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  1. From Game Theoretical Accounts of Cooperation to Meta-Ethical Choices.Arif Ahmed - 2013 - Studies in Christian Ethics 26 (2):176-183.
  2. Indirect Reciprocity, Golden Opportunities for Defection, and Inclusive Reputation.Max Albert & Hannes Rusch - 2013 - MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner’s dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be invaded by any other strategy that conditions behavior only on own and partner reputation. The first point of this paper is to show that an evolutionary version of backward induction can lead to a breakdown of this kind of indirectly reciprocal cooperation. Backward induction, (...)
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  3. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 149 Pages. [REVIEW]J. McKenzie Alexander - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):441-448.
  4. Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1289-1304.
    Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.
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  5. Evolutionary Game Theory.J. McKenzie Alexander - unknown
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  6. Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):490-516.
    Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his account and describe a model which, they allege, undermines his theory. I sketch a (...)
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  7. Co-Evolutionary Dynamics on a Deformable Landscape.J. McKenzie Alexander, Marc Ebner & Richard Watson - unknown
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  8. The (Spatial) Evolution of the Equal Split.Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - unknown
    The replicator dynamics have been used to study the evolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's success in playing the game. In these models, a population whose initial conditions was randomly chosen from the space of population proportions converges to a state of fair division approximately 62% of the time. (Higher rates of convergence to final states of fair division can be obtained by introducing artificial correlations (...)
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  9. Marinoff on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.Brad Armendt - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):789-793.
    Louis Marinoff [1990] criticizes Axelrod and Hamilton's [1981] use of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy, and claims to find an inconsistency between their theory for repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games and empirical results. Marinoff seeks to resolve the inconsistency by arguing that Axelrod and Hamilton's model is ill conceived: he purports to prove, contra Axelrod and Hamilton, that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. But his argument is flawed, and moreover, Marinoff gives no good reason (...)
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  10. Explaining Altruism. A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits.Eckhart Arnold - 2008 - Ontos Verlag.
    Employing computer simulations for the study of the evolution of altruism has been popular since Axelrod's book "The Evolution of Cooperation". But have the myriads of simulation studies that followed in Axelrod's footsteps really increased our knowledge about the evolution of altruism or cooperation? This book examines in detail the working mechanisms of simulation based evolutionary explanations of altruism. It shows that the "theoretical insights" that can be derived from simulation studies are often quite arbitrary and of little use for (...)
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  11. Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment.Judith Avrahami, Werner Güth & Yaakov Kareev - 2005 - Theory and Decision 59 (4):255-294.
    The paper presents a set of games of competition between two or three players in which reward is jointly determined by a stochastic biased mechanism and players’ choices. More specifically, a resource can be found with unequal probabilities in one of two locations. The first agent is rewarded only if it finds the resource and avoids being found by the next agent in line; the latter is rewarded only if it finds the former. Five benchmarks, based on different psychological and (...)
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  12. Spontaneous Coordination and Evolutionary Learning Processes in an Agent-Based Model.Pierre Barbaroux & Gilles Enée - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (2):179-195.
    This paper is concerned with adaptive learning and coordination processes. Implementing agent-based modeling techniques (Learning Classifier Systems, LCS), we focus on the twofold impact of cognitive and environmental complexity on learning and coordination. Within this framework, we introduce the notion of Adaptive Learning Agent with Rule-based Memory (ALARM), which is a particular class of Artificial Adaptive Agent (AAA, Holland and Miller 1991). We show that equilibrium is approached to a high degree, but never perfectly reached. We also demonstrate that memorization (...)
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  13. Review: Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract. [REVIEW]Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237 - 241.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  14. Numerical Testing of Evolution Theories.Nils Aall Barricelli - 1962 - Acta Biotheoretica 16 (1-2):69-98.
    An interpretive system for the IBM 704 computer permitting interpretation of the genetic pattern of a numeric symbioorganism as a game strategy has been developed. Selection for best performance in a simple game has been applied in a preliminary experiment. An objective method to measure the quality of a game played is described. The results presented in the article show a small but significant improvement of game quality during a period of 2300 generations.The general characteristics of the phenomena observed are (...)
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  15. Sexual Drift.Ken Binmore - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):201-208.
    This paper uses a 4 × 4 expansion of the Hawk–Dove Game to illustrate how sexual drift in a large genotype space can shift a population from one equilibrium in a smaller phenotype space to another. An equilibrium is only safe from being destabilized in this way when implemented by recessive alleles.
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  16. Reciprocity and the Social Contract.Ken Binmore - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (1):5-35.
    This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • responsibility (...)
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  17. Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]Ken Binmore - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):352-354.
  18. Propositional Content in Signalling Systems.Jonathan Birch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  19. Queller's Separation Condition Explained and Defended.Jonathan Birch & James A. R. Marshall - 2014 - American Naturalist 184 (4):531-540.
    The theories of inclusive fitness and multilevel selection provide alternative perspectives on social evolution. The question of whether these perspectives are of equal generality remains a divisive issue. In an analysis based on the Price equation, Queller argued (by means of a principle he called the separation condition) that the two approaches are subject to the same limitations, arising from their fundamentally quantitative-genetical character. Recently, van Veelen et al. have challenged Queller’s results, using this as the basis for a broader (...)
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  20. Brian Skyrms. 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (Jesús Zamora Bonilla).Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2012 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (3):400-402.
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  21. Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Rob Boyd - manuscript
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a generous strategy (...)
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  22. Group Beneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population.Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson - unknown
    Group beneficial norms are common in human societies. The persistence of such norms is consistent with evolutionary game theory, but existing models do not provide a plausible explanation for why they are common. We show that when a model of imitation used to derive replicator dynamics in isolated populations is generalized to allow for population structure, group beneficial norms can spread rapidly under plausible conditions. We also show that this mechanism allows recombination of different group beneficial norms arising in..
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  23. Evolutionary Game Theory Meets the Social Contract.Michael Bradie - 1999 - Biology and Philosophy 14 (4):607-613.
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  24. Evolutionary Games Without Rationality?Martin Bunzl - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.
    It is sometimes claimed that evolutionary game theory provides a basis fordoing without rationality. The author defends the thesis that on any plausibleconstrual of the assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory, it cannotprovide a plausible basis for deviations from rationality. But on any plausibleconstrual of rationality, evolutionary game theory cannot provide an alternativethat coincides with the outcomes dictated by considerations of rationality,either. Key Words: evolutionary game theory • game theory • rationality • Skyrms.
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  25. Evolution, the Emotions, and Rationality in Social Interaction.David J. Butler - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):156-157.
    Although Colman's criticisms of orthodox game theory are convincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multidisciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in particular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when facing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for modifying orthodox game theory.
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  26. Not the Only Game in Town.Werner Callebaut - 2009 - Biological Theory 4 (2):107-111.
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  27. The Evolutionary Meaning of World 3.Hubert Cambier - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):242-264.
    The World 3 theory outlined by Popper in the 1960s has been diversely received, raising enthusiasms as well as severe criticisms. In this paper, I resituate the theory in the development of Popper’s philosophy. I not only present the three “sources” of W3, but I also show that the first one dominates the two others. Comparing it with a few other evolutionary philosophies, I propose to understand Popper’s metaphysics as part of an evolutionary and spiritualist philosophy, which was, however, always (...)
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  28. Beliefs, Intentions, and Evolution: Old Versus New Psychological Game Theory.Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):158-159.
    We compare Colman's proposed “psychological game theory” with the existing literature on psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. 1989), in which beliefs and intentions assume a prominent role. We also discuss experimental evidence on intentions, with a particular emphasis on reciprocal behavior, as well as recent efforts to show that such behavior is consistent with social evolution.
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  29. Game Theory, Agent-Based Modeling, and the Evolution of Social Behavior.Andrew M. Colman - 1998 - Complexity 3 (3):46-47.
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  30. How Evolutionary Biology Challenges the Classical Theory of Rational Choice.W. S. Cooper - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (4):457-481.
    A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in (...)
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  31. The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games.Ross Cressman, József Garay, Antonino Scarelli & Zoltán Varga - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):141-152.
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  32. Review Essays : The Role of Creationism in Evolutionary Theory. [REVIEW]Ron Curtis - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):389-400.
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  33. The Role of Creationism in Evolutionary Theory.Ron Curtis - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):389.
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  34. Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract.Fred D'Agostino, John Thrasher & Gerald Gaus - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  35. Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice.Justin D'Arms, Robert Batterman & Krzyzstof Gorny - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):76-102.
    Game theoretic explanations of the evolution of human behavior have become increasingly widespread. At their best, they allow us to abstract from misleading particulars in order to better recognize and appreciate broad patterns in the phenomena of human social life. We discuss this explanatory strategy, contrasting it with the particularist methodology of contemporary evolutionary psychology. We introduce some guidelines for the assessment of evolutionary game theoretic explanations of human behavior: such explanations should be representative, robust, and flexible. Distinguishing these features (...)
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  36. Learning to Cooperate: Reciprocity and Self-Control.Peter Danielson - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):256-257.
    Using a simple learning agent, we show that learning self-control in the primrose path experiment does parallel learning cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. But Rachlin's claim that “there is no essential difference between self-control and altruism” is too strong. Only iterated prisoner's dilemmas played against reciprocators are reduced to self-control problems. There is more to cooperation than self-control and even altruism in a strong sense.
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  37. Evolution of the Social Contract.Peter Danielson - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):627-652.
  38. Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution.Peter Danielson (ed.) - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection focuses on questions that arise when morality is considered from the perspective of recent work on rational choice and evolution. Linking questions like "Is it rational to be moral?" to the evolution of cooperation in "The Prisoners Dilemma," the book brings together new work using models from game theory, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, as well as from philosophical analysis. Among the contributors are leading figures in these fields, including David Gauthier, Paul M. Churchland, Brian Skyrms, Ronald de (...)
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  39. Order From Disorder: The Role of Noise in Creative Processes. A Special Issue on Game Theory and Evolutionary Processes – Overview.Paul Davies - manuscript
    The importance of applying game theory to the evolution of information in the presence of noise has recently become widely recognized. This Special Issue addresses the theme of spontaneously emergent order in both classical and quantum systems subject to external noise, and includes papers directly related to game theory or the development of supporting techniques. In the following editorial overview we examine the broader context of the subject, including the tension between the destructive and creative aspects of noise, and foreshadow (...)
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  40. Genetic Learning in Strategic Form Games.Herbert Dawid & Alexander Mehlmann - 1996 - Complexity 1 (5):51-59.
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  41. A Stag Hunt with Signalling and Mutual Beliefs.Jelle de Boer - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.
    The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs (...)
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  42. Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism (...)
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  43. Evolution and Moral Diversity.Tim Dean - 2012 - Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7 (1):1-16.
    If humans have an evolved moral psychology, then we should not expect it to function in an identical way between individuals. Instead, we should expect a diversity in the function of our moral psychology between individuals that varies along genetic lines, and a corresponding diversity of moral attitudes and moral judgements that emerge from it. This is because there was no one psychological type that would reliably produce adaptive social behaviour in the highly heterogeneous environments in which our minds evolved. (...)
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  44. Kooperative Strategien Im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation Eines N-Personen-Spiels.Andreas Diekmann & Klaus Manhart - 1989 - Analyse & Kritik 11 (2):134-153.
    Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners, dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, (...)
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  45. Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology.Zach Ernst - 2009 - In Michael Ruse (ed.), Philosophy After Darwin: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Princeton University Press. pp. 464.
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  46. Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.
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  47. Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory.Zachary Ernst - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.
    A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship (...)
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  48. Explaining the Social Contract.Zachary Ernst - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-24.
    Brian Skyrms has argued that the evolution of the social contract may be explained using the tools of evolutionary game theory. I show in the first half of this paper that the evolutionary game-theoretic models are often highly sensitive to the specific processes that they are intended to simulate. This sensitivity represents an important robustness failure that complicates Skyrms's project. But I go on to make the positive proposal that we may none the less obtain robust results by simulating the (...)
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  49. Modelli Evoluzionistici Del Contratto Sociale.Roberto Festa - 1999 - Etica E Politica 1 (1).
    In a recent book on The Evolution of Social Contract, Brian Skyrms shows how evolutionary game theory can be used to explain how the implicit social contract we live by might have evolved. In this paper, after describing the main lines of Skyrms’s approach, we will examine some problems arising from it, on the basis of a comparison with von Hayek’s evolutionary view. Finally, we will make some remarks on the possible relevance of the outcomes achieved by Skyrms for the (...)
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  50. Book Review:Causal Necessity Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]James H. Fetzer - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-.
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