About this topic
Summary Moral norms are intimately connected to how we, as moral agents, think, feel, and behave. As the interdisciplinary study of the mind, cognitive science is well suited to address such issues as they relate to ethical theory. Fruitful areas of inquiry include, for example: the nature of happiness, character, personality, emotions, and choice; the kinds of processes in the brain that generate our moral intuitions (e.g. affective versus cognitive); the evolutionary origins of our moral capacities (e.g. moral emotions, intuitions, and motivation); cross-cultural differences in moral norms; and so on. 
Key works Collections of key works in cognitive science generally include Nadelhoffer et al 2010 (both historical and contemporary articles) and Sinnott-Armstrong 2008 (a comprehensive state of the art with multiple volumes full of new articles and replies from prominent philosophers and scientists). On some more specific topics: Sober & Wilson 1998 (evolution of altruism), Joyce 2006 (evolution of morality), Doris 2014 (skepticism about character), Haidt 2001 (moral cogniiton), Mikhail 2012 (moral cognition), Greene 2013 (neuroethics), Bloom 2013 (moral development).
Introductions Doris 2010 provides an excellent collection of original articles for a handbook. Doris & Stich 2008 and May 2017 are overviews of empirical work in moral psychology, while more specific topics are covered in Andreou 2007 (ethics and psychology), Levy 2009 (neuroethics), May 2014 (moral cognition).
Related categories

1932 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 1932
Material to categorize
  1. Considerations on the Evolution of Qualitative Multistate Traits.John C. Avise - 1979 - Acta Biotheoretica 28 (3):190-203.
    Simple models for the evolution of qualitative multistate traits are considered, in which the traits are permitted to evolve in time-dependent versus speciation-dependent fashion. Of particular interest are the means and variances of distances for these traits in evolutionary phylads characterized by different rates of speciation, when alternative characters are neutral with respect to fitness, and when the total number of observable characters is limited to small values. As attainable character states are increasingly restricted, mean distance (D) in a phylad (...)
  2. Character and History.Eugene Bagger - 1949 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):216-224.
  3. The Role of Intent in Mental Functioning.John W. Baird - 1917 - In James Edwin Creighton & George Holland Sabine (eds.), Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton. Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press. pp. 307--317.
  4. Are Beliefs Brain-States, and If They Are What Might That Explain - Reply to Vangulick.LR Baker - unknown
  5. The Characterization of Moral Evolution.Albert G. A. Balz - 1927 - International Journal of Ethics 37 (4):403-418.
  6. The Characterization of Moral Evolution.Albert G. A. Balz - 1926 - Ethics 37 (4):403.
  7. What Does the Transmitted Image of a Human Face Tell an Observer About Personality Traits?V. Barabanschikov - 2010 - Social Science Information 49 (3):465-488.
  8. Adaptivity: From Metabolism to Behavior.Xabier Barandiaran & Alvaro Moreno - 2008 - Adaptive Behavior 16 (5):325-344.
  9. An Essential Knowledge: That On Which Cooperation Rests.Julio De León Barbero - 2011 - Eleutheria 2.
  10. Evolution and Theology, and Other Essays, by Otto Pfleiderer. [REVIEW]H. Barker - 1900 - Ethics 11:533.
  11. Use of a Rasch Model to Predict Response Times to Utilitarian Moral Dilemmas.Jonathan Baron, Burcu Gürçay, Adam B. Moore & Katrin Starcke - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):107-117.
    A two-systems model of moral judgment proposed by Joshua Greene holds that deontological moral judgments (those based on simple rules concerning action) are often primary and intuitive, and these intuitive judgments must be overridden by reflection in order to yield utilitarian (consequence-based) responses. For example, one dilemma asks whether it is right to push a man onto a track in order to stop a trolley that is heading for five others. Those who favor pushing, the utilitarian response, usually take longer (...)
  12. The Systemizing Quotient: An Investigation of Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High-Functioning Autism and Normal Sex Differences. Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya & Gurunathan & Wheelwright - 2004 - In Uta Frith & Elisabeth Hill (eds.), Autism: Mind and Brain. Oxford University Press.
  13. Group Size, Heterogeneity, and Prosocial Behavior: Designing Legal Structures to Facilitate Cooperation in a Diverse Society.Benjamin Barros - manuscript
    Recent social science research has found that in many scenarios, increases in group size and diversity have a negative impact on cooperation and other prosocial behavior. A related study by the political scientist Robert Putnam has created a firestorm of debate within the past few months about the negative effects of diversity on the social fabric. This essay addresses a subset of this larger debate. It looks to recent social science research to explore how and why group size and diversity (...)
  14. Personality: A Psychological and Metaphysical Problem.H. Baruk - 1957 - Philosophy Today 1 (2):122.
  15. Character.Stanley Bates - 2009 - In Richard Eldridge (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature. Oup Usa.
  16. The Biological Evolution of Cooperation and Trust.Patrick Bateson - 1988 - In Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell. pp. 14--30.
  17. Biochemistry: A Cross-Disciplinary Endeavor That Discovered a Distinctive Domain.William Bechtel - 1986 - In Integrating Scientific Disciplines. pp. 77--100.
  18. The Distinctive Traits of an Empirical Method.Lewis White Beck - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (13):337-344.
  19. Predicting More of the People More of the Time: Assessing the Personality of Situations.David J. Bem & David C. Funder - 1978 - Psychological Review 85 (6):485-501.
  20. Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights.Adam Benforado & Jon D. Hanson - unknown
    This article is the third of a multipart series. The first part, "The Great Attributional Divide," argues that a major rift runs across many of our major policy debates based on our attributional tendencies: the less accurate dispositionist approach, which explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people's dispositions (i.e., personalities, preferences, and the like), and the more accurate situationist approach, which bases attributions of causation and responsibility on unseen influences within us and around us. The second part, "Naive Cynicism," (...)
  21. The Human Personality.Louis Berg - 1934 - The Monist 44:315.
  22. Defending Intentionalist Accounts of Self-Deception.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108.
    This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.
  23. Logic and Human Morality. An Attractive If Untestable Scenario.I. S. Bernstein - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Boehm reasons that human morality began when several heads of households formed a coalition to limit the despotic bullying of an alpha male. The logic is clear and the argument is persuasive. The premises require that: dominant individuals behave like chimpanzees, bullying their subordinates, early humans somehow developed one-male units from a chimpanzee like society and, the power of a despot is limited by group consensus and political activities. Not all alpha males behave like chimpanzees; most primate societies show little (...)
  24. Eudaimonic Ethics: The Philosophy and Psychology of Living Well.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2014 - Routledge.
    In this book , Lorraine Besser-Jones develops a eudaimonistic virtue ethics based on a psychological account of human nature. While her project maintains the fundamental features of the eudaimonistic virtue ethical framework—virtue, character, and well-being—she constructs these concepts from an empirical basis, drawing support from the psychological fields of self-determination and self-regulation theory. Besser-Jones’s resulting account of "eudaimonic ethics" presents a compelling normative theory and offers insight into what is involved in being a virtuous person and "acting well." This original (...)
  25. The Empirical Nature of Behavior Therapies.Anthony Biglan & David J. Kass - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):1-15.
  26. The Nonadditivity of Personality Impressions.Michael H. Birnbaum - 1974 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (3):543.
  27. Morality Judgments: Tests of an Averaging Model.Michael H. Birnbaum - 1972 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 93 (1):35.
  28. On the Origin of Morality.Donald Black - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Christopher Boehm proposes that morality began when a society of hunter-gatherers punished a member for violating its rules. He claims social control of this kind is universal, and that apes have related tendencies. Emile Durkheim had a similar conception of social control in the simplest and earliest societies. But both are wrong: Hunter-gatherers rarely, if ever, handle conflict in a law-like and penal fashion, and the society as a whole rarely if ever is the agent of social control. Individuals typically (...)
  29. Affect, Relationality and the `Problem of Personality'.L. Blackman - 2008 - Theory, Culture and Society 25 (1):23-47.
  30. The Developmental Origins of Fairness: The Knowledge–Behavior Gap.Peter R. Blake, Katherine McAuliffe & Felix Warneken - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (11):559-561.
  31. Evolved to Be Irrational?: Evolutionary and Cognitive Foundations of Pseudosciences.Stefaan Blancke & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press.
  32. Group Selection in the Upper Palaeolithic.Christopher Boehm - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Using criteria of relative plausibility, it is possible to make a case for significant group selection over the 100,000 years that Anatomically Modern Humans have been both moral and egalitarian. Our nomadic forebears surely lived in egalitarian communities that levelled social differences and moralistically curbed free-riding behaviour, and this egalitarian syndrome would have had profound effects on levels of selection. First, it reduced phenotypic variation at the within-group level. Second, it increased phenotypic variation at the between-group level. Third, and crucially, (...)
  33. The Origin of Morality as Social Control.Christopher Boehm - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1/2):149-184.
  34. Anthony O'Hear, What Philosophy Is. [REVIEW]Elisabeth Boetzkes - 1986 - Philosophy in Review 6:394-396.
  35. Pastoralism and Personality.Charlene Bolton, Ralph Bolton, Lorraine Gross, Amy Koel, Carol Michelson, Robert L. Munroe & Ruth H. Munroe - 1976 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 4 (4):463-481.
  36. The Nostalgias of Situationist Subversion.A. Bonnett - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (5):23-48.
  37. Varieties of Self-Deception.Robert F. Bornstein - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):108-109.
    Mele's analysis of self-deception is persuasive but it might also be useful to consider the varieties of self-deception that occur in real-world settings. Instances of self-deception can be classified along three dimensions: implicit versus explicit, motivated versus process-based, and public versus private. All three types of self-deception have implications for the scientific research enterprise.
  38. Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays.T. H. Huxley.B. Bosanquet - 1895 - International Journal of Ethics 5 (3):390-392.
  39. Science and Christian Tradition, by T. H. Huxley.B. Bosanquet - 1894 - Ethics 5:265.
  40. Book Review:Science and Christian Tradition. T. H. Huxley. [REVIEW]Bernard Bosanquet - 1895 - Ethics 5 (2):265-.
  41. Science and Christian Tradition.T. H. Huxley.Bernard Bosanquet - 1895 - International Journal of Ethics 5 (2):265-266.
  42. Des Fourmis Et des Hommes : Examen des Prémisses Darwiniennes Dans la Pensée de Benoît Dubreuil. Benoît Dubreuil, Human Evolution and the Origins of HierarchiesBenoît Dubreuil, Human Evolution and the Origins of Hierarchies.Frédéric Bouchard - 2012 - Philosophiques 39 (1):265-270.
  43. Le Cas Spencer.Michel Bourdeau - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):170-172.
  44. Situationist Charges Versus Personologist Defenses and the Issue of Skills.Luc Bovens - unknown
  45. Punishment Sustains Large-Scale Cooperation in Prestate Warfare.Robert Boyd & Simon A. Levin - unknown
    Understanding cooperation and punishment in small-scale societies is crucial for explaining the origins of human cooperation. We studied warfare among the Turkana, a politically uncentralized, egalitarian, nomadic pastoral society in East Africa. Based on a representative sample of 88 recent raids, we show that the Turkana sustain costly cooperation in combat at a remarkably large scale, at least in part, through punishment of free-riders. Raiding parties comprised several hundred warriors and participants are not kin or day-to-day interactants. Warriors incur substantial (...)
  46. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW]Michael Bradie - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):235-238.
  47. Character, and Beyond.David Braun - 2012 - In Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 9.
  48. What is Character?David Braun - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241--273.
  49. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation. [REVIEW]William H. Brenner - 1999 - International Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):103-104.
  50. An Outline of Abnormal Psychology.James W. Bridges - 1920 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (15):418-419.
1 — 50 / 1932