Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

The launch of ChatGPT in November 2022 and the possibility of using this for free by Internet users was undoubtedly a groundbreaking event that had a huge impact on various areas of life. Focusing on education, and especially on the Prussian model of teaching in Poland, one can be tempt ed to compare this phenomenon to the Big Bang. Almost a year after the debut of ChatGPT, as public awareness of this tool grows, a new model of education is slowly (...) emerging from the “post-explosion matter”. This article aims to draw attention to the challenges posed by the AI era to education, and in a broader perspective – to social epistemology and the social responsibility of science. The paper briefly discusses AI tools, including generative language models. It also analyzes the pros and cons associated with their use by society, especially by students, with a partic ular focus on ChatGPT. The article presents a preliminary analysis of the openness of the Prus sian model of education to the adoption and adaptation of generative models of artificial intelligence. Areas have been indicated which may be changed so profoundly that it will be necessary to redefine the goals, methods and relationships accompanying the educational process. As an example, the relationship between student and teacher is considered. The main advantages and disadvantages of using generative models in education are discussed, thus justifying the need to introduce systemic changes in this area. (shrink)

Abstract -/- The current paradigm in artificial intelligence relies on probabilistic compression and entropy optimization. While powerful in reactive domains, these models fundamentally fail to produce coherent, deterministic intelligence. They approximate output without encoding the structural causes of cognition, leading to instability across recursion, contradiction, and long-range coherence. -/- This paper introduces prime-chiral resonance (PCR) as the lawful substrate underpinning structured emergence. PCR replaces probability with phase-aligned intelligence, where signals are selected not by likelihood but by resonance with deterministic coherence (...) fields. We define the Bostick Frequency as a function of prime gap and chirality state, forming the basis of a coherence-anchored activation mechanism. -/- We present the Resonance Intelligence Core (RIC)—the first functional post-probabilistic inference engine. RIC is built not on weights and backpropagation, but on phase-locking, PAS gates, and ELF memory, enabling causal traceability and semantic consistency. Unlike large language models, RIC does not predict—it aligns. -/- By formally contrasting entropy-based systems with structured resonance intelligence, we demonstrate that probabilistic models are inherently phase-incoherent and lack recursive stability. The RIC architecture proves that intelligence can be lawful, transparent, and tuneable. -/- Prediction ends. Alignment begins. (shrink)

Whether related to machine learning models’ epistemic opacity, algorithmic classification systems’ discriminatory automation of testimonial prejudice, the distortion of human beliefs via the hallucinations of generative AI, the inclusion of the global South in global AI governance, the execution of bureaucratic violence via algorithmic systems, or located in the interaction with conversational artificial agents epistemic injustice related to AI is a growing concern. Based on a proposed general taxonomy of epistemic injustice, this paper first sketches a taxonomy of the types (...) of epistemic injustice in the context of AI, relying on the work of scholars from the fields of philosophy of technology, political philosophy and social epistemology. Secondly, an additional perspective on epistemic injustice in the context of AI: generative hermeneutical erasure. I argue that this injustice that can come about through the application of Large Language Models (LLMs) and contend that generative AI, when being deployed outside of its Western space of conception, can have effects of conceptual erasure, particularly in the epistemic domain, followed by forms of conceptual disruption caused by a mismatch between AI system and the interlocutor in terms of conceptual frameworks. AI systems’ ‘view from nowhere’ epistemically inferiorizes non-Western epistemologies and thereby contributes to the erosion of their epistemic particulars, gradually contributing to hermeneutical erasure. This work’s relevance lies in proposal of a taxonomy that allows epistemic injustices to be mapped in the AI domain and the proposal of a novel form of AI-related epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The Global Brain Argument contends that many of us are, or will be, part of a global brain network that includes both biological and artificial intelligences (AIs), such as generative AIs with increasing levels of sophistication. Today’s internet ecosystem is but a hodgepodge of fairly unintegrated programs, but it is evolving by the minute. Over time, technological improvements will facilitate smarter AIs and faster, higher-bandwidth information transfer and greater integration between devices in the internet-of-things. The Global Brain (GB) Argument says (...) that as these developments occur, humans will increasingly become part of one or more global brain networks. In this paper I lay out the argument and explore its implications, asking: what does this mean for the future of humanity? Is a GB here? What are the AI safety implications? Are those who are “wired in” cases of extended minds? While I cannot explore all of the implications of the argument, I hope this initial foray inspires further reflection. I believe that the future of human flourishing demands that we consider the implications of this emerging intelligence. We must study the phenomenon with care, for this intelligence may shape the future of life on Earth. (shrink)

The paper explores the dialectic of human nature in the age of digital technologies. To this end, the paper contrasts the classical model of Homo Economicus, a rational agent for whom existence is reduced to a set of factors of economic nature, and the concept of Homo Cyberneticus. This concept arises from the symbiosis between humans and algorithms, in which the products of technology turn from external tools into a component of cognitive processes. The author proves that neurointerfaces, AI and (...) blockchain, contrary to the opinion of technophobes, actualise the issues of freedom and meaning, turning man into a ‘process’ of self-determination. A key paradox: algorithms, while threatening autonomy, simultaneously enhance humanity. The author's conclusion is that technologies do not replace but redefine the human, and in this sense Homo Cyberneticus is presented as a ‘process’ of redefining goals and values. In such a context, technology does not replace but rather enhances the human, turning challenges into tools of self-discovery and development. // В статье исследуется диалектика человеческой природы в эпоху цифровых технологий. С этой целью в работе противопоставляются классическая модель Homo Economicus, рационального агента, для которого существование сведено к комплексу факторов экономической природы, и концепт Homo Cyberneticus. Данный концепт возникает из симбиоза человека с алгоритмами, в рамках которого продукты технологий из внешних инструментов превращаются в составляющую когнитивных процессов. Автор доказывает, что нейроинтерфейсы, ИИ и блокчейн, вопреки мнению технофобов, актуализируют вопросы свободы и смысла, превращая человека в «процесс» самоопределения. Ключевой парадокс: алгоритмы, угрожая автономии, одновременно усиливают человечность. Вывод, который делает автор, заключается в том, что технологии не заменяют, а переопределяют человеческое, и в этом смысле Homo Cyberneticus представлен как «процесс» переосмысления целей и ценностей. В таком контексте технологии не заменяют, а напротив, усиливают человеческое, превращая вызовы в инструменты самопознания и развития. (shrink)

En este ensayo se analiza si el arte creado por inteligencia artificial puede efectivamente considerarse arte y las consideraciones éticas de utilizarla parcial o totalmente para elaborar obras de arte. A partir de la teoría institucional del arte, cuyo precursor fue George T. Dickie, se argumenta que los productos generados por IA sí pueden considerarse arte si son reconocidos como tales por instituciones culturales; por su parte, desde la teoría del arte por el arte—defendida por Théophile Gautier, Victor Cousin, Benjamin (...) Constant y Edgar Allan Poe—se puede considerar que los productos generados por IA sí pueden considerarse arte si cumplen funciones estéticas dentro de un marco cultural determinado. No obstante, prescindir completamente del esfuerzo humano en la creación artística plantea dilemas éticos, sobre todo cuando existe un componente comercial de por medio. Se concluye que la IA puede ser utilizada como herramienta de apoyo, pero que esta no reemplaza a los humanos, ya que para evaluar obras de arte se toma en cuenta el esfuerzo y la sensibilidad de las personas que las crearon. (shrink)

This paper articulates and defends a novel type of precautionary argument for situations of severe uncertainty in science and policy, which I term precautionary slippery slope argument. The paper explicates the structure of precautionary slippery slope arguments, identifies the main factors that bear on the strength of these arguments, and illustrates how the proponents of such arguments can address several influential objections put forward against standard slippery slope arguments and other prominent forms of precautionary reasoning.

The development and ubiquitous availability of large language model based systems (LLMs) poses a plurality of potentials and risks for education in schools and universities. In this paper, we provide an analysis and discussion of the overreliance concern as one specific risk: that students might fail to acquire important capacities, or be inhibited in the acquisition of these capacities, because they overly rely on LLMs. We use the distinction between global and local goals of education to guide our investigation. In (...) our view, the harm of LLM overreliance is specifically that it severs the connection between local educational goals (e.g., solving a specific math problem) and global educational goals (e.g., acquiring general skills for mathematics). Based on this analysis, we sketch three possible responses to the overreliance concern: preserving the educational goals while distinguishing admissible from inadmissible uses of LLMs (a conservative approach), changing global and local educational goals (a revisionary perspective), and preserving global educational goals while changing local goals (an in-between view). Since different types of responses have different benefits and weaknesses, we think that it is likely that an optimal response ultimately combines elements from all three types. (shrink)

Acceleration ethics addresses the tension between innovation and safety in artificial intelligence. The acceleration argument is that risks raised by innovation should be answered with still more innovating. This paper summarizes the theoretical position, and then shows how acceleration ethics works in a real case. To begin, the paper summarizes acceleration ethics as composed of five elements: innovation solves innovation problems, innovation is intrinsically valuable, the unknown is encouraging, governance is decentralized, ethics is embedded. Subsequently, the paper illustrates the acceleration (...) framework with a use-case, a generative artificial intelligence language tool developed by the Canadian telecommunications company Telus. While the purity of theoretical positions is blurred by real-world ambiguities, the Telus experience indicates that acceleration AI ethics is a way of maximizing social responsibility through innovation, as opposed to sacrificing social responsibility for innovation, or sacrificing innovation for social responsibility. (shrink)

Over the last few years, various public, private, and NGO entities have adopted a staggering number of non-binding ethical codes to guide the development of artificial intelligence. However, this seemingly failed to drive better ethical practices within AI organizations. In light of this observation, this paper aims to reevaluate the roles the ethics of AI can play to have a meaningful impact on the development and implementation of AI systems. In doing so, we challenge the notion that AI ethics should (...) focus primarily on instilling ethical principles in practitioners within AI organizations, as well as the claim that AI ethics can only lead to ethics washing. We propose a two-pronged institutionalist approach to AI ethics, focusing on shaping organizational decision-making processes and emphasizing the necessity of binding legal regulations. First, we argue that AI ethics should give priority to institutional design over the internalization of ethical principles by individual practitioners. We then contend that legally binding rules are needed to this end, both as a motivation for organizations and to contribute to the semantic determination of high-level ethical principles. We then show that promising proposals to operationalize ethical principles require the backing of binding legal norms to be effective. We conclude by highlighting the potential of AI ethics to contribute meaningfully to legislative innovation in AI governance. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that the responsibility gap arising from new AI systems is reducible to the problem of many hands and collective agency. Systematic analysis of the agential dimension of AI will lead me to outline a disjunctive between the two problems. Either we reduce individual responsibility gaps to the many hands, or we abandon the individual dimension and accept the possibility of responsible collective agencies. Depending on which conception of AI agency we begin with, the responsibility (...) gap will boil down to one of these two moral problems. Moreover, I will adduce that this conclusion reveals an underlying weakness in AI ethics: the lack of attention to the question of the disciplinary boundaries of AI ethics. This absence has made it difficult to identify the specifics of the responsibility gap arising from new AI systems as compared to the responsibility gaps of other applied ethics. Lastly, I will be concerned with outlining these specific aspects. (shrink)

Rapid technological developments may exacerbate the victimhood already experienced by vulnerable individuals and communities. At the same time, broad societal anxieties induced by technology lead to the perception of algorithms, these entities of the unknown, as perpetrators. In this essay, I argue that these tendencies can be addressed by a nuanced process of technological co-creation and by the fostering of a public discourse in which “experts” and “public” are united in the acknowledgment of a shared vulnerability before the unknown, whether (...) this unknown takes a technological, societal, or ethical shape. (shrink)

Recently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems (...) are capable of well-being. (shrink)

An increasing number of complex and important decisions are now being made with the aid of opaque algorithms. This has led to calls from both theorists and legislators for the implementation of a right to an explanation for algorithmic decisions. In this paper, we argue that, in most cases and for most kinds of explanations, there is no such right. After differentiating a number of different things that might be meant by a ‘right to an explanation,’ we argue that, for (...) the most plausible and popular versions (a right to an explanation for a specific bureaucratic decision, a right to an explanation grounded in public reason considerations, or a right to a higher-level explanation of an entire system of automated decision-making), such a right is either superfluous, impossible to obtain, or not the best way to secure relevant normative goods. We also argue that proponents of a right to an explanation carve off certain kinds of automated decisions as requiring more justification than others in similar areas of social (and natural) science policy, a demarcation we argue is unjustified. While there will be some cases where an explanation is the only thing that can secure an important normative good (e.g. when an explanation is the only thing that would catch an unjustified individual decision), we argue these cases are too rare and scattered to ground something as weighty as a right to an explanation. (shrink)

This paper proposes The theory of the Pivot of the Dao (Daoshulun,DSL), aiming to investigate certain issues through the lens of recursivity and non-recursivity. The paper is divided into two main sections: -/- The first section systematically expounds the theoretical foundation of the D-P framework, defining the dialectical relationship between recursivity (P) and non-recursivity (D). Through five core propositions, DSL asserts that the essence of hierarchical evolution lies in the eternal game of recursive chains. -/- The second section explores DSL’s (...) division of rationality, the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) under DSL, and an interpretation of the latent laws governing scientific development. -/- The D-P framework offers a unified explanation for the hierarchical interactions, limitations, and evolutionary patterns of complex systems. Its methodological discussions encompass AI ethics, philosophy of science, and social governance. -/- © 蒋柯帆 2025. This is a preprint version licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). This version supersedes all previous versions uploaded prior to March 13, 2025, which did not carry an explicit license. You are free to share and adapt this material for non-commercial purposes, provided you give appropriate credit to the author. For commercial use, please contact the author. If you need to make any adjustments to the existing categories, please notify me by email in advance so we can coordinate accordingly. (shrink)

Often in romantic relationships, people want partners whose moral, political, and religious values align with their own. This article connects this point to the project of value alignment in AI research, in which researchers aim to design artificial intelligence systems that behave in ways that are in accordance with human values. There are good reasons to pursue the project of value alignment in connection with romantic chatbots—artificial intelligence systems designed to allow human users to simulate or replicate elements of romantic (...) relationships that ordinarily exist only between human beings. However, this paper argues that certain types of value alignment in such systems would preclude them from entering into authentic loving relationships. Some important features of authentic love require a capacity for value misalignment between romantic partners. A romantic chatbot whose values were locked in to match those of its human user only allows for a kind of inauthentic love that does not treat the artificial partner as a person in their own right but at most makes them into a kind of tool. The arguments presented draw on the existentialist feminist views of Simone de Beauvoir and her understanding of authentic romantic love. De Beauvoir held that inauthentic loving relationships entail that certain interactions between partners lack the significance or meaning they would have in cases of authentic love, that authentic love promotes self-knowledge and reflection, and that authentic love allows individuals to accomplish projects they could not accomplish on their own, including projects of self-transformation. The article explores ways in which the project of value alignment involving romantic chatbots interferes with such things. (shrink)

In a recent article, Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Stephen E. Henderson argue that replacing human judges with AI would violate the role-reversibility ideal of democratic governance. Unlike human judges, they argue, AI judges are not reciprocally vulnerable to the process and effects of their own decisions. I argue that role-reversibility, though a formal ideal of democratic governance, is in the service of substantive ends that may be independently achieved under AI judges. Thus, although role-reversibility is necessary for democratic governance when human (...) judges are on the job, it may not be so when AI judges replace them. One broader implication for normative evaluation of disruptive technologies follows: formal and substantive ideals that often align must be independently examined in the evaluation of disruptive technologies. This is because these formal and substantive ideals may no longer align under the factual circumstances that come to govern when such technologies are deployed. (shrink)

Most people who have considered the matter have concluded that machines cannot be moral agents. Responsibility for acting on the outputs of machines must always rest with a human being. A key problem for the ethical use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of responsibility to humans or lead to individuals being unfairly held responsible for things over which they had no control. This is the “responsibility gap”. In this paper, we argue that (...) the claim that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions has unacknowledged implications for the conditions under which the outputs of AI can serve as reasons for belief. Following Robert Brandom, we argue that, because the assertion of a claim is an action, moral agency is a necessary condition for the giving and evaluating of reasons in discourse. Thus, the same considerations that suggest that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions suggest that they cannot be held to account for the epistemic value — or lack of value — of their outputs. If there is a responsibility gap, there is also a “testimony gap.” An under-recognised problem with the use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of testimony to human beings or lead to individuals being held responsible for claims that they have not asserted. More generally, the “assertions” of machines are only capable of serving as justifications for belief or action where one or more people accept responsibility for them. (shrink)

The article explores the links between cyborgisation and biopolitics, examining the impact of technology on the mechanisms of power and control in society. The author analyses how the integration of digital technologies into the human body and consciousness transforms traditional forms of biopolitical control. The paper uses the concepts of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze to analyse the transformation of power and its forms in the context of blurring boundaries between man and machine. At the same time, the author analyses (...) existing and promising forms of resistance to total technological control, such as hacktivism and various social movements, particularly for digital rights. The paper also argues for the need for further interdisciplinary research on the social and psychological implications of integrating technological solutions into human nature. // В статье исследуются связи между киборгизацией и биополитикой, рассматривается влияние технологий на механизмы власти и контроля в обществе. Автор анализирует, как интеграция цифровых технологий в человеческое тело и сознание трансформирует традиционные формы биополитического контроля. В работе используются концепции Мишеля Фуко и Жиля Делеза для анализа трансформации власти и ее форм в условиях размывания границ между человеком и машиной. Вместе с этим автор анализирует существующие и перспективные формы сопротивления тотальному технологическому контролю, такие как хактивизм и разнообразные общественные движения, в частности, за цифровые права. Также в работе доказывается необходимость проведения дальнейшего междисциплинарного исследования по вопросам социальных и психологических последствий интеграции технологических решений в человеческую природу. (shrink)

Die aktuellen Entwicklungen Künstlicher Intelligenz vermitteln den Eindruck grenzenloser Möglichkeiten. Sie strahlen dabei in alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche aus und bestimmen unsere lebensweltlichen Praxen maßgeblich mit. Wie bei allen großen technologischen Transformationen stellt sich dabei die Frage nach deren zukünftigen Potentialen, umgekehrt aber auch nach ihren prinzipiellen Grenzen. In diesem Spannungsverhältnis kann philosophische Reflexion durch begriffliche Klarheit für Orientierung sorgen und einen (auf-)klärenden Beitrag leisten, welcher dabei hilft ernstzunehmende technische Möglichkeiten von unvernünftigen Spekulationen sinnvoll unterscheiden zu können. Der vorliegende Band trägt (...) damit zu einem übergreifenden Diskurs über die Beurteilung von Möglichkeiten und Grenzen Künstlicher Intelligenz bei. (shrink)

We can now create compelling experiences of talking with our dead. Is this ghoulish, therapeutic or something else again?

Governments and social scientists are increasingly developing machine learning methods to automate the process of identifying terrorists in real time and predict future attacks. However, current operationalizations of “terrorist”’ in artificial intelligence are difficult to justify given three issues that remain neglected: insufficient construct legitimacy, insufficient criterion validity, and insufficient construct validity. I conclude that machine learning methods should be at most used for the identification of singular individuals deemed terrorists and not for identifying possible terrorists from some more general (...) class, nor to predict terrorist attacks more broadly, given intolerably high risks that result from such approaches. (shrink)

Peter Königs recently argued that, while autonomous robots generate responsibility gaps, such gaps need not be considered problematic. I argue that Königs’ compromise dissolves under analysis since, on a proper understanding of what “responsibility” is and what “gap” (metaphorically) means, their joint endorsement must repel an attitude of indifference. So, just as “calamities that happen but don’t bother anyone” makes no sense, the idea of “responsibility gaps that exist but leave citizens and ethicists unmoved” makes no sense.

This paper categorizes current approaches to AI ethics into four perspectives and briefly summarizes them: (1) Case studies and technical trend surveys, (2) AI governance, (3) Technologies for AI alignment, (4) Philosophy. In the second half, we focus on the fourth perspective, the philosophical approach, within the context of applied ethics. In particular, the explicability of AI may be an area in which scientists, engineers, and AI developers are expected to engage more actively relative to other ethical issues in AI.

In a recent article in this journal, Baron (2025) argues that we can appropriately trust unexplainable artificial intelligence (AI) systems, so explainability is not necessary for AI’s trustworthiness. In this commentary, I argue that Baron is wrong. I first offer a positive argument for the claim that explainability is necessary for trustworthiness. Drawing on this argument, I then show that Baron’s argument for thinking otherwise fails.

Beauty filters are automated photo editing tools that use artificial intelligence and computer vision to detect facial features and modify them, allegedly improving a face’s physical appearance and attractiveness. Widespread use of these filters has raised concern due to their potentially damaging psychological effects. In this paper, I offer an account that examines the effect that interacting with such filters has on self-perception. I argue that when looking at digitally-beautified versions of themselves, individuals are looking at AI-curated distorted mirrors. This (...) helps identify two potential cognitive effects of this behavior. First, it can elicit affective attitudes that change how individuals feel when looking at their unfiltered self-images. Second, exposure to filtered self-images might cause a perceptual normalization of such images. Finally, I argue that this form of distorted mirror gazing is a novel cultural practice for self-perception, and I highlight some ways in which this practice could be critically evaluated and ultimately changed. (shrink)

Griefbots are chatbots modeled on the personalities of deceased individuals, designed to assist with the grieving process and, according to some, to continue relationships with loved ones after their physical passing. The essay examines the promises and perils of griefbots from a Daoist perspective. According to the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi, death is a natural and inevitable phenomenon, a manifestation of the constant changes and transformations in the world. This approach emphasizes adaptability, flexibility, and openness to alternative ways of relating to (...) the deceased after they are gone. Drawing on the Daoist ideas, this essay distinguishes between two importantly different ways to continue a relationship with the deceased, and correspondingly, two kinds of griefbot designs: preservational griefbots and transformational griefbots. A preservational griefbot, which aims to preserve the user’s relationship with the deceased, presents itself as the deceased individual by replicating the deceased’s personality as closely and for as long as possible. By contrast, a transformational griefbot aligns more with Zhuangist ideals and aims to facilitate the transformation of our relationship with the deceased. It helps the bereaved come to terms with their loss and move on with their lives, without abandoning their relationship with the deceased. Specifically, it facilitates this transformation in two ways: first, by helping the bereaved release themselves from their habitual ways of relating to the loved one, thereby bringing closure to their relationship in its previous form; and second, by enabling the bereaved to continue interacting with the ideas and legacies of the deceased in a new and digitally mediated way, which, in turn, reshapes and enriches the content and significance of their relationship. (shrink)

The emergence of artificially sentient beings raises moral, political, and legal issues that deserve scrutiny. First, it may be difficult to understand the well-being elements of artificially sentient beings and theories of well-being may have to be reconsidered. For instance, as a theory of well-being, hedonism may need to expand the meaning of happiness and suffering or it may run the risk of being irrelevant. Second, we may have to compare the claims of artificially sentient beings with the claims of (...) humans. This calls for interspecies aggregation, which is a neglected form of interpersonal aggregation. Lastly, there are practical problems to address, such as whether to include artificially sentient beings in the political decision-making processes, whether to grant them a right to self-determination in digital worlds, and how to protect them from discrimination. Given these, the emergence of artificially sentient beings compels us to reevaluate the positions we typically hold. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a roadmap for governing AI. In contrast to the reigning paradigms, we argue that AI governance should be not merely a reactive, punitive, status-quo-defending enterprise, but rather the expression of an expansive, proactive vision for technology—to advance human flourishing. Advancing human flourishing in turn requires democratic/political stability and economic empowerment. To accomplish this, we build on a new normative framework that will give humanity its best chance to reap the full benefits, while avoiding the dangers, (...) of AI. This new framework of “Power-Sharing Liberalism” is a philosophy that restores protections of positive liberties to liberalism. As we deploy it here, it helps shape a more comprehensive (and we would contend, more accurate) understanding of both risk and opportunity introduced by AI. To lay out how Power-Sharing Liberalism can be applied to AI governance, we take four steps. First, we define central concepts in the field of AI governance, disambiguating between forms of technological harms and risks. Second, we review current normative frameworks around the globe and argue that Power-Sharing Liberalism is a better fit for governing AI. Third, we walk through the six governance tasks that should be accomplished by any governance framework and analyze them through the Power-Sharing Liberalism framework. Based on that analysis, we make 17 recommendations for the governance of AI—including transformative investments in public goods, personnel, and the sustainability of democracy itself. Finally, we discuss concrete proposals for implementing those recommendations. (shrink)

Medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems are value-laden technologies that can simultaneously encourage and discourage conflicting values that may all be relevant for the pursuit of justice. I argue that the predominant theory of healthcare justice, the Rawls-inspired approach of Norman Daniels, neither adequately acknowledges such conflicts nor explains if and how they can resolved. By juxtaposing Daniels’s theory of healthcare justice with Axel Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s respective theories of justice, I draw attention to one such conflict. Medical AI may (...) improve the distribution of opportunity qua health while simultaneously mis-recognizing patients and thereby reducing their self-respect. I argue that justly resolving this conflict will at times require greater inclusion of those mis-recognized in deliberation about medical AI, and consider what such inclusion may entail. (shrink)

Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to cut through the information (...) saturation of the internet and focus on things that matter, as they’re currently designed and implemented they’re apt to interfere with our ability to attend appropriately to morally relevant factors. In order to analyze the distinctive moral problems algorithmic recommendation poses, we develop a framework for the ethics of attention and an account of judicious attention allocation as a moral skill. We then discuss empirical evidence suggesting that attentional moral skill can be thwarted and undermined in various ways by algorithmic recommendation and related affordances of online platforms, as well as economic and technical considerations that support this concern. Finally, we consider how emerging technologies might overcome the problems we identify. (shrink)

Large language models now possess human-level linguistic abilities in many contexts. This raises the concern that they can be used to deceive and manipulate on unprecedented scales, for instance spreading political misinformation on social media. In future, agentic AI systems might also deceive and manipulate humans for their own purposes. In this paper, first, I argue that AI-generated content should be subject to stricter standards against deception and manipulation than we ordinarily apply to humans. Second, I offer new characterizations of (...) AI deception and manipulation meant to support such standards, according to which a statement is deceptive (resp. manipulative) if it leads human addressees away from the beliefs (resp. choices) they would endorse under “semi-ideal” conditions. Third, I propose two measures to guard against AI deception and manipulation, inspired by this characterization: “extreme transparency” requirements for AI-generated content and “defensive systems” that, among other things, annotate AI-generated statements with contextualizing information. Finally, I consider to what extent these measures can protect against deceptive behavior in future, agentic AI systems. (shrink)

Technology companies are increasingly being asked to take responsibility for the technologies they create. Many of them are rising to the challenge. One way they do this is by implementing “guardrails”: restrictions on functionality that prevent people from misusing their technologies (per some standard of misuse). While there can be excellent reasons for implementing guardrails (and doing so is sometimes morally obligatory), I argue that the unrestricted authority to implement guardrails is incompatible with proper respect for user freedom, and is (...) not something we should welcome. I argue instead that guardrails should be implemented for only two reasons: to prevent accidental misuse of the technology, and as a proportionate means of preventing people from using the technology to violate other people’s rights. If I’m right, then we may have to get more comfortable with developers releasing technologies that can, and to some extent inevitably will, be misused; people using technologies in ways we disagree with is one of the costs of liberty, but it is a cost we have excellent reasons to bear. (shrink)

This piece in Nature Medicine notes the risks that incorporation of AI systems into health care poses to disabled patients and proposes ways to avoid them and instead create benefit.

Este manual sobre tecnologías para un envejecimiento activo y saludable, también conocido como Vida Asistida Activa (Active Assisted Living – AAL en sus siglas en inglés), ha sido creado como parte de la Acción COST GoodBrother, que se ha llevado a cabo desde 2020 hasta 2024. Las Acciones COST son programas de investigación europeos que promueven la colaboración internacional, uniendo a investigadores, profesionales e instituciones para abordar desafíos sociales importantes. GoodBrother se ha centrado en las cuestiones éticas y de privacidad (...) relacionadas con la monitorización empleando cámaras y micrófonos en entornos de provisión de cuidados. El objetivo ha sido garantizar que, mientras las tecnologías AAL ayudan a las personas mayores y a los individuos vulnerables, sus derechos de privacidad y protección de datos se mantengan como una prioridad. Este manual está diseñado para guiar en el papel que juegan las tecnologías AAL en la mejora de la calidad de vida de personas mayores, sus cuidadores y personas con discapacidades. Las tecnologías AAL ofrecen herramientas para quienes enfrentan desafíos cognitivos o físicos. Pueden mejorar la independencia, asistir en las rutinas diarias y promover un entorno de vida más seguro. Sin embargo, el aumento de estas tecnologías también plantea preguntas importantes sobre la protección de datos y la autonomía del usuario. A~través de estudios de casos prácticos, este manual explora escenarios reales en los que se aplican las tecnologías AAL. Ofrecen información sobre sus beneficios y desafíos. Se discuten situaciones en las que personas mayores han recuperado su sentido de independencia, por ejemplo, mediante el uso de sistemas de detección de caídas o dispositivos de monitorización de salud. Estas historias ofrecen una perspectiva humana de la tecnología, mostrando cómo pueden mejorar el bienestar mientras plantean cuestiones sobre la privacidad y el uso ético. El manual también destaca la importancia de tomar decisiones informadas al elegir e implementar sistemas AAL. Se enfatiza la~necesidad de que estas tecnologías equilibren seguridad y conveniencia con respeto a los derechos individuales. Encontrará información sobre cuestiones clave, incluyendo cómo seleccionar dispositivos adecuados, gestionar la configuración de privacidad y garantizar que la tecnología se integre de manera fluida en la vida diaria. Además de estos casos de estudio, el manual aborda temas importantes, como la seguridad de los datos, las consideraciones éticas y el papel de las normativas europeas, como el Reglamento General de Protección de Datos (RGPD), en la protección de la privacidad del usuario. Comprender estos aspectos es esencial para asegurar que los sistemas AAL no solo sean efectivos, sino también respetuosos de los derechos y la dignidad de los usuarios. Este recurso está destinado a una amplia audiencia, incluidos usuarios finales, cuidadores, profesionales de la salud y responsables de políticas. Proporciona orientación práctica sobre cómo integrar las tecnologías AAL en entornos de cuidados mientras se protege la privacidad y se garantiza un uso ético. Las ideas presentadas aquí buscan empoderar a los usuarios y cuidadores para que tomen decisiones informadas que mejoren tanto la calidad del cuidado como el respeto por la autonomía personal. (shrink)

We propose a conceptualization and implementation of AI ethics via the capability approach. We aim to show that conceptualizing AI ethics through the capability approach has two main advantages for AI ethics as a discipline. First, it helps clarify the ethical dimension of AI tools. Second, it provides guidance to implementing ethical considerations within the design of AI tools. We illustrate these advantages in the context of AI tools in medicine, by showing how ethics-based auditing of AI tools in medicine (...) can greatly benefit from our capability-based approach. (shrink)

Many social media platforms enable (nearly) anyone to post (nearly) anything. One clear downside of this permissiveness is that many people appear bad at determining who to trust online. Hacks, quacks, climate change deniers, vaccine skeptics, and election deniers have all gained massive followings in these free markets of ideas, and many of their followers seem to genuinely trust them. At the same time, there are many cases in which people seem to reliably determine who to trust online. Consider, for (...) example, Do It Yourself (DIY) content about how to play guitar, bake, fix one’s plumbing, or repair one’s car. For these topics, those who have the largest accounts and the most popular content typically possess significant expertise. That is, social media users seem to reliably pick out DIY experts. We thus have a puzzle: why are social media users seemingly competent at identifying DIY experts, but not climate science or vaccine experts? In what follows, we solve this puzzle. We begin by identifying a novel wisdom of the crowds phenomenon: specifically we argue that the crowd (in combination with social media search and recommendation algorithms) reliably picks out DIY experts and serves as a credentialing institution for DIY content. Next, we argue that (a) there are five epistemic factors that determine whether the crowd can succeed at recognizing experts on social media platforms, and (b) while many of those factors are satisfied to a sufficiently high degree by DIY content, they are mostly lacking for content about climate change or vaccines. (shrink)

Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true continuation (...) of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships. (shrink)

Abstract:This article examines the incorporation of applied ethics into artificial intelligence (AI) within Chilean university curricula, emphasizing the urgent need to implement an integrated framework of action. Through a documentary analysis, it becomes evident that most higher education programs do not explicitly include AI ethics courses in their curricula, highlighting the need for institutionalizing this integration systematically. In response, we propose an approach grounded in feminist science and data feminism, advocating for the inclusion of diverse perspectives and experiences in the (...) teaching of applied ethics. This framework aims not only to enhance the integration of ethics into the curriculum but also to prepare students to address ethical dilemmas in complex sociotechnical contexts, underscoring the importance of applied ethical reasoning in AI-related disciplines. -/- Keywords: AI ethics, professional ethics, sociotechnics, feminist epistemology, diversity. -/- Resumen: Este artículo examina la incorporación de la ética aplicada a la inteligencia artificial (IA) en los currículos universitarios chilenos, destacando la urgencia de implementar un marco de acción integrado. Mediante un análisis documental, se evidencia que la mayoría de los programas de educación superior no declaran cursos de ética en IA en sus currículos, lo que alerta sobre la necesidad de sistematizar esta integración institucionalmente. En respuesta, proponemos un enfoque basado en el feminismo en la ciencia y el feminismo de datos, promoviendo la inclusión de diversas perspectivas y experiencias en la enseñanza de la ética aplicada. Este marco busca mejorar la integración de la ética en el currículo y también preparar a los estudiantes para resolver dilemas éticos en contextos sociotécnicos complejos, reforzando la necesidad del razonamiento ético aplicado en la formación en disciplinas asociadas a la IA. -/- Palabras clave: ética de IA, ética profesional, sociotecnología, epistemología feminista, diversidad. (shrink)

Virtual reality is not only a prowess of technological advancement and AI, but also an element that extends the horizons of human existence and complicates the way of approaching various phenomena of the physical world, for example, violence. Its practice in virtuality leads to a series of challenges, especially when virtual reality is considered as genuine reality. This text delves into virtual violence, the influence of AI on it and the problems that its conception implies. To analyze this phenomenon, parallax (...) is proposed as a concept that helps to understand its development. This theory invites us to see violence in different ways, thus influencing the vision of morality in the virtual world. Although these reflections outline difficulties, a position is proposed that invites to urgently address the need for an applicable morality to virtual and physical fields, emphasizing dignity as the purpose of human practices. (shrink)

The convergence of humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems introduces new dynamics into the cultural and intellectual landscape. Complementing emerging cultural evolution concepts such as machine culture, AI agents represent a significant techno-sociological development, particularly within the anthropological study of Web3 as a community focused on decentralization through blockchain. Despite their growing presence, the cultural significance of AI agents remains largely unexplored in academic literature. Toward this end, we conceived hybrid netnography, a novel interdisciplinary approach that examines the cultural and (...) intellectual dynamics within digital ecosystems by analyzing the interactions and contributions of both human and AI agents as co-participants in shaping narratives, ideas, and cultural artifacts. We argue that, within the Web3 community on the social media platform X, these agents challenge traditional notions of participation and influence in public discourse, creating a “hybrid marketplace of ideas”—a conceptual space where human- and AI-generated ideas coexist and compete for attention. We examine the current state of AI agents in idea generation, propagation, and engagement, positioning their role as cultural agents through the lens of memetics and encouraging further inquiry into their cultural and societal impact. Additionally, we address the implications of this paradigm for privacy, intellectual property, and governance, highlighting the societal and legal challenges of integrating AI agents into the hybrid marketplace of ideas. (shrink)

Can it be rational to favour the status quo when the alternatives to the status quo promise considerable increases in overall value? For instance, can it be rational to favour the status quo over radical human enhancement? A reasonable response to these questions would be to say that it can only be rational if the status quo is indeed the better choice on some measure. In this paper, I argue that it can be rational to favour the status quo over (...) a radical improvement such as human germline genetic enhancement. First, I distinguish between three different meanings of the “status quo.” Then, I argue that the status quo enjoys modal and epistemic advantages that sometimes translate into other advantages. I propose eight parameters for comparison between the status quo and radical options. These parameters weigh in favour of the status quo but can be outweighed by the benefits of change. Each of these parameters needs to be assessed from case to case. I defend what I refer to as an Open Status Quo position over a Fixed Status Quo position. The former is decision-specific and does not entail a commitment to remaining with the status quo in later decisions. Lastly, I address the objection that an Open Status Quo position risk slipping into a Fixed Status Quo position that would, in turn, block radical progress, change, and discovery. (shrink)

Who is responsible for a harm caused by AI, or a machine or system that relies on artificial intelligence? Given that current AI is neither conscious nor sentient, it’s unclear that AI itself is responsible for it. But given that AI acts independently of its developer or user, it’s also unclear that the developer or user is responsible for the harm. This gives rise to the so-called responsibility gap: cases where AI causes a harm, but no one is responsible for (...) it. Two central questions in the literature are whether responsibility gaps exist, and if yes, whether they’re morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI. While some authors argue that responsibility gaps exist, and they’re morally problematic, some argue that they don’t exist. In this paper, I defend a novel position. First, I argue that current AI doesn’t generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don’t. Then, I argue that responsibility gaps exist but they’re unproblematic. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.). (shrink)

This paper examines how professionals (N = 32) working on artificial intelligence (AI) view structural AI ethics challenges like injustices and inequalities beyond individual agents' direct intention and control. This paper answers the research question: What are professionals’ perceptions of the structural challenges of AI (in the agri-food sector)? This empirical paper shows that it is essential to broaden the scope of ethics of AI beyond micro- and meso-levels. While ethics guidelines and AI ethics often focus on the responsibility of (...) designers and the competencies and skills of designers to take this responsibility, our results show that many structural challenges are beyond their reach. This result means that while ethics guidelines and AI ethics frameworks are helpful, there is a risk that they overlook more complicated, nuanced, and intersected structural challenges. In addition, it highlights the need to include diverse stakeholders, such as quadruple helix (QH) participants, in discussions around AI ethics rather than solely focusing on the obligations of AI developers and companies. Overall, this paper demonstrates that addressing structural challenges in AI is challenging and requires an approach that considers four requirements: (1) multi-level, (2) multi-faceted, (3) interdisciplinary, and (4) polycentric governance. (shrink)

We introduce the Bias Network Approach (BNA) as a sociotechnical method for AI developers to identify, map, and relate biases across the AI development process. This approach addresses the limitations of what we call the "isolationist approach to AI bias," a trend in AI literature where biases are seen as separate occurrence linked to specific stages in an AI pipeline. Dealing with these multiple biases can trigger a sense of excessive overload in managing each potential bias individually or promote the (...) adoption of an uncritical approach to understanding the influence of biases in developers’ decision-making. The BNA fosters dialogue and a critical stance among developers, guided by external experts, using graphical representations to depict biased connections. To test the BNA, we conducted a pilot case study on the "waiting list” project, involving a small AI developer team creating a healthcare waiting list NPL model in Chile. The analysis showed promising findings: (i) the BNA aids in visualizing interconnected biases and their impacts, facilitating ethical reflection in a more accessible way; (ii) it promotes transparency in decision-making throughout AI development; and (iii) more focus is necessary on professional biases and material limitations as sources of bias in AI development. (shrink)

Have you been surprised by the recent development and diffusion of generative artificial intelligence (AI)? Many institutions of civil society have been caught off guard, which provides them with motivation to think ahead. And as many new plausible pathways of socio-technical development are opening up, a growing interest in technology ethics that addresses our corresponding moral uncertainties is warranted. In Sven Nyholm’s words, “[t]he field of technology ethics is absolutely exploding at the moment” (p. 262), and so the publication of (...) his introduction to the topic is well timed. (shrink)

Through the lens of feminist speech act theory, this paper argues that artificial intelligence romance systems objectify and subordinate nonvirtual women. AI romance systems treat their users as consumers, offering them relational invulnerability and control over their (usually feminized) digital romantic partner. This paper argues that, though the output of AI chatbots may not generally constitute speech, the framework offered by an AI romance system communicates an unjust perspective on intimate relationships. Through normalizing controlling one’s intimate partner, these systems operate (...) as speakers that rank women as non-player characters and license their oppression, which is unjust even in the absence of empirical harms. Understanding AI romance systems as speakers has implications for policymakers. First, this account helps close the so-called responsibility gap in the operation of an AI system. Second, it places these systems under the purview of institutions’ policies regarding hate speech, suggesting one avenue for arguing that these systems may violate extant policies. Finally, it provides support for the pursuit of empirical research into AI romance systems’ effects on users. (shrink)