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  1. added 2020-02-18
    Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness.James Fritz - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up (...)
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  2. added 2020-02-17
    Belief Gambles in Epistemic Decision Theory.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Don't form beliefs on the basis of coin flips or random guesses. More generally, don't take belief gambles: if a proposition is no more likely to be true than false given your total body of evidence, don't go ahead and believe that proposition. Few would deny this seemingly innocuous piece of epistemic advice. But what, exactly, is wrong with taking belief gambles? Philosophers have debated versions of this question at least since the classic dispute between William Clifford and William James (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-17
    Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions.Avery Archer - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (53):63-88.
    In her paper “Why Suspend Judging?” Jane Friedman has argued that being agnostic about some question entails that one has an inquiring attitude towards that question. Call this the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis. I argue that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis is implausible. Specifically, I maintain that the agnostic-as-inquirer thesis requires that we deny the existence of a kind of agent that plausibly exists; namely, one who is both agnostic about Q because they regard their available evidence as insufficient for answering Q and who (...)
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  4. added 2020-02-11
    Belief's Own Ethics.James Montmarquet - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):703-705.
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  5. added 2020-02-07
    What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.
    Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an (...)
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  6. added 2020-01-28
    A Ética da Crença (verbete).Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste verbete, tangenciando o clássico debate entre William Clifford e William James, apresento e discuto três maneiras pelas quais o ato de crer se relaciona com o domínio da ética.
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  7. added 2020-01-25
    Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. London, UK:
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-25
    Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. London, UK:
    This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity. I show how this problem poses a prima facie threat to the common assumption in epistemology and metaethics that beliefs and other attitudes are governed by robust normative requirements. Secondly, I motivate philosophical inquiry about an ethics of mind by tracing this field back to recent debates in the ethics of belief. I (...)
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  9. added 2020-01-03
    Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In discussions of whether and how pragmatic considerations can make a difference to what one ought to believe, two sets of cases feature. The first set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic reasons for belief, is exemplified by cases of being financially bribed to believe (or withhold from believing) something. The second set, which dominates the debate about pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification, is exemplified by cases where acting on a belief rashly risks some disastrous outcome if the belief turns (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-22
    The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity.Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst - forthcoming - London, UK: Routledge.
    This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. -/- The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such (...)
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  11. added 2019-12-19
    Linking Faith and Trust: Of Contracts and Covenants.Ionut Untea - 2019 - Teoria 39 (1):157-168.
    Trust is so intimately linked with faith that sometimes trust needs faith to unfold in a relationship. I argue that the role of this faith element in trust is to elevate the status of the one in which we trust so as to emphasize the equal dignity of all the participants in the relationship of trust. Against views that focus on a «rational» trust based on an exaggerated emphasis on the capacity of self-trust as a point of departure for the (...)
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  12. added 2019-11-16
    Evidentialism in Action.A. K. Flowerree - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 1 (online first):1-18.
    Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it (...)
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  13. added 2019-11-10
    'Reasonable Steps': Amending Section 273.2 to Reflect the Jurisprudence.Lucinda Ann Vandervort Brettler - 2019 - Criminal Law Quarterly 66 (4):376-387.
    This piece proposes amendments to section 273.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code. Section 273.2, enacted in 1992 and revised in 2018, specifies circumstances in which belief in consent is not a defence to sexual assault. The amendments proposed here are designed to ensure that the wording of this statutory provision properly reflects the significant jurisprudential developments related to mens rea and the communication of voluntary agreement (i.e., affirmative sexual consent) achieved by Canadian judges since the original enactment of section 273.2 (...)
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  14. added 2019-11-10
    The Prejudicial Effects of 'Reasonable Steps' in Analysis of Mens Rea and Sexual Consent: Two Solutions.Lucinda Vandervort - 2018 - Alberta Law Review 55 (4):933-970.
    This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether (...)
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  15. added 2019-11-10
    Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief in Consent.Lucinda Vandervort - 2005 - Canadian Bar Review 84 (1):89-105.
    Despite amendments to the sexual assault provisions in the Criminal Code, decisions about the availability and operation of the defence of belief in consent remain vulnerable to the influence of legally extraneous considerations. The author proposes an approach designed to limit the influence of such considerations.
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  16. added 2019-11-10
    Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault.Lucinda Vandervort - 2004 - Osgoode Hall Law Journal 42 (4):625-660.
    The exculpatory rhetorical power of the term “honest belief” continues to invite reliance on the bare credibility of belief in consent to determine culpability in sexual assault. In law, however, only a comprehensive analysis of mens rea, including an examination of the material facts and circumstances of which the accused was aware, demonstrates whether a “belief” in consent was or was not reckless or wilfully blind. An accused's “honest belief” routinely begs this question, leading to a truncated analysis of criminal (...)
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  17. added 2019-11-10
    Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea.Lucinda Vandervort - 1987-1988 - Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 2 (2):233-309.
    In this ground-breaking article submitted for publication in mid-1986, Lucinda Vandervort creates a radically new and comprehensive theory of sexual consent as the unequivocal affirmative communication of voluntary agreement. She argues that consent is a social act of communication with normative effects. To consent is to waive a personal legal right to bodily integrity and relieve another person of a correlative legal duty. If the criminal law is to protect the individual’s right of sexual self-determination and physical autonomy, rather than (...)
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  18. added 2019-11-04
    Testimony, Faith and Humility.Finlay Malcolm - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of trusting this purported divine testimony. In this paper, I argue that when faith is understood in this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must (...)
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  19. added 2019-10-31
    Moral Encroachment and Reasons of the Wrong Kind.James Fritz - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral considerations, including moral considerations that do not bear on the truth or likelihood of p. Defenders of moral encroachment face a central challenge: they must explain why the moral considerations they cite, unlike moral bribes for belief, are reasons of the right kind for belief (or withheld belief). This paper distinguishes between a moderate and a radical version of (...)
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  20. added 2019-10-30
    An Argument for the Prima Facie Wrongness of Having Propositional Faith.Rob Lovering - 2019 - Philosophy – Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3 (3):95-128.
    W. K. Clifford famously argued that it is “wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not. To wit, I am inclined to think that it is not morally wrong for, say, an elderly woman on her death bed to believe privately that she is going to heaven even if she does so on insufficient evidence—indeed, and lest there be any confusion, even if the (...)
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  21. added 2019-10-29
    Open-Mindedness in Philosophy of Religion.Gregory E. Trickett & John R. Gilhooly (eds.) - 2019 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
  22. added 2019-10-29
    On The Incompatibility of Faith and Intellectual Humility.James Elliott - 2019 - In Gregory E. Trickett & J. R. Gilhooly (eds.), Open-mindedness in Philosophy of Religion. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars. pp. 121-139.
    Although the relationship between faith and intellectual humility has yet to be specifically addressed in the philosophical literature, there are reasons to believe that they are at least in some sense incompatible, especially when judging from pre-theoretical intuitions. In this paper I attempt to specify and explicate this incompatibility, which is found in specific conflicting epistemic attitudes they each respectively invite. I first suggest general definitions of both faith and intellectual humility (understood as intellectual virtues), building off current proposals in (...)
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  23. added 2019-10-27
    Justified Belief and Just Conviction.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), Truth and Trial. Routledge.
    Abstract: When do we meet the standard of proof in a criminal trial? Some have argued that it is when the guilt of the defendant is sufficiently probable on the evidence. Some have argued that it is a matter of normic support. While the first view provides us with a nice account of how we ought to manage risk, the second explains why we shouldn’t convict on the basis of naked statistical evidence alone. Unfortunately, this second view doesn’t help us (...)
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  24. added 2019-10-21
    The Information Environment and Blameworthy Beliefs.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (6):525-537.
    Thanks to the advent of social media, large numbers of Americans believe outlandish falsehoods that have been widely debunked. Many of us have a tendency to fault the individuals who hold such beliefs. We naturally assume that the individuals who form and maintain such beliefs do so in virtue of having violated some epistemic obligation: perhaps they failed to scrutinize their sources, or failed to seek out the available competing evidence. I maintain that very many ordinary individuals who acquire outlandish (...)
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  25. added 2019-10-20
    The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.
    In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
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  26. added 2019-10-20
    The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):4-28.
    We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes (...)
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  27. added 2019-10-16
    Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I out- line a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to defend the teleological (...)
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  28. added 2019-10-16
    On Belief: Aims, Norms, and Functions.C. J. Atkinson - 2018 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
    In this dissertation, I explore whether teleological, normative, and functional theories of belief each have the resources to answer three central questions about the nature and normativity of belief. These questions are: (i) what are beliefs, (ii), why do we have them, and (iii) how should we interpret doxastic correctness--the principle that it is correct to believe that p if and only if p? -/- I argue that teleological and normative theories fail to adequately address these questions, and I develop (...)
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  29. added 2019-10-07
    Evidentialism Doesn’T Make an Exception for Belief.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard’s claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism (...)
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  30. added 2019-10-01
    Почему эвиденциалисты должны верить обещаниям (Why Evidentialists Must Believe in Promises).Pavel Butakov - 2019 - Phiosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3 (3):172-200.
    I argue that evidentialist ethics of belief requires believing in every promise, because any promise always has sufficient evidence. In order to combine evidentialism with ethics of belief, I distinguish two belief-like propositional attitudes. The first is categorical belief, which I call “opinion,” the second is quantitative belief, which I call “credence.” I accept doxastic voluntarism about opinions, and doxastic involuntarism about credences. Opinion has two values—affirmative and negative—and the subject has control over which one to choose. Credence can have (...)
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  31. added 2019-09-26
    Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties. Routledge.
    In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate (...)
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  32. added 2019-09-19
    Conflicts of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    The thesis contains my early work arguing against evidentialism for reasons for belief (chapter 1), my early argument that rationality is not normative (chapter 2), an argument that rationality is not responding reasons, at least understood in one way (chapter 2), a general discussion of how normative conflicts might (appear to) arise in many different ways (chapter 3), a discussion of how to weigh pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief (chapter 4), and a discussion of the general structure of normativity (...)
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  33. added 2019-09-18
    Evidence and Self-Fulfilling Belief.Gregory Antill - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):319-331.
    This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs. Following Grice (1971), many philosophers hold that adopting a self-fulfilling belief would involve an impermissible form of bootstrapping. I argue that such objections gets their force from a popular but problematic model of theoretical deliberation which pictures deliberation as a function, treating the deliberation’s inputs as given, fixed prior to and independently from the deliberation. Though such a picture may seem plausible, attending to the case of self-fulfilling beliefs can help (...)
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  34. added 2019-09-13
    Accumulating Epistemic Power.Kristie Dotson - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):129-154.
    On December 3, 2014, in a piece entitled “White America’s Scary Delusion: Why Its Sense of Black Humanity Is So Skewed,” Brittney Cooper criticizes attempts to deem Black rage at state-sanctioned violence against Black people “unreasonable.” In this paper, I outline a problem with epistemology that Cooper highlights in order to explore whether beliefs can wrong. My overall claim is there are difficult-to-defeat arguments concerning the “legitimacy” of police slayings against Black people that are indicative of problems with epistemology because (...)
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  35. added 2019-09-08
    Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity.Luis R. G. Oliveira - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...)
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  36. added 2019-09-06
    Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
  37. added 2019-09-03
    Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives.Benjamin R. Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.) - 2019 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    The papers collected in this book share a common motivation: All respond to certain kinds of injustice that unfairly and unreasonably prevent the insights and intellectual abilities of vulnerable and stigmatized groups from being given their due recognition. Most people are opposed to injustice in principle, and do not want to have mistaken views about others. But research in the social sciences reveals a disturbing truth: Even people who intend to be fair-minded and unprejudiced are influenced by unconscious biases and (...)
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  38. added 2019-08-28
    Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue (...)
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  39. added 2019-08-13
    Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge, 2019.
    A growing number of philosophers are concerned with the epistemic status of culturally nurtured beliefs, beliefs found especially in domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion. Plausibly, worries about the deep impact of cultural contingencies on beliefs in these domains of controversial views is a question about well-foundedness: Does it defeat well-foundedness if the agent is rationally convinced that she would take her own reasons for belief as insufficiently well-founded, or would take her own belief as biased, had she been (...)
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  40. added 2019-08-13
    Dossier “La philosophie de l’humilité”.Elisa Grimi, C. Canullo, M. Micheletti, K. Opalka, R. Pouivet & M. Salvioli - 2017 - Tolosa, Francia: ICT.
    Dossier: L’humilité Présentation du dossier. Coordonné par Elisa Grimi. Essays and contributors: L’intelligence de l’humilité, Carla Canullo; La virtù dell’umiltà e l’eudemonismo, Mario Micheletti; Humility – A work of love?, Katharine Opalka; L’humilité intellectuelle, la foi et l’épistémologie, Roger Pouivet; L’irriducibile ragionevolezza di un paradosso. L’umiltà secondo Tommaso d’Aquino e Gilbert K. Chesterton, Marco Salvioli, O.P.; L’Humilité, une ontologie de l’identité, Elisa Grimi.
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  41. added 2019-08-07
    Critical Notice of Epistemic Consequentialism (Eds. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn). [REVIEW]Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - Analysis.
  42. added 2019-07-05
    Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.
    Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist (...)
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  43. added 2019-06-19
    The Specter of Normative Conflict: Does Fairness Require Inaccuracy?Rima Basu - forthcoming - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. Routledge.
    A challenge we face in a world that has been shaped by, and continues to be shaped by, racist attitudes and institutions is that the evidence is often stacked in favor of racist beliefs. As a result, we may find ourselves facing the following conflict: what if the evidence we have supports something we morally shouldn’t believe? For example, it is morally wrong to assume, solely on the basis of someone’s skin color, that they’re a staff member. But, what if (...)
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  44. added 2019-06-18
    An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
    Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...)
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  45. added 2019-06-15
    How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...)
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  46. added 2019-06-06
    Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...)
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  47. added 2019-06-06
    Structure and Content in “The Will to Believe”.Jeff Kasser - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (3):320.
    This paper argues that sustained attention to the highlighted structure of William James's “The Will to Believe” yields surprising insights into the essay. “Highlighted structure” includes James's announcements of his intentions, his section breaks, and, especially, patterns of repetition and contrast within the work. Particular attention is paid to a criticism to which James frequently returns, viz. that evidentialists are driven by their passions to adopt evidentialism. I argue that James does not take this to constitute an objection to evidentialism (...)
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  48. added 2019-06-06
    XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
    Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative (...)
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  49. added 2019-06-06
    Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, by Katja Maria Vogt.: Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1204-1207.
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  50. added 2019-06-06
    Review of Owen Anderson, The Clarity of God’s Existence: The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment: Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2008, ISBN: 9781556356957, Pb, 206 Pp. [REVIEW]Graham Oppy - 2010 - Sophia 49 (2):301-308.
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