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Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
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  1. added 2016-12-10
    Iurato Giuseppe, Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, Jürgen Habermas e le loro comuni radici teologiche nella nozione di ordine, raffrontati da un punto di vista heideggeriano.
    Seguendo l’esposizione data in (Orsi 2012), riguardante una comparazione fra alcuni aspetti dell’opera di Carl Schmitt e di Jürgen Habermas in filosofia politica, centrata sulla nozione di ordine ed inquadrata, nelle sue basi, entro la sociologia delle religioni di Max Weber, sarà possibile, oltre l’individuazione in essa di un comune punto di convergenza fra il pensiero dei questi autori nella nozione di ordine, portare avanti, su un piano teoretico di livello superiore, un ulteriore raffronto più orientato verso la metodologia della (...)
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  2. added 2016-12-08
    Daniel Greco (2016). Safety, Explanation, Iteration. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):187-208.
    This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with (...)
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  3. added 2016-12-07
    Carter A. Gordon E. & B. Jarvis (eds.) (forthcoming). Knowledge First Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  4. added 2016-12-07
    Steven James Bartlett (2016). Conviction and Rationality. Willamette University Faculty Research Website.
    A short paper presented before the Fellows of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions during the academic year 1969-70, with an Introductory Note written nearly 50 years later. The paper describes the author's enduring personal philosophical precept; it is also an implicit encomium to individuals whose psychology establishes a dependable bridge between their rational convictions and their conduct.
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  5. added 2016-12-05
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-05
    Jäger Christoph (2016). Glaube, Wissen und rationales Hoffen. In Geschichte - Gesellschaft - Geltung: XXIII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, 28. September -- 2. Oktober 2014 an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Kolloquienbeiträge, ed. Michael Quante, Hamburg, Felix Meiner: 2016. 501-517.
    Discussing two accounts of rational religious faith suggested by Peter Rohs and Volker Gerhardt, the paper critically explores the relation between (i) faith and knowledge and (ii) faith and hope. It argues that, if faith essentially involves some form of eschatological hope, then an account of rational faith ought to incorporate an analysis of rational hope.
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  7. added 2016-12-05
    Anne Meylan (2014). La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentendu. In Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoît Gaultier (eds.), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. 231-252.
    Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’une part de présenter ces deux réponses, d’autre part, d’expliquer pourquoi (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-04
    Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti, Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-04
    L. A. Paul (forthcoming). The Subjectively Enduring Self. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Temporal Experience. Routledge
    The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-04
    L. A. Paul (forthcoming). First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of Empathy. Inquiry.
    There are a host of fascinating philosophical issues that concern our understanding of the self, its relation to the first personal perspective, and its connection to the structure and content of conscious experience. These issues connect to work in the philosophy of language involving the nature of de se content and the role of perspective. They concern the role of indexicals in broader philosophical theories and the nature of the semantic content that indexicals contribute to our linguistic and conceptual representations. (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-03
    Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges (2015). Sosa on Animal Knowledge and Emotions. Analytica 19 (1):145-160.
    Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-02
    Elliot Samuel Paul & Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Attributing Creativity. In Berys Gaut & Matthew Kieran (eds.), Creativity and Philosophy. Routledge
    Three kinds of things may be creative: persons, processes, and products. The standard definition of creativity, used nearly by consensus in psychological research, focuses specifically on products and says that a product is creative if and only if it is new and valuable. We argue that at least one further condition is necessary for a product to be creative: it must have been produced by the right kind of process. We argue furthermore that this point has an interesting epistemological implication: (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-02
    Gilbert Plumer (2016). Can Cogency Vanish? Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1):89-109.
    This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...)
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  14. added 2016-12-01
    Lisa Miracchi (forthcoming). Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem. In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess
    I extend my direct virtue epistemology to explain how a knowledge-first framework can account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked by externalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate lacks justification, the other tracked by internalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate has justification, and moreover that such justification is not enjoyed by the vicious duplicate. It also explains what these kinds of epistemic standing have to do with each other. I argue that all justified beliefs are good (...)
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  15. added 2016-11-29
    Artūrs Logins (2016). Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K. Theoria 82 (4).
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
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  16. added 2016-11-29
    Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen (2016). Norms of Belief. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.
    When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify (...)
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  17. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosopohy.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with (...)
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  18. added 2016-11-28
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning. Inquiry.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
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  19. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2016). Evaluative Effects on Knowledge Attributions. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell 359-367.
    Experimental philosophers have investigated various ways in which non‐epistemic evaluations can affect knowledge attributions. For example, several teams of researchers (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010; Beebe and Jensen 2012; Schaffer and Knobe 2012; Beebe and Shea 2013; Buckwalter 2014b; Turri 2014) report that the goodness or badness of an agent’s action can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. These findings raise important questions about how patterns of folk knowledge attributions should influence philosophical theorizing about knowledge.
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  20. added 2016-11-26
    Guy Bennett-Hunter (forthcoming). Ineffability: Reply to Professors Metz and Cooper. Philosophia.
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  21. added 2016-11-26
    Peter J. Graham (2016). Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):172-186.
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  22. added 2016-11-25
    Matthew R. X. Dentith (2016). In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (11):27-33.
    A reply to Patrick Stokes' “Between Generalism and Particularism About Conspiracy Theory".
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  23. added 2016-11-23
    Evgeny Blinov (forthcoming). The New Scientific Policy: The Early Soviet Project of “State-Sponsored Evolutionism”. Social Epistemology:1-15.
    The aim of the present paper is to show that the fundamental transformation of Russian society that had been realized by the Soviet government since the early twenties included not only the reforms of scientific institutions or the creation of a new educational system but also a radical reevaluation of the social role of the expert knowledge. It proposes a transversal analysis of the institutional history of the Soviet science and its complex relations with the state apparatus in order to (...)
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  24. added 2016-11-22
    Ulrich de Balbian (forthcoming). Meta-Philosophy (Critique of Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology). Academic Publishers.
    Meta-philosophy (Critique of philosophy=metaphysics, ontology, epistemology).
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  25. added 2016-11-22
    Steven James Bartlett (1980). Self-Reference, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Science. Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology 13 (3):143-167.
    The paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored that attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual approach is (...)
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  26. added 2016-11-20
    Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief. Logos and Episteme.
    I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what (...)
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  27. added 2016-11-20
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. Episteme.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-20
    Moreira de Carvalho Eros (2016). An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):545-572.
    In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...)
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  29. added 2016-11-19
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief. Synthese:1-21.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
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  30. added 2016-11-19
    David J. Pauleen, David Rooney & Ali Intezari (forthcoming). Big Data, Little Wisdom: Trouble Brewing? Ethical Implications for the Information Systems Discipline. Social Epistemology:1-17.
    The question we pose in this paper is: How can wisdom and its inherent drive for integration help information systems in the development of practices for responsibly and ethically managing and using big data, ubiquitous information and algorithmic knowledge and so make the world a better place? We use the recent financial crises to illustrate the perils of an overreliance on and misuse of data, information and predictive knowledge when global Information Systems are not wisely integrated. Our analysis shows that (...)
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  31. added 2016-11-18
    Lisa Warenski (forthcoming). Disentangling the Epistemic Failings of the 2008 Financial Crisis. In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge
    I argue that epistemic failings are a significant and underappreciated moral hazard in the financial services industry. I argue further that an analysis of these epistemic failings and their means of redress is best developed by identifying policies and procedures that are likely to facilitate good judgment. I call these policies and procedures “best epistemic practices.” I explain how best epistemic practices support good reasoning, thereby facilitating accurate judgments about risk and reward. -/- Failures to promote and adhere to best (...)
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  32. added 2016-11-18
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Defeating Pragmatic Encroachment? Synthese:1-14.
    This paper examines the prospects of a prima facie attractive response to Fantl and McGrath’s argument for pragmatic encroachment. The response concedes that if one knows a proposition to be true then that proposition is warranted enough for one to have it as a reason for action. But it denies pragmatic encroachment, insofar as it denies that whether one knows a proposition to be true can vary with the practical stakes, holding fixed strength of warrant. This paper explores two ways (...)
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  33. added 2016-11-17
    Michael Hannon, Review of Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology.
  34. added 2016-11-17
    Paul Mengal & Marcio Miotto - Tradutor (jul-dez 2016). Para uma Historia da Psicologia. Ideação 34:355-374.
    A história da psicologia, tal como aparece em algumas obras (E.G. Boring 1950; M. Reuchlin 1957; P. Fraisse e J. Piaget 1963) ou em capítulos introdutórios de alguns manuais (M. Reuchlin 1977), reflete uma adesão — raramente discutida — a uma concepção internalista. Segundo essa concepção, a psicologia seria animada por uma dinâmica própria, um processo evolutivo totalmente endógeno, e seria independente de fatores externos tais como os domínios religiosos, sociopolíticos e econômicos. Além do mais, os partidários dessa história aceitam (...)
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  35. added 2016-11-16
    Faik Kurtulmuş, Faik Kurtulmus, Gürol Irzık & Gurol Irzik, Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge.
    In this article we develop an account of justice in the distribution of knowledge. We first argue that knowledge is a fundamental interest that grounds claims of justice due to its role in individuals’ deliberations about the common good, their personal good and the pursuit thereof. Second, we identify the epistemic basic structure of a society, namely, the institutions that determine individuals’ opportunities for acquiring knowledge and discuss what justice requires of them. Our main contention is that a systematic lack (...)
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  36. added 2016-11-16
    Finlay Malcolm (forthcoming). How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier. Episteme.
    Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower (...)
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  37. added 2016-11-16
    Bob Fischer (forthcoming). C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf Problem. Episteme.
    Realists about modality offer an attractive semantics for modal discourse in terms of possible worlds, but standard accounts of the worlds—as properties, propositions, or causally-isolated concreta—invoke entities with which we can’t interact. If realism is true, how can we know anything about modal matters? Let's call this "the Benacerraf Problem." I suggest that C. I. Lewis has an intriguing answer to it. Given that we’re willing to disentangle some of Lewis’s insights from his phenomenalism, we can take the following line. (...)
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  38. added 2016-11-16
    Christoph Baumberger & Georg Brun (2017). Dimensions of Objectual Understanding. In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge 165-189.
    In science and philosophy, a relatively demanding notion of understanding is of central interest: an epistemic subject understands a subject matter by means of a theory. This notion can be explicated in a way which resembles JTB analyses of knowledge. The explication requires that the theory answers to the facts, that the subject grasps the theory, that she is committed to the theory and that the theory is justified for her. In this paper, we focus on the justification condition and (...)
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  39. added 2016-11-16
    Christoph Baumberger, Claus Beisbart & Georg Brun (2017). What is Understanding? An Overview of Recent Debates in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemolgy and Philosophy of Science. Routledge 1-34.
    The paper provides a systematic overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science on the nature of understanding. We explain why philosophers have turned their attention to understanding and discuss conditions for “explanatory” understanding of why something is the case and for “objectual” understanding of a whole subject matter. The most debated conditions for these types of understanding roughly resemble the three traditional conditions for knowledge: truth, justification and belief. We discuss prominent views about how to construe these (...)
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  40. added 2016-11-16
    Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Pohlhaus Jr (eds.) (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge.
    Epistemic injustice is one of the most important and ground-breaking subjects to have emerged in philosophy in recent years. By examining the way injustice can occur to individuals when they are undermined or not ‘heard’ on account of their gender, race or age, and the injustices that can occur to individuals or groups because a society lacks an entire concept, such as sexual harassment, epistemic injustice draws attention to the fundamental links between knowledge, ethics and power. The Routledge Handbook of (...)
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  41. added 2016-11-16
    Caleb Cohoe (2016). Getting Things Less Wrong: Religion and the Role of Communities in Successfully Transmitting Beliefs. Res Philosophica 93 (3):621-636.
    I use the case of religious belief to argue that communal institutions are crucial to successfully transmitting knowledge to a broad public. The transmission of maximally counterintuitive religious concepts can only be explained by reference to the communities that sustain and pass them on. The shared life and vision of such communities allows believers to trust their fellow adherents. Repeated religious practices provide reinforced exposure while the comprehensive and structured nature of religious worldviews helps to limit distortion. I argue that (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-16
    Catherine Maloney, From Epistemic Responsibility to Ecological Thinking: The Importance of Advocacy for Epistemic Community.
    This is the third paper in the invited collection. Maloney highlights commonalities and divergences between two of Code’s works, Epistemic Responsibility and Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, focussing on three concepts: epistemic responsibility, which is central and common across both works; cognitive interdependence which is common to both works, but undergoes a major transformation in Ecological Thinking; and advocacy, which is entirely absent from the discussion in Epistemic Responsibility. Code’s work intersects with aspects of the work of two (...)
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  43. added 2016-11-15
    James Chase & Penelope Rush (forthcoming). Factivity, Consistency and Knowability. Synthese:1-20.
    One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction (...)
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  44. added 2016-11-13
    Anthony Bolos & James Henry Collin (forthcoming). A Sensitive Virtue Epistemology. Synthese.
    We offer an alternative to two influential accounts of virtue epistemology: Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE). We argue that while traditional RVE does offer an explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge, it is unable to effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck; and while ALVE does effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck, it lacks RVE’s resources to account for the distinctive value of knowledge. The account we provide, however, is both robustly virtue-theoretic and anti-luck, (...)
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  45. added 2016-11-11
    Felipe Romero (forthcoming). Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Social Epistemic Study. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon (...)
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  46. added 2016-11-10
    William T. Lynch (forthcoming). Cultural Evolution and Social Epistemology: A Darwinian Alternative to Steve Fuller’s Theodicy of Science. Social Epistemology:1-11.
    Key to Steve Fuller’s recent defense of intelligent design is the claim that it alone can explain why science is even possible. By contrast, Fuller argues that Darwinian evolutionary theory posits a purposeless universe leaving humans with no motivation to study science and no basis for modifying an underlying reality. I argue that this view represents a retreat from insights about knowledge within Fuller’s own program of social epistemology. I argue for a Darwinian picture of science as a product of (...)
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  47. added 2016-11-10
    Michael R. Starks (2016). The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein & Searle.
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem (...)
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  48. added 2016-11-09
    Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and Global Vs. Local Skepticism. Philosophia:1-15.
    In this paper, I argue that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a metaphysically necessary condition for the possibility of Y,” must be grounded in considerations of conceivability and possibility. More explicitly, the Transcendental Premise is based on what Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, p. 2) call the “conceivability-possibility (or inconceivability-impossibility) move.” This “inconceivability-impossibility” move, however, is a problematic argumentative move when advancing transcendental arguments (...)
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  49. added 2016-11-08
    Adam Leite, Why Moore Matters.
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
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  50. added 2016-11-08
    Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming). Contextualism About Epistemic Reasons. In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge
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