Ethical Egoism

There are problems with egoism as a theory, but what matters here is the point that intuitively ethics is thought to be about the good of others, so that focusing on your own good seems wrong from the start. Virtues are not just character traits, however, since forgetfulness or stubbornness are not virtues. Virtues are character traits which are in some way desirable. Criticism is generally renewed at this point on the grounds that claims about flourishing are now including claims (...) about virtue, and are thus no longer common ground to the defender and the critic of virtue ethics. But virtue ethics has never held that they are, so this is not a problem. It is only to be expected that the virtuous will differ from the nonvirtuous in their assessments of flourishing, because we are dealing here with virtue in the context of a formally characterized conception of flourishing. (shrink)

Tibor Machan's _Ayn Rand_ aims to provide an introduction to Ayn Rand’s thought for “a broader readership who may have heard of Rand but not examined her ideas in detail”. . . . He portrays himself as an admirer, but not as a true believer who supposes that Rand can think no wrong. In addition to sympathetically discussing her views, he tries also to respectfully assess criticisms of those views. His position is not one of unqualified endorsement, but rather one (...) of respect and high regard for Rand as a philosopher. (shrink)

In "Egoism versus Rights," I argued that egoism is incompatible with rights. Here, I respond to two critics of that argument.

I develop an argument that key theses from Ayn Rand's ethics and political philosophy are incompatible with one another. Her ethical egoism is not compatible with her rights theory. Though Rand's version of rights theory is libertarian, the argument does not depend upon any claims peculiar to her theory, but would apply to the (in)compatibility of ethical egoism and almost any plausible rights theory.

Until recently it has been conventional to assume that ethical egoism is "ethical" is name, alone, and that no account that considers one's own interests as the standard of moral obligation could count as seriously "ethical." In recent years, however, philosophers have shown increasing respect for more sophisticated forms of ethical egoism which attempt to define self-interest in enriched terms characterizing self-interest as human flourishing in both material and psychological dimensions. But philosophers are still skeptical that any conception of self-interest (...) could underpin ethical theory. This paper considers recent arguments by Richard Joyce, who is willing to concede enriched conceptions of self-interest, but who claims that egoism cannot support appropriate counterfactual conditionals about morality, or inferential uses of ordinary moral thinking. I argue that ethical egoism can satisfy each of Joyce's desiderata for morality, provided that it is taken to involve the very notion of enriched self-interest that Joyce is elsewhere willing to consider. In showing that egoism can count as a moral theory, I show, in effect, that Joyce's arguments for error theory about morality are really arguments for error theory about agent-neutral, non-egoistic morality. (shrink)

Contrary to the standard Objectivist view of post-Kantian philosophy's two principal lines of development, Linguistic Analysis and Existentialism, there are deep and striking commonalities between Ayn Rand's aesthetic views and those of two prominent writers in the latter traditions: Susanne Langer and Albert Camus. In particular, Langer holds the equivalent of Rand's microcosm view of art (as elaborated upon in Roger Bissell, "Art as Microcosm," Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5, no. 2), and Camus holds a view indistinguishable in all (...) essential respects from Rand's definition of art as "selective re-creation of reality.". (shrink)

Roger E. Bissell challenges Barry Vacker's claim that "aesthetics is at the core of Randian theory," even as he endorses Vacker's comments on the fractal aesthetics of Rand's Fountainhead. Bissell observes that "the actual fountainhead" of Rand's aesthetics is a certain metaphysical value-judgment, which he terms the Turbulent Universe, Pro-Effort Premise. He acknowledges Vacker's valuable insights about the demanding nature of the dynamic, chaotic processes in the world around us and explains how it is just another aspect of what Rand (...) regards as the (conditional) "benevolence" of the universe. (shrink)

Egoism is the doctrine that one ought to act only for self-interested reasons. I shall be concerned with the presupposition of egoism: acting only for self-interested reasons is in one's long-term interest. I shall be concerned with this presupposition's truth with respect only to cases in which one's interests conflict with those of others. So I shall be concerned with this affiliated egoistic doctrine ; in cases of conflict between one's interests and those of others, acting only for self-interested reasons (...) tends to be in one's long-term interest. With respect to conflict of interests' cases, I refer to one's best all-things-considered interests at the time. However, no one or few people know accurately their actual, all-things-considered, long-term interests and perhaps few their all-things-considered immediate interests. Also, by 'advantage', I refer both to the acquisition of Moorean-type intrinsic goods and common naturalistic goods like wealth, power, pleasure, etc. By 'naturalistic goods', I mean some human ends considered valuable by reasons reducible to natural selection and, possibly, social conventions. I also assume that conflicts of interests occur regularly throughout everyone's lifetime, owing to different human needs and wants, scarcity of resources, etc. ;I shall have two tasks in this dissertation: to detail and explain chronologically the main arguments for and against egoism and, specifically, the doctrine of advantage from the Western tradition until and including the eighteenth century discussions; to classify these arguments. I shall not concern myself with theological arguments concerning the rewards and punishments in the hereafter. I shall only be concerned with arguments with respect to earthly types of advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)

Ayn Rand most certainly favored liberty, although she renounced the "libertarian" appellation. Yet, in her continuous, contemptuous and shrill attacks on religion, she was denigrating an institution that has made great contributions to freedom. The present essay is an attempt to right the balance; to demonstrate that religion and liberty are not the enemies supposed by Rand.

The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.

Doubts about the adequacy of appeals to impartial practical reason give those with rationalist sympathies reason to explore the metaphysical, and not merely strategic, reconciliation of prudence and altruism contained in metaphysical egoism. Even if we recognize impartial practical reason, the supremacy of moral demands may depend upon the plausibility of metaphysical egoism. For as long as we recognize the demands of prudence, the conflict between altruism and prudence will threaten altruism's supremacy. We might consider one version of metaphysical egoism (...) that appeals to psychological reductionism about personal identity and exploits some Platonic and Aristotelian analogies between intrapersonal and interpersonal relations and concern. (shrink)

Whether morality has rational authority is an open question insofar as we can seriously entertain conceptions of morality and practical reason according to which it need not be contrary to reason to fail to conform to moral requirements. Doubts about the authority of morality are especially likely to arise for those who hold a broadly prudential view of rationality. It is common to think of morality as including various other-regarding duties of cooperation, forbearance, and aid. Most of us also regard (...) moral obligations as authoritative practical considerations. But heeding these obligations appears sometimes to constrain the agent's pursuit of his own interests or aims. If we think of rationality in prudential terms–as what would promote the agent's own interests–we may wonder whether moral conduct is always rationally justifiable. Indeed, we do not need to think of rationality in exclusively prudential terms to raise this worry. The worry can arise even if there are impartial reasons–that is, nonderivative reasons to promote the welfare of others. (shrink)

Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by (...) arguments of a sort that apply equally well to utilitarianism. It is said to be “unprovable,” when many of the greatest utilitarians themselves, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), admitted that no normative ethical theory, including their own, is provable. Critics of ethical egoism seldom discuss the various theoretical moves that utilitarians are routinely allowed to make, such as (1) fighting the facts, (2) transforming the theory from “act utilitarianism” to “rule utilitarianism,” and (3) biting the bullet. This essay argues that every defensive move made by utilitarians can be made, with equal vigor (if not also plausibility), by ethical egoists. The conclusion is that ethical egoism deserves to be taken more seriously than it is. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between the novelist/philosopher Ayn Rand (TheFountainhead,AtlasShrugged) and the broader conservative movement in the twentieth-century United States. Although Rand was often dismissed as a lightweight popularizer, her works of radical individualism advanced bold arguments about the moral status of capitalism, and thus touched upon a core issue of conservative identity. Because Rand represented such a forthright pro-capitalist position, her career highlights the shifting fortunes of capitalism on the right. In the 1940s, she was an inspiration to (...) those who struggled against the New Deal and hoped to bring about a new, market-friendly political order. As a second generation of conservatives built upon these sentiments and attempted to tie them to a defense of Christian tradition, Rand's status began to erode. Yet by the late 1960s, Rand's once-revolutionary defense of capitalism had become routine, although she herself remained a controversial figure. The essay traces the ways in which Rand's ideas were assimilated and modified by key intellectuals on the right, including William F. Buckley, Jr, Whittaker Chambers, and Gary Wills. It identifies the relationship between capitalism and Christianity as a fundamental dilemma for conservative and right-wing thinkers. By treating Rand as an intellectual and cultural leader of significant import, the essay broadens our understanding of the American right beyond the confines of conservatism, and re-establishes the primacy of the 1930s, and 1940s, to its ideological formation. Responding to a paucity of scholarship on Rand, the essay offers an analysis and summary of Rand's ideas, and argues that despite her outsider status, Rand's work both embodied and shaped fundamental themes of right-wing thought throughout the century. (shrink)

This book critiques Ayn Rand’s secular philosophy of religion while simultaneously highlighting the fundamental contradiction of the Tea Party movement’s dual basis, that is, Randian economics and conservative Christianity.