Equality

How should we think about public rioting for political ends? Might it ever be more than morally excusable behavior? In this essay, I show how political rioting can sometimes be positively morally justified as an intermediate defensive harm between civilly disobedient protest and political revolution. I do so by reading political rioters as, at the same time, uncivil and ultimately conciliatory with their state. Unlike civilly disobedient protestors, political rioters express a lack of faith in the value or applicability of (...) civility itself in interacting with the state under the political status quo. But unlike political revolutionaries who aim at separation from the state, political rioters paradigmatically seek fuller inclusion within it. By rejecting even the appearance of compliance with the political status quo’s systems of justice, political rioters can create a unique venue for systemically marginalized citizens to express warranted disrespect for the state that maintains them in ongoing subjection, as well as their inviolable respect for themselves as persons with dignity beyond the boundaries of civility. (shrink)

Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) discussed the main issues of the science of kalām in the first period and expressed his best views on these issues in response to the sects that he accepted as bid'ah (innovation). Later, kalām scholars tried to justify these views by using different arguments according to the changing conditions and time. Undoubtedly, one of the most important opinions that Abū Ḥanīfa expressed and passed on to the next generations from the perspective of the science of kalām (...) is those related to faith. In fact, faith is the strongest and most deep-rooted bond a believer establishes with his/her Creator. The individual shapes his world and the hereafter through this bond. On the other hand, faith is a phenomenon that does not contain doubt but carries certainty. In this respect, a person is included in the same category as a believer after she has firmly believed, and is called a believer or a Muslim, as the Qur'an puts it. Because no matter what race or color he is, he takes the same name because he believes in the same principles. Abū Ḥanīfa, who lived in a time when Muslims differed among themselves and differences of opinion increased, accepted faith as a common denominator by emphasizing the common values of Islam. Abū Ḥanīfa refers to this as "equality in faith". The issue of equality in faith, which is discussed as a result of the differentiation in matters related to the nature of faith, is shaped according to whether the action is counted as part of faith or not. Since Abū Ḥanīfa did not consider deeds a part of faith, so he advocated equality in faith. This view was adopted later by many scholars in the Māturīdī tradition. In the Hanafī-Māturīdī tradition, it can be said that the issue of equality in faith as well as issues such as confirmation and certainty in faith were shaped by the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfa. When equality in faith is accepted, one is not allowed to question the faith of another and say that his/her own faith is superior to the other because only God can know it. On the other hand, the understanding of equality in faith prevents external appearance and formalism from being decisive in one's religious life. Thus, a believer cannot accuse his brother who has deficiencies in his deeds but has faith of being infidel. When Abū Ḥanīfa's view of equality in faith is interpreted according to contemporary paradigms, his emphasis on human love, tolerance, and unity of the ummah, which has validity today, can clearly be observed. Therefore, it is seen that the reflection of a theological issue on social life is stressed in his opinion. This paper aims to study the issue of "equality in faith", one of the issues related to faith, and its reflection on social life by using the texts which are attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa. (shrink)

There is lively debate on the question if states have legitimate authority to enforce the exclusion of (would-be) immigrants. Against common belief, I argue that even non- cosmopolitan liberals have strong reason to be sceptical of much contemporary border authority. To do so, I first establish that for liberals, broadly defined, a state can only hold legitimate authority over persons whose moral equality it is not engaged in undermining. I then reconstruct empirical cases from the sphere of international relations in (...) which what I call ‘colonial norms’ continue to play significant structuring roles. I argue that it is sometimes only by unveiling these colonial norms and the roles they play that we can understand how some states today culpably contribute to undermining the moral equality of persons over whom they will come to claim immigration-related authority. I thus contend that paying attention to colonial norms distinctly enables us to reveal a set of instances in which all liberals should agree that states forfeit legitimate authority over would-be immigrants. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper argues that there is a neglected democratic challenge for policy-relevant social science that existing accounts of the relationship between science and democracy fail to address. It is widely acknowledged that policy-relevant social science is value-laden in a number of ways. To reconcile this with democracy, it has been proposed that the values that enter social science need to be democratically aligned or legitimated in some way to guard against a democratically problematic technocracy. But where the value judgements that (...) need to be made are especially contentious, and persistent disagreement can be expected, this response may not address the danger of a kind of epistemic inequality that I will argue is also problematic on democratic grounds: the epistemic inequality that arises when social scientific results concerning matters of public interest are more relevant, usable and trustworthy for the subset of the population that shares the value judgements made in the research than for the subset of the population that doesn't. A value pluralist approach, in contrast, can help ensure epistemic equality. I will thus argue that if and where greater value pluralism is feasible in social science without undermining other important values, it is clearly desirable on democratic grounds. The measurement of value-laden social scientific indicators, such as measures of the cost of living or wellbeing, will serve as an example of a domain where greater pluralism is both especially desirable and feasible. (shrink)

While recent scholarship has argued for the utility of W. E. B. Du Bois’s thought for democratic theory, his career-long emphasis on the problem of social equality—and the solution of self-conscious manhood—has gone largely unnoticed. In this article, I argue that while Du Bois’s emphasis on social equality powerfully situates racial oppression as a social and epistemic problem, his solution of self-conscious manhood paradoxically reproduces the very conditions of social inequality he seeks to combat. Open to people of all races, (...) genders, and classes, the path of self-conscious manhood consists in radical truth-telling, a free anarchy of the spirit, a will to strive and act, and the purity of isolation. However, through a close reading of Du Bois’s biographies, editorials, and fiction, I show that self-conscious manhood centers an exclusionary and atomized ethic of self-creation rather than producing a democratic political and social order. (shrink)

Elections are generally considered the only way to create a democratic legislature where direct democracy is not an option. However, in recent years that assumption has been challenged by individuals who claim that lotteries are a democratic way of selecting people for office, elections are aristocratic or oligarchic, not democratic, and that elections as we know them are inadequate if true democracy is prioritized. In opposition to this wave, my paper argues that the assertions made to support the democratic merits (...) of lotteries are unpersuasive. Current evidence that sortition is either more egalitarian or produces epistemically better results than elections is poor. Instead, these assertions illuminate the importance of elections in enabling the constituents of a democracy to reconcile the personal and political dimensions of their lives and, therefore, better reflect citizens’ claims to privacy and equality. The paper begins by recapping the main arguments for treating sortition as a democratic way to select a legislature, outlines their deficiencies, and then turns to what these perceived failings actually suggest about the democratic value of elections. (shrink)

This paper explores Kant's account of marriage and its relevance to contemporary debates over same-sex marriage. Kant's defense of marriage is read against debates unfolding in Prussia in the 1790s, when the question of whether marriage was a "universal estate" was a central point of debate surrounding the Prussian Legal Code of 1794. By reading Kant's arguments in light of this historical context, and in comparison with those offered by his contemporaries, Fichte and von Hippel, this article shows both that (...) the debates about marriage in the 1790s mirror contemporary tensions, and that Kant took a "middle path" that innovatively defended marriage as a basic feature of the state. (shrink)

Presents Judith Butler's interest in plurality of bodily lives and her search for a social transformation conducive to a more livable world Offers a novel understanding of Butler’ work as a call for an insurrection at the level of the real Provides a framework based on an intersection of four main pillar-concepts, performativity, agency, livable life and non-violence Reads Butler’s philosophy as centred on bodies Reads Butler’s work as a convincing counter-argument against liberal versions of ontology This book is the (...) only monograph-length study of the work of Judith Butler to focus on the entire scope of her work, including the last decade of her writing. In light of these texts, it presents a fresh interpretation of Butler’s political thought, oriented by the idea of an insurrection at the level of the real. -/- Chapters on ontology, performativity, agency and precariousness, a liveable life and non-violence explain how Butler’s thought has always been focused on embodied performances. Instead of seeing Butler as simply a thinker of the subversive performance of cultural scripts, the book frames her work for the twenty-first century as an ambitious and coherent egalitarian alternative to liberal political philosophy. -/- Each chapter introduces a Butlerian concept, clarifying this in the context of critical debates, while explaining its contribution to a new social ontology whose key normative principle is a liveable life. The book explores the potential of this conceptual framework not just in relation to the politics of gender, but also to questions of social inequality, structural violence and the experience of precarity. Designed for both researchers and students, it provides a comprehensive way of accessing what is radically original about this crucial political theorist. (shrink)

The paper explores the logical structure of Rawlsian justice principles in order to see whether their justificatory or explanatory conditions are unproblematic. To facilitate this purpose, drawing on readers of Rawls, the author shows that the Aristotelian principle is used to explain the principles of rational choice, particularly the principle of inclusiveness. Then, on the basis of the Aristotelian principle, Rawls justifies his conclusion, via the principles of rational choice and the theory of primary goods. After figuring out the logical (...) structure of justice as fairness, the author deals with the central objective of the paper, where he exposes some problems suffered by the motivational basis of the principles of justice. The foundation on which Rawls grounds his principles of justice is problematic, and consequently, they remain as matters of contention as of today. (shrink)

Shavelson et al. (2023) raise the familiar question of parity or fairness in the assisted dying1 debate: if we legally permit the practice for one person, should we not permit everyone similarly si...

The Moral Equality Account of Hypocrisy (ME) is a prominent theory of why hypocrites lack moral standing to blame. Hypocrites make exceptions for themselves and thereby implicitly deny moral equality, which is an essential premise of moral standing to blame. ME has recently faced challenges from philosophers who deny that it is the hypocrite’s rejection of moral equality that causes her to lose moral standing to blame. I have distinguished three main challenges which I discuss and rebut in this article: (...) “The Internal Blame and Blame of Fictional Characters Challenge”, which I attribute to Todd ( 2019 ), and “The Hypercrite Challenge” and “The Inegalitarian Norm Challenge”, which are due to Lippert-Rasmussen ( 2021 ). The article begins by offering an account of ME. It fills in a few gaps in the theory, by explaining why it is necessary for a blamer to invoke a special right to blame and by determining the type of right that standing to blame is. It also distinguishes between the question of why hypocrisy is wrong or bad, and the question of why it undermines moral standing to blame. I hold that several theories provide plausible answers to the first question, but only ME has so far given a good answer to the second question. When distinguishing properly between these two questions, we see that ME can respond satisfactorily to the three challenges. (shrink)

Individuals with ‘severe’ cognitive disabilities are primarily discussed in philosophy and bioethics to determine their moral status. In this paper it is argued that theories of moral status have limited relevance to the unjust ways in which people with cognitive disabilities are routinely treated in the actual world, which largely concerns their relegation to an inferior social status. I discuss three possible relationships between moral and social status, demonstrating that determinate answers about the moral status of individuals with ‘severe’ cognitive (...) disabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient for defending the imperative that they be treated as our social equals. (shrink)

This presentation will introduce my doctrinal and socio-legal doctoral thesis, which is understood to be the first doctoral thesis on the subject of Law as it relates to Deaf people in the UK and possibly internationally, exploring the possible solutions to the conflict between equality law (which categorises Deaf people as disabled) and the Deaf identity, and how its findings contribute to the development of Deaf Legal Theory, originally penned by Bryan and Emery. Bryan and Emery argue that for Deaf (...) jurisprudence to develop, the current underpinnings of law are based on incomplete assumptions which need to be exposed. Thus, I will attempt to expose equality law’s incomplete assumptions of Deaf people, and how this exposure contributes to the development of Deaf Legal Theory. At present, equality law on a domestic, European and international level currently provides Deaf people with human rights and protects them from discrimination. However, with the limited exception of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), these rights are given to Deaf individuals as disabled individuals, rather than as Deaf individuals. This is essentially what I refer to as the ‘Deaf Legal Dilemma.’ The British Deaf Association espouses that “equality is what it stands for”, and on the international stage, the World Federation of the Deaf highlights that one of its most important priorities in its work is to ensure human rights for Deaf people all over the world, in every aspect of life. Thus, it would appear that what Deaf people want above all is equality. There is no initial agreement among scholars as to what the important questions are, and McIntyre J, speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia remarked that “more than any of the rights and freedoms, [equality] lacks precise definition”. Nonetheless, I have attempted to make sense of equality law, and relying on Westen’s precepts of equality and McLachlin’s “emerging rocks of certainty,” present three categories of equality: formal, substantive and transformative, within which the various concepts of equality can be categorised accordingly. It is clear from this exercise that transformative equality is the most appropriate approach for Deaf people to achieve equality in their own right as Deaf individuals rather than as disabled individuals. Having established which approaches to equality law are most relevant to Deaf people, a doctrinal approach is to be undertaken with regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention for Human Rights, the Equality Act 2010 and the UNCRPD, as well as the British Sign Language (Scotland) Act 2015, to establish their main provisions that apply to Deaf people and a critique of each in relation to the Deaf identity, and other factors such as enforcement mechanisms. Initial findings as to the potential solutions to the Deaf Legal Dilemma in relation to equality law at present are wider use of the CRPD, the widening of the social model of disability, sign language recognition, and/or reverting to the social welfare model. (shrink)

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position (...) is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in itsCitizens Uniteddecision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (HarperandBryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law. (shrink)

The article examines the relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim. Based on this examination, a justification for criminal punishment is proposed. It is argued that crime violates thea prioriequality of constituent boundaries and of infinite human value between the wrongdoer and the victim. Criminal punishment re-equalizes respective boundaries and infinite human value. To develop this argument, the article observes how subject-subject boundaries are essential for the formation of separateness between subjects - separateness which is recognized and acknowledged by them (...) in a cooperative process. The article further discusses the value of boundaries and the significance of theira prioriequality in every human relationship. It then shows how crime, which is intrusion of the victim’s boundaries, works to demolish the victim’s self-recognizing separateness and hence to create inequality in the parties’ value. Last, the article demonstrates that only punishment can reset the relationship between the parties and re-equate their (still infinite) human value in the relationship. (shrink)

The Anthropocene stresses existing inequalities among humans and human communities, broadens the scope of these questions across time, space, species, and the rest of nature, and emerges as an epoch in which the concept of ‘equivalence’ is in crisis. This article first considers intra-human inequality, sketching the genesis of environmental and climate justice movements before indicating certain conceptual problems with equity in international climate diplomacy. Focus then shifts to measures of inequality and criticism of the dominant economic model that assumes (...) that all values can be monetized. Insofar as questions of inequality remain concentrated on humans, such concerns, however important, do not measure up to the rift in orders of scale that the Anthropocene brings about. A politics of the Anthropocene oriented to climate justice will have to negotiate the incommensurable scales that define the epoch. (shrink)

In this article I address differences between myself and Uwe Steinhoff in relation to the moral principle of reciprocity and its implications for the doctrine of the moral equality of combatants. Whereas I agree with Steinhoff that there is a principle of reciprocity in play in war, contra Steinhoff, I suggest that this principle and, indeed, moral principles of reciprocity more generally, are particularist principles, although if conventionalised or given legal status they can assume a generalised form. Moreover, I also (...) hold that there is a moral difference between those fighting a just war and those fighting an unjust war and this difference, taken in conjunction with the moral equality of combatants doctrine, generates a degree of moral complexity that seems to have gone unrecognised by Steinhoff (and, for that matter, by the two dominant schools of thought in this area, revisionists and Walzerians). (shrink)

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status‐conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of (...) moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude‐based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status‐holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter. (shrink)

When generally applicable rules clash with one’s cultural, religious or moral commitments, should exemptions be granted? The debate on exemptions raises the question both of what it means to treat people equally and of what it means to protect diversity adequately. The objective of this paper is to defend the no-exemption argument and to make it a more attractive position for liberals. I first argue that exemptions violate the principle of equal treatment because they rely on distinctions that cannot be (...) neutrally justified. I then argue that diversity can be adequately accommodated if we use a more demanding interpretation of the justification of generally applicable rules. There should be no exemption to fully justified rules, but rules are only fully justified when the particular demands that they impose on individuals are justified, i.e. when they are either neutral or pass both a Necessity Test and a Sufficiency Test. When rules are not fully justified, they should be repealed or modified. Based on this focus on the demands of rules, equality can be reconciled with an adequate accommodation of diversity. (shrink)

Relational egalitarianism, the view that social equality is fundamentally about equal relationships, has a problem addressing intergenerational justice. Specifically, how can we have any relationship, egalitarian or otherwise, with people that we do not overlap with temporally? I argue that the problem is even greater than that since we do not overlap in many other relevant ways, and are not in relationships with most of our temporal peers either. If relational equality relies on actual relationships, it cannot succeed as an (...) account of justice. However, we stand in certain social relations to one another, less direct than relationships, that might connect us, in an egalitarian fashion, to many more people than the ones with whom we have relationships. If this account, or one like it, cannot succeed, however, we may have to give up on relational egalitarianism altogether. (shrink)

Novel forms of assisted gestation—uterus transplantation and artificial placentas—are highly anticipated in the ethico‐legal literature for their capacity to enhance reproductive autonomy. There are also, however, significant challenges anticipated in the development of novel forms of assisted gestation. While there is a normative exploration of these challenges in the literature, there has not yet, to my knowledge, been empirical research undertaken to explore what reproductive rights organisations and advocates identify as potential benefits and challenges. This perspective is invaluable. These organisations/individuals (...) have an awareness not only of the needs of individuals but also of the political landscape in which regulatory decisions are made and which individuals navigate when seeking reproductive assistance. In this study, data was generated from two semi‐structured focus groups (n = 11). Reflective thematic analysis was used to examine the views raised by study participants in these focus groups. This paper explores two of the themes constructed in the data. First, the equality‐enhancing potential of assisted gestation exploring the multifaceted ways in which assisted gestation has structural benefits for marginalised groups. Second, realising the equality‐enhancing potential of assisted gestation explores the intersecting barriers to access to reproductive technologies and how they may impede the benefits of these technologies in practice. These results can enhance conceptual understanding of the importance of novel forms of assisted gestation and ensure that attention is paid to practical barriers in further normative research. (shrink)

This book enables readers to understand contemporary Japanese society and culture. Since it is written by experts, it allows readers to start with any chapters they are interested in. It also provides a unique way to introduce Japanese society and culture to those who have never visited or studied Japanese society by reading articles from various authors on topics such as gender, family, economy, natural disasters and politics and laws. It provides scholars, academics, graduate students and the general educated audience (...) all the information required to understand contemporary Japanese society and culture fully and see the diverse perspectives available. (shrink)

The $$\varepsilon $$ -elimination method of Hilbert’s $$\varepsilon $$ -calculus yields the up-to-date most direct algorithm for computing the Herbrand disjunction of an extensional formula. A central advantage is that the upper bound on the Herbrand complexity obtained is independent of the propositional structure of the proof. Prior (modern) work on Hilbert’s $$\varepsilon $$ -calculus focused mainly on the pure calculus, without equality. We clarify that this independence also holds for first-order logic with equality. Further, we provide upper bounds analyses (...) of the extended first $$\varepsilon $$ -theorem, even if the formalisation incorporates so-called $$\varepsilon $$ -equality axioms. (shrink)

Several contemporary philosophers have argued that democracy earns its moral keep in part by rendering political authority compatible with social or relational equality. In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Motchoulski examines these relational egalitarian defenses of democracy, finds the standard approach wanting, and advances an alternative. The standard approach depends on the claim that inequality of political power constitutes status inequality (the ‘constitutive claim’). Motchoulski rejects this claim on the basis of a theory of social status: once you (...) see what social status is, Motchoulski thinks, the constitutive claim is a non-starter. In its place, Motchoulski suggests that relational egalitarians can and should content themselves with a defense of democratic institutions on the basis of a causal-instrumental link between equality of political power and equality of social relations. In this reply, I advance three main claims. First, relational egalitarians have good reason to hope for a defense of the constitutive claim, since that claim is required if relational equality is to vindicate the intrinsic value of democracy. Second, Motchoulski’s argument against the constitutive claim fails, because it depends on conflating one species of social status for the genus as a whole. Finally, I argue that the constitutive claim is trivially true for one kind of status, namely de facto authority, but, since equality of that kind of status is not intrinsically valuable, this does not amount to a defense of the intrinsic value of democracy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism—equality between non-disabled human adults—implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human—an attribute which fetuses have.

Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need for (...) justification altogether or by reframing justification in either ostensive or coherentist fashion, showing that each fails to account for our sense that basic equality is objectively true. In response, I outline a Hegelian approach that treats the commitment to basic equality as a social fact that constrains philosophical reasoning in contemporary liberal democracies. By itself that might suggest complacent conservatism or cultural relativism, but I argue that practices and institutions that reflect and foster a commitment to basic equality have a distinct value in permitting reciprocal recognition and thereby enabling us to make a distinct class of normative claims on one another. This Hegelian resolution of the problem is dialectically superior to its rivals and therefore warrants further development. (shrink)

changin the object of change, for a new man, a nem world, a new society.

While most theorists agree with the claim that human beings have high and equal moral standing, there are strong disagreements about how to justify this claim. These disagreements arise because there are different ways of managing the difficulty of finding a basis for this claim, which is sufficiently substantial to do this justifying work, but not vary in degree in order to not give rise to inequality of moral considerability. The aim of this paper is to review previous attempts to (...) address this difficulty and to demonstrate why they fail and then to defend another way of dealing with this challenge by applying two views: the substance view on the human person and the natural-law account of morality. My claim is that this approach has comparative advantages because it provides a binary and a normatively significant basis of justification for equality without being implausibly inclusive. (shrink)

This article contributes to ongoing discussions in the social sciences about how to interpret the incorporation of gender equality into integration policies – is it a form of state feminism or femonationalism? Drawing upon intersectionality, we analyse how gender equality is presented, discussed and negotiated in relation to ethnicity and nationality in Sweden. Methodologically, we employ a bifocal lens that combines (1) a quantitative investigation of representations of civic orientation programmes in Swedish policy documents and mainstream media, and (2) a (...) qualitative analysis of ethnographic data collected in six civic orientation courses – three in English and three in Arabic – in three large municipalities. Such a two-pronged approach, which connects policy and media discourses with interactions in civic orientation classes, offers a granular picture of the complex and often ambivalent intersections of ethnicity and gender in relation to migration in Sweden. Ultimately, the co-optation of feminist values brings with it the risk of warping feminism into a trait of national/ethnic distinctiveness. Crucially, femonationalism is not the prerogative of far-right parties but is already becoming institutionalised, informing both mainstream media and educational practices in a feminist state like Sweden. (shrink)

In the contemporary context, there is growing scepticism about liberal and democratic institutions as not only failing in many ways to ensure a valuable life for their citizens but even, some think, as being positively harmful to them. The essays collected in this volume contribute to an ongoing project to go ‘beyond’ liberalism without thereby abandoning commitment to liberal values or institutions. They are motivated by two commitments. First, that liberal institutions need to be defended as important for protecting human (...) well-being and even embodying duties toward our fellow citizens. Second, the conviction that the many challenges which threaten the very persistence of liberal and democratic states around the world can be met only by drawing on resources provided by perfectionist traditions. (shrink)

1. The maritime community has strong masculine roots. According to the International Maritime Organization,1 women today represent only 1.2% percent of the global seafarer workforce. Most of those...

In a recent public engagement study on heritable human genome editing (HHGE) conducted among South Africans, participants approved of using HHGE for serious health conditions—viewing it as a means of bringing about valuable social goods—and proposed that the government should actively invest resources to ensure everyone has equal access to the technology for these purposes. This position was animated by the view that future generations have a claim to these social goods, and this entitlement justified making HHGE available in the (...) present. This claim can be ethically justified in the Ubuntu ethic (deriving from South Africa) as it (a) emphasizes the interests of the community, and (b) espouses a metaphysical conception of the community that transcends the present generation and includes past and future generations. On this basis, a compelling claim can be made on behalf of prospective persons in favor of equal access to HHGE. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Postscript: Exchange with Peter Singer References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction I Education, Capability and Equal Participation in Society II Capability Equality in Education: Elements of a Fundamental Educational Entitlement III Elements of a Fundamental Educational Entitlement for Students with Disabilities and Special Educational Needs IV Towards a Principled Framework for a Just Distribution of Educational Resources to Students with Disabilities and Special Educational Needs Notes References.

The ideal of equality has led a double existence in modern society. In one guise the ideal has been at least very popular if not uncontroversial and in its other guise the ideal has been attractive to some and repulsive to others. These two aspects of equality are equality of democratic citizenship and equality of condition.

This chapter contains section titled: I The Challenge Model II Challenge Versus Impact III Parameters and Limitations IV Tolerance, Neutrality, and Antipaternalism V Equality VI Resources Versus Welfare VII Conclusion Acknowledgement.

This chapter contains sections titled: Liberty or Political Freedom Equality Independence as a Key Concept in Kant's Political Philosophy Sovereignty and Independence Independence and Fraternity Resistance and Publicity Conclusion.

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV Acknowledgement.