologie, Ästhetik, Pädagogik und deren gegenseitige Beziehungen auswirkt. Ausgehend von neuen funktionalistischen Interpretationen seiner Philosophie wird gezeigt, wie durch eine relationale Methodologie eine pluralistische Wissenschaftsauffassung ermöglicht wird, welche einerseits die selbständige Entwicklung einzelner Disziplinen rechtfertigt, andererseits deren formalen Zusammenhang nachweist. Der systematische Bezug der Pädagogik wird aus Sicht der Philosophie festgelegt. Hinsichtlich ihrer Möglichkeit, Begründung und wissenschaftlichen Verortung (...)
  15. Understanding Philosophy.Tom Regan - 1974 - Encino, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co..
  16. Philosophical Standardism: An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology.Nicholas Rescher - 2000 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    This study seeks to sidestep pretensions of necessity to allow a more modest and cautious perspective that asks what our experience of the world indicates to be the normal course of affairs.
  17. Kant's Dialectic.Nathan Rotenstreich - 1953 - Review of Metaphysics 7 (3):389 - 421.
  18. Myriad Philosophical Methodologies.Penelope A. Rush - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):679-695.
    This article offers an overview of philosophical methodologies. In an attempt to avoid a certain circularity, the article itself tries to avoid consciously or solely deploying and engaging with any current standard notion of what constitutes a philosophical method or philosophy itself. It hopes to find some of the possible places in which philosophy occurs, and this turns out to include such endeavours as literature, art, poetry, and linguistics. From here it considers how almost anything—for example, conversation, everyday life, and (...)
  19. Attention: Experimental and Critical.E. C. Sanford - 1897 - Psychological Review 4 (2):209-211.
  20. Scientists Out of Place.Paul Robert Shipman - 1903 - The Monist 13 (4):617-618.
  21. Conflicting Intuitions About Causality1.Patrick Suppes - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):151-168.
  22. Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tamar Gendler draws together in this book a series of essays in which she investigates philosophical methodology, which is now emerging as a central topic of philosophical discussions. Three intertwined themes run through the volume: imagination, intuition and philosophical methodology. Each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary--and they explore the implications of this for how thought experiments and appeals to intuition can serve as mechanisms (...)
  23. Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Concerns about philosophical methodology have emerged as a central issue in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this volume, Tamar Gendler draws together fourteen essays that together illuminate this topic. Three intertwined themes connect the essays. First, each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary. This theme is explored in a wide range of cases, including scientific thought experiments, early childhood pretense, thought experiments concerning personal identity, fictional (...)
  24. Armchair Philosopher or Poet in Slippers.Glenn Tiller - 2003 - Newsletter of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 31 (96):13-20.
  25. Philosophy-- A Myth?: And Other Metaphysical Stories.Ulrich Verster - 1992 - Academic Publications.
    philosophical reasoning, arguments https://www.amazon.com/Philosophy-Myth-Other-Stories/dp/1874440018/ref=asap_bc?ie=UTF8.
  26. The Art of Philosophizing and Other Essays. [REVIEW]A. J. W. - 1969 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (2):355-355.
  27. Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analysis: Its Possibility, its Aim or Aims, and its Limit or Terminus.David Wiggins - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):73-109.
Epistemology of Philosophy, Misc
  1. Analytic Philosophy as Metaphilosophy.J. J. Acero - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (1).
  2. Contemporary Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. Adams - 1951 - Philosophy of Science 18 (3):218-222.
  3. Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable.James Andow - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
    Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that (...)
  4. Intuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap: Empirically Testing the “Received Wisdom” About Armchair Philosophy.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):595-612.
    The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...)
  5. Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture.Zoe Ashton & Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):58-70.
    Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is (...)
  6. Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.
    I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.
  7. Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - forthcoming - Mind:fzw076.
    Should we believe our controversial philosophical views? Recently, several authors have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: If we believe our views, we are irrational. If we do not, we are not sincere in holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain (...)
  8. Epistemological Intelligence.Steven James Bartlett - 2017 - Willamette University Faculty Research Website.
    The monograph’s twofold purpose is to recognize epistemological intelligence as a distinguishable variety of human intelligence, one that is especially important to philosophers, and to understand the challenges posed by the psychological profile of philosophers that can impede the development and cultivation of the skills associated with epistemological intelligence.
  9. Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument - Book Review. [REVIEW]Steven James Bartlett - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics (4):738-740.
    A book review of _Free Choice: A Self-referential Argument_ by J. M. Boyle, Jr., G. Grisez, and O. Tollefsen. The review concerns the pragmatical self-referential argument employed in the book, and points to the fact that the argument is itself self-referentially inconsistent, but on the level of metalogical self-reference.
  10. Towards a Unified Concept of Reality.Steven James Bartlett - 1975 - ETC: A Review of General Semantics 32 (1):43-49.
    This is a study of the relativity of facts in relation to the frameworks of reference in terms of which those facts are established. In this early paper from 1975, intended for a less technical audience, the author proposes an understanding of facts and their associated frameworks in terms of complementarity. This understanding of facts leads to an integrated yet pluralistic concept of reality. In the Addendum, readers will find a partial listing of related publications by the author that extend (...)
  11. A Relativistic Theory of Phenomenological Constitution: A Self-Referential, Transcendental Approach to Conceptual Pathology.Steven James Bartlett - 1970 - Dissertation, Universite de Paris X (Paris-Nanterre) (France)
    A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOCICAL CONSTITUTION: A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY. (Vol. I: French; Vol. II: English) -/- Steven James Bartlett -/- Doctoral dissertation director: Paul Ricoeur, Université de Paris Other doctoral committee members: Jean Ladrière and Alphonse de Waehlens, Université Catholique de Louvain Defended publically at the Université Catholique de Louvain, January, 1971. -/- Universite de Paris X (France), 1971. 797pp. -/- The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise methodology which can serve (...)
  12. Wittgenstein's Anti-Scientistic Worldview.Jonathan Beale - 2017 - In Jonathan Beale & Ian James Kidd (eds.), Wittgenstein and Scientism. London: Routledge. pp. 59-80.
    This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in the above passage. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...)
  13. Les antinomies épistémologiques entre les réductionismes et les émergentismes.Donato Bergandi - 1998 - Revue Internationale de Systémique 12 (3):225-252.
  14. Die transzendentale Argumentation in der Transzendentalen Logik Fichtes.Alessandro Bertinetto - 2007 - Fichte-Studien 31:255-265.
  15. Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Should philosophers prefer simpler theories? Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) argues that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.
  16. Review of 'Ontology After Carnap' Edited by Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe. [REVIEW]Darren Bradley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):858-861.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com‘Carnap is not completely unknown to us’ comments Richard Creath in his contribution to this book. ‘We often know just enough to be baffled’. It will be no surprise to anyone when I say that this book will not unbaffle us. But it does give us a collection of rewarding papers that each wrestle with the legacy Carnap has (...)
  17. Scepticism About Philosophy.Jason Brennan - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):1-16.
    Suppose a person who is agnostic about most philosophical issues wishes to have true philosophical beliefs but equally wishes to avoid false philosophical beliefs. I argue that this truth-seeking, error-avoiding agnostic would not have good grounds for pursuing philosophy. Widespread disagreement shows that pursuing philosophy is not a reliable method of discovering true answers to philosophical questions. More likely than not, pursuing philosophy leads to false belief. Many attempts to rebut this sceptical argument fail.
  18. What is a Possible Ontological and Epistemological Framework for a True Universal 'Information Science'?: The Suggestion of a Cybersemiotics.Søren Brier - 1997 - World Futures 49 (3):287-308.
    (1997). What is a possible ontological and epistemological framework for a true universal ‘information science'?: The suggestion of a cybersemiotics. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 287-308.
  19. Grenzen des Wissens.Joachim Bromand - 2009 - Münster, Germany: Mentis.
    Diese Studie greift die klassische philosophische Frage nach den Grenzen unseres Wissens auf und analysiert kritisch aktuell diskutierte Argumente, welche die Begrenztheit unseres Wissens erweisen sollen. Im Zentrum stehen dabei drei Argumentationsansätze: Zunächst geht es um Komplexitätsgrenzen des Wissens, wie sie G. Chaitin mit seiner algorithmischen Informationstheorie aufzeigen will. Dann wird auf Präzisionsgrenzen des Wissens eingegangen, die sich aus der epistemischen Theorie der Vagheit (T. Williamson u.a.) ergeben. Schließlich werden Grenzen unserer Selbsterkenntnis erörtert. Dabei geht es um verschiedene Argumente für (...)
  20. Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Colorado
    Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...)
  21. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...)
  22. Sull'influenza di Cartesio, Leibniz e Newton nel primo approccio di Kant al problema dello spazio e della sua dimensionalita.Francisco Caruso & R. Moreira Xavier - 1998 - Epistemologia 21 (2):211-224.
    L'idea di relazionare la dimensionalità dello spazio ad una legge fisica, contenuta nel primo scritto di Kant "Pensieri sulla veridica estima delle forze vive", svela un modo di guardare i rapporti tra Fisica e Matematica così nuovo ed originale che potè essere sviluppato e compreso nella sua plenitudine soltanto nel secolo XX. Ci riferiamo qui ala prospettiva aperta da Ehrenfest nel suo "In what way does it become manifest in the fundamental laws of physics that space has three dimensions?". In (...)
  23. Knowing How and 'Knowing How'.Yuri Cath - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 527-552.
    What is the relationship between the linguistic properties of knowledge-how ascriptions and the nature of knowledge-how itself? In this chapter I address this question by examining the linguistic methodology of Stanley and Williamson (2011) and Stanley (2011a, 2011b) who defend the intellectualist view that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. My evaluation of this methodology is mixed. On the one hand, I defend Stanley and Williamson (2011) against critics who argue that the linguistic premises they appeal to—about the syntax and (...)
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