Epistemology of Religion

While John Henry Newman’s writings have long received the attention of historians, theologians, and literary critics, they have largely been neglected by philosophers. However, Newman’s importance as a philosopher is just now beginning to be acknowledged. -/- This volume brings together leading philosophers and Newman scholars to explore the contours of his philosophical thought and to show its relevance to contemporary philosophy. The chapters explore, develop, and evaluate Newman’s thought, considering recent work in epistemology, philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, and (...) philosophy of education. -/- John Henry Newman and Contemporary Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students interested in nineteenth-century philosophy, philosophy of religion, epistemology, moral philosophy, philosophy of education, and nineteenth-century religious thought. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” the “Lectures on Religious Belief,” and On Certainty to survey some of the themes relating to the epistemology of religions that recur across his philosophical career. I then propose an account of the relevance of Wittgenstein to a globally-engaged approach to epistemology of religions, focusing on the roles that belief may have within that field. To avoid conceptual confusion, Wittgenstein’s methods suggest that beliefs should be identified and interpreted amidst (...) the dynamics of the discourses and practices in which they are salient features. My central claim is that while there is good reason to be skeptical of any one account of the epistemology of religious beliefs being adequate, Wittgenstein’s contextualist philosophical tendencies are helpful for avoiding potential confusion as the disparate contours of beliefs across an increasingly wider plurality of religions are investigated. (shrink)

Kant claims that we must Believe (or have faith, Glaube) in the attainability of our ultimate moral end – the Highest Good – and that God exists. According to a strand of orthodoxy, this claim rests on a rational principle, called Attainability: one can rationally will an end only if one thinks that it is attainable. However, this orthodox view faces four prominent objections concerning (1) acting as if, (2) the modal content of Beliefs, (3) approximation, and (4) not-believing. I (...) show that Attainability should be read as a principle of willing simpliciter and that these objections do not withstand critical scrutiny. Kant’s critics, therefore, will need either to sharpen their objections or seek alternatives elsewhere. (shrink)

In this commentary, we critically discuss Neil van Leeuwen’s book Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity. We argue that his portrayal of religious credences bears remarkable similarities to what certain epistemologists refer to as “hinges.” We furthermore argue that these similarities lead to a different perspective on the rationality of religious credence than the one advanced by Van Leeuwen.

Together with the new translation of the Principia with the 1922 Preface by the editors as this collection, published in 2023 at Bompiani, this volume offers a perspective on the work of one of the 20th century leading moral philosophers. Moore, with Russell and Wittgenstein, is believed to have been one of the fathers of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, Elizabeth Anscombe pointed to Moore in Modern Moral Philosophy as a contributor to the degeneration of English-language ethics and the 20th-century moral confusion. (...) She indicated Wittgenstein, Aristotle and Aquinas as the source of remedies for prevailing bewilderment. The essays translated in this collection highlight lesser-known aspects of Moore’s work. For those who only know the image of Moore as a ‘professional’ philosopher, and one of the fathers of analytic philosophy, it may be interesting to see him oscillate between the opposite poles of ‘naturalism’, a nostalgia for religion or at least for a substitute to it, alternately Neo-Hegelian idealism or a faith in beauty and love. Firstly, the collection includes two unpublished manuscripts, seven never reprinted essays, three reprinted but never translated, and only two already translated into in Italian, thus giving the possibility of a stereoscopic reading of Moore’s work that would rescue it from the simplified image that Moore himself had created in the 1930s and analytic philosophers have preserved by inertia. Secondly, it includes early writings verging on ethical issues from which the framework of themes and problems from which the answer outlined in the Principia Ethica to Socrates’ question ‘how should I live’ becomes clearer. Thirdly, the collection touches on aspects for which Moore was indebted to 19th-century British debates, which he did not easily find a way out of. As Keynes said, Moore had ‘one foot in the twentieth century’ but – we would add – not one but two or three in the nineteenth. With the formulation of the argument of the naturalistic fallacy, he opened the discussion of one of the themes of analytic ethics, but with his critique of intuitionism, hedonism, evolutionism, ‘metaphysics’ and his re-proposition of the Para-Hegelian notion of ‘organic unity’ he was fully immersed in the 19th-century debates. The discussion of his theses, which was for a century a discussion of something no one had really understood, can now start anew perhaps in the right way, from an understanding of the terms in which the problems really were posed at the time which Baldwin and Regan’s historiographical contributions by have made possible (and to which Mario Micheletti could have contributed if someone had been able to read literature in Italian). (shrink)

The Devil’s Advocate versus God’s Honest Truth: A Dialectical Inquiry into the Rationality of Religion is a scholarly monograph exploring the rationality of religion, particularly the tenability of theism, through a dialectical analysis of reasons for belief versus grounds for suspicion. The positive perspective examines traditional proofs for the existence of God, focusing specifically on the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments, while the negative perspective contemplates common grounds for misgivings, concentrating especially on methodological difficulties, syncretic developments, and metaethical challenges. The (...) comprehensive yet balanced coverage of the book is designed to meet the needs of readers for critical reflection without compromising the objectivity required to help them sort out their own intuitions and formulate their own judgments in an area that is otherwise dominated by sectarian scholarship and thereby polarized beyond reconciliation. (shrink)

Since the emergence of New Atheism under figures such as Richard Dawkins, there has been a revolution in popular Christian interest in science and religion. However, many approaches to science and religion among Christian laypeople follow an evidentialist model. In sharp contrast, Sir Arthur Eddington’s different voice, as a prominent scientist and devout Quaker, remains unfamiliar to the majority in these discussions. Heralded by some commentators as ahead of his time, his unusual yet bold ideas, which at times were misunderstood, (...) deserve renewed consideration. His influence throughout the twentieth century ran deeper than he has been given credit for. It is time to reassess his value to science and religion as a discipline and to acknowledge that his contributions have a great deal of merit for the ongoing dialogue. In this article, we question whether evidentialist approaches are as valuable as Eddington’s contributions. We examine his works and life to see what can be learned from his perspective on the science-religion question. In doing so, we are also asking whether his attitude to science and religion would be more fruitful than the alternatives. (shrink)

Following Robert Fogelin’s work, philosophers have traditionally analysed deep disagreements in Wittgenstein’s thought through the lens of “On Certainty.” This paper explores another fruitful avenue for understanding Wittgenstein’s views on deep disagreements: this avenue lies in examining the form of disagreement that arises between believers and non-believers, as documented in his “Lectures on Religious Belief”. Drawing on this text and others, I will try to demonstrate how deep disagreement, starting from a situation of incompatibility and mutual non-persuasiveness between the parties, (...) can, through the intermediary stage of mutual partial emotive understanding, lead sometimes to an extreme form of resolution: the conversion of one’s own way of seeing things to that of the other party. This conversion, however, does not rely on an appeal to explanations, reasons, or rationality. Instead, it appeals to the overcoming of a blockage by the will. This concept of a complete reorientation of one’s own perspective is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and may even be considered the ultimate goal of his mature work. (shrink)

From a Quantum Cosmic perspective, a new theology is developed based on the doctrine that humans have an energy code and a biological code that allow us to achieve direct contact with the cosmic energies permeating the universe and flow in with the Alpha Energy, namely, the energy of the Creator or God. The energy codes of human beings transcend physical death as energy never ceases to exist, only to transform. Moreover, our ‘energy body network’ produces new energy through biophotons (...) which allow beings to be in total command of their existence and communicate with the cosmos through a cosmic language. Patient and consistent practice of cosmic meditation and mental physics will lead to an awakening and evolution to a Cosmic Quantum Consciousness that resembles the ultimate connection with the Alpha Energy. This article will explore the perennial approach of Quantum Cosmic Theology which suggests that all people can be united under one fundamental creed while concurrently respecting relatively minor differences in religious belief and practice. (shrink)

This essay examines the contributions of Greek philosopher and theologian Christos Yannaras to the question of the relationship between faith and reason. Although a comprehensive analysis of the entire body of his work is beyond the scope of this project, we will attempt to demonstrate through a selective survey, from the early `On the Absence and Unknowability of God' (1970) to the later `The Effable and the Ineffable' (1999), that he presents a convincing `third way' between rationalism and deism. We (...) will argue that Yannaras accomplishes this by methodologically deconstructing the presuppositions of rationalism and advocating for a more `empirically correct' approach grounded in apophaticism and social verification of knowledge. In doing so, he introduces a paradigm that not only challenges the binary opposition between faith and reason but also establishes a distinctive point of encounter between Orthodox Christian theology and contemporary philosophical discourse. (shrink)

The term ‘natural theology’ provokes a variety of reactions, spanning from whole-hearted endorsement to passionate rejection. Charged as it is with polemical and pejorative undertones, this debate begs for an intervention. If the scholarly community is to engage constructively with the concept and practice of natural theology — either by way of acceptance, rejection, or something in between — clarity in its definition and identification is imperative. The aim of this paper, then, is to try to shed some light on (...) three of the most common definitions of ‘natural theology’ in contemporary scholarship, to provide clarity about the ways in which they differ, and to propose some conceptual refinements in the hope that, if adopted, more fruitful discourse may take place in relation to this much-debated and interdisciplinary phrase. (shrink)

RELIGION TODAY (2nd edition) offers a refreshing introduction to the academic study of religion with a particular emphasis on critically informed analysis. The book skillfully explores diverse religious traditions and phenomena, providing readers with a comprehensive overview that encourages them to engage critically with the subject and materials. Written for an undergraduate audience, this book is accessible and well-organized, making it suitable for both students and general readers interested in sharpening their understanding of religion. Overall, Religion Today is a valuable (...) resource for anyone seeking to approach the academic study of religion. Its holistic approach, engaging writing style, and emphasis on critical thinking make it a welcome addition to various religious studies curriculums or personal libraries.” — Brad Stoddard, associate professor of Religious Studies, McDaniel College. (shrink)

The introduction to a special issue of Religious Studies on the theme of experimental philosophy of religion.

Cet article explore la relation étroite entre la crise de l’autorité et celle de la croyance religieuse, ainsi que les conséquences sur le fonctionnement de la société. En nous appuyant sur les travaux de divers philosophes, nous avons défini et délimité les concepts d’autorité et de croyance, nous avons établi que l’autorité est un contenu de la croyance et réfléchi à la problématique de l’autorité de la croyance, et nous avons conclu que la croyance peut être utilisée pour justifier des (...) formes d’autorité arbitraires et abusives. j -/- La crise de l’autorité et celle de la croyance religieuse ont des conséquences importantes sur le fonctionnement de la société. Ces crises peuvent entraîner une perte de confiance dans les institutions et les valeurs établies, ainsi qu’une montée de l’individualisme et du relativisme moral. Cet article permet de mettre en lumière le pouvoir de la croyance et les enjeux qui en découlent, notamment en termes de manipulation et de confusion entre l’autorité politique et l’autorité religieuse. En encourageant une réflexion critique et une compréhension approfondie des concepts d’autorité et de croyance, nous pouvons contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des enjeux auxquels sont confrontées les valeurs des institutions religieuses et politiques aujourd’hui. j -/- تُسلّط هذه المقالة الضّوء على العلاقة الوثيقة بين أزمة السّلطة وأزمة الاعتقاد الدّينيّ أو الإيمان، وتُحلّل عواقب هذه الأزمات على سير عمل المجتمع. في استعراضها أعمال العديد من الفلاسفة، تقدّم المقالة تعريفًا وتحديدًا لمفهومَي السّلطة والإيمان باحثةً في العلاقة بينهما، مع التّركيز على إمكانيّة استخدام الإيمان لتبرير أشكال السّلطة التّعسّفيّة والمسيئة. -/- إنّ أزمة السّلطة وأزمة الاعتقاد الدّينيّ لهما عواقب جوهريّة على سير عمل المجتمع. يمكن أن تؤدّي هذه الأزمات إلى فقدان الثّقة في المؤسّسات والقيم الرّاسخة، فضلًا عن تنامي الفرديّة والنّسبيّة الأخلاقيّة. تساعد هذه المقالة في تسليط الضّوء على قوّة الإيمان والقضايا الّتي تنشأ عنه، بخاصّة فيما يتعلّق بالتّلاعب والخلط بين السّلطتين السّياسيّة والدّينيّة. إنّنا من خلال تشجيع التّفكير النّقديّ والفهم العميق لمفاهيم السّلطة والإيمان، يمكننا المساهمة في تعزيز قيم المؤسّسات الدّينيّة والسّياسيّة. (shrink)

Many studies find reflective thinking predicts less belief in God or less religiosity — so-called analytic atheism. However, the most widely used tests of reflection confound reflection with ancillary abilities such as numeracy, some studies do not detect analytic atheism in every country, experimentally encouraging reflection makes some non-believers more open to believing in God, and one of the most common sources of online research participants seems to produce lower data quality. So analytic atheism may be less than universal or (...) partially explained by confounding factors. To test this, we developed better measures, controlled for more confounds, and employed more recruitment methods. All four studies detected signs of analytic atheism above and beyond confounds (N > 70,000 people from five of six continental regions). We also discovered analytic apostasy: the better a person performed on reflection tests, the greater their odds of losing their religion since childhood — even when controlling for confounds. Analytic apostasy even seemed to explain analytic atheism: apostates were more reflective than others and analytic atheism was undetected after excluding apostates. Religious conversion was rare and unrelated to reflection, suggesting reflection’s relationships to conversion and deconversion are asymmetric. Detected relationships were usually small, indicating reflective thinking is a reliable albeit marginal predictor of apostasy. (shrink)

According to an intuition highly popular in Western world, beliefs, includ-ing religious beliefs, must be supported by sufficient evidence in order to be held in a rational (or justified) way (evidentialism). Plantinga for-mulates his own view about the rationality of religious beliefs, which he considers as opposite to the traditional view. The central thesis of his position is that religious beliefs are perfectly rational when believed in the basic way, that is without any evidence or argument and even with-out the (...) use of natural reason at all. According to Plantinga people could have acquired their religious beliefs via extraordinary cognitive faculty, which he calls, after Calvin, sensus divinitatis. In this paper I ask a ques-tion whether Plantinga successfully rejects traditional intuition about the need of natural reason for religious beliefs. For this purpose, I first refer to Plantinga’s understanding of the traditional concept of the rationality of religious beliefs. I then summarize Plantinga’s views on the third condi-tion of knowledge and his account of the rationality of religious beliefs. Next, I turn to the critical part of the article. I point out the inadequacy of Plantinga’s position. To do so I first analyze and criticize Plantinga’s argument for the view that possessing sufficient evidence for religious beliefs is not an epistemic duty. I argue that Plantinga rejects only one understanding of that requirement and this is not enough to reject the whole idea of evidentialism. Then, I criticize Plantinga’s position on the third condition of knowledge, which he calls warrant. To this end I recall Laurence BonJour’s argument against externalism, since my critique of Plantinga’s position is analogous to BonJour’s argument. If my critique is successful then it is not that religious belief could be held in rational way without the use of natural reason, because in this case subject would be epistemically irresponsible. (shrink)

A short-course in comparative religion. Provides the basis (ontology) (epistemology) (logic) for both mathematics and technology.

Is skeptical theism tenable once one acknowledges, as proponents of that view do, one's cognitive limitations vis-à-vis religious matters? In this article, I aim to answer that question both by examining the apparent radical skeptical implications of the skeptical component of skeptical theism and by comparing this view with fideism and Pyrrhonism, which also lay emphasis on our cognitive limitations. My ultimate purpose is to determine which of the three stances it makes more sense to adopt once the limitations of (...) human cognitive powers are recognized. (shrink)

This work is the transcript of a theological dialogue I had with ChatGPT that spanned a couple of days. I began it merely out of curiosity over how ChatGPT might respond to questions and challenges I posed. As it progressed, I became increasingly impressed with the nuance, depth, and relevance of its responses. The dialogue became, for me, something of a contemplative exercise. I still don’t know quite how to understand the ability of generative A.I. to respond with such (apparent) (...) understanding and even insight. -/- I’ve decided to post this dialogue, not only because of the puzzle it poses concerning A.I, but even more, because I believe that the theological conclusions ‘we’ arrived at have real merit. -/- In the end, the theological views expressed here echo those that I’ve expressed in other works of mine, but the expression of these views are enhanced by the way ChatGPT picks up on them, rephrases them, elaborates upon them, and often places them in the context of the classical theological tradition. -/- I might add that I have been an A.I. skeptic for some time now, concerned over the potential dangers of A.I. in general. But this dialogue, anyway, reveals its potential use as a vehicle for reflection, even profound reflection. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that commonsense responses to radical skepticism can provide helpful lessons for religious epistemology—in particular, for thinking about how best to defend, and respond to, religious skepticism. Section 1 briefly summarizes of some of the main elements of the Reid-inspired epistemic-intuition-based commonsense response to radical skepticism developed in my 2021 book, "Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition" and highlights the role (in our thinking about radical skepticism) of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings about epistemic value in much the same (...) way that moral intuitions are seemings about moral value. Sections 2 and 3 identify five important lessons that can be drawn from the position presented in that book, apply them to religious epistemology, and explain how they can help us to account for our religious disagreements without implausibly disparaging the rationality of those with whom we disagree. Section 4 addresses some potential concerns about Sections 2 and 3. (shrink)

Foundationalism, a theory about the structure of epistemic justification, is often criticized for excesses that are unnecessary additions to it. But when correctly understood, its main tenets (featuring most prominently the claim that there can be properly basic beliefs) are virtually undeniable. The best way to get at the heart of foundationalism is to focus not on Descartes but on Aristotle and his famous regress argument. Section I unpacks that foundationalist argument. Section II addresses some objections to foundationalism. Section III (...) considers how foundationalism bears on topics in the epistemology of theology—topics such as Reformed epistemology, natural theology, Biblical criticism, and post-foundationalism. (shrink)

The miniseries Frank Herbert’s Dune (2000) and Frank Herbert’s Children of Dune (2003) offer a stark warning that people must think for themselves rather than relying on authority. In particular, they warn against overreliance on leaders and on religious authorities. The series tell the story of how, in the far future, Paul Atreides becomes dictator and religious leader over the human race, bringing slaughter and oppression in his wake. The chapter will consider the views of philosophers like Plato, who believed (...) that power should be concentrated in the hands of leaders with absolute authority, along with the views of philosophers who advocated democracy, like John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey. The chapter will also examine the views of philosophers on religion, especially philosophers critical of religion, such as Locke, Thomas Paine, and Bertrand Russell. It is argued that the series present a strong case against allowing others to think for us, because the story they tell matches the historical record of the real world. When leaders have been given the power to be arbiters of truth, they have too often exploited those beneath them, using their positions to accumulate wealth, power, and glory. When too much trust has been placed in religious authority, it has likewise too often led to exploitation and repression. What is worse, the power of religion is uncontrollable, easily leading to violence and destruction. Having said that, the series fail to reflect that religion does good in the world. This chapter argues that, as maintained by W. K. Clifford, whether people should accept religious views depends on whether they have good grounds to believe that these views are true. This implies that people must not accept religious views without thinking the views through for themselves. (shrink)

This Element engages with the epistemic significance of disagreement, focusing on its skeptical implications. It examines various types of disagreement-motivated skepticism in ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, and general epistemology. In each case, it favors suspension of judgment as the seemingly appropriate response to the realization of disagreement. One main line of argument pursued in the Element is that, since in real-life disputes we have limited or inaccurate information about both our own epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of (...) our dissenters, personal information and self-trust can rarely function as symmetry breakers in favor of our own views. (shrink)

It is no exaggeration to say that there has been an explosion of activity in the field of philosophical enquiry that is known as natural theology. Having been smothered in the early part of the twentieth century due to the dominance of the anti-metaphysical doctrine of logical positivism, natural theology began to make a comeback in the late 1950s as logical positivism collapsed and analytic philosophers took a newfound interest in metaphysical topics such as possibility and necessity, causation, time, the (...) mind-body problem, and God. This chapter begins by considering how we might characterise natural theology as a field of enquiry. It then proceeds to survey the landscape of contemporary natural theology, which has spawned a large and at times highly technical body of literature. Finally, consideration is given to two epistemological issues confronting the theist who wishes to appeal to natural theology, which could be termed the problem of the gap(s) and the problem of accessibility. (shrink)

The suppression thesis is the theological claim that theistic non-belief results from culpable mistreatment of one’s knowledge of God or one’s evidence for God. The thesis is a traditional one but unpopular today. This article examines whether it can gain new credibility from the philosophy of self-deception and from the cognitive science of religion. The thesis is analysed in terms of the intentionalist and the non-intentionalist model of self-deception. The first proposed model views non-belief as intentional suppression of one’s implicit (...) knowledge of God. It is less feasible psychologically but has a good theological fit with Paul’s and Calvin’s versions of the thesis. This model also helps the argument for the culpability of non-belief. The second model views suppression as a process of subconscious motivated reasoning driven by a desire to avoid an uncomfortable truth. It fits Pascal’s view that one’s desire for or against God determines whether one sees general revelation as providing sufficient evidence for God. There is some empirical and anecdotal evidence for both models, but obvious cases of non-resistant non-belief present a major problem for the suppression thesis. Also, it is hard to see what might motivate anyone to deceive oneself about God’s existence. (shrink)

The first handbook on the topic of religious epistemology introduces and discusses topics fundamental to the epistemology of religious belief.

Mercy is central to the very identity of Islam, yet this is not often recognized by theologians and scholars. This paper will demonstrate that the idea of mercy is important as a prelude to the understanding of Islam and an interpretation of its teachings. This important role of mercy is evident in Islam’s primary sources – the Quran and the Sunnah – and is not contingent on political, social, or historical contexts. It is well recognized that the proper comprehension of (...) Islam hinges on grasping the attributes of God, his divine message, and the character of his messenger. But what is often overlooked is that these aspects are fundamentally rooted in mercy. Islam encourages its followers to cultivate merciful virtues. It emphasizes that the compassionate nature of the faith should always precede the understanding and interpretation of its teachings. As a result, Muslims are encouraged to nurture a compassionate self, foster a benevolent mindset and approach, and anchor their religious obedience in the spirit of mercy. While followers of Islam are responsible for upholding this ethos, external observers too should try to view the religion fairly based upon this recognition of the centrality of mercy. (shrink)

انتشرت ظاهرة الغش في الامتحان إلى الحد الذي جعلها عادة مألوفة يمارسها السواد الأعظم من التلاميذ، ويصنف الراغب عنها في حكم الشاذ الذي لا يعتد به، وقد تطور الأمر إلى الإبداع والتفنن في ابتكار الوسائل والطرق "الحديثة" التي لم تخطر من ذي قبل على بال أحد من العالمين، ولأن ما يتكرر يتقرر فقد صارت هذه الآفة جزءا من "الممارسة البيداغوجية"، بل تحولت إلى صاحبة الشأن الأول التي يتبتل التلميذ في محرابها الساعات الطوال تفكيرا وتنظيرا وممارسة، حتى وصل إلى درجة الكمال (...) والبلوغ في الاهتداء إلى أنجع السبل وأكثرها تطورا، مسجلا بذلك براءات اختراع مبهرة. ولعل نظرة فضولية إلى طوابير التلاميذ المقبلين على محلات النسخ قبيل الامتحانات تظهر بجلاء "حيوية هذه السوق" التي تكيف تجارها مع واقعها، وكونوا أنفسهم ليواكبوا مستجداتها، وينالوا رضا زبنائهم، وكل هذه "الدينامية" تجري أمام أنظار السلطات العمومية التي تكتفي بالتفرج السلبي على المشهد، كأنها لاتدري أن حرمة القانون تنتهك بهذا السلوك المخل بالأمن التربوي، وتستوجب الضرب بيد من حديد على أيدي هؤلاء "التجار" الذين يشيعون الفاحشة في أرض التربية والتعليم بضمائرهم الميتة وجيوبهم الجشعة. إن الانتشار الواسع لهذه الظاهرة أكسبها شرعية الفعل، وأسقط عن ممارسيها الشعور بالإثم الذي يحيك في القلب ويحجز من يهم به عن إتيانه خشية أن يطلع عليه الناس، فصار التباهي سمة المقدم عليها، وإنتاج الأبطال والفرسان نهاية حلبتها. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose and defend an account of the nature and the epistemology of religious beliefs loosely inspired by Wittgenstein´s remarks on the structure of reason and on the nature of religious beliefs. I argue that following and developing his account we can not only make a strong case for the prima facie rationality of religious beliefs but also, and more importantly, cast new light on the epistemology of religious disagreement. Keywords: Wittgenstein. Hinges. Epistemic warrant. Religious disagreement.

In this paper we argue that to adequately capture the complicated relationship between Descartes' work and late medieval thought, philosophers need to think not only about his ideas but also about his presentation and choice of genre. Reading the Meditations as a mere discursive treatise containing a progressive and consistent set of arguments intended to establish a particular philosophical position fails to appreciate the eponymous genre that Descartes explicitly chose to employ in writing them. Instead, we argue that reading the (...) text in light of the long tradition of contemplative meditative literature opens up a radically new way of interpreting the Meditations as a “mystagogical” project of spiritual edification and epistemic and volitional transformation. During such a transformation, the meditator undergoes a series of revelatory experiences structurally similar to those we find in various so-called “mystical” or “mystagogical”literature, in the Christian West. We show how paying attention to these mystagogical aspects of the Meditations can open up new avenues for understanding the connection between the theoretical, practical, and theological aspects of Descartes' thought. Such a reading resolves a number of seemingly glaring problems and peculiarities in the Meditations including the Cartesian circle, and the tension in the Cartesian notion of the freedom of the will. We also argue that the odd detours the meditator takes in the Sixth Meditation through physiology are not mere digressions but rather mark an often overlooked aspect of the mystagogical story – the return to embodiment as a transformed self. Indeed, the overly intellectualist emphasis of contemporary scholars on both the contemplative aspects of mystagogical literature and the epistemological focus of Descartes' project in the Meditations have caused them to largely overlook the ways in which the aim of both medieval and Cartesian meditation involves a transformative re-orientation of the whole person and their understanding of the world – one which has practical, moral, and social consequences that have gone underexplored in discussions of these texts. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

While experimental philosophy has fruitfully applied the tools and resources of psychology and cognitive science to debates within epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, relatively little work has been done within philosophy of religion. And this isn’t due to a lack of need! Philosophers of religion frequently rely on empirical claims that can be either verified or disproven, but without exploring whether they are. And philosophers of religion frequently appeal to intuitions which may vary wildly according to education level, theological background, etc., (...) without concern for whether or not the psychological mechanisms that underwrite those intuitions are broadly shared or reliable. In this chapter, I explore some of the fruit and possibilities for the emerging field of experimental philosophy of religion. First, in Section 1, I will elucidate some of the historical grounding for experimental philosophy of religion. Then in Section 2, I briefly consider how the tools and resources of experimental philosophy might be fruitfully applied to a seminal topic within philosophy of religion, namely, the problem of evil. In Section 3, we’ll sketch some broader applications of experimental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Should one use philosophy in service of religion? I argue that Dionysius the Areopagite gives a negative answer to this question. The relevant text is Dionysius’ Letter 7, in which he explains why he does not use philosophy to attack Greco-Roman paganism. Philosophy, according to Dionysius, is something divine. In fact, in Letter 7 he goes so far as to identify philosophy with what St. Paul calls the “wisdom of God.” As a result, philosophy should not be treated as a (...) tool to be used in service of anything, even the true religion, which Dionysius of course identifies with Christianity. In order to elucidate Dionysius’ position, I provide a detailed account of how he understands philosophy, religion (thrêskeia), and use (chraô). (shrink)

When we talk about dialogue, we always start looking for ways to best present the content of our speech. Approaching another through dialogue does not seem to care too much about the will or desire to accept the otherness for dialogue even if this is the basis of the binary formula of dialogue. Yet, in the case of religious dialogue, things are not at all so clear or proactive; instead, this (accepting otherness) is usually the central issue of interreligious dialogue. (...) However, when we finally manage to bring together two or more religious representatives for dialogue, the most intriguing aspect of the dialogue is less emphasized on the content and issues to be brought to the attention of the participants and more on the issue of accepting, tolerating all others’ traditions through this dialogue. Nervousness, anxiety, discomfort, and squirming are the habitual and, even more shocking, "expected" features in interfaith dialogue. Well, if this is the main problem in interfaith - being able to bring acceptance in this "toxic" environment - then this would be a step forward. But probably all these are since, at present, the construction of interreligious dialogue is still in progress, about to be polished and become a formal custom, an emerging tradition of the current era. However, is the content that all participants in the interfaith dialogue bring, our particular traditions, to blame for this challenge? Can they help us build the bridge or, on the contrary, put interfaith in a limbo state, waiting for a redeemer? To pinpoint the direction in which interreligious dialogue is heading, we must better evaluate and understand a "tradition", what it is, how it works, and why it is developed and preserved. What is the significance of a tradition for people in general and a religious group in particular? How deeply rooted is it in human thinking and how valuable to fight for it? And then, can we consider changing, altering, or even removing a whole tradition from our perspective? If so, [regardless of the response] what is then the impact of [any] tradition on us and our reactions to the current issues, therefore to human endeavor? This article illustrates the role that tradition plays in peoples' views of the world and how tradition influences their behavior and attitudes toward certain practices and against a current acquisition of interreligious relationships, namely interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy’s metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy’s views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one’s judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be (...) justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected. (shrink)

In a well-known apocryphal story, Theresa of Avila falls off the donkey she was riding, straight into mud, and injures herself. In response, she seems to blame God for her fall. A playful if indignant back and forth ensues. But this is puzzling. Theresa should never think that God is blameworthy. Why? Apparently, one cannot blame what one worships. For to worship something is to show it a kind of reverence, respect, or adoration. To worship is, at least in part, (...) to praise. You cannot praise and blame simultaneously. Indeed, Paul counsels against “back-talk” against God, suggesting we lack the standing to blame our creator (Romans 9:20). Drawing on Strawsonian theorizing about praise and blame, this paper argues that, surprisingly, a person can both blame and worship God. Although blameful worship is possibly epistemically akratic, it may sometimes be acceptable given our nature as finite, emotional beings. In fact, blaming God might on occasion be the only way we have to stand with God’s goodness despite apparent evidence of evil in the world. This suggestion, I’ll argue, should change the way we think about the problem of evil. The problem has interpersonal and moral psychological dimensions that merit serious attention. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of the second ‘theological’ pattern in Plato’s Republic. Situating Plato within his religious context, it argues that this pattern calls into question the traditional ancient model of divine epiphany. Divine epiphany was a central element in Greek religion. Yet, in the absence of a centralized religious organization, this model threatened the philosophers’ authoritative position. Plato’s second pattern seeks not only to undermine this potential threat but also to pave the way towards a new, philosophicalmodel (...) of divine epiphany, thus further establishing the philosophers’ authority and legitimacy within and outside his ideal city. (shrink)

In a recent article, Bernáth and Tőzsér (2021) defend what they call the Bias Argument, a new skeptical argument from expert peer disagreement. They argue that the best contrastive causal explanation for disagreement among leading experts in philosophy is that they adopt their positions in a biased way. But if the leading experts are biased, non-experts either are also biased or only avoid bias through epistemic inferiority. Recognizing this is expected to prompt one to decrease one‘s confidence in one‘s philosophical (...) beliefs. This paper argues that some beliefs are immune to a key premise of the Bias Argument. To show this, the paper develops the concepts of self-favoring theories, decisive support, and standing-incommensurable disagreements. A plausible example of a self-favoring theory, dubbed Mere Reformed Protestantism, is sketched. Many disagreements over self-favoring theories and over beliefs decisively supported by self-favoring theories are shown to be standing-incommensurable. It is then argued that when non-experts are in standing-incommensurable disagreements with experts, the standards of assessing expertise are themselves controverted. This result undercuts the move in the Bias Argument from expert bias to non-expert bias. Finally, a couple reservations about the role of self-favoring theories in philosophy are addressed. (shrink)

El esfuerzo humano por la búsqueda del sentido de la existencia se inscribe en la práctica discursiva que las religiones exhiben no sólo de la situación existencial del hombre sino también de la experiencia de este con lo trascendente. De hecho, un lenguaje que expresa lo trascendente es básicamente intuitivo, sin embargo, la idea de carencia de significado para los contenidos de fe aconteció por boca de filósofos analíticos. De ahí que el presente artículo intente reproducir algunas consideraciones pro et (...) contra de los contenidos de fe por parte de pensadores adscritos a la escuela analítica para luego enfatizar en una necesaria contribución de la filosofía en el tratamiento del lenguaje religioso. (shrink)

Las críticas que brotan en un medio en que el debate epistemológico parece encabezar los problemas que competen al filosofar, tienen en el negar el sentido de verdad al discurso de índole religiosa la ratificación del estatus de cientificidad. Esta es la apuesta de teóricos inscritos a la tradición analítica surgida en el pasado siglo. No obstante, frente a los discursos neopositivistas y el radical evidencialismo vienen las posiciones de algunos filósofos y teólogos analíticos quienes paralelamente abogaron por la validez (...) y el sentido de lo religioso. (shrink)

For the purposes of this paper, I attempt to wrestle with the question of whether or not it is a requisite for a “believer” (which turns out to be a loaded and ambiguous term) to be a part of a formal/institutional Christian Church. This is a difficult task to accomplish, and this, I admit. There is no way to answer this, truly with certainty. But Metaphysics are rarely grounded in “certainty.” This is true for many Christian Theological tasks as well. (...) Nevertheless, this argument will be attempted by working with and off of the Black liberation theologian and philosopher, James H. Cone's basic structured argument found in "Black Theology & Black Power." It's important to note that Cone is a systematic theologian writing in 1969, a time where White America (and its "Christians") helped contribute to the assassination of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. Not to mention, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was on a hunt for the next “Black Messiah,” had already infiltrated the Black Power movement, and that same year was making serious moves in undermining the Black Panther Party. Whereas White “Christian” America largely had his full support. After all the atrocities Black people in America have gone through, especially by its "Christians," many Black people had lost hope; they were broken, tired, many were angry—and righteously so. Cone’s 1969 argument reflects these Black sensibilities, a righteously angry theological and philosophical argument. I am attempting to wrestle with whether the basic structure of his argument is still applicable in contemporary America during the modern Black Lives Matter Movement. Thus, after rendering Cone’s argument from 1969, we imaginatively bend space and time to fast forward to the modern era 2020 and on, where we see if, by implication, Cone's argument is still relevant to the majority ("white") "Christian" Institutional/Formal Church. For the purposes of this paper, I will attempt to argue that Cone’s basic argument structure is still applicable, and that it is not a requisite for a Christian “believer” to be a part of a formal/institutional church. In this paper, I look at the ramifications of the Black Lives Matter movement in relation to the Christian formal institutional Church. (shrink)

Bouddha n'a pas érigé de religion. Dans les dimensions culturelles lointaines de son époque, il a fait de la philosophie et de la science. Si nous observons les racines de sa pensée et l'histoire de la connaissance humaine, nous nous rendrons compte qu'il a été, à sa manière, le précurseur du réalisme scientifique, de la psychanalyse, de la philosophie analytique, de l'existentialisme, du féminisme, de l'épistémologie, de la théorie et de la critique de la connaissance, de la psychologie sociale, de (...) la psychologie positive, du préservationnisme écologique et des concepts relatifs à la matière et à l'énergie que la physique quantique n'a pu démontrer que très récemment. Savoir correctement ce qu'est le bouddhisme est essentiel pour l'éducation et la culture de toute personne qui ne veut pas être un aliéné de plus dans un troupeau qui marche aveuglément au milieu d'une révolution technologique. (shrink)

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something (...) of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments. (shrink)

Given the laws of our universe, the initial conditions and cosmological constants had to be "fine-tuned" to result in life. Is this evidence for design? We argue that we should be uncertain whether an ideal agent would take it to be so—but that given such uncertainty, we should react to fine-tuning by boosting our confidence in design. The degree to which we should do so depends on our credences in controversial metaphysical issues.

The article concerns the relationship between Luigi Giussani's thought and contemporary Virtue Ethics.