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  1. LERNER , Evidence and Inference. [REVIEW]Abelson Abelson - 1960 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21:413.
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  2. Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Peter Achinstein - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume address three fundamental questions in the philosophy of science: What is required for some fact to be evidence for a scientific ...
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  3. A Challenge to Positive Relevance Theorists: Reply to Roush.Peter Achinstein - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):521-524.
    Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful.
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  4. The Book of Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, (...)
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  5. On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew.Peter Achinstein - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):81–83.
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  6. Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher.Peter Achinstein - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):175-182.
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  7. Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori?Peter Achinstein - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  8. Stronger Evidence.Peter Achinstein - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):329-350.
    According to a standard account of evidence, one piece of information is stronger evidence for an hypothesis than is another iff the probability of the hypothesis on the one is greater than it is on the other. This condition, I argue, is neither necessary nor sufficient because various factors can strengthen the evidence for an hypothesis without increasing (and even decreasing) its probability. Contrary to what probabilists claim, I show that this obtains even if a probability function can take these (...)
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  9. Courage, Evidence, And Epistemic Virtue.Osvil Acosta-Morales - 2006 - Florida Philosophical Review 6 (1):8-16.
    I present here a case against the evidentialist approach that claims that in so far as our interests are epistemic what should guide our belief formation and revision is always a strict adherence to the available evidence. I go on to make the stronger claim that some beliefs based on admittedly “insufficient” evidence may exhibit epistemic virtue. I propose that we consider a form of courage to be an intellectual or epistemic virtue. It is through this notion of courage that (...)
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  10. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology.Joseph Agassi - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):261-270.
    If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is (...)
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  11. Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness.Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):259-282.
    How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition (...)
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  12. Truth and Evidence.Robert Almeder - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):365-368.
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  13. Believing Necessary Propositions.Alice Ambrose - 1974 - Mind 83 (330):286-290.
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  14. Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11 (18).
    Two theses figure centrally in work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’) and Uniqueness (‘U’). According to EW, you should give precisely as much weight to the attitude of a disagreeing epistemic peer as you give to your own attitude. U has it that, for any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Although EW has received considerable discussion, the case for U has not (...)
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  15. The Book of Evidence (London).John Banville - forthcoming - Minerva.
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  16. Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW]Eric Christian Barnes - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.
    Sherrilyn Roush's Tracking Truth provides a sustained and ambitious development of the basic idea that knowledge is true belief that tracks the truth. In this essay, I provide a quick synopsis of Roush's book and offer a substantive discussion of her analysis of scientific evidence. Roush argues that, for e to serve as evidence for h, it should be easier to determine the truth value of e than it is to determine the truth value of h, an ideal she refers (...)
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  17. Higher-Order Evidence: Its Nature and Epistemic Significance.Brian Barnett - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    Higher-order evidence is, roughly, evidence of evidence. The idea is that evidence comes in levels. At the first, or lowest, evidential level is evidence of the familiar type—evidence concerning some proposition that is not itself about evidence. At a higher evidential level the evidence concerns some proposition about the evidence at a lower level. Only in relatively recent years has this less familiar type of evidence been explicitly identified as a subject of epistemological focus, and the work on it remains (...)
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  18. Evidence and Ideal Evidence.William H. Baumer - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (4):567-572.
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  19. Probability, Objectivity, and Evidence.F. C. Benenson - 1984 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    INTRODUCTION I should begin by warning the reader that many of the views presented in this book are decidedly unfashionable; the theory of probability I ...
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  20. Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience.Gregor Betz - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137.
    Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...)
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  21. Can There Be Empirical Evidence for General Truth?Chandidas Bhattacharya - 1987 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (4):333-347.
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  22. Is Evidence Non-Inferential?Alexander Bird - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):252–265.
    Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry.
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  23. Motivating Epistemic Reasons for Action.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):265 - 271.
    Rowbottom (2008) has recently challenged my definition of epistemic reasons for action and has offered an alternative account. In this paper, I argue that less than giving an 'alternative' definition, Rowbottom has offered an additional condition to my original account. I argue, further, that such an extra condition is unnecessary, i.e. that the arguments designed to motivate it do not go through.
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  24. Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may (...)
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  25. On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
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  26. Ethics and Evidence. Botkin Jr - 1992 - Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (1):63.
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  27. Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.
    Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient (...)
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  28. Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality.Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder & Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):279-300.
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  29. "Inquiry, Evidence, and Experiment: The "Experimenter's Regress" Dissolved.Matthew J. Brown - manuscript
    Contemporary ways of understanding of science, especially in the philosophy of science, are beset by overly abstract and formal models of evidence. In such models, the only interesting feature of evidence is that it has a one-way ``support'' relation to hypotheses, theories, causal claims, etc. These models create a variety of practical and philosophical problems, one prominent example being the experimenter's regress. According to the experimenter's regress, good evidence is produced by good techniques, but which techniques are good is only (...)
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  30. Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.
    This paper addresses the question of whether gathering additional evidence is always rationally required, both from the point of view of instrumental rationality and of epistemic rationality. It is shown that in certain situations, it is not instrumentally rational to look for more evidence before making a decision. These are situations in which the risk of “misleading” evidence – a concept that has both instrumental and epistemic senses – is not offset by the gains from the possibility of non-misleading evidence. (...)
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  31. A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
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  32. Logical Form: Types of Evidence. [REVIEW]Greg N. Carlson - 1983 - Linguistics and Philosophy 6 (3):295 - 317.
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  33. Well‐Ordered Science: Evidence for Use.Nancy Cartwright - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):981-990.
    This article agrees with Philip Kitcher that we should aim for a well-ordered science, one that answers the right questions in the right ways. Crucial to this is to address questions of use: Which scientific account is right for which system in which circumstances? This is a difficult question: evidence that may support a scientific claim in one context may not support it in another. Drawing on examples in physics and other sciences, this article argues that work on the warrant (...)
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  34. A Theory of Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy.Nancy Cartwright & Jacob Stegenga - 2011 - In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy. pp. 291.
    WE AIM HERE to outline a theory of evidence for use. More specifically we lay foundations for a guide for the use of evidence in predicting policy effectiveness in situ, a more comprehensive guide than current standard offerings, such as the Maryland rules in criminology, the weight of evidence scheme of the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), or the US ‘What Works Clearinghouse’. The guide itself is meant to be well-grounded but at the same time to give practicable (...)
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  35. Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology.Wallace L. Chafe & Johanna Nichols (eds.) - 1986 - Ablex.
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  36. Higher-Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  37. The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  38. A Problem for the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.
    Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the (...)
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  39. Revisited Linguistic Intuitions.Jennifer Culbertson & Steven Gross - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639 - 656.
    Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus (...)
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  40. Realism and the Absence of Rivals.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2427-2446.
    Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are arguments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. On this basis it is argued that the likelihood of a theory (...)
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  41. A Classic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):237-240.
    Book review of Paul Horwich, Probability and Evidence (Cambridge Philosophy Classics edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 (paperback).
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  42. Evidence.Victor DiFate - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43. God and Perceptual Evidence.Paul Draper - 1992 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 32 (3):149 - 165.
  44. Inferential Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):203-213.
    Consider: -/- The Evidence Question: When, and under what conditions does an agent have proposition E as evidence (at t)? -/- Timothy Williamson's (2000) answer to this question is the well-known E = K thesis: -/- E = K: E is a member of S's evidence set at t iff S knows E at t. -/- I will argue that this answer is inconsistent with the version of Bayesianism that Williamson advocates. This is because E = K allows an agent (...)
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  45. Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
  46. II. Ultimate Evidence.Roderick Firth - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (23):732-739.
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  47. Spandrels and a Pervasive Problem of Evidence.Patrick Forber - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (2):247-266.
  48. Counterexamples to a Likelihood Theory of Evidence.Malcolm R. Forster - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (3):319-338.
    The likelihood theory of evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858. In Novum organon renovatum (Part II of the 3rd ed.). The philosophy of (...)
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  49. Preservationism in the Epistemology of Memory.Matthew Frise - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).
    Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t2, then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t2. Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in (...)
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  50. Evidence and What We Make of It.Logan Paul Gage - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):89-99.
    Some prominent epistemologists make a distinction between evidence on the one hand and what is made of that evidence by a subject on the other. For reasons that will become clear, this view threatens the evidentialist project. Yet, I argue, it is possible to retain evidentialism while preserving the intuition behind this distinction. First, I explain this distinction and illustrate it with two examples. Second, I explain what is at stake for evidentialism. Third, I develop a possible solution to the (...)
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