Evil

My comment on Jim Sterba’s bookFootnote1 will consist in a critique of what I take to be the central argument of the book, an argument that a certain kind of evil that is prevalent in our world is logically inconsistent with the existence of a good God. For our purposes here, the argument can be summarized briefly; if my objection as given here succeeds, the entire argument will fail to establish its conclusion. It begins with a statement of an alleged (...) moral principle, then makes some assertions and draws a conclusion based on that principle. This principle is the Moral Evil Prevention Requirement 1. (shrink)

I develop a new theodicy in defense of Anselmian theism, one that has several advantages over traditional and recent replies to the Problem of Evil. To make my case, I first explain the value of a positive trajectory: a forward-in-time decrease in ‘first-order-gratuitous’ evil: evil that is not necessary for any equal-or-greater first-order good, but may be necessary for a higher-order good, such as the good of strongly positive axiological trajectory. Positive trajectory arguably contributes goodness to a world in proportion (...) to the magnitude of this trajectory, and worlds that contain first-order-gratuitous evil thereby have the potential to contain a strongly positive trajectory. This would arguably explain why God would permit first-order-gratuitous evils: he may be indifferent between a world with no first-order-gratuitous evil and a world with some first-order-gratuitous evil but a strongly positive trajectory. Next, I answer the most salient objections to this theodicy. Finally, I explain how this theodicy is superior to some common theodicies. (shrink)

The objection of horrible commands claims that divine command metaethics is doomed to failure because it is committed to the extremely counterintuitive assumption that torture of innocents, rape, and murder would be morally obligatory if God commanded these acts. Morriston, Wielenberg, and Sinnott-Armstrong have argued that formulating this objection in terms of counterpossibles is particularly forceful because it cannot be simply evaded by insisting on God’s necessary perfect moral goodness. I show that divine command metaethics can be defended even against (...) this counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands because we can explain the truth-value intuitions about the disputed counterpossibles as the result of conversational implicatures. Furthermore, I show that this pragmatics-based defence of divine command metaethics has several advantages over Pruss’s reductio counterargument against the counterpossible version of the objection of horrible commands. (shrink)

The demon is, in the thinker,s words, "supremely powerful and clever", and it is only the combination of these two traits with the demon's incessant deception that empowers Descartes to stage the radical doubt that will terminate in his attempted proofs of God and the material world. The reason the demon is necessary is that the thinker cannot prove that it would be wrong for God to allow us to be deceived occasionally. Thus, Descartes needed, methodologically and rhetorically, something more (...) than just an imperfect God or a lack of God altogether; he needed a being with exactly as much power as God but without God's goodness. In short, one should utilize philosophy for the everyday analogue to lucid dreaming. For those unfamiliar with the phenomenon, lucid dreaming involves training oneself, by a simple concentration exercise performed before falling asleep, to be able to become conscious of being in a dream while still in it and without thereby ending it. (shrink)

The point of departure for this article is a comparative study of Adorno and Arendt on the question of evil and modernity. To be precise, I observe how Adorno and Arendt present us with very different ways of understanding radical evil as an expression of the modern project of acceleration. This divergence presents us with a problematic which does not fit easily into the framework of the contemporary post-metaphysical engagement with evil. The latter projects a relational, non-substantive concept of evil (...) addressed under the order of collective memory and against the background of a normatively neutralized order of history. Yet I show, by tracing the continuities and discontinuities which exist between Arendt and Adorno’s conceptualizing of radical evil, on the one hand, and the different elements of this contemporary engagement, on the other, how the initial problematic is symptomatic of a continuing investment in history and can only be addressed in terms of such an investment. This investment is the product of a dynamic between history and memory, informing the work of both thinkers, which partially intersects with the Hegelian strategy of theodicy. I thus conclude with a consideration of whether certain aspects of the latter should be rehabilitated. (shrink)

There are many cries to resist particular objects (e.g. inequality in the workplace) but very little is said concerning the nature of resistance. As such, this project begins by mapping the concept of resistance. Next, I develop several tools that allow us to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable instances of resistance. I then argue that many versions of “the problem of evil” are actually instances of resistance. As such, these versions of the problem of evil are subject to the tools (...) of evaluation developed here. And, as it turns out, many instances of the problem of evil are instances of unreasonable resistance. I end the project by discussing the intersection between resistance and faith, arguing that faith (and the resistance it generates) can be perfectly rational while also providing a kind of response to the relevant problems of evil. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of a projected book to be entitled, The Ego and the Spirit. This book will endeavor to examine what lies at the heart of human spiritual aspiration from a psychological, philosophical, and religious perspective. In this first chapter, I discuss the predicament of the human ego, charged with a task that it cannot fulfill: To establish itself securely within being. The ego's efforts to fulfill this task through its dealings with the things and people of (...) the material world lead to distortions in its self-experience, its relations with others, and its involvement in life in general. The world's spiritual traditions have long recognized the predicament of the ego and present themselves as a means to its resolution. In this first chapter, though, the focus is on the ego and its predicament. (shrink)

The problem of evil has recently gained renewed attention. As before, what is so mind-boggling is not just the horrific aggression of man against man but the fact of offenders not easily being demonized into new versions of Iago or Macbeth. Somehow, what Hannah Arendt terms “the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” has to be dealt with, but the very effort to do so can be problematic if the idea of original sin is somehow resurrected. To examine the issue beyond (...) the conventional framework of Christian-Platonism, it is important to remember the wider international context of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when the matter first came up for discussion and when the philosophical and religious ideas received from the Far East provided for it a provocatively different frame of reference. (shrink)

The paper explores the way in which we can make sense of the seemingly contradictory presentations of God and the gods in tragic literature by looking to the thought of Martin Heidegger. The duplicity of the gods in tragedy is found to be a function of the uncertainty and questionworthiness of being.

There has been much recent debate over the meaning of the claim that God is good and loving. Although the participants in this debate strongly disagree over the correct analysis of the claim, there is nonetheless agreement across all parties that there is a single correct analysis. This paper aims to overthrow this consensus, by showing that sentences such as ‘There is a good and loving God’ are often used to express a variety of beliefs with quite different logico-grammatical characteristics. (...) Belief in a good and loving God might range from being an evidentially grounded and empirically falsifiable ontological hypothesis, all the way to being a belief which is both ungrounded and unfalsifiable, and more akin to an attitude than to an hypothesis. The logical variety exhibited by the belief in a good and loving God often gives rise, in turn, to people holding that belief in a way that is indeterminate, mixed, or fluid between those different varieties. That is, someone’s belief in a good and loving God may hover indeterminately between more than one logical variety of the belief; or it may mix together some of the logical characteristics of different varieties of the belief; or it may change from having one logical character to another and perhaps back again. These properties are often masked by the fact that the belief is always expressed by the same sentence regardless of any indeterminacy, mixedness, or fluidity. Though these properties are rarely discussed by analytic philosophers of religion, logico-grammatical variety, indeterminacy, mixedness, and fluidity are pervasive in religious beliefs and utterances, and account for much of those beliefs and utterances' real-life complexity. This paper will make a start at an examination of these important properties by using the belief in a good and loving God as a representative case study. (shrink)

Evil is both the experience of suffering and the fear that suffering subverts all meaning and order in the world. Given evil's many faces, at least five paradigms can be identified to account for God's relationship to suffering.

Augustine asserted that demons (and angels) have material bodies, while Aquinas denied demonic corporeality, upholding that demons are separated, incorporeal, intelligible substances. Augustine’s conception of demons as composite substances possessing an immaterial soul and an aerial body is insufficient, in Thomas’s view, to account for certain empirical phenomena observed in demoniacs. However, Thomas, while providing more detailed accounts of demonic possession according to his development of Aristotelian psychology, does not avail of this demonic incorporeal eminence when analysing demonic attacks: demonic (...) agency is still confined to the material body. Aquinas’s account of demonic possession need not, on the face of it, require an immaterial cause. In his renouncement of the strong Christian tradition affirming demonic corporeality, Aquinas either conflates the need for a demonic agent with a requirement for a super corporeal one, or subordinates his demonology and angelology to a deeper, more fundamental Dionysian metaphysical principle of creative diffusion to which these adhere in a secondary way. (shrink)

The problem of evil might better be called "the problem of problems." That there is "evil" in the world can be expressed most generally by saying that there are problems with the way things are, that at least something is not the way it should be. I shall propose that the various possible resolutions of the problem of evil correspond to varying approaches that people generally take to the problems in their lives. In this way, a connection can be made (...) between the problem of evil as discussed by professional philosophers - a problem concerning the consistency of beliefs - and the problem as often discussed by other writers - a problem concerning the proper response to the "evil" that we find around and within us. In the course of demonstrating the parallel between the philosophical and the practical problem, I shall elaborate on the contrasting points of view of exoteric and esoteric religion, and I shall conclude with an attempt to explain why the problem remains a problem. (shrink)

In this very brief piece, I outline a way of thinking about spiritual pursuits.

Augustin est bien connu comme défenseur d’une « théorie privative » du mal. On peut lire, par exemple, dans les Confessions que « le mal n’est que la privation du bien, à la limite du pur néant ». Le problème, cependant, avec les théories privatives du mal est qu’elles ne nous offrent pas, généralement, une explication robuste ni de l’activité du mal, ni de son pouvoir à causer des effets bien réels ; effets desquels l’expérience demande, malgré tout, une explication (...) rationnelle. Or, selon Augustin, la privation seule ne permet pas de rendre compte de toutes les manifestations du mal. L’explication privative du mal est, certes, la plus étudiée par la littérature ; mais elle ne constitue qu’une partie du tableau. Cet article veut souligner quatre moments de l’explication du mal qu’Augustin propose : le mal comme privation ; le mal comme parasite par rapport à l’être ; le mal comme perversion de la volonté ; et finalement, le mal comme conflit d’intérêts. Chacun de ces moments éclaire un type de mal, mais aucun ne permet à lui seul de rendre compte du problème. Pris ensemble, cependant, et gardant leurs différences respectives à l’esprit, la réponse d’Augustin à la question du mal se révèle beaucoup plus sophistiquée et exhaustive qu’on ne voudrait souvent l’admettre lorsqu’on se limite uniquement à la théorie de la privation. | : Augustine is well-known for advocating a ‘privation theory’ of evil. In Confessions, he writes that “evil has no existence except as a privation of good, down to that level which is altogether without being.” The problem with privation theories of evil generally is that they do not provide a robust enough account of the activity and power of evil to cause the very real effects for which experience demands a rational explanation. For Augustine, however, privation alone does not fully account for evil in all of its manifestations. The privation account of evil receives much scholarly treatment, but it is only part of the complete Augustinian picture. This paper outlines four accounts of evil in Augustine : evil as privation, as parasitic on being, as perversion of the will, and as conflict of interest. Each deals with a kind of evil, but none alone provides a complete account. Taken together, however, with their differences in mind, Augustine’s explanation of evil is shown to be much more sophisticated and comprehensive than is often recognised when one limits one’s understanding of Augustine’s conception of evil to the privation theory alone. (shrink)

Review of Alain Badiou, emEthics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil/em, trans. Peter Hallward, New York, Verso, 2001. ISBN: 1-85984-435-9br /.

This paper argues that Molinism best rebuts the problem of natural evil when compared to the attempts of Open Theists, particularly William Hasker. The author begins by summarizing Hasker's own Natural Order Theodicy, and subsequently critiques it. He finds no issues with the proposed theodicy, but takes issue with Hasker's attempt to establish the coherence of Open Theism from this theodicy. He then explains the weaknesses of Open Theism's response to natural evil, and simultaneously argues for the strength of Molinism's (...) response. He concludes that Open Theism leaves God as a reckless risk-taker, and therefore Molinism provides a better response to the problem of natural evil. (shrink)

Whence comes suffering? If the divine reality is a reality of bliss, and all is derived from this divine reality, how can suffering arise? Does the reality of God contain suffering? Might suffering be understood as a mode of bliss? These are the questions I take up in this essay. I suggest that the various states of suffering may best be understood as fragments of bliss, progressively resolved as fragmentation is overcome. Spiritual life is the progressive movement from the suffering (...) of ontological fragmentation toward the bliss of reunion. (shrink)

Much moral critique of theodicies is misplaced. Firstly, much of the critique begs the question because it presupposes something else to be true than what the theodicy claims; had the theodicy been true, it would not be immoral. Secondly, much of the moral critique shows situations where theodicies are inappropriate, and argues that they should never be communicated because of these situations. But if a theory is true, there will be some situations where it is appropriate to communicate it, and (...) others where it is not. This is no basis for a moral dismissal of the theory. (shrink)

In recent years, discussion on evil as a philosophical problem has increased. However, there is a tendency to see this problem from an aesthetic point of view, to frame it in theodicy's plot, or even to suggest silence in front of those extreme forms of evil that are linked to specific episodes, such as totalitarianism or ethnic cleansing. This review article focuses on María Pía Lara's development of a postmetaphysical theory of evil in her book Narrating Evil. The main purpose (...) of Lara's theoretical effort is to show that critical recovery of historical episodes that have become paradigms of evil for us, has a narrative texture and intends to generate a discussion in the present time about the ways we can give reality to an idea of democratic justice, in the context of what Jürgen Habermas has called secular and postmetaphysical societies. Thus, learning from catastrophes — the term coined by Habermas and redefined by Lara — becomes a tool for mastering the past, but also constitutes a narrative device that allows us a critical approach to our present political reality. (shrink)

McCloskey presents a powerful case for the view, already well argued in briefer form by Mackie, Flew, McCloskey, and others, that the existence of evil—any and particularly actual evil-is, if not logically, morally incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, all-good creator. While he promises to "take up the challenge" of certain theists who claim no logical contradiction is implied in the position God and evil exist, aside from a few ad hominem arguments directed Plantinga’s way he seems finally (...) to concede their point. The early chapters are of a preliminary nature and aim at defining traditional and parallel forms of the problem of evil, describing the enormity of actual evil, and establishing, by way of assessing particular ethical and linguistic theories, the presuppositions required for the problem to appear as a real one. It is in the later chapters, however, that the author makes his case. Here he considers and rejects for numerous reasons the view that physical evil, pain and suffering, can be justified by the virtuous and other goods they make possible, and the view that they are justified theologically, as punishment for sin. The former view implies an ethic, unacceptable to McCloskey, in which evil befalling a person can be willed or approved as a means. The latter view fails in the case of undeserved suffering, e.g., animals and undeserving children. (shrink)

This work is a "prolegomena to the study of evil," the beginning of a more ambitious project designated by the author an "ideational critique of society." Such an endeavor would include a "rhetoric that grasps the structures of consciousness, the phenomenology of history, and the dramaturgy of contemporary scenes." The bulk of the present study constitutes an essay in phenomenological sociology. Each of the seven deadly sins is insightfully described in terms of its dominant features as well as in relation (...) to and distinction from allied or similar phenomena. Significantly, the presiding intellectual presences are as often Homer, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Aquinas as more contemporary ones such as Simmel, Marx, Weber, and Freud. The scope and sensitivity of the author is further manifested in his illuminating use of literary figures including Dante, Shakespeare, Chekhov, and Artaud. Lyman maintains that "sin has been neglected by sociology" and views this work as a first step in remedying such neglect. At the outset he states that he is not offering a way out of or elimination of evil nor the promise of good. Fortunately, much of the book and in particular its concluding chapter serves as at least a strong qualification of this posture. Though holding out no hope for redemption or a final release from sin and evil, Lyman’s effort would seem to have a commendable melioristic aim. He is concerned, however, to avoid what is for him the besetting sin of contemporary sociology—the attempt to present a sociological blueprint for earthly happiness. Lyman would like to see sociology respect "the social visions that the reason of ordinary people produces," while neither applauding nor opposing them. "The sociological task would then be to describe the processes of social architectonics, and not to build the new society in advance of them." It is evident that Lyman wishes to avoid explaining away sin or reducing it to psychological or societal deviance but it would have been helpful to have had some suggestion of his ontology or metaphysics of sin. The "reality" of sin and evil remains unclarified throughout these analyses. The citations from Homer, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Dante, and other such figures are presented without irony or condescension. Now it may be possible to distill psychological and sociological insights from these thinkers while rejecting or ignoring their theological dimensions. To do so, however, involves a process of abstraction and a contextualism which hardly leaves the phenomena as presented by these thinkers untouched and unchanged. Hence, it would seem that some justification for the "sin" character of these actions in their contemporary milieu is called for. Lyman hints that he is unhappy with the neutralization of sin resulting from contemporary social science. What is not clear is whether he rejects the naturalistic assumptions which undergird and indeed make inevitable such neutralizing interpretations. The background assumption of Lyman’s study is a Nietzschean-like "sociology of the absurd" which presupposes "a world that is ultimately and essentially without meaning" but is made meaningful "by the actions and beliefs of the people who participate in it." This is, of course, a radically different world than the one within which the sin-evil language emerged and gave this language its depth and significance. One aspect of Lyman’s continuing task, therefore, would be to show how it is possible to speak meaningfully of sin and evil when the belief in a transcendent which constituted these phenomena in their classical modes is absent. Nietzsche’s challenge must be faced: after the "death of God" we can still speak of "good and bad" but can we any longer speak of "good and evil"?—E.F. (shrink)

In this article, two of Theodore Drange’s atheological arguments against the God of Christianity are refuted by what I call the “Expectations Defense.” By means of this defense, it is shown that, despite what Drange argues, the existence of evil and unbelief cannot be used as evidence against the existence of the God of the Bible. The fact that biblical history describes God as allowing there to be vast amounts of evil and unbelief prevents us from citing the existence of (...) those things as evidence against the existence of the biblical God. Quite simply, we should expect there to be great amounts of suffering and doubt if the God of the Bible exists. As a result of this, it follows that Drange’s arguments are unsound, and should be rejected by rational people. (shrink)

Eric Wielenberg and I agree that basic moral truths are necessarily true. But Wielenberg thinks that, because these truths are necessary, they require no explanation, and I do not: some basic moral truths are not self-explanatory. I argue that Wielenberg’s reasons for thinking that my justification of that claim is inadequate are ultimately unconvincing.

During the latter part of his career, Kant proposes three different accounts of evil. In these accounts are found psychological, logical, and teleological elements intetwoven in such a way as to give a coherent reading of evil as a complex philosophical issue. Recent commentators have emphasized one or the other of these two elements and consequently have only given a partial picture of Kant’s struggle with evil. I argue that Kant’s use of scripture needs to be taken much more seriously (...) than it has been taken in order to unify these psychological, logical, and teleological aspects of his treatment. (shrink)

Amélie Rorty has put together a wonderfully varied collection of writings, with a range in time of three thousand years and a range of style from sacred writings to fiction to analytical philosophy. There is nothing like it in print, and it will be an invaluable source for many of us. The writings she has collected are all about—well, I’m not sure that there is something that they are all about. The title suggests that the collection is about a phenomenon (...) called Evil that has many faces: one underlying factor in human life, which can manifest itself in varied forms. In fact, the writings are about uncooperative behavior, sin, cruelty, lust, vice, impiety, indifference, and cynicism, among other things. All of these are bad; they impact on human life in many different deleterious ways. Some of the writings, for example the selection from the book of Genesis and the excerpt from Jean Hampton, assume that all immorality is of a kind and may be treated together. Others, for example the selections from Theophrastus and from Nietzsche, are trying to persuade us to see differences before disapproval clouds our vision. (shrink)

Robert Pargetter has recently argued that, even if the theist cannot produce plausible explanations for the evil we experience, the atheologian has no justifiable basis for claiming that evil can in any sense count as strong evidence against God's existence. His strategy is to challenge as question-begging the atheologian's assumption that a prima facie conflict between God and evil exists and the atheologian's claim that God's nonexistence is a more plausible explanation for unresolved evil than a number of theistic options. (...) I argue that Pargetter is unsuccessful, mainly because he fails to understand clearly the conditions under which a prima facie moral conflict exists and fails to distinguish clearly between 'plausibility' and 'possibility' as these terms are applicable to explanatory hypotheses. (shrink)

For many centuries philosophers have been discussing the problem of evil - one of the greatest problems of intellectual history. There are many facets to the problem, and for students and scholars unfamiliar with the vast literature on the subject, grasping the main issues can be a daunting task. This Companion provides a stimulating introduction to the problem of evil. More than an introduction to the subject, it is a state-of-the-art contribution to the field which provides critical analyses of and (...) creative insights on this longstanding problem. Fresh themes in the book include evil and the meaning of life, beauty and evil, evil and cosmic evolution, and anti-theodicy. Evil is discussed from the perspectives of the major monotheistic religions, agnosticism, and atheism. Written by leading scholars in clear and accessible prose, this book is an ideal companion for undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, and scholars across the disciplines. (shrink)