Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
209 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 209
  1. added 2018-08-16
    Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Mind.
    Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to the possibility of defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual effect, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. added 2018-08-15
    Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Belief: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, it has proved puzzling how higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order defeat seems to defy being understood in terms of conditionalization; and higher-order defeat can sometimes place agents in what seem like epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. added 2018-08-15
    Knowledge From Scientific Expert Testimony Without Epistemic Trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper we address the question of how it can be possible for a non-expert to acquire justified true belief from expert testimony. We discuss reductionism and epistemic trust as theoretical approaches to answer this question and present a novel solution that avoids major problems of both theoretical options: Performative Expert Testimony (PET). PET draws on a functional account of expertise insofar as it takes the expert’s visibility as a good informant capable to satisfy informational needs as equally important (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. added 2018-08-15
    Derivative Differential Responsibility: A Reply to Peels.Benjamin Rossi - 2018 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):139-151.
    At the heart of Rik Peels’s Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology is the idea that responsibility for belief ought to be understood on the model of responsibility for states of affairs that are subject to our influence but not under our intentional control, or what he calls derivative responsibility. In this article, I argue that reflection on the nature and scope of derivative responsibility reveals important lacunae in Peels’s account of responsible belief and his account of responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. added 2018-08-15
    Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. added 2018-08-14
    The Instability of John Rawls’s “Stability for the Right Reasons”.Hun Chung - forthcoming - Episteme.
    John Rawls’s most mature notion of political order is “stability for the right reasons.” Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of “stability for the right reasons.” Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non- compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. added 2018-08-14
    Troubles with Bayesianism: An Introduction to the Psychological Immune System.Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    A Bayesian mind is, at its core, a rational mind. Bayesianism is thus well-suited to predict and explain mental processes that best exemplify our ability to be rational. However, evidence from belief acquisition and change appears to show that we do not acquire and update information in a Bayesian way. Instead, the principles of belief acquisition and updating seem grounded in maintaining a psychological immune system rather than in approximating a Bayesian processor.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. added 2018-08-13
    Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - Apeiron.
    The Pyrrhonist’s argumentative practice is characterized by at least four features. First, he makes a therapeutic use of arguments: he employs arguments that differ in their persuasiveness in order to cure his dogmatic patients of the distinct degrees of conceit and rashness that afflict them. Secondly, his arguments are for the most part dialectical: when offering an argument to oppose it to another argument advanced by a given dogmatist, he accepts in propria persona neither the truth of its premises and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. added 2018-08-11
    Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
    There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. added 2018-08-11
    Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper examines three reasons to think that Craig's genealogy of the concept of knowledge is incompatible with knowledge-first epistemology and finds that far from being incompatible with it, the genealogy lends succour to it. This reconciliation turns on two ideas. First, the genealogy is not history, but a dynamic model of needs. Second, by recognising the continuity of Craig's genealogy with Williams's genealogy of truthfulness, we can see that while both genealogies start out from specific needs explaining what drives (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. added 2018-08-11
    Del cartesianismo de Quine hacia el giro epistemológico intersubjetivo.Diana Couto - 2018 - In L. Valls, A. Meléndez, B. Fernández & A. L. Batalla (eds.), Nuevas tendencias en la Filosofía Contemporánea. Valencia, España: pp. 21-43.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. added 2018-08-11
    The Jury's Still Out on What Constitutes a Microaggression.Musa Al-Gharbi - 2018 - In Gary Weiner (ed.), Microaggressions, Trigger Warnings & Safe Spaces. Farmington Hills, Michigan: Greenhaven Press. pp. 106-13.
    In "Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence," Scott Lillenfeld argues that, despite a decade of scholarship, the Microaggression Research Program (MRP) continues to suffer serious analytic and evidentiary problems. After walking through these shortcomings, he provides 18 suggestions to help improve the reliability and utility of the MRP. In "Microaggressions and 'Evidence': Experimental or Experiential Reality?" Derald Wing Sue responds. This chapter provides background on the origin of the MRP, and referees the dispute between Lillenfeld and Sue about its contemporary status.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. added 2018-08-11
    Race and the Race for the White House: On Social Research in the Age of Trump.Musa Al-Gharbi - 2018 - American Sociologist 32.
    As it became clear that Donald Trump had a real base of political support, even as analysts consistently underestimated his electoral prospects, they grew increasingly fascinated with the question of who was supporting him (and why). However, researchers have also tended to hold strong negative opinions about Trump, and have approached research with uncharitable priors about the kind of person who would support him and what they would be motivated by. This essay presents a series of case studies showing how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. added 2018-08-10
    Diagramming Evolution: The Case of Darwin's Trees.Greg Priest - forthcoming - Endeavour.
    From his earliest student days through the writing of his last book, Charles Darwin drew diagrams. In developing his evolutionary ideas, his preferred form of diagram was the tree. An examination of several of Darwin’s trees—from sketches in a private notebook from the late 1830s through the diagram published in the Origin—opens a window onto the role of diagramming in Darwin’s scientific practice. In his diagrams, Darwin simultaneously represented both observable patterns in nature and conjectural narratives of evolutionary history. He (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. added 2018-08-10
    Framing Causal Questions About the Past: The Cambrian Explosion as Case Study.Greg Priest - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 63:55-63.
    About 540 million years ago, a rapid radiation of animal phyla radically changed the Earth’s biota in a geological eye-blink. What caused this “Cambrian explosion”? Over the years, paleontologists have pointed to a wide array of different physical mechanisms as the causal “trigger” for the explosion. More recently, some paleontologists have proposed complex causal pathways to which multiple physical mechanisms are said to have contributed. Despite their variety, these answers share an assumption that a single explanation can in principle be (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. added 2018-08-10
    Wahrscheinlichkeit und Erkenntnis.Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2013 - In Thomas Bonk (ed.), Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. added 2018-08-09
    Knowledge, Justification, and (a Sort of) Safe Belief.Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - Synthese.
    An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substantive proposals concerning knowledge and justification.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. added 2018-08-09
    Strong Internalism, Doxastic Involuntarism, and the Costs of Compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluations—evaluations of what we ought to believe or may not believe. Some philosophers endorse strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology on which agents can always access what determines the deontic status of their beliefs and degrees of belief. This paper articulates a new challenge for strong internalist versions of epistemic deontology. Any version of epistemic deontology must face William Alston’s argument. Alston combined a broadly voluntarist conception (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. added 2018-08-09
    We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.Ulf Hlobil - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. added 2018-08-07
    Review of Wedgwood, The Value of Rationality[REVIEW]Ali Hasan - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 20188.
  21. added 2018-08-07
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: Hume on Mental Representation and Intentionality.Jonathan Cottrell - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (8):e12520.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. added 2018-08-06
    The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. added 2018-08-06
    The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding.Fabio Sterpetti - 2018 - In David Danks & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), Building Theories. Heuristics and Hypotheses in Sciences. Cham:
    There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some authors (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. added 2018-08-06
    Wittgensteinian contextualism against epistemic relativism.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - APRIORI. Серия: Гуманитарные науки 5:1-37.
  25. added 2018-08-05
    The Bohr and Einstein Debate - Copenhagen Interpretation Challenged.Rochelle Marianne Forrester - unknown
    The Bohr Einstein debate on the meaning of quantum physics involved Einstein inventing a series of thought experiments to challenge the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. Einstein disliked many aspects of the Copenhagen Interpretation especially its idea of an observer dependent universe. Bohr was able to answer all Einstein’s objections to the Copenhagen Interpretation and so is usually considered as winning the debate. However the debate has continued into the present time as many scientists have been unable to accept the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. added 2018-08-04
    Val Dusek' Philosophy of Technology (Arabic Translation of the Introduction and Chapters III and IV) فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق.Salah Osman - manuscript
    فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق، في إطار مشروع لترجمة الكتاب بالكامل بالاشتراك مع آخرين.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. added 2018-08-04
    Agential Insensitivity and Socially Supported Ignorance.Lauren Woomer - forthcoming - Episteme.
    In this paper, I identify a form of epistemic insensitivity that occurs when someone fails to make proper use of the epistemic tools at their disposal in order to bring their beliefs in line with epistemically relevant evidence that is available to them. I call this kind of insensitivity agential insensitivity because it stems from the epistemic behavior of an individual agent. Agential insensitivity can manifest as a failure to either attend to relevant and available evidence, or appropriately interpret evidence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. added 2018-08-04
    Knowledge Transfer in Theoretical Ecology: Implications for Incommensurability, Voluntarism, and Pluralism.Justin Donhauser & Jamie Shaw - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    Well-known epistemologies of science have implications for how best to understand knowledge transfer (KT). Yet, to date, no serious attempt has been made explicate these particular implications. This paper infers views about KT from two popular epistemologies; what we characterize as incommensurabilitist views (after Devitt 2001; Bird 2002, 2008; Sankey and Hoyningen-Huene 2013) and voluntarist views (after van Fraassen 1984; Dupré 2001; Chakravartty 2015). We argue views of the former sort define the methodological, ontological, and social conditions under which research (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. added 2018-08-03
    Looking for Collective Scientific Knowledge.Raul Hakli - forthcoming - Metascience:1-4.
    A book review of Susann Wagenknecht: A Social Epistemology of Research Groups, Palgrave, 2016.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. added 2018-08-03
    Informative Ecological Models Without Ecological Forces.Justin Donhauser - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Sagoff (2016) criticizes widely used “theoretical” methods in ecology; arguing that those methods employ models that rely on problematic metaphysical assumptions and are therefore uninformative and useless for practical decision-making. In this paper, I show that Sagoff misconstrues how such model-based methods work in practice, that the main threads of his argument are problematic, and that his substantive conclusions are consequently unfounded. Along the way, I illuminate several ways the model-based inferential methods he criticizes can be, and have been, usefully (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. added 2018-08-02
    The Virtue of Curiosity.Lewis Ross - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    A thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. added 2018-07-31
    The Limits of Stanley and Williamson’s Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy (AO):1-30.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson's take on Ryle's argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle's argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson's purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson's reconstruction of Ryle's argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduce extraneous elements: I examine what they regard as additional assumptions needed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. added 2018-07-31
    Early Pyrrhonism as a Sect of Buddhism? A Case Study in the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy.Monte Ransome Johnson & Brett Shults - 2018 - Comparative Philosophy 9 (2):1-40.
    We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press, entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. In making (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. added 2018-07-30
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. added 2018-07-30
    The Case of Fuller Vs Kuhn.Steve Fuller - 2004 - Social Epistemology 18 (1):3-49.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. added 2018-07-29
    Testimony and Children’s Acquisition of Number Concepts.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge. Approaches from Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science. London, UK: pp. 172-186.
    An enduring puzzle in philosophy and developmental psychology is how young children acquire number concepts, in particular the concept of natural number. Most solutions to this problem conceptualize young learners as lone mathematicians who individually reconstruct the successor function and other sophisticated mathematical ideas. In this chapter, I argue for a crucial role of testimony in children’s acquisition of number concepts, both in the transfer of propositional knowledge (e.g., the cardinality concept), and in knowledge-how (e.g., the counting routine).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. added 2018-07-29
    To Infer Liberalism From Value Pluralism.Jinzhou Ye - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (4):663-688.
    Robert Talisse charges as doomed the Berlinian effort to infer liberal politics from value pluralism, based on the observation that it unavoidably vio- lates Hume’s law and that the two in fact clash in their basic logic. In arriving at this diagnosis, however, Talisse relies on several problematic assumptions about practical reasoning as well as about value pluralism and liberalism. As a result, he fails to appreciate the practical nature of practical reasoning and also fails to see the negative aspects (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. added 2018-07-29
    ‘Interview’, Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions.Luc Bovens - 2010 - In Vincent Hendricks & Alan Hajek (eds.), Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions. XX: Automatic Press. pp. 13-28.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. added 2018-07-29
    Interview: Epistemology: 5 Questions.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemology: 5 Questions. XX: Automatic Press. pp. 47-61.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. added 2018-07-28
    Modeling the Invention of a New Inference Rule: The Case of ‘Randomized Clinical Trial’ as an Argument Scheme for Medical Science.Jodi Schneider & Sally Jackson - 2018 - Argument and Computation 9 (2):77-89.
    A background assumption of this paper is that the repertoire of inference schemes available to humanity is not fixed, but subject to change as new schemes are invented or refined and as old ones are obsolesced or abandoned. This is particularly visible in areas like health and environmental sciences, where enormous societal investment has been made in finding ways to reach more dependable conclusions. Computational modeling of argumentation, at least for the discourse in expert fields, will require the possibility of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. added 2018-07-27
    Real World Problems.L. A. Paul & John Quiggin - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):363-382.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. added 2018-07-26
    Is Knowledge of Causes Sufficient for Understanding?Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. added 2018-07-26
    Inductive Knowledge.Andrew Bacon - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper formulates some paradoxes of inductive knowledge. Two responses in particular are explored: According to the first sort of theory, one is able to know in advance that certain observations will not be made unless a law exists. According to the other, this sort of knowledge is not available until after the observations have been made. Certain natural assumptions, such as the idea that the observations are just as informative as each other, the idea that they are independent, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. added 2018-07-26
    Review of What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy BY Maddy Penelope. [REVIEW]Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    It is worth noting that Maddy oversimplifies the history of Gettierology, for a lot of epistemologists who work on the Gettier Problem do not engage in analysing the concept of knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. added 2018-07-26
    Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter? Color-Blindness and Epistemic Injustice.Ashley Atkins - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-22.
    ABSTRACTThose who take ‘All lives matter’ to oppose ‘Black lives matter’ take the latter to mean something like ‘Only black lives matter.’ Those who regard this exclusionary construal as mistaken hold the error to be due to an ideology of color-blindness. It has further been argued that the ideologically-motivated suppression of racial discourse has resulted in an epistemic injustice, blinding objectors to the fact that ‘Black lives matter’ really means ‘Black lives matter, too’. I will argue that attempts to make (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. added 2018-07-25
    Understanding the Progress of Science.C. D. McCoy - manuscript
    This paper develops a problem-solving account of scientific progress that takes understanding as the principal epistemic aim of science. It examines a recent paper of Bird's on scientific progress, argues for the primacy of understanding over knowledge in this context, illustrates the account using a Kuhnian picture of science, and defends it against knowledge reductionism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. added 2018-07-25
    Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I argue against a dispositional account of the intentionality of belief states that has been endorsed by proponents of phenomenal intentionality. Specifically, I argue that the best characterization of a dispositional account of intentionality is one that takes beliefs to be dispositions to undergo occurrent judgments. I argue that there are cases where an agent believes that p, but fails to have a disposition to judge that p.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. added 2018-07-25
    Grit.Sarah Paul & Jennifer Morton - forthcoming - Ethics.
    Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit." Philosophers have had little to say about grit, however, insofar as it differs from more familiar notions of willpower or continence. This leaves us ill-equipped to assess the social and moral implications of promoting grit. We propose that grit has an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. added 2018-07-25
    Believing in Others.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):75-95.
    Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. added 2018-07-24
    Safety in Sosa.John Greco - forthcoming - Synthese:1-11.
    What is the relationship between virtue and safety? This paper argues that Sosa’s positions in A Virtue Epistemology and in Judgment and Agency regarding this question are, despite appearances to the contrary, in fact consistent. Moreover, Sosa’s position there is well motivated—his Virtue Epistemology explains why knowledge should require apt belief, and why aptness should imply safety. Finally, the paper shows how two kinds of safety are importantly related to Sosa’s response to the Pyrrhonian Problematic. Specifically, reflections on the modal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 209