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  1. added 2020-03-27
    Power by Association.Travis Lacroix & Cailin O'Connor - manuscript
    We use tools from evolutionary game theory to examine how power might influence the cultural evolution of inequitable norms between discernible groups in a population of otherwise identical individuals. Similar extant models always assume that power is homogeneous across a social group. As such, these models fail to capture situations where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end up disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership. Thus, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the groups (...)
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  2. added 2019-11-02
    Deception: A Functional Account.Marc Artiga & Cédric Paternotte - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):579-600.
    Deception has recently received a significant amount of attention. One of main reasons is that it lies at the intersection of various areas of research, such as the evolution of cooperation, animal communication, ethics or epistemology. This essay focuses on the biological approach to deception and argues that standard definitions put forward by most biologists and philosophers are inadequate. We provide a functional account of deception which solves the problems of extant accounts in virtue of two characteristics: deceptive states have (...)
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  3. added 2019-11-02
    Teleosemantic Modeling of Cognitive Representations.Marc Artiga - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):483-505.
    Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-16
    On the Emergence of Minority Disadvantage: Testing the Cultural Red King Hypothesis.Aydin Mohseni, Cailin O'Connor & Hannah Rubin - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The study of social justice asks: what sorts of social arrangements are equitable ones? But also: how do we derive the inequitable arrangements we often observe in human societies? In particular, in spite of explicitly stated equity norms, categorical inequity tends to be the rule rather than the excep- tion. The cultural Red King hypothesis predicts that differentials in group size may lead to inequitable outcomes for minority groups even in the absence of explicit or implicit bias. We test this (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Models as Products of Interdisciplinary Exchange: Evidence From Evolutionary Game Theory.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):386-397.
    The development of evolutionary game theory is closely linked with two interdisciplinary exchanges: the import of game theory into biology, and the import of biologists’ version of game theory into economics. This paper traces the history of these two import episodes. In each case the investigation covers what exactly was imported, what the motives for the import were, how the imported elements were put to use, and how they related to existing practices in the respective disciplines. Two conclusions emerged from (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    On an Evolutionary Foundation of Neuroeconomics: Burkhard C. Schipper.Burkhard C. Schipper - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):495-513.
    Neuroeconomics focuses on brain imaging studies mapping neural responses to choice behaviour. Economic theory is concerned with choice behaviour but it is silent on neural activities. We present a game theoretic model in which players are endowed with an additional structure – a simple “nervous system” – and interact repeatedly in changing games. The nervous system constrains information processing functions and behavioural functions. By reinterpreting results from evolutionary game theory, we suggest that nervous systems can develop to “function well” in (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-05
    Game Theory as Mathematics for Biology: Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Ross Cressman Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 (330 Pp; $48.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262033054); Moral Sentiments and Material Interests Herbert Gintis , Samuel Bowles , Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr , Eds Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005 (416 Pp; $50.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262072521).Don Ross - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):104-107.
  8. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewsBrian Skyrms,. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. 149. $55.00 ; $20.00. [REVIEW]Matthew Simpson - 2004 - Ethics 115 (1):166-169.
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  9. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewKen Binmore,. Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998. Pp. Xxiii + 589. $50.00. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2001 - Ethics 111 (4):794-797.
  10. added 2019-06-05
    Precis of Evolution of the Social ContractEvolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):217.
    Evolution of the social contract uses evolutionary game theory and evolutionary dynamics to analyze the sorts of interactions that are important to the social contract. The discussion is at a level that accommodates cultural as well as biological evolution. Various chapters deal with central issues in bargaining, commitment, mutual aid, property, and communication by means of simple game-theoretic models. These include Nash Bargaining, Ultimatum Bargaining, Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (or Hawk-Dove), and Sender-Receiver Signaling Games. Evolutionary models provide better explanations of observed (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-05
    Causal Necessity. Brian Skyrms.James H. Fetzer - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-335.
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  12. added 2019-05-16
    Payback Without Bookkeeping: The Origins of Revenge and Retaliation.Isaac Wiegman - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (7):1100-1128.
    ABSTRACTCurrent evolutionary models of revenge focus on its complex deterrent functions. Nevertheless, there are some retaliatory behaviors in nonhuman animals that do not appear to have a deterren...
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  13. added 2019-05-16
    Anger and Punishment: Natural History and Normative Significance.Isaac Wiegman - 2014 - Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    I argue that the evolutionary history of anger has substantive implications for normative ethics. In the process, I develop an evolutionary account of anger and its influence on action. First, I consider a prominent argument by Peter Singer and Joshua Greene. They conclude that evolutionary explanations of human cooperation debunk – or undercut the evidential value of – the moral intuitions supporting duty ethics (as opposed to utilitarian or consequentialist ethics). With this argument they aim to defend consequentialist theories. However, (...)
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  14. added 2019-03-04
    Review of Herbert Gintis’s Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 357 Pp. [REVIEW]Michiru Nagatsu - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):117-124.
    In his own words, Herbert Gintis’s latest book is “an analysis of human nature and a tribute to its wonders” (3).1More prosaically, it is a collection of essays, some of which are original and others published elsewhere. Instead of being structured around topics in decision and game theory,like his previous book (2009), this book develops interrelated themes, such as the evolutionary origins of moral sense, its central role in political games, and the socially entangled nature of human rationality and individuality. (...)
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  15. added 2019-02-24
    Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—How the Templeton Foundation Bought a Harvard Professorship and Attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization. A Review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’(2012)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 377-391.
    Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes --not only an outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for political expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least in (...)
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  16. added 2019-02-23
    The Dead Hands of Group Selection and Phenomenology -- A Review of Individuality and Entanglement by Herbert Gintis 357p (2017)(Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 364-376.
    Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a (...)
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  17. added 2019-02-20
    Agents and Goals in Evolution, by Samir Okasha. [REVIEW]Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1408-1416.
    In this essay review of Samir Okasha's Agents and Goals in Evolution, I reflect on the rationale for agential thinking in biology, and consider whether the rationale is the same for genes as for organisms. I also discuss Okasha's ingenious examples of the evolution of irrational behaviour, and in particular the evolution of violations of the "independence axiom" of rational choice theory. These examples rely on a crucial distinction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
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  18. added 2019-01-11
    Content in Simple Signalling Systems.Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1009-1035.
    Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content (...)
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  19. added 2018-12-06
    The Dark Side of the Force: When Computer Simulations Lead Us Astray and ``Model Think'' Narrows Our Imagination.Eckhart Arnold - manuscript
    This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of when the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific explanations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory. Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies of the input parameters. If (...)
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  20. added 2018-11-13
    Models and Reality—A Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social Contract.Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson, Elliott Sober & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237.
    Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in one-shot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of divide-the-cake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely (...)
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  21. added 2018-10-28
    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics.Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):497-521.
    The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. The models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class (...)
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  22. added 2018-09-10
    Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game.Carl Brusse & Justin Bruner - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1068-1079.
    We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help (...)
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  23. added 2018-09-06
    Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
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  24. added 2018-08-26
    The Origins of Life: The Managed-Metabolism Hypothesis.John E. Stewart - 2018 - Foundations of Science:1-25.
    The ‘managed-metabolism’ hypothesis suggests that a ‘cooperation barrier’ must be overcome if self-producing chemical organizations are to undergo the transition from non-life to life. This dynamical barrier prevents un-managed autocatalytic networks of molecular species from individuating into complex, cooperative organizations. The barrier arises because molecular species that could otherwise make significant cooperative contributions to the success of an organization will often not be supported within the organization, and because side reactions and other ‘free-riding’ processes will undermine cooperation. As a result, (...)
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  25. added 2018-03-23
    On Salience and Signaling in Sender–Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points.Travis LaCroix - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1725-1747.
    I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In Lewis’ (Convention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Skyrms (Signals: evolution, learning & information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-18
    Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
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  27. added 2018-02-18
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
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  28. added 2018-02-16
    Evolution and Moral Diversity.Tim Dean - 2012 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7:1-16.
    If humans have an evolved moral psychology, then we should not expect it to function in an identical way between individuals. Instead, we should expect a diversity in the function of our moral psychology between individuals that varies along genetic lines, and a corresponding diversity of moral attitudes and moral judgements that emerge from it. This is because there was no one psychological type that would reliably produce adaptive social behaviour in the highly heterogeneous environments in which our minds evolved. (...)
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  29. added 2017-09-25
    Co-Evolutionary Dynamics on a Deformable Landscape.J. McKenzie Alexander, Marc Ebner & Richard Watson - 2000 - In .
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  30. added 2017-02-15
    Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution.Werner Leinfellner - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:197-210.
    Since Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of games, the debate among social scientists, economists, mathematicians, and social philosophers about what kind of theory it is has not ended. Some think that it is a new interdiscipline, some that it is a mere accumulation of gametheoretical models, such as utility theory, competitive, cooperative, collective choice models, and so on. Most of them agree that the models of game theory deal with isolated, single, and independent specific societal interactions between individuals who wish to (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-15
    Game Theory, Agent-Based Modeling, and the Evolution of Social Behavior.Andrew M. Colman - 1998 - Complexity 3 (3):46-47.
  32. added 2017-02-14
    Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are key ingredients for (...)
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  33. added 2017-02-14
    Classical Versus Evolutionary Game Theory.Herbert Gintis - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Classical and evolutionary game theory attempt to explain different phenomena. Classical game theory describes socially and temporally isolated encounters while evolutionary game theory describes macro-social behavioural regularities. The actors in classical game theory are payoff maximizers whose identity remains fixed during the course of play. By contrast, in evolutionary game theory, the players are constantly changing, and the central actor is a replicator -- an entity having some means of making approximately accurate copies of itself. However successful in its own (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-12
    The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games.Ross Cressman, József Garay, Antonino Scarelli & Zoltán Varga - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):141-152.
  35. added 2017-02-11
    Modeling Prejudice Reduction: Spatialized Game Theory and the Contact Hypothesis.Patrick Grim, Evan Selinger, William Braynen, Robert Rosenberger, Randy Au, Nancy Louie & John Connolly - 2005 - Public Affairs Quarterly 19 (2):95-125.
  36. added 2017-02-11
    Communication and Coordination.John H. Miller & Scott Moser - 2004 - Complexity 9 (5):31-40.
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  37. added 2017-02-11
    B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986.Tim Kohler - 1997 - Complexity 2 (6):6-6.
  38. added 2017-02-10
    A Stag Hunt with Signalling and Mutual Beliefs.Jelle de Boer - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.
    The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-09
    Alternative Definitions of Epistasis: Dependence and Interaction.Michael J. Wade, Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Aneil F. Agrawal & Charles J. Goodnight - 2001 - Trends in Ecology and Evolution 16 (9):498-504.
    Although epistasis is at the center of the Fisher-Wright debate, biologists not involved in the controversy are often unaware that there are actually two different formal definitions of epistasis. We compare concepts of genetic independence in the two theoretical traditions of evolutionary genetics, population genetics and quantitative genetics, and show how independence of gene action (represented by the multiplicative model of population genetics) can be different from the absence of gene interaction (represented by the linear additive model of quantitative genetics). (...)
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  40. added 2017-02-09
    Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:374-394.
    This paper discusses the explanatory significance of the equilibrium concept in the context of an example of extremely complicated dynamical behavior. In particular, numerical evidence is presented for the existence of chaotic dynamics on a "strange attractor" in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker [also known as the "replicator dynamics"]. This phenomenon is present already in four strategy evolutionary games where the dynamics takes place in a simplex in three dimensional space-the lowest number of dimensions in which (...)
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  41. added 2017-02-09
    On "Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory".Harold B. Jamison & Robert I. Rhodes - 1969 - Science and Society 33 (3):348 - 358.
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  42. added 2017-02-09
    The Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory.Robert I. Rhodes - 1968 - Science and Society 32 (4):383 - 412.
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  43. added 2017-02-07
    Spontaneous Coordination and Evolutionary Learning Processes in an Agent-Based Model.Pierre Barbaroux & Gilles Enée - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (2):179-195.
    This paper is concerned with adaptive learning and coordination processes. Implementing agent-based modeling techniques (Learning Classifier Systems, LCS), we focus on the twofold impact of cognitive and environmental complexity on learning and coordination. Within this framework, we introduce the notion of Adaptive Learning Agent with Rule-based Memory (ALARM), which is a particular class of Artificial Adaptive Agent (AAA, Holland and Miller 1991). We show that equilibrium is approached to a high degree, but never perfectly reached. We also demonstrate that memorization (...)
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  44. added 2017-02-03
    Integrating Reinforcement Learning, Bidding and Genetic Algorithms.Ron Sun - unknown
    This paper presents a GA-based multi-agent reinforce- ment learning bidding approach (GMARLB) for perform- ing multi-agent reinforcement learning. GMARLB inte- grates reinforcement learning, bidding and genetic algo- rithms. The general idea of our multi-agent systems is as follows: There are a number of individual agents in a team, each agent of the team has two modules: Q module and CQ module. Each agent can select actions to be performed at each step, which are done by the Q module. While the (...)
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  45. added 2017-02-02
    Distinctive Human Social Motivations in a Game-Theoretic Framework.Don Ross - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):715-716.
    I discuss implications of Tomasello et al's hypothesis that humans exhibit distinctive collective intentionality for game-theoretic approaches to modeling human evolution. Representing the hypothesis game-theoretically forces a question about whether it implies only distinctively human motivations or both distinctive motivations and distinctive cognitive capacities for representation of intentions. I also note that the hypothesis explains uniquely human ideological conflict and invites game-theoretic modeling of this.
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  46. added 2017-02-01
    Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-30
    In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.
    I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-30
    The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-29
    Kooperative Strategien Im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation Eines N-Personen-Spiels.Andreas Diekmann & Klaus Manhart - 1989 - Analyse & Kritik 11 (2):134-153.
    Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners, dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-28
    The Role of Creationism in Evolutionary Theory.Ron Curtis - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):389.
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