The notion of evidence features importantly in epistemology
and philosophy of science. There are three primary questions that a theory of
evidence must address. The constitution
question asks: What is the nature of evidence? A major divide in answers to the
constitution question is between those who think that all evidence is
propositional and those who think that some evidence is non-propositional. The possession
question asks: When does someone possess a piece of information as evidence? Restrictive
views of evidence possession hold that one has as evidence only information that one is consciously entertaining. More inclusive views of evidence
possession hold that one’s evidence includes non-occurrent
information, such as stored memories. Lastly, a theory of
evidence must address the positive
support question. In philosophy of science and formal epistemology the positive support question is: When is a hypothesis confirmed by evidence? In
contemporary epistemology the positive support question is: When is a belief
justified by evidence?
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Material to categorize
- P. Achinstein (1997). On Evidence: A Reply to McGrew. Analysis 57 (1):81-83.
- Rani Lill Anjum (2016). Evidence Based or Person Centered? An Ontological Debate. European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 4 (2):421-429.
- Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen D. Mumford (forthcoming). A Philosophical Argument Against Evidence-Based Policy. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
- Lennart Åqvist (2007). An Interpretation of Probability in the Law of Evidence Based on Pro-Et-Contra Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.
- Robert Audi (1999). Self-Evidence. Noûs 33 (s13):205-228.
- Daryl J. Bem (1998). Is EBE Theory Supported by the Evidence? Is It Androcentric? A Reply to Peplau Et Al. Psychological Review 105 (2):395-398.
- Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal (2015). Evidence of Evidence is Evidence. Analysis 75 (4):557-559.
- Tej N. Dhar (2015). Fictions of Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt. The European Legacy 21 (1):91-93.
- Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz (2016). An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support. Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.
- Ellery Eells & F. C. Benenson (1987). Probability, Objectivity and Evidence. Philosophical Review 96 (1):134.
- Irving John Good (1950). Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. Charles Griffin & Company Limited: London.
- Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization.
- Gilbert Harman (2015). Chapter 9. Evidence One Does Not Possess. In Thought. Princeton University Press. pp. 142-154.
- S. C. Hetherington (1996). Foley's Evidence and His Epistemic Reasons. Analysis 56 (2):122-126.
- William E. Hoffmann (1975). Almeder on Truth and Evidence. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (98):59-61.
- Jakob Hohwy (2004). Evidence, Explanation, and Experience. Journal of Philosophy 101 (5):242-254.
- Paul Horwich & A. J. Ayer (1973). Probability and Evidence. Philosophical Review 82 (4):547.
- Isaac Levi & Clark Glymour (1982). Theory and Evidence. Philosophical Review 91 (1):124.
- Berislav Maru%si'C. (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford University Press.
- Maruš, I.ć & Berislav (2015). Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving. Oxford University Press UK.
- Manfred Mayer, Theresa Smith & Irene Brückle (2014). III The Evidence of the Forged Paper. In Paul Needham, Irene Brückle & Horst Bredekamp (eds.), A Galileo Forgery: Unmasking the New York Sidereus Nuncius. De Gruyter. pp. 35-60.
- Vincent McNabb (1937). On Evidence. New Blackfriars 18 (204):165-170.
- Mitova Velislava (2017). Believable Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
- Wayne C. Myrvold (2017). On the Evidential Import of Unification. Philosophy of Science 84 (1):92-114.
- De Witt H. Parker (1942). World Hypotheses. A Study in Evidence. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 39 (19):527-530.
- Peter J. Phelan & Peter J. Reynolds (1996). Argument and Evidence: Critical Analysis for the Social Sciences. Routledge.
- George Pitcher (2015). III. Evidence for the Theory. In Theory of Perception. Princeton University Press. pp. 131-195.
- Douglas Walton with Chris Reed, Evaluating Corroborative Evidence.
- Nicholas Rescher & Carey B. Joynt (1959). Evidence in History and in the Law. Journal of Philosophy 56 (13):561-578.
- Teddy Seidenfeld & Paul Horwich (1984). Probability and Evidence. Philosophical Review 93 (3):474.
- Jacob Stegenga (2011). Is Meta-Analysis the Platinum Standard of Evidence? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):497-507.
- Richard B. Stothers (2004). Ancient Scientific Basis of the “Great Serpent” From Historical Evidence. Isis 95 (2):220-238.
- Eyal Tal & Juan Comesaña (2015). Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Noûs 50 (4).
- R. H. Vincent (1962). The Paradox of Ideal Evidence. Philosophical Review 71 (4):497-503.
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