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  1. added 2019-01-05
    Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction.William Peden - unknown
    John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, though his theory has attracted considerable criticisms. I detail several novel issues for his theory, but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-30
    In Defense of an Epistemic Probability Account of Luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as significant, and (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-28
    Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
    The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-13
    Influences on Primary Care Provider Imaging for a Hypothetical Patient with Low Back Pain.Hh le, Matt DeCamp, Amanda Bertram, Minal Kale & Zackary Berger - 2018 - Southern Journal of Medicine 12 (111):758-762.
    OBJECTIVE: How outside factors affect physician decision making remains an open question of vital importance. We sought to investigate the importance of various influences on physician decision making when clinical guidelines differ from patient preference. -/- METHODS: An online survey asking 469 primary care providers (PCPs) across four practice sites whether they would order magnetic resonance imaging for a patient with uncomplicated back pain. Participants were randomized to one of four scenarios: a patient's preference for imaging (control), a patient's preference (...)
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  5. added 2018-12-06
    Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    According to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon (...)
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  6. added 2018-11-29
    Evidence and Intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
    Many philosophers accept a view—what I will call the intuition picture—according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson (2004, 2007 Ch, 1) has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgments relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that it: (I) is consistent with (...)
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  7. added 2018-11-28
    Lewis on Williamson: Evidence, Knowledge and Vagueness.Daniel Nolan - manuscript
    In May 1999, David Lewis sent Timothy Williamson an intriguing letter about knowledge and vagueness. This paper has a brief discussion of Lewis on evidence, and a longer discussion of a distinctive theory of vagueness Lewis puts forward in this letter, one rather different from standard forms of supervaluationism. Lewis's theory enables him to provide distinctive responses to the challenges to supervaluationism famously offered in chapter 5 of Timothy Williamson's 1994 book Vagueness. However these responses bring out a number of (...)
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  8. added 2018-11-21
    On Williamson's Account of Propositional Evidence.Artūrs Logins - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):347-354.
    In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary (...)
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  9. added 2018-11-11
    Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...)
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  10. added 2018-11-06
    Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  11. added 2018-11-04
    On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscript
    Abstract: Scepticism about the normativity of rationality is often partially based on the assumption that normative reasons are normative. Starting from the assumption that normative reasons are normative, someone will argue that reasons and rationality can require different things from us and conclude that rationality must not be normative. We think that the assumption that normative reasons are normative is one that deserves more scrutiny, particularly if it turns out, as we shall argue, that no one has yet shown that (...)
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  12. added 2018-09-17
    The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Facts about justification are not brute facts. They are epistemic facts that depend upon more fundamental non-epistemic facts. Internalists about justification often argue for mentalism, which claims that facts about justification supervene upon one’s non-factive mental states, using Lehrer and Cohen’s :191–207, 1983) New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem tells you to imagine yourself the victim of a Cartesian demon who deceives you about what the external world is like, and then asks whether you nevertheless have justification (...)
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  13. added 2018-09-06
    Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.
    There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...)
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  14. added 2018-08-20
    The Prejudicial Effects of 'Reasonable Steps' in Analysis of Mens Rea and Sexual Consent: Two Solutions.Lucinda Vandervort - 2018 - Alberta Law Review 55 (4):933-970.
    This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether (...)
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  15. added 2018-08-11
    The Jury's Still Out on What Constitutes a Microaggression.Musa Al-Gharbi - 2018 - In Gary Weiner (ed.), Microaggressions, Trigger Warnings & Safe Spaces. Farmington Hills, Michigan: Greenhaven Press. pp. 106-13.
    In "Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence," Scott Lillenfeld argues that, despite a decade of scholarship, the Microaggression Research Program (MRP) continues to suffer serious analytic and evidentiary problems. After walking through these shortcomings, he provides 18 suggestions to help improve the reliability and utility of the MRP. In "Microaggressions and 'Evidence': Experimental or Experiential Reality?" Derald Wing Sue responds. This chapter provides background on the origin of the MRP, and referees the dispute between Lillenfeld and Sue about its contemporary status.
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  16. added 2018-07-23
    On Providing Evidence.Charity Anderson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):245-260.
    Obligations to provide evidence to others arise in many contexts. This paper develops a framework within which to understand what it is to provide evidence to someone. I argue that an initially plausible connection between evidence-providing and evidence-possession fails: it is not the case that in order to count as providing evidence to someone, the intended recipient must have the evidence. I further argue that the following is possible: evidence is provided to an agent, the agent does not have the (...)
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  17. added 2018-06-25
    Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports.Michael J. Shaffer - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-13.
    It is wholly uncontroversial that measurements-or, more properly, propositions that are measurement reports-are often paradigmatically good cases of propositions that serve the function of evidence. In normal cases it is also obvious that stating such a report is an utterly pedestrian case of successful assertion. So, for example, there is nothing controversial about the following claims: (1) that a proposition to the effect that a particular thermometer reads 104C when properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient is (...)
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  18. added 2018-05-30
    Safety and the Preface Paradox.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):215-219.
    In the preface paradox the posited author is supposed to know both that every sentence in a book is true and that not every sentence in that book is true. But, this result is paradoxically contradictory. The paradoxicality exhibited in such cases arises chiefly out of the recognition that large-scale and difficult tasks like verifying the truth of large sets of sentences typically involve errors even given our best efforts to be epistemically diligent. This paper introduces an argument designed to (...)
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  19. added 2018-05-25
    Visual Representations in Science - Concept and Epistemology.Nicola Mößner - 2018 - London AND New York: Routledge.
    Visual representations (photographs, diagrams, etc.) play crucial roles in scientific processes. They help, for example, to communicate research results and hypotheses to scientific peers as well as to the lay audience. In genuine research activities they are used as evidence or as surrogates for research objects which are otherwise cognitively inaccessible. Despite their important functional roles in scientific practices, philosophers of science have more or less neglected visual representations in their analyses of epistemic methods and tools of reasoning in science. (...)
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  20. added 2018-05-22
    Intraspecies Impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme:1-17.
    The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P. Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson (Episteme, 2017) claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that (...)
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  21. added 2018-04-19
    Does Luck Exclude Knowledge or Certainty?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    A popular account of luck, with a firm basis in common sense, holds that a necessary condition for an event to be lucky, is that it was suitably improbable. It has recently been proposed that this improbability condition is best understood in epistemic terms. Two different versions of this proposal have been advanced. According to my own proposal (Steglich-Petersen 2010), whether an event is lucky for some agent depends on whether the agent was in a position to know that the (...)
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  22. added 2018-03-02
    Medicine is Not Science.Clifford Miller & Donald W. Miller - 2014 - European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 2 (2):144-153.
    ABSTRACT: Abstract Most modern knowledge is not science. The physical sciences have successfully validated theories to infer they can be used universally to predict in previously unexperienced circumstances. According to the conventional conception of science such inferences are falsified by a single irregular outcome. And verification is by the scientific method which requires strict regularity of outcome and establishes cause and effect. -/- Medicine, medical research and many “soft” sciences are concerned with individual people in complex heterogeneous populations. These populations (...)
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  23. added 2018-02-18
    Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-17
    "Facing Mecca: Ultimism, Religious Skepticism, and Schellenberg's" Meta-Evidential Condition Constraining Assent.Stephen J. Wykstra - 2011 - Philo 14 (1):85-100.
    Schellenberg’s Wisdom to Doubt uses a “meta-evidential condition constraining assent” that I dub MECCA. On MECCA, my total current evidence E may be good evidence for H, yet not justify my believing H, due to meta-evidential considerations giving me reason to doubt whether E is “representative” of the total evidence E* that exists. I argue that considerations of representativeness are implicit in judging that E is good evidence, rendering this description incoherent, and that Schellenberg’s specific meta-evidence has less trumping power (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-17
    Perceptual Evidence and Information.Tommaso Piazza - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):75-95.
    Quite recently, Luciano Floridi has put forward the fascinating suggestion that knowledge should be analyzed as special kind of information, in particular as accounted information. As I will try tentatively to show, one important consequence of Floridi’s proposal is that the notion of justification, and of evidence, should play no role in a philosophical understanding of knowledge. In this paper, I shall suggest one potential difficulty with which Floridi’s proposal might be consequently afflicted, yet accept the fundamental suggestion that traditional (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-17
    Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Jonathan Matheson - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):269-279.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
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  27. added 2018-02-17
    The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time.Miranda Fricker - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:121-138.
    The current literature on the value of knowledge is marred by two unwarranted presumptions, which together distort the debate and conceal what is perhaps the most basic value of knowledge, as distinct from mere true belief. These presumptions are the Synchronic Presumption, which confines philosophical attention to the present snapshot in time; and the Analytical Presumption, which has people look for the value of knowledge in some kind of warrant. Together these presumptions conceal that the value of knowledge might inhere (...)
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  28. added 2018-02-17
    ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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  29. added 2018-02-17
    On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony.P. Faulkner - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):353-370.
    The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and (...)
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  30. added 2018-02-16
    Strategies for Securing Evidence Through Model Criticism.Kent W. Staley - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-43.
    Some accounts of evidence regard it as an objective relationship holding between data and hypotheses, perhaps mediated by a testing procedure. Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence is an example of such an approach. Such a view leaves open the question of when an epistemic agent is justified in drawing an inference from such data to a hypothesis. Using Mayo’s account as an illustration, I propose a framework for addressing the justification question via a relativized notion, which I designate security , (...)
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  31. added 2018-02-16
    The Routledge Companion to Epistemology.Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. _The Routledge Companion to Epistemology_ provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the _Companion_ is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-12
    Optogenetics, Pluralism, and Progress.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (00):1090-1101.
    Optogenetic techniques are described as “revolutionary” for the unprecedented causal control they allow neuroscientists to exert over neural activity in awake behaving animals. In this paper, I demonstrate by means of a case study that optogenetic techniques will only illuminate causal links between the brain and behavior to the extent that their error characteristics are known and, further, that determining these error characteristics requires comparison of optogenetic techniques with techniques having well known error characteristics and consideration of the broader neural (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-20
    Logic of Probability and Conjecture.Harry Crane - unknown
    I introduce a formalization of probability which takes the concept of 'evidence' as primitive. In parallel to the intuitionistic conception of truth, in which 'proof' is primitive and an assertion A is judged to be true just in case there is a proof witnessing it, here 'evidence' is primitive and A is judged to be probable just in case there is evidence supporting it. I formalize this outlook by representing propositions as types in Martin-Lof type theory (MLTT) and defining a (...)
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  34. added 2018-01-05
    The Problem of Evaluating Automated Large-Scale Evidence Aggregators.Nicolas Wüthrich & Katie Steele - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria for evaluating an evidence aggregator of this sort are. What is the (...)
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  35. added 2017-11-04
    Necessary Truths, Evidence, and Knowledge.Artūrs Logins - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...)
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  36. added 2017-09-05
    Evidence Neutrality.Brian Weatherson - manuscript
    Notes for a talk exploring Timothy Williamson's arguments against evidence neutrality.
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  37. added 2017-07-21
    Knowing What Things Look Like.Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it?s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of?just seeing? that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one?s knowledge of what the relevant (...)
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  38. added 2017-07-04
    Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.
    An infuential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for more specific category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.
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  39. added 2017-06-26
    Standing in Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer.
    According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support (...)
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  40. added 2017-06-09
    What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence Of?Fabio Lampert & John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):195-206.
    Richard Feldman’s well-known principle about disagreement and evidence – usually encapsulated in the slogan, ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’, (EEE) – invites the question, what should a rational believer do when faced by such evidence, especially when the disagreement is with an epistemic peer? The question has been the subject of much controversy. However, it has been recently suggested both that the principle is subject to counterexamples and that it is trivial. If either is the case, the question of what (...)
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  41. added 2017-05-30
    The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
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  42. added 2017-05-22
    What to Believe About Your Belief That You're in the Good Case.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    Going about our daily lives in an orderly manner requires us, once we are aware of them, to dismiss many metaphysical possibilities. We take it for granted that we are not brains in vats, or living in the Matrix, or in an extended dream. Call these things that we take for granted “anti-skeptical assumptions”. What should a reflective agent who believes these things think of these beliefs? For various reasons, it can seem that we do not have evidence for such (...)
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  43. added 2017-05-22
    Daniel Star, Knowing Better. [REVIEW]Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  44. added 2017-05-09
    A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.
    One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
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  45. added 2017-05-09
    Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
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  46. added 2017-02-14
    Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
  47. added 2017-02-14
    Recensioni/Reviews-Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. On Two Dogmas of Epistemology.S. Hetherington & J. L. Camp - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):353.
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  48. added 2017-02-14
    Recensioni/Reviews-Confusion. A Study in the Theory of Knowledge.N. Vassallo - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):353.
  49. added 2017-02-14
    The Limitations of Evidence.Douglas Black - 1998 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 42 (1):1-7.
  50. added 2017-02-14
    Paul K. Moser, Ed., Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology Reviewed By.Andrew Latus - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (1):57-58.
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