About this topic
Summary The interplay of essentialism and modal logic is a major topic in the logic and metaphysics of modality. Turquette 1953 argued that quantified modal logic (QML) entails essentialism, the view that an object can have a property essentially, independently of how it is referred to. Since he found essentialism to be unintelligible, Quine concluded by modus tollens that QML should be rejected. Kripke 1963 and Marcus 1967 have contributed to the rehabilitation of QML by showing how it can be made sense of within a suitable semantic framework. Others, such as Parsons 1969 and McKay 1975, have argued that QML is not committed to the thesis of essentialism in the way Quine thought. Now that the intelligibility of QML is no longer at issue, a central problem in the contemporary debate is whether the notion of essence can be understood in modal terms. A classical modalist analysis of essence is due to Moore 1919: x is essentially P iff x is necessarily P (or, in conditional form: iff x is necessarily P, if existent). This reduction of essence to pure QML has been found wanting by Fine 1994. A general argument against modal characterizations of essence has been proposed by Torza 2015. As a consequence, the Moorean definition has been mostly abandoned (but see Cowling 2013). Some proposals have emerged that attempt to understand essence by means of revisions or extensions of standard QML. Zalta 2006 and Wildman 2013 have proposed to reduce essence to a combination of modal and non-modal notions. Correia 2007 has put forward an analysis of essence carried out in a modal logic which is more fine-grained that standard QML.  Fine 1995, 2000 has formulated a quantified intensional logic for the notion of essence.
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  1. Essentialism and the Modal Semantics of J. Hintikka.John Robert Baker - 1978 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (1):81-91.
  2. Quantified Modal Logic and the Problem of Essentialism.John Robert Baker - 1973 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
  3. Modalities: Philosophical Essays.Ruth Barcan Marcus & Shaughan Lavine - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):267-274.
    Based on her earlier ground-breaking axiomatization of quantified modal logic, the papers collected here by the distinguished philosopher Ruth Barcan Marcus cover much ground in the development of her thought, including influential essays on moral conflict, on belief and rationality, and on some historical figures.
  4. Quine E O “pecado” Da Lógica Modal.Cleverson Bastos & Paulo de Oliveira - 2011 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (1):1-17.
    O presente trabalho pretende analisar as objeções de Quine à ló­gica modal. O trabalho evidencia que tais objeções dirigem-se às formas proposicionais e também às formas quantificadas. Como o próprio Quine faz, não se pretende aqui apresentar soluções, mas apenas levantar os pro­blemas que o seu trabalho identificou. Este texto apóia-se, sobretudo, no importante estudo de Jaime Nubiola, intitulado El Compromisso Esencialista de La Lógica Modal: Estudio de Quine y Kripke. Inicialmente, serão apresen­tadas as seis objeções de Quine e, em (...)
  5. CIFOL: Case-Intensional First Order Logic. Toward a Theory of Sorts.Nuel Belnap & Thomas Müller - unknown
    This is Part I of a two-part essay introducing case-intensional first-order logic, an easy-to-use, uniform, powerful, and useful combination of first order logic with modal logic resulting from philosophical and technical modifications of Bressan’s General interpreted modal calculus. CIFOL starts with a set of cases; each expression has an extension in each case and an intension, which is the function from the cases to the respective case-relative extensions. Predication is intensional; identity is extensional. Definite descriptions are context-independent terms, and lambda-predicates (...)
  6. Ruth Barcan Marcus Est-Elle la Mère du Fils de Wittgenstein?(Considerations Existencialistes Sur la Formule de Barcan).Jean-Yves Béziau - 1999 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22 (2):11-27.
  7. Potency and Modality.Alexander Bird - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):491-508.
    Let us call a property that is essentially dispositional a potency.1 David Armstrong thinks that potencies do not exist. All sparse properties are essentially categorical, where sparse properties are the explanatory properties of the type science seeks to discover. An alternative view, but not the only one, is that all sparse properties are potencies or supervene upon them. In this paper I shall consider the differences between these views, in particular the objections Armstrong raises against potencies.
  8. Il Genio Compreso: La Filosofia di Saul Kripke.Andrea Borghini (ed.) - 2010 - Carocci.
  9. De Re and de Dicto Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to an Aristotelean Essentialism.Baruch A. Brody - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (1-2):117-136.
  10. "The Metaphysics of Modality" by Graeme Forbes. [REVIEW]Mark A. Brown - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):615.
  11. Non-Essentialistic Modal Logic or Meaning and Necessity Revisited.Howard Burdick - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):87-93.
    Using the method of ordered pairs proposed in my 'A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes', a non-essentialistic modal logic is possible which avoids these oddities.
  12. A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes.Howard Burdick - 1982 - Synthese 52 (2):185 - 230.
    The author puts forth an approach to propositional attitude contexts based upon the view that one does not have beliefs of ordinary extensional entitiessimpliciter. Rather, one has beliefs of such entities as presented in various manners. Roughly, these are treated as beliefs of ordered pairs — the first member of which is the ordinary extensional entity and the second member of which is a predicate that it satisfies. Such an approach has no difficulties with problems involving identity, such as of (...)
  13. Kripke.John P. Burgess - 2013 - Polity.
    Saul Kripke has been a major influence on analytic philosophy and allied fields for a half-century and more. His early masterpiece, _Naming and Necessity_, reversed the pattern of two centuries of philosophizing about the necessary and the contingent. Although much of his work remains unpublished, several major essays have now appeared in print, most recently in his long-awaited collection _Philosophical Troubles_. In this book Kripke’s long-time colleague, the logician and philosopher John P. Burgess, offers a thorough and self-contained guide to (...)
  14. Meaning and Necessity.V. C. C. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):536-536.
  15. Modality de Dicto and de Re.Richard Campbell - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):345 – 359.
  16. 'De Re'and'de Dicto'-Modal Reference and Possibility in Aristotle.G. Cora - 1988 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 17 (1-2):3-60.
  17. (Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality.Fabrice Correia - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):63–84.
    In Fine 1994, Kit Fine challenges the view that the notion of essence is to be understood in terms of the metaphysical modalities, and he argues that it is not essence which reduces to metaphysical modality, but rather metaphysical modality which reduces to essence. In this paper I put forward a modal account of essence and argue that it is immune from Fine’s objections. The account presupposes a non‐standard, independently motivated conception of the metaphysical modalities which I dub Priorean. Arthur (...)
  18. Quantified Modal Logic.Horacio Costa - 2012 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2.
    The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part gives an introduction to issues in quantified modal logic . We provide an overview of recent work in QML and we presuppose the use of a relational semantics. We discuss models for constant domains, increasing domains and varying domains and present axiomatizations for the corresponding logics. We also discuss philosophical issues related to the interpretation of the quantifiers, terms and identity and we present a first-order quantified intensional logic. A crucial (...)
  19. Predicate Wormism a Quinean Account of de Re Modality.M. J. Cresswell - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 212:449-464.
  20. Physical theories and possible worlds.M. J. Cresswell - 1973 - Logique Et Analyse 16 (63):495.
    Formalized physical theories are not, as a rule, stated in intensional languages. Yet in talking about them we often treat them as if they were. We say for instance: 'Consider what would happen if instead of p's being true q were. In such a case r would be likely.' If we say this sort of thing, p, q and r appear to stand for the meanings of sentences of the theory, but meanings in some intensional sense. Now it is very (...)
  21. A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - Routledge.
    This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...)
  22. In Defence of the Barcan Formula.Max Cresswell - 1991 - Logique Et Analyse 135 (136):271-282.
  23. Quine and de Dicto Modal Substitution.S. Croddy - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 28 (112):395-402.
  24. Quine and de dicto modal substitution.W. S. Croddy - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 28 (12):395.
  25. Quine Against Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic.W. Stephen Croddy - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):317-328.
  26. Aristotle’s Modal Logic: Essence and Entailment in the Organon. [REVIEW]Michael J. Degnan - 2000 - Ancient Philosophy 20 (1):215-222.
  27. Modal Reality and (Modal) Logical Space.John Divers - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):726-733.
  28. The Analysis of Possibility and the Possibility of Analysis.John Divers - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):141–160.
  29. Contingent Existence and Iterated Modality.Cian Dorr - forthcoming - Analysis:anw071.
    A discussion of a view, defended by Robert Adams and Boris Kment, according to which contingent existence requires rejecting many standard principles of propositional modal logic involving iterated modal operators.
  30. Semantics for the Logic of Essence.Kit Fine - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (6):543-584.
    This paper provides a possible worlds semantics for the system of the author's previous paper 'The Logic of Essence '. The basic idea behind the semantics is that a statement should be taken to be true in virtue of the nature of certain objects just in case it is true in any possible world compatible with the nature of those objects. It is shown that a slight variant of the original system is sound and complete under the proposed semantics.
  31. The Logic of Essence.Kit Fine - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241 - 273.
  32. Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
  33. The Problem of de Re Modality.Kit Fine - 1989 - In John Perry, J. Almog & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--272.
  34. A Theory of Logical Essences.Frederic B. Fitch - 1967 - The Monist 51 (1):104-109.
  35. The Definite Description and Quine's Formal Attack on Quantified Modal Logic.Vicky Ruth Vicklund Franks - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    Quine's formal challenge to quantified modal logic involves the dual problems of referential opacity and extensional transparency. Quine's position is that the modal logician is faced with an inescapable dilemma: modal logic is either referentially opaque or extensionally transparent, and, hence, either "quantification into" modal contexts is illegitimate or the distinctions between the necessary, the possible and the actual collapse. Quine himself was convinced that the first horn of the dilemma is true, that modal logic is referentially opaque; however, I (...)
  36. Interview with Ruth Barcan Marcus.Michael Frauchiger - 2015 - In Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes From Barcan Marcus. De Gruyter. pp. 147-166.
  37. Referential Opacity and Modal Logic.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 2004 - Routledge.
    This landmark work provides a systematic introduction to systems of modal logic and stands as the first presentation of what have become central ideas in philosophy of language and metaphysics, from the "new theory of reference" and non-linguistic necessity and essentialism to "Kripke semantics.".
  38. Quine on Modality.Dagfinn Føllesdal - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):147 - 157.
    An appraisal of the current status of the modalities and of quine's arguments against them. The author accepts "quine's thesis," that one cannot quantify into referentially opaque contexts, And argues that nobody has succeeded in making sense of such quantification. However, It is shown that modal constructions, Being constructions on general terms and sentences, Can be referentially transparent and extensionally opaque and that consequently the collapse of modal distinctions warned against by quine in "word and object" can be avoided. This (...)
  39. A New Semantics for Systems of Logic of Essence.Alessandro Giordani - 2013 - Studia Logica 102 (3):411-440.
    The purpose of the present paper is to provide a way of understanding systems of logic of essence by introducing a new semantic framework for them. Three central results are achieved: first, the now standard Fitting semantics for the propositional logic of evidence is adapted in order to provide a new, simplified semantics for the propositional logic of essence; secondly, we show how it is possible to construe the concept of necessary truth explicitly by using the concept of essential truth; (...)
  40. Iterated Modalities, Meaning and A Priori Knowledge.Dominic Gregory - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (3).
    Recent work on the philosophy of modality has tended to pass over questions about iterated modalities in favour of constructing ambitious metaphysical theories of possibility and necessity, despite the central importance of iterated modalities to modal logic. Yet there are numerous unresolved but fundamental issues involving iterated modalities: Chandler and Salmon have provided forceful arguments against the widespread assumption that all necessary truths are necessarily necessary, for example. The current paper examines a range of ways in which one might seek (...)
  41. The Problem of Transworld Identity.Lars Gundersen - 1995 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 30.
  42. Contingent Objects and the Barcan Formula.Reina Hayaki - 2005 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):75 - 83.
    It has been argued by Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, and independently by Timothy Williamson, that the best quantified modal logic is one that validates both the Barcan Formula and its converse. This requires that domains be fixed across all possible worlds. All objects exist necessarily; some – those we would usually consider contingent – are concrete at some worlds and non-concrete (but still existent) at others. Linsky and Zalta refer to such objects as ‘contingently non-concrete’. I defend the standard (...)
  43. Actualism and Quantified Modal Logic.Reina Hayaki - 2002 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    It has been alleged that actualism and quantified modal logic are incompatible. My aim in this dissertation is twofold: to defend thoroughgoing actualism with respect to possible objects, and to present a modified semantics for quantified modal logic that is compatible with such a position. The basic strategy is to draw on the parallels between fictions and possible worlds to develop a hierarchical system of worlds-within-worlds ;Actualists usually take first-order modal statements as being about the right objects, by stipulation. Any (...)
  44. Relativized Metaphysical Modality.Benj Hellie, Adam Russell Murray & Jessica Wilson - forthcoming - In Otávio Bueno & Scott Shalkowski (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modality. New York: Routledge.
    Relativized Metaphysical Modality (RMM: Murray and Wilson, 'Relativized metaphysical modality', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2012; Murray, Perspectives on Modal Metaphysics, 2017) exploits 'two-dimensionalist' resources to metaphysical, rather than epistemological, ends: the second dimension offers perspective-dependence without contingency, diverting attacks on 'Classical' analyses of modals (in effect, analyses validating S5 and the Barcan Formulae). Here, we extend the RMM program in two directions. First, we harvest resources for RMM from Lewis's 1980 'Context--Index' (CI) framework: (a) the ban in CI on binding (...)
  45. Ruth Barcan Marcus. Modalities. Philosophical Essays.C. O. Hill - forthcoming - Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
  46. Modalities and Extended Systems.Henry Hiż - 1961 - Journal of Philosophy 58 (23):723-731.
  47. A Companion to Modal Logic: Some Corrections.G. E. Hughes & M. J. Cresswell - 1986 - Logique Et Analyse 29 (3):41-51.
  48. The Construction of a Subcalculus of Lewis' S1 and a Solution of its Decision Problem.Arata Ishimoto & Yoshimi Fujikawa - 1968 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 1:9-22.
  49. Object as a Determinable.Nicholas K. Jones - 2016 - In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-151.
    This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception (...)
  50. Iterated Modalities and Modal Voluntarism.Timo Kajamies - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):17-28.
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