Evolutionary Biology

In this collection of closely interrelated essays, Robert Young emphasizes the scope of the nineteenth-century debate on 'man's place in nature' at the same time as he engages with the approaches of scholars who write about it. He is critical of the separation of the writing of history from writing about history, historiography, and of the separation of history from politics and ideology, then or now. Dr Young challenges fellow historians for reimposing the very disciplinary boundaries that the nineteenth-century debate (...) showed were in the service of ideological forces in that culture. Rather, he proposes that the full weight of the contending forces should be made apparent and debated openly so that neither nineteenth-century nor contemporary issues about the role of science in culture should be treated in a narrow perspective. (shrink)

"Provine's thorough and thoroughly admirable examination of Wright's life and influence, which is accompanied by a very useful collection of Wright's papers on evolution, is the best we have for any recent figure in evolutionary biology."—Joe Felsenstein, Nature "In Sewall Wright and Evolutionary Biology... Provine has produced an intellectual biography which serves to chart in considerable detail both the life and work of one man and the history of evolutionary theory in the middle half of this century. Provine is admirably (...) suited to his task.... The resulting book is clearly a labour of love which will be of great interest to those who have a mature interest in the history of evolutionary theory."-John Durant, ;ITimes Higher Education Supplement;X. (shrink)

Systematische inleiding in de wijsgerige pedagogiek.

Upon entering clinical medicine in the 1940s, antibiotic therapy seemed to complete a transformation of hospitals that originated in the late nineteenth century. Former death sinks had become harbingers of therapeutic progress. Yet this triumph was short-lived. The arrival of pathologies caused by resistant bacteria, and of nosocomial infections whose spread was helped by antibiotic therapies, seemed to be intimately related to modern anti-infective therapy. The place where such problems culminated were hospitals, which increasingly appeared as dangerous environments where attempts (...) to combat infectious diseases had instead created hothouses of disease evolution. This paper will focus on one aspect of that history. It caused clinical medicine and hospital hygiene in particular to pay attention to a dimension of infectious disease it had previously paid little attention to thus far: The evolution of infectious disease—previously a matter of mostly theoretical interest—came to be useful in explaining many phenomena observed. This did not turn hospital hygienists into geneticists, though it did give them an awareness that the evolution of infectious disease in a broad sense was something that did matter to them. The paper advances its argument by looking at three phases: The growing awareness of the hospital as a dangerous environment in the 1950s, comprehensive attempts at improving antibiotic therapy and hospital hygiene that followed from the 1960s and lastly the framing of such challenges as risk factors from the 1970s. In conclusion, I will argue that hospital hygiene, being inspired in particular by epidemiology and risk factor analysis, discussed its own specific version of disease emergence and therefore contributed to the 1980s debates around such topics. Being loosely connected to more specialized studies, it consisted of a re-interpretation of infectious disease centred around the temporality of such phenomena as they were encountered in day-to-day dealings of clinical wards. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self-undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most (...) serious of which is that it has the unpalatable consequence that we should never revise our moral beliefs in response to evidence that our capacity for normative cognition is globally impaired. The second objection, which comes to us from Katia Vavova, claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are doomed to fail, because they attempt to show that our moral beliefs are unreliable without making any assumptions about the nature of morality, and this is impossible. I argue, to the contrary, that the etiological higher-order evidence cited by debunking arguments can give us good reason to think that our moral beliefs are unreliable, even if we make no assumptions about what morality is like. (shrink)

Kuhn (1962) proposed an evolutionary model to explain how scientific knowledge is built, based on the concept of paradigm. Even though Kuhn’s model is general, it has been applied to only a few topics in evolutionary biology, almost exclusively to broad-based paradigms. We analyze here, through the lens of Kuhn’s theory, a small-scale paradigm change that occurred with the resolution of the controversy about the mating system of a Mediterranean shrub Phillyrea angustifolia (Oleaceae). We first summarize the different steps of (...) the paradigm change and replace them in the more general context of sex ratio theory. Second, we show how the different steps of the paradigm change can be interpreted by Kuhnian concepts and tools. Finally, we discuss the actual and future status of the new paradigm. (shrink)

В книге исследуется острая проблема совместной эволюции (коэволюции) Человека и Природы, условий выживания людей и окружающей среды, перспективы развития ноосферы – биосферы и Разума.

Geannoteerde briefwisseling van de twee geleerden over het vraagstuk van de evolutie.

The subject of research in this article is some aspects of the life path of a prominent figure of the Reformation in Germany, Philip Melanchthon, which influenced the evolution of his worldview. Special attention is paid to the facts of his biography, the characteristics of his early works, as well as his assessments of the confessional struggle and calls for the active involvement of administrative resources to crack down on dissidents. The methodological basis of this article is the dialectical approach, (...) in particular, the principle of the relationship between the general and the singular, as well as the principle of the unity of the logical and historical. These principles allow us to identify the ethical nuances of the evolution of F. Melanchthon's views as a Reformation figure based on his statements and assessments. Philip Melanchthon is often evaluated in the scientific literature as one of the founders of the new faith, the second most important after Martin Luther, whose merit was the attempt to reconcile humanistic views and new confessional interests. However, based on a detailed analysis of the material presented in the article, the authors come to the conclusion that Philip Melanchthon, having devoted himself entirely to the Reformation, renounced the German humanistic tradition of the XV century, the values of humanism represented in the works of Jacob Wimplefing, Johann Reichlin, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Thomas More, John Colet. Therefore, its classification as "Christian humanism" is erroneous. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Introduction Chapitre I. L'Origine des Espèces Chapitre II. Les sciences de la nature avant Darwin Chapitre III. La naissance d'une théorie : découverte et implications Chapitre IV. Progrès et évolution avant l'origine des espèces (...) Chapitre V. La théologie victorienne Chapitre VI. Les polémiques Chapitre VII. Triomphe et déclin du positivisme évolutionniste 1860-1900 Chapitre VIII. La religion victorienne etl'évolutionnisme Chapitre IX Bibliographie Index auteurs Pages de fin. (shrink)

The conventional wisdom declares that evolution is not goal directed, that teleological considerations play no part in our understanding of evolutionary trends. Here I argue that, to the contrary, under a current view of teleology, field theory, most evolutionary trends would have to be considered goal directed to some degree. Further, this view is consistent with a modern scientific outlook, and more particularly with evolutionary theory today. Field theory argues that goal directedness is produced by higher-level fields that direct entities (...) contained within them to behave persistently and plastically, that is, returning them to a goal-directed trajectory following perturbations (persistence) and directing them to a goal-directed trajectory from a large range of alternative starting points (plasticity). The behavior of a bacterium climbing a chemical food gradient is persistent and plastic, with guidance provided by the external “food field,” the chemical gradient. Likewise, an evolutionary trend that is produced by natural selection is a lineage behaving persistently and plastically under the direction of its local ecology, an “ecological field.” Trends directed by selection-generated boundaries, thermodynamic gradients, and certain internal constraints, would also count as goal directed. In other words, most of the causes of evolutionary trends that have been proposed imply goal directedness. However, under field theory, not all trends are goal directed. Examples are discussed. Importantly, nothing in this view suggests that evolution is guided by intentionality, at least none at the level of animal intentionality. Finally, possible implications for our thinking about evolutionary directionality in the history of life are discussed. (shrink)

"Deserves to be as widely read as were the originals when they were first published."—Biological Journal of the Linneas Society. Includes five chapters from The Origin of Speices,complete and unabridged; significant extracts from the works that precede and develop the theory of evolution: The Voyage of the Beagle, The Descent of Man, and The Variations of Animals and Plants; scientific papers, travel writings, letters, and a family memorial; plus a chronology and biography.

Ever since its inception, the theory of evolution has been reified into an “-ism”: Darwinism. While biologists today tend to shy away from the term in their research, the term is still actively used in the broader academic and societal contexts. What exactly is Darwinism, and how precisely are its various uses and abuses related to the scientific theory of evolution? Some call for limiting the meaning of the term “Darwinism” to its scientific context; others call for its abolition; yet (...) others claim the term refers to a myth-like story. In this paper we propose a conceptually grounded overview of the term. We show how the scientific dimension of Darwinism feeds into, and is influenced by, guises of Darwinism as a methodology and as an ethically and politically charged “worldview”. The full meaning of Darwinism, as well as how this meaning has changed over time, can only be understood through the complex interaction between these three dimensions. (shrink)

In order to address why the number of patients suffering from anxiety and depression are seemingly exploding in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) countries, it is sensible to look at the evolution of human fearfulness responses. Here, we draw on Veit's pathological complexity framework to advance Grossmann's goal of re-characterizing human fearfulness as an adaptive trait.

Our commentary focuses on the interaction between Grossmann's fearful ape hypothesis (FAH) and the human self-domestication hypothesis (HSDH), also taking into account language acquisition and evolution. Although there is considerable overlap between the two hypotheses, there are also some discrepancies, and our goal is to consider the extent to which HSDH can explain the phenomena identified by FAH without invoking fearfulness as directly adaptive.

Dans cette étude, nous examinons l’apport philosophique de l’ouvrage de Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu’est-ce que la littérature? (1948), dans le contexte de la méditation existentialiste de cette époque (Beauvoir et Merleau-Ponty). Nous établissons en quel sens Sartre y étaye le concept de liberté, selon ses aspects épistémique et praxique de témoignage et de prise de conscience, ainsi que ses dimensions intrinsèques de négativité et de construction. Nous poursuivons en montrant en quoi cet approfondissement conceptuel entraîne une méditation nouvelle par Sartre du (...) philosophème « faire l’Histoire ». Une telle méditation impose une modification drastique de la préséance et de l’ordre de ce que Sartre nomme les « catégories cardinales de la réalité humaine », laquelle se fait au détriment de celles de l’être et de l’avoir, et au profit de celle du faire. Nous montrons en quoi il y a là un changement de cap par rapport aux analyses de L’être et le néant. Nous terminons en envisageant les conséquences de cet approfondissement conceptuel de la liberté, de cette méditation de l’histoire et de ce remaniement catégoriel pour les questions du sens praxique de la littérature, de sa forme adéquate et de sa possible totalisation. (shrink)

How is word meaning established, and how do individuals acquire it? What ensures the uniform understanding of word meaning in a linguistic community? In this paper I draw from cultural attraction theory and use folk biology as an example domain and address these questions by treating meaning acquisition as an inferential process. I show that significant variation exists in how individuals understand the meaning of inclusive biological labels such as “plant” and “animal” due to variation in their salience in contemporary (...) ethnic minority groups in southwest China, and I present historical textual evidence that the meaning of inclusive terms is often unstable but can be sustained by such cultural institutions as religion and education, which provide situations in which the meaning of linguistic labels can be unambiguously inferred. (shrink)

Moral realism is often taken to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. Indeed, by some lights, common sense and initial appearances underlie all the central positive arguments for moral realism. We offer a kind of debunking argument, taking aim at realism’s common sense standing. Our argument differs from familiar debunking moves both in its empirical assumptions and in how it targets the realist position. We argue that if natural selection explains the objective phenomenology of moral deliberation and (...) judgement, then this undermines arguments from that phenomenology. This results in a simpler, and in some ways more direct, challenge to realism. It is also less vulnerable to the main objections that have been leveled against such arguments. If accepted, our conclusion should make a real difference to the dialectic in this area. It means that neither realism nor its denial is the default, to-be-refuted, position. (shrink)

(Penultimate Draft). I consider common ground in its evolutionary context and argue for several claims. First, common ground is widely (though not universally) distributed among social animals. Second, the use of common ground is favored (i.e. is predicted to emerge and subsequently persist) among populations of animals whose members face recurrent interdependent decision-making problems in which the benefit of their courses of action are contingent on the variable choices of their stable social partner(s). Third, humans deploy cognitive and social mechanisms (...) for establishing and updating common ground that are not deployed by other living animals—the use of common ground has not only persisted within the human lineage but been amplified as well. Finally, I suggest that some of these points count against the iterative construal of common ground. In its place, I propose an alternative psychological construal of common ground in terms of what I will call reciprocal responsiveness. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.