Related categories

320 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 320
  1. Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   123 citations  
  2. The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track.Jonathan E. Adler - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  3. Criteria for Plausible Arguments.Joseph Agassi - 1974 - Mind 83 (331):406-416.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Reasons for Reliance.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):311-338.
    Philosophers have in general offered only a partial view of the normative grounds of reliance. Some maintain that either one of evidence or of pragmatic considerations has a normative bearing on reliance, but are silent about whether the other kind of consideration has such a bearing on it as well. Others assert that both kinds of considerations have a normative bearing on reliance, but sidestep the question of what their relative normative bearing is. My aim in this article is to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation. [REVIEW]Richard Amesbury - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):25 - 37.
    William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name "ethics of belief" can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. XIV—Ethics and Belief.Robert R. Ammerman - 1965 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65 (1):257-266.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Ethics and Belief.Robert R. Ammerman - 1964 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:257 - 266.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Race Research and the Ethics of Belief.Jonny Anomaly - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry.
  9. Race, Genes, and the Ethics of Belief: A Review of Nicholas Wade, A Troublesome Inheritance. [REVIEW]Jonny Anomaly - 2014 - Hastings Center Report 44 (5):51-52.
  10. The Ethics of Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Elias Antill - unknown -
    This dissertation examines how we ought to reason about propositions whose truth is determined by whether we believe them. In it, I defend the thesis that in cases of self-fulfilling belief we ought to believe whatever would be best, if true. Though believing whatever would be best if true appears to be a form of wishful thinking, and so unwarranted, this dissertation develops an account according to which, when a belief is self-fulfilling, optimistic reasons which show what we believe to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.R. Audi - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. The Ethics of Belief: Doxastic Self-Control and Intellectual Virtue.Robert Audi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):403-418.
    Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Epistemic Authority of Testimony and the Ethics of Belief.Robert Audi - 2005 - In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Possibility and Permission? Intellectual Character, Inquiry, and the Ethics of Belief.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Pihlstrom S. & Rydenfelt H. (eds.), William James on Religion. (Palgrave McMillan “Philosophers in Depth” Series.
    This chapter examines the modifications William James made to his account of the ethics of belief from his early ‘subjective method’ to his later heightened concerns with personal doxastic responsibility and with an empirically-driven comparative research program he termed a ‘science of religions’. There are clearly tensions in James’ writings on the ethics of belief both across his career and even within Varieties itself, tensions which some critics think spoil his defense of what he calls religious ‘faith ventures’ or ‘overbeliefs’. (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. (More) Springs of My Discontent.Guy Axtell - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (1):131-137.
    A further reply to Trent Dougherty, author of Evidentialism and its Discontents, on a range of issues regarding a proper understanding of epistemic normativity and doxastic responsibility. The relative importance of synchronic and diachronic concerns with epistemic agency is discussed, both with respect to epistemology proper, as well as in connection to broader concerns with ‘ethics of belief’ and ‘epistemology of disagreement.’.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism.Guy Axtell - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in both senses. However, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Teaching James's “The Will to Believe”.Guy Axtell - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (4):325-345.
    Many readers have viewed William James's "The Will to Believe" as his most distinctive and resonating lecture. Yet for all the scholarly attention it has received, the complexities of the "pragmatic defence," and the issues it raises concerning evidential and pragmatic reasoning are still often misunderstood. In this paper I explicate a neglected "core" argument tied closely to James's thesis statement, and provide charts and other tools useful in presenting James' lecture in the philosophy classroom. This argument, based on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. A Right to Believe.Richard L. Barber - 1955 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 4:19-30.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. A Positive Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.Benjamin Bayer - manuscript -
    This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and function of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism.Benjamin Bayer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):233-252.
    This paper evaluates recent proposals for compatibilism about doxastic freedom, and attempts to refine them by applying Fischer and Ravizza’s moderate reasons-responsiveness compatibilism to doxastic freedom. I argue, however, that even this refined version of doxastic compatibilism is subject to challenging counter-examples and is more difficult to support than traditional compatibilism about freedom of action. In particular, it is much more difficult to identify convincing examples of the sort Frankfurt proposed to challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. The Ethics of Belief Debate.John Begley - 1995 - The Australasian Catholic Record 72 (1):83.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Believing on Authority.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6:133-144.
    Linda Zagzebski's "Epistemic Authority" (Oxford University Press, 2012) brings together issues in social epistemology with topics in moral and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. In this paper I criticize her discussion of self-trust and rationality, which sets up the main argument of the book; I consider how her view of authority relates to some issues of epistemic authority in testimony; and I raise some concerns about her treatment of religious epistemology and religious authority in particular.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. The Ethics of Belief: Conservative Belief Management.Melissa Bergeron - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):67 – 78.
    Some hold that W.K. Clifford's arguments are inconsistent, appealing to the disvalue of likely consequences of nonevidential belief-formation, while also insisting that the consequences are irrelevant to the wrongness of so believing. My thesis is that Clifford's arguments are consistent; one simply needs to be clear on the role consequences play in the "Ethics of Belief" (and, for that matter, in William James's "The Will to Believe"). The consequences of particular episodes of nonevidential belief-formation are, as Clifford insists, irrelevant to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Croyance et justification.Renée Bilodeau - 2001 - Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 37:153-165.
    Cet article se propose de montrer que l’éthique de la croyance, si elle permet de clarifier certains problèmes épistémiques, a le tort d’être utilisée à des fins pour lesquelles le réseau conceptuel de l’éthique est inadéquat. Dans ce but, je présente d’abord la thèse de la divergence et les arguments qui militent en sa faveur. J’indique ensuite pourquoi ces arguments ne sont pas concluants en examinant de plus près les rapports existant entre raisons épistémiques et raisons pratiques. Cette discussion se (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Selbsttäuscherische Hoffnung: Eine sprachanalytische Annäherung.Roland Bluhm - 2012 - mentis.
    The concept of hope—as used in ordinary language in assertions of (for example) the form ›Person S hopes that p‹—can be analysed in terms of belief, desire, and, as I claim, affective quality. According to my analysis, one feature of hope is that what S hopes for has some subjective probability for S. Hope thus has an epistemic component on which demands of rationality can be (and, as a matter of fact, are) placed. Ordinary language distinguishes various types of deficient (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):747-768.
    The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e., ought-implies-can). The point of this paper is to argue that there are active and passive aspects of belief, which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Introduction [to Logos & Episteme, Special Issue: The Ethics of Belief].Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):397-404.
    This special issue collects five new essays on various topics relevant to the ethics of belief. They shed fresh light on important questions, and bring new arguments to bear on familiar topics of concern to most epistemologists, and indeed, to anyone interested in normative requirements on beliefs either for their own sake or because of the way such requirements bear on other domains of inquiry.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Value, Epistemic.Patrick Bondy - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Epistemic Value Epistemic value is a kind of value which attaches to cognitive successes such as true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, and understanding. These kinds of cognitive success do of course often have practical value. True beliefs about local geography help us get to work on time; knowledge of mechanics allows us to build vehicles; … Continue reading Value, Epistemic →.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Islamic Philosophy & the Ethics of Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2016 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this book the author argues that the Falasifa, the Philosophers of the Islamic Golden Age, are usefully interpreted through the prism of the contemporary, western ethics of belief. He contends that their position amounts to what he calls ‘Moderate Evidentialism’ – that only for the epistemic elite what one ought to believe is determined by one’s evidence. The author makes the case that the Falasifa’s position is well argued, ingeniously circumvents issues in the epistemology of testimony, and is well (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2015 - Ratio 29 (4).
    The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
    I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self-defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non-epistemic reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. On Some Recent Moves in Defence of Doxastic Compatibilism.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1867-1880.
    According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
    In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35. All Things Considered Duties to Believe.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):509-517.
    To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  36. Compatibilism and Free Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.
    Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  37. Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
    What, according to proponents of doxastic deontologism, is responsible belief? In this paper, we examine two proposals. Firstly, that responsible belief is blameless belief (a position we call DDB) and, secondly, that responsible belief is praiseworthy belief (a position we call DDP). We consider whether recent arguments in favor of DDP, mostly those recently offered by Brian Weatherson, stand up to scrutiny and argue that they do not. Given other considerations in favor of DDP, we conclude that the deontologist should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  38. Motivated Irrationality: The Case of Self-Deception.Montse Bordes - 2001 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 33 (97):3-32.
    This paper inquires into the conceptual nature of self-deception. I shall afford a theory which links SD to wishful thinking. First I present two rival models for the analysis of SD, and suggest reasons why the interpersonal model is flawed. It is necessary for supporters of this model to work out a strategy that avoids the ascription of inconsistency to the self-deceiver in order to fulfill the requirements of the charity principle. Some objections to the compartmentalization strategy are put forward, (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):879-900.
    In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Nikolaj Nottelmann (Ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, Xii + 258 Pp., GBP 55 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137026514. [REVIEW]Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
  42. Deciding to Believe Redux.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Epistemic Norms and Social Contexts. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Compatibilism and Doxastic Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
    Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic agency may have for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  45. Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture?Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Acceptance and Deciding to Believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
    ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  47. Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.
    Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Morally Untenable Beliefs.Richard J. Burke - 1990 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 23 (3):168 - 183.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. A Dispositional, Internalist, Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):399-424.
    This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidentialsupport. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt.William Caldwell - 1899 - International Journal of Ethics 9 (3):373-378.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 320