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  1. added 2020-06-28
    Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence.John Turri - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The lottery problem. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    I review recent empirical findings on knowledge attributions in lottery cases and report a new experiment that advances our understanding of the topic. The main novel finding is that people deny knowledge in lottery cases because of an underlying qualitative difference in how they process probabilistic information. “Outside” information is generic and pertains to a base rate within a population. “Inside” information is specific and pertains to a particular item’s propensity. When an agent receives information that 99% of all lottery (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-21
    Arguments and Stories in Legal Reasoning: The Case of Evidence Law.Gianluca Andresani - 2020 - Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 106 (1):75-90.
    We argue that legal argumentation, as the subject matter as well as a special subfield of Argumentation Studies (AS), has to be examined by making skilled use of the full panoply of tools such as argumentation and story schemes which are at the forefront of current work in AS. In reviewing the literature, we make explicit our own methodological choices (particularly regarding the place of normative deliberation in practical reasoning) and then illustrate the implications of such an approach through the (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-06
    Relevance and Risk: How the Relevant Alternatives Framework Models the Epistemology of Risk.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-28
    Sleeping Beauty's Evidence.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    What degrees of belief does Sleeping Beauty's evidence support? That depends.
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  5. added 2020-04-29
    The Functional Complexity of Scientific Evidence.Matthew J. Brown - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (1):65-83.
    This article sketches the main features of traditional philosophical models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that it regards as doing more harm than good. It then proceeds to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, a view the author calls dynamic evidential functionalism (DEF). This alternative builds on insights from philosophy of scientific practice, Kuhnian philosophy of science, pragmatist epistemology, philosophy of experimentation, and functionalist philosophy of mind. Along the way, the (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-18
    Philosophy of Medicine: Causality, Evidence and Explanation.David Teira - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):456-458.
  7. added 2020-02-28
    The Context Distinction: Controversies Over Feminist Philosophy of Science.Monica Aufrecht - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):373-392.
    The “context of discovery” and “context of justification” distinction has been used by Noretta Koertge and Lynn Hankinson Nelson in debates over the legitimacy of feminist approaches to philosophy of science. Koertge uses the context distinction to focus the conversation by barring certain approaches. I contend this focus masks points of true disagreement about the nature of justification. Nonetheless, Koertge raises important questions that have been too quickly set aside by some. I conclude that the context distinction should not be (...)
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  8. added 2020-02-23
    What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.
    Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the evidential support of some (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-21
    Medical Nihilism By Jacob Stegenga. [REVIEW]Leemon McHenry - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Nihilism, as most commonly understood, is the existential thesis that life is without objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value. Medical nihilism is the radical skepticism, indeed cynicism, about the objectivity, purpose or value of medical interventions. According to Stegenga, it is the view that we should have little confidence in the effectiveness of medical treatments. Stegenga provides a rigorous epistemological investigation into the evidence for medical interventions, one that is informed by the methods of analytical philosophy and a Bayesian formalism.
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  10. added 2020-02-09
    Randomization in Experimental Design.Zeno Gerhard Swijtink - 1982 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    Experimental randomization is defended as a procedure to select an allocation of treatments in comparative experiments. To be convincing, a comparative experiment should allow many alternative allocations of treatments over experimental units, that look equally informative "on paper," but may have underlying differences. Randomization prevents these underlying differences to be causally influential when an allocation is chosen for implementation. Randomization helps prevent bias. ;Both Bayesian criticisms of randomization and what seems to be the opinion of the early Fisher are rejected. (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-07
    New Work For Certainty.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8).
    This paper argues that we should assign certainty a central place in epistemology. While epistemic certainty played an important role in the history of epistemology, recent epistemology has tended to dismiss certainty as an unattainable ideal, focusing its attention on knowledge instead. I argue that this is a mistake. Attending to certainty attributions in the wild suggests that much of our everyday knowledge qualifies, in appropriate contexts, as certain. After developing a semantics for certainty ascriptions, I put certainty to explanatory (...)
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  12. added 2020-02-07
    Targeted Chemotherapy, the Medical Ecosystem, and the Future of American Health Care.Muriel R. Gillick - 2014 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 57 (2):268-284.
    In light of the central role that medications play in medical progress, the declining rate of new drug development over the past decade is cause for concern . Without important breakthroughs in drug discovery, the future will not be auspicious for the many people suffering from chronic and incurable illnesses. The sluggish pace of pharmaceutical innovation has been particularly characteristic of the largest drug manufacturers, which have generally focused their energies on potential blockbuster medications, those that can generate over $1 (...)
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  13. added 2019-12-06
    Evidence, Belief, and Action: The Failure of Equipoise to Resolve the Ethical Tension in the Randomized Clinical Trial.Deborah Hellman - 2002 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 30 (3):375-380.
  14. added 2019-12-01
    A Challenge for Evidence-Based Policy.Adam La Caze & Mark Colyvan - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (1):1-13.
    Evidence-based policy has support in many areas of government and in public affairs more generally. In this paper we outline what evidence-based policy is, then we discuss its strengths and weaknesses. In particular, we argue that it faces a serious challenge to provide a plausible, over-arching account of evidence. We contrast evidence-based policy with evidence-based medicine, especially the role of evidence in assessing the effectiveness of medicines. The evidence required for policy decisions does not easily lend itself to randomized controlled (...)
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  15. added 2019-11-30
    Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.
    This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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  16. added 2019-11-22
    Guest Editorial: Evidence-Based Approaches and Practises in Phenomenology: Evidence and Pedagogy.Sally Borbasi & Kathleen Galvin - 2012 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup2):1-4.
  17. added 2019-11-20
    Meta-Research Evidence for Evaluating Therapies.Jonathan Fuller - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):767-780.
    The new field of meta-research investigates industry bias, publication bias, contradictions between studies, and other trends in medical research. I argue that its findings should be used as meta-evidence for evaluating therapies. ‘Meta-evidence’ is evidence about the support that direct ‘first-order evidence’ provides the hypothesis. I consider three objections to my proposal: the irrelevance objection, the screening-off objection, and the underdetermination objection. I argue that meta-research evidence works by rationally revising our confidence in first-order evidence and, consequently, in the hypothesis—typically, (...)
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  18. added 2019-11-20
    Evidence‐Based Medicine, Case‐Based Medicine; Scientific Medicine, Quasi‐Scientific Medicine. Commentary on Tonelli (2006), Integrating Evidence Into Clinical Practice: An Alternative to Evidence‐Based Approaches.Olli S. Miettinen - 2006 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 12 (3):260-264.
    In this issue of Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, Tonelli criticizes the ‘philosophy’ of the evidence‐based medicine (EBM) movement and advocates a ‘case‐based’ or ‘casuistic’ alternative to EBM – I shall call this case‐based medicine, CBM. -/- Here, I summarize Tonelli’s article, comment on it critically, and then proceed to advocate commitment to knowledge‐based medicine instead. More specifically, I advocate commitment to scientific medicine and to its precursor, quasi‐scientific medicine – to efforts to bring these about as expeditiously as (...)
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  19. added 2019-11-13
    Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry, by Tim Thornton.C. Perring - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):882-886.
  20. added 2019-10-19
    The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle relies on called Entitlement, a (...)
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  21. added 2019-10-14
    Reasonable Science. [REVIEW]James Franklin - 2003 - New Criterion 22 (3):70-73.
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  22. added 2019-10-05
    Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
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  23. added 2019-09-19
    New Water in Old Buckets: Hypothetical and Counterfactual Reasoning in Mach’s Economy of Science.Lydia Patton - 2019 - In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Springer Verlag.
    Ernst Mach’s defense of relativist theories of motion in Die Mechanik involves a well-known criticism of Newton’s theory appealing to absolute space, and of Newton’s “bucket” experiment. Sympathetic readers (Norton 1995) and critics (Stein 1967, 1977) agree that there’s a tension in Mach’s view: he allows for some constructed scientific concepts, but not others, and some kinds of reasoning about unobserved phenomena, but not others. Following Banks (2003), I argue that this tension can be interpreted as a constructive one, springing (...)
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  24. added 2019-08-23
    Intraspecies Impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.
    The Uniqueness thesis says that any body of evidence E uniquely determines which doxastic attitude is rationally permissible regarding some proposition P. Permissivists deny Uniqueness. They are charged with arbitrarily favouring one doxastic attitude out of the set of attitudes they regard as rationally permissible. Simpson claims that an appeal to differences in cognitive abilities can remove the arbitrariness. I argue that it can't. Impermissivists face a challenge of their own: The problem of fine distinctions. I suggest that meeting this (...)
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  25. added 2019-08-08
    Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice: Predicting What Will Work Locally.Kathryn E. Joyce & Nancy Cartwright - forthcoming - American Educational Research Journal.
    This article addresses the gap between what works in research and what works in practice. Currently, research in evidence-based education policy and practice focuses on randomized controlled trials. These can support causal ascriptions (“It worked”) but provide little basis for local effectiveness predictions (“It will work here”), which are what matter for practice. We argue that moving from ascription to prediction by way of causal generalization (“It works”) is unrealistic and urge focusing research efforts directly on how to build local (...)
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  26. added 2019-07-12
    You Can’T Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):225-227.
    In this discussion note, I put forth an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. If this argument is sound, then epistemologists who think that knowledge is factive are thereby also committed to the view that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
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  27. added 2019-06-28
    The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.) - 2019 - Routledge.
  28. added 2019-06-06
    Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush: Review Article.Eric Christian Barnes - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549-557.
    Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber &Lsqb;2005&Rsqb;: Articles.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Tommaso Mastropasqua - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201-211.
    Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. Introduction Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation Bayesian Confirmation by (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    Knowledge and Evidence.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
    Most of us, tacitly or explicitly, embrace a more or less Cartesian conception of our epistemic condition. According to such a conception, "what we have to go on" in learning about the world is, on the one hand, that which is a priori accessible to us, and, on the other, the inner experiences-visual imagery, tactile sensations, recollective episodes and so on-that pop into our Cartesian theaters. One of the central themes of Knowledge and its Limits is that this picture is (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence&Quest.Michael Veber - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):557-569.
    Gilbert Harman has presented an argument to the effect that if S knows that p then S knows that any evidence for not-p is misleading. Therefore S is warranted in being dogmatic about anything he happens to know. I explain, and reject, Sorensen's attempt to solve the paradox via Jackson's theory of conditionals. S is not in a position to disregard evidence even when.
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    ‘A General Theory of Societal Knowledge’?Martin Kusch - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (1):183-192.
  33. added 2019-06-06
    Comments on Susan Haack’s Evidence and Inquiry.H. S. Thayer - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):615-619.
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    Haack’s Evidence and Inquiry.Bruce Aune - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):627-632.
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    Evidence and Inquiry by Susan Haack.James Cargile - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):621-625.
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  36. added 2019-06-06
    Can Knowledge Be Reached?∗.Arm Næss - 1961 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4 (1-4):219-227.
    There is no amount or quality of evidence such that if that amount or quality is reached, then truth is reached. If, therefore, a proposition must be true in order to constitute knowledge, knowledge is never reached. If certain standards of evidence are satisfied I have the right to say ?I know?, and the right does not depend on how one answers the question whether it is right what I say.
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  37. added 2019-06-05
    Evidence and Inference.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):299-317.
    I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our knowledge. This entails Williamson's equation of knowledge with evidence.
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  38. added 2019-06-05
    Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
    We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence or testimony providing causal information. Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why (...)
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  39. added 2019-06-05
    Precis of Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in EpistemologyEvidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology. [REVIEW]Susan Haack - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):611.
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  40. added 2019-06-05
    Evidence and Inference. Daniel Lerner.Leo Simons - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):98-98.
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  41. added 2019-04-27
    Du Bois’ Democratic Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Liam Bright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2227-2245.
    Philosophers of science debate the proper role of non-epistemic value judgements in scientific reasoning. Many modern authors oppose the value free ideal, claiming that we should not even try to get scientists to eliminate all such non-epistemic value judgements from their reasoning. W. E. B. Du Bois, on the other hand, has a defence of the value free ideal in science that is rooted in a conception of the proper place of science in a democracy. In particular, Du Bois argues (...)
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  42. added 2019-04-16
    Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1395-1402.
    Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by BrownJessica. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xii + 197.
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  43. added 2019-04-05
    Armchair Access and Imagination.Giada Fratantonio - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):525-547.
    In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins (2005), and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line (...)
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  44. added 2019-03-07
    Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation.Erhan Demircioglu - 2019 - Theoria 85 (2):119-144.
  45. added 2019-02-28
    The Logical Structure of Human Behavior.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic (...)
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  46. added 2019-02-23
    A Review of ‘The Blue and Brown Books’ by Ludwig Wittgenstein 208p (1958) (1933-1935)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas: Reality Press. pp. 275-294.
    This work can be regarded as an outline of behavior (human nature) from our greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. Sadly, Wittgenstein's brilliant exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful. -/- Much of the work is aimed at undermining the (...)
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  47. added 2019-02-11
    Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Greco - forthcoming - In Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  48. added 2019-01-05
    Direct Inference in the Material Theory of Induction.William Peden - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):672-695.
    John D. Norton’s “Material Theory of Induction” has been one of the most intriguing recent additions to the philosophy of induction. Norton’s account appears to be a notably natural account of actual inductive practices, although his theory has attracted considerable criticism. I detail several novel issues for his theory but argue that supplementing the Material Theory with a theory of direct inference could address these problems. I argue that if this combination is possible, a stronger theory of inductive reasoning emerges, (...)
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  49. added 2018-12-30
    In Defense of an Epistemic Probability Account of Luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.
    Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as significant, and (...)
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  50. added 2018-12-28
    Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press.
    The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In (...)
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