Epistemology

Edited by Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia, Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
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  1. added 2018-10-15
    Rethinking the Epistemic Case Against Epistocracy.Udit Bhatia - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-26.
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  2. added 2018-10-15
    Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-15
    Self and Social Relations.Matthew Whittingham - 2018 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book is concerned with the human individual and her relationship with the communities of which she is a member. It argues against the traditional atomistic view that individuals are essentially independent of the social relations into which they enter, and instead argues for the holistic view that we are essentially social beings who cannot exist apart from normative communities. -/- Matthew Whittingham engages in a sustained exploration and criticism of the classic Western picture of epistemology. He argues instead that (...)
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  4. added 2018-10-15
    Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something (...)
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  5. added 2018-10-15
    Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji.Paweł Zięba - 2016 - Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111.
    This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...)
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  6. added 2018-10-13
    Under What Conditions May Western Science and Indigenous Knowledge Be Jointly Used and What Does This Really Entail? Insights From a Western Perspectivist Stance.Fulvio Mazzocchi - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-13.
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  7. added 2018-10-12
    Epistemology Without Intuition.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53.
    From Plato to present, intuition plays a central role in epistemology. My concern in this paper is with the nature and epistemic status on intuition. To that end, I will be reviewing both Bealer’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of intuition. I will be arguing that by ‘intuition’ Bealer understands modal intuition that has Platonic and metaphysical roles. Subsequently, I shall also show that although Wittgenstein’s view avoids these two issues, it amounts to the idea that intuition is a normative activity with (...)
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  8. added 2018-10-12
    Deconstructing Climate Misinformation to Identify Reasoning Errors.John Cook, Dave Kinkead & Peter Ellerton - 2018 - Environmental Research Letters 3.
    Misinformation can have significant societal consequences. For example, misinformation about climate change has confused the public and stalled support for mitigation policies. When people lack the expertise and skill to evaluate the science behind a claim, they typically rely on heuristics such as substituting judgment about something complex (i.e. climate science) with judgment about something simple (i.e. the character of people who speak about climate science) and are therefore vulnerable to misleading information. Inoculation theory offers one approach to effectively neutralize (...)
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  9. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Mind.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations have recently emerged in its favor. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form, ‘If I don’t know it, p.’ Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
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  10. added 2018-10-11
    Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - New York City, New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...)
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  11. added 2018-10-09
    A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality, and Reasons.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - Manuscrito.
    In this paper, I present a brief (and more than a little potted) history of the concepts of reason, rationality, reasonableness, and reasons in modern European philosophy and consider whether this history might support the "Anscombean" conclusion that, "The concepts of rationality and reasons ought to jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of psychology and philosophy which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it.".
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  12. added 2018-10-08
    Higher-Order Defeat and Intellectual Responsibility.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been (...)
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  13. added 2018-10-08
    Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
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  14. added 2018-10-08
    Desiring to Understand.Jennifer K. Uleman - 2018 - ArtForum 2018 (August 16).
    Jennifer Uleman on the phenomenology and reality of reason.
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  15. added 2018-10-07
    Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Suppressed Disagreement.Katherine Furman - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-13.
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  16. added 2018-10-07
    Nearly Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):16-21.
    This is a reply to Chris Tweed's recent attempt to solve the problem of "nearly convergent knowledge" and thus defend a binary account of knowledge against a contrastivist alternative. Ingenuous as his proposal is, it still does not solve the problem.
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  17. added 2018-10-06
    Object Reidentification and the Epistemic Role of Attention.Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Ratio 31 (4).
    Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner (...)
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  18. added 2018-10-06
    Standard Bearers.David Sosa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):329-341.
    In both ethics and epistemology an important question is whether justification is a fully internal or a partly external matter. In view of analogies between relevant considerations in each area, I recommend distinguishing, as basic and independent subjects of normative status, (i) people and (ii) what they do. Evaluations of subjects, on one hand, and of their beliefs and actions, on the other, are less intimately related than is presupposed. This helps resolve internalism/externalism controversies in both domains. An important related (...)
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  19. added 2018-10-06
    Postures et Pratiques de L'homme: Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise.Jordanco Sekulovski - 2013 - Paris, France: L'Harmattan.
    POSTURES ET PRATIQUES DE L'HOMME Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise Jordanco SEKULOVSKI Nous, les sans-philosophie ASIE Japon -/- La philosophie véhicule des distinctions dualistes dont la conflictualité affaiblit gravement notre sentiment de solidarité humaine ; affronter la philosophie sur son propre terrain mène à une impasse, toute objection à son règne métaphysique devant, pour être reçue, se formuler dans les termes mêmes de la métaphysique... Il s'agit donc de changer de terrain, ou de chemin... L'auteur s'appuie sur le kâta (...)
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  20. added 2018-10-05
    Explicating Objectual Understanding: Taking Degrees Seriously.Christoph Baumberger - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie.
    The paper argues that an account of understanding should take the form of a Carnapian explication and acknowledge that understanding comes in degrees. An explication of objectual understanding is defended, which helps to make sense of the cognitive achievements and goals of science. The explication combines a necessary condition with three evaluative dimensions: An epistemic agent understands a subject matter by means of a theory only if the agent commits herself sufficiently to the theory of the subject matter, and to (...)
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  21. added 2018-10-05
    The Proper Work of the Intellect.Nick Treanor - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is at heart two distinct goals that are in tension (...)
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  22. added 2018-10-05
    Does "Think" Mean the Same Thing as "Believe"? Insights Into Religious Cognition.Larisa Heiphetz, Casey Landers & Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Psychology of Religion and Spirituality.
    When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...)
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  23. added 2018-10-05
    Review of Avner Baz, The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nat Hansen - forthcoming - Mind.
    This is the second book by Baz that aims to show that a big chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. His first book, When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (2012) adopted a therapeutic approach (in the Wittgensteinian style) to problems in contemporary epistemology, arguing that when properly thought through, the way philosophers talk about ‘knowing’ that something is the case ultimately does not make sense. Baz’s goal in his second book is less therapeutic and (...)
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  24. added 2018-10-05
    Denken over liefde hoeft geen schrik aan te jagen.Hanne De Jaegher - 2018 - Antwerp, Belgium: Letterwerk.
    Wat gebeurt er allemaal in relaties? -/- We raken gefrustreerd wanneer een vriend niet terugbelt. We missen een geliefde die ver weg is. We komen elkaar tegen op straat. We vrijen. We voelen ons eenzaam. Soms terwijl we vrijen. -/- We voelen ons diep met iemand verbonden. We verwachten veel. We doen ons best om niet te veel te verwachten. Soms lukt dat, en dan kunnen we elkaar echt ontmoeten. -/- Dit boek gaat over de spanningen die in elke relatie (...)
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  25. added 2018-10-04
    Higher-Order Uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.
    You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. I defend three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is (...)
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  26. added 2018-10-04
    "Peer Disagreement" and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.
    What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer's disagreement is itself evidence against one's belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to adjust one's belief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up with depends, in part, on (...)
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  27. added 2018-10-04
    Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
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  28. added 2018-10-04
    Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.
    Many epistemologists have endorsed a version of the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, even a fully rational belief state can be defeated by (sufficiently strong) misleading higher-order evidence, which indicates that the belief state is irrational. In a recent paper, however, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) calls this view into doubt. Her argument proceeds in two stages. First, she argues that higher-order defeat calls for a two-tiered theory of epistemic rationality. Secondly, she argues that (...)
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  29. added 2018-10-04
    Instrumental Rationality Without Separability.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Erkenntnis.
    This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents' attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they may (...)
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  30. added 2018-10-04
    Metacognition as Evidence for Evidentialism.Matthew Frise - 2018 - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer. pp. 91-107.
    Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in ‘ordinary retrieval cases’, cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary (...)
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  31. added 2018-10-03
    Evidential Reasoning.Marcello Di Bello & Bart Verheij - 2018 - In G. Bongiovanni, G. Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 447-493.
    The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the nature of evidential reasoning, the characteristic difficulties encountered, and the tools to address these difficulties. Our focus is on evidential reasoning in criminal cases. There is an extensive scholarly literature on these topics, and it is a secondary aim of the chapter to provide readers the means to find their way in historical and ongoing debates.
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  32. added 2018-10-02
    Review of What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy BY Maddy Penelope. [REVIEW]Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    It is worth noting that Maddy oversimplifies the history of Gettierology, for a lot of epistemologists who work on the Gettier Problem do not engage in analysing the concept of knowledge.
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  33. added 2018-10-02
    Comments on Penelope Maddy’s What Do Philosophers Do?.Barry Stroud - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):223-230.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 223 - 230 I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, _What Do Philosophers Do?_ Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with _whether_ anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding _how_ we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in (...)
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  34. added 2018-10-02
    Introductory Overview.Penelope Maddy - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):193-197.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 193 - 197 This piece gives an overview of my book, _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_.
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  35. added 2018-10-02
    What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 198 - 207 The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_.
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  36. added 2018-10-02
    Replies to Coliva, Leite, and Stroud.Penelope Maddy - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):231-244.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 231 - 244 Here I cast some doubt on Professor Coliva’s interpretive claim that Moore’s “Proof of an external world” is addressed to idealism, not skepticism, and explore the consequences for our understanding of the final paragraphs of the paper. In response to Professor Leite, I examine the disagreement between us on whether the global skeptical hypotheses can be refuted by ordinary evidence. Finally, after analyzing the logic of the skeptical argumentation, I attempt (...)
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  37. added 2018-10-02
    The Plain Inquirer’s Plain Evidence Against the Global Skeptical Scenarios.Adam Leite - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):208-222.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...)
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  38. added 2018-10-01
    The Point of Moore's Proof.Charles Raff - manuscript
    The current standard interpretation of Moore’s proof assumes Moore offers a solution to Kant’s famously posed problem of an external world, which Moore quotes at the start of his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” As a solution to Kant’s problem, Moore’s proof fails utterly. Similarly, a second received interpretation imputes an aim of refuting metaphysical idealism that Moore’s proof does not at all achieve. This study departs from the received interpretations to credit Moore’s stated aim for the proof (...)
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  39. added 2018-10-01
    The Problem of Descartes's First Meditation and its Solution.Charles Raff - manuscript
    Descartes’s First Meditation imposes a pressing, currently neglected problem of reconciling its sound central argument that concludes that all the meditator’s current and currently prospective results are doubtful with subsequent Meditations’ results that are not at all doubtful. The problem cannot be addressed by received interpretations that fail to credit the First Meditation with a sound extended central argument; it cannot be solved by interpretations reliant on standard translations that obscure the Second Meditation’s opening argument. This study credits the First (...)
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  40. added 2018-10-01
    The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - forthcoming - Philosophia.
    Some philosophers have defended the idea that in cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence it is rational to take divergent doxastic attitudes to p and E supports p. In a recent paper, Sophie Horowitz has argued that such “Level-Splitting views” are implausible since they violate a rational requirement she calls the Non-Akrasia Constraint. In this paper, I argue that Horowitz’s objection is misguided since it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality.
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  41. added 2018-09-30
    The Corporation and the Epistemologist.Mihailis Diamantis - manuscript
    The line between guilt and innocence often turns on what a defendant knew. While the law’s approach to knowledge may be relatively straightforward for individuals, its doctrines for corporate defendants are fraught with ambiguity and opportunities for gamesmanship. Corporations can spread information thinly across employees so that it is never “known.” And prosecutors can exploit legal uncertainties to bring knowledge-based charges where corporations were merely negligent in how they handled information. While knowledge as a mens rea has unique practical and (...)
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  42. added 2018-09-30
    What Ignorance Really Is. Examining the Foundations of Epistemology of Ignorance.Nadja El Kassar - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-11.
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  43. added 2018-09-30
    Cajal: Key Psychological Factors in the Self-Construction of a Genius.Nuria Anaya-Reig - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-14.
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  44. added 2018-09-29
    Knowledge From Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
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  45. added 2018-09-29
    An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Symbolic Logic Volume 2: Informal Reasoning Assignments.Rebeka Ferreira & Anthony Ferrucci - 2018 - Open Educational Resource: OpenStax-CNX and Canvas Commons.
    This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...)
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  46. added 2018-09-28
    Bias.Daniel Moseley - forthcoming - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Following Kahneman and Tversky, I examine the term ‘bias’ as it is used to refer to systematic errors. Given the central role of error in this understanding of bias, it is helpful to consider what it is to err and to distinguish different kinds of error. I identify two main kinds of error, examine ethical issues that pertain to the relation of these types of error, and explain their moral significance. Next, I provide a four-level explanatory framework for understanding biases: (...)
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  47. added 2018-09-28
    Collective Amnesia and Epistemic Injustice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: pp. 195-219.
    Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness (...)
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  48. added 2018-09-27
    Gettier and Externalism.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem.
  49. added 2018-09-27
    Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat.
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  50. added 2018-09-27
    Unreasonable Selflessness.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Veritas 3 (61):492-502.
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