This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

154 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 154
  1. added 2019-01-11
    Content in Simple Signalling Systems.Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1009-1035.
    Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in contexts where false content (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. added 2018-12-06
    The Dark Side of the Force: When Computer Simulations Lead Us Astray and ``Model Think'' Narrows Our Imagination.Eckhart Arnold - manuscript
    This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of when the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific explanations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory. Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies of the input parameters. If (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-11-13
    Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social ContractEvolution of the Social Contract.Martin Barrett, Ellery Eells, Branden Fitelson, Elliott Sober & Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):237.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-10-28
    Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics.Aydin Mohseni - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. These models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis, and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-09-10
    Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis Signaling Game.Carl Brusse & Justin Bruner - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1068-1079.
    We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this article can also help (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2018-09-06
    Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. added 2018-08-26
    The Origins of Life: The Managed-Metabolism Hypothesis.John E. Stewart - 2018 - Foundations of Science:1-25.
    The ‘managed-metabolism’ hypothesis suggests that a ‘cooperation barrier’ must be overcome if self-producing chemical organizations are to undergo the transition from non-life to life. This dynamical barrier prevents un-managed autocatalytic networks of molecular species from individuating into complex, cooperative organizations. The barrier arises because molecular species that could otherwise make significant cooperative contributions to the success of an organization will often not be supported within the organization, and because side reactions and other ‘free-riding’ processes will undermine cooperation. As a result, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-03-23
    On Salience and Signaling in Sender–Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points.Travis LaCroix - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In Lewis’ (Convention, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Skyrms (Signals: evolution, learning & information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010a) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-02-18
    Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):21-25.
    The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume's meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. added 2018-02-18
    Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  11. added 2018-02-16
    Evolution and Moral Diversity.Tim Dean - 2012 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7:1-16.
    If humans have an evolved moral psychology, then we should not expect it to function in an identical way between individuals. Instead, we should expect a diversity in the function of our moral psychology between individuals that varies along genetic lines, and a corresponding diversity of moral attitudes and moral judgements that emerge from it. This is because there was no one psychological type that would reliably produce adaptive social behaviour in the highly heterogeneous environments in which our minds evolved. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-09-25
    Co-Evolutionary Dynamics on a Deformable Landscape.J. McKenzie Alexander, Marc Ebner & Richard Watson - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2017-02-15
    Game Theory, Sociodynamics, and Cultural Evolution.Werner Leinfellner - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:197-210.
    Since Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of games, the debate among social scientists, economists, mathematicians, and social philosophers about what kind of theory it is has not ended. Some think that it is a new interdiscipline, some that it is a mere accumulation of gametheoretical models, such as utility theory, competitive, cooperative, collective choice models, and so on. Most of them agree that the models of game theory deal with isolated, single, and independent specific societal interactions between individuals who wish to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-02-15
    Game Theory, Agent-Based Modeling, and the Evolution of Social Behavior.Andrew M. Colman - 1998 - Complexity 3 (3):46-47.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2017-02-14
    Game Theory, Rationality and Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are key ingredients for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. added 2017-02-14
    Classical Versus Evolutionary Game Theory.Herbert Gintis - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
    Classical and evolutionary game theory attempt to explain different phenomena. Classical game theory describes socially and temporally isolated encounters while evolutionary game theory describes macro-social behavioural regularities. The actors in classical game theory are payoff maximizers whose identity remains fixed during the course of play. By contrast, in evolutionary game theory, the players are constantly changing, and the central actor is a replicator -- an entity having some means of making approximately accurate copies of itself. However successful in its own (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2017-02-12
    The Dynamic Stability of Coalitionist Behaviour for Two-Strategy Bimatrix Games.Ross Cressman, József Garay, Antonino Scarelli & Zoltán Varga - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):141-152.
  18. added 2017-02-11
    Modeling Prejudice Reduction: Spatialized Game Theory and the Contact Hypothesis.Patrick Grim, Evan Selinger, William Braynen, Robert Rosenberger, Randy Au, Nancy Louie & John Connolly - 2005 - Public Affairs Quarterly 19 (2):95-125.
  19. added 2017-02-11
    Communication and Coordination.John H. Miller & Scott Moser - 2004 - Complexity 9 (5):31-40.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. added 2017-02-11
    B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986.Tim Kohler - 1997 - Complexity 2 (6):6-6.
  21. added 2017-02-10
    A Stag Hunt with Signalling and Mutual Beliefs.Jelle de Boer - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.
    The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2017-02-09
    Alternative Definitions of Epistasis: Dependence and Interaction.Michael J. Wade, Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther, Aneil F. Agrawal & Charles J. Goodnight - 2001 - Trends in Ecology and Evolution 16 (9):498-504.
    Although epistasis is at the center of the Fisher-Wright debate, biologists not involved in the controversy are often unaware that there are actually two different formal definitions of epistasis. We compare concepts of genetic independence in the two theoretical traditions of evolutionary genetics, population genetics and quantitative genetics, and show how independence of gene action (represented by the multiplicative model of population genetics) can be different from the absence of gene interaction (represented by the linear additive model of quantitative genetics). (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2017-02-09
    Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:374-394.
    This paper discusses the explanatory significance of the equilibrium concept in the context of an example of extremely complicated dynamical behavior. In particular, numerical evidence is presented for the existence of chaotic dynamics on a "strange attractor" in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker [also known as the "replicator dynamics"]. This phenomenon is present already in four strategy evolutionary games where the dynamics takes place in a simplex in three dimensional space-the lowest number of dimensions in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2017-02-09
    On "Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory".Harold B. Jamison & Robert I. Rhodes - 1969 - Science and Society 33 (3):348 - 358.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-02-09
    The Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory.Robert I. Rhodes - 1968 - Science and Society 32 (4):383 - 412.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2017-02-07
    Spontaneous Coordination and Evolutionary Learning Processes in an Agent-Based Model.Pierre Barbaroux & Gilles Enée - 2005 - Mind and Society 4 (2):179-195.
    This paper is concerned with adaptive learning and coordination processes. Implementing agent-based modeling techniques (Learning Classifier Systems, LCS), we focus on the twofold impact of cognitive and environmental complexity on learning and coordination. Within this framework, we introduce the notion of Adaptive Learning Agent with Rule-based Memory (ALARM), which is a particular class of Artificial Adaptive Agent (AAA, Holland and Miller 1991). We show that equilibrium is approached to a high degree, but never perfectly reached. We also demonstrate that memorization (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Causal Necessity Brian Skyrms. [REVIEW]James H. Fetzer - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):329-.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2017-02-03
    Integrating Reinforcement Learning, Bidding and Genetic Algorithms.Ron Sun - unknown
    This paper presents a GA-based multi-agent reinforce- ment learning bidding approach (GMARLB) for perform- ing multi-agent reinforcement learning. GMARLB inte- grates reinforcement learning, bidding and genetic algo- rithms. The general idea of our multi-agent systems is as follows: There are a number of individual agents in a team, each agent of the team has two modules: Q module and CQ module. Each agent can select actions to be performed at each step, which are done by the Q module. While the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2017-02-02
    Distinctive Human Social Motivations in a Game-Theoretic Framework.Don Ross - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):715-716.
    I discuss implications of Tomasello et al's hypothesis that humans exhibit distinctive collective intentionality for game-theoretic approaches to modeling human evolution. Representing the hypothesis game-theoretically forces a question about whether it implies only distinctively human motivations or both distinctive motivations and distinctive cognitive capacities for representation of intentions. I also note that the hypothesis explains uniquely human ideological conflict and invites game-theoretic modeling of this.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2017-02-01
    Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):94-113.
    even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  31. added 2017-01-30
    In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):29-59.
    I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which “plays it safe.” Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. added 2017-01-30
    The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Brian Skyrms - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  33. added 2017-01-29
    Kooperative Strategien Im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation Eines N-Personen-Spiels.Andreas Diekmann & Klaus Manhart - 1989 - Analyse & Kritik 11 (2):134-153.
    Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod's research on iterative prisoner's dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player-version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners, dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some 'nice' strategies like 'tit-for-tat' are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-01-28
    The Role of Creationism in Evolutionary Theory.Ron Curtis - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):389.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-01-28
    SKYRMS, Brian: Choice and Chance. [REVIEW]D. Stove - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46:189.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2017-01-27
    The Evolution of Wright’s Adaptive Field to Contemporary Interpretations and Uses of Fitness Landscapes in the Social Sciences.Lasse Gerrits & Peter Marks - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (4):459-479.
    The concepts of adaptation and fitness have such an appeal that they have been used in other scientific domains, including the social sciences. One particular aspect of this theory transfer concerns the so-called fitness landscape models. At first sight, fitness landscapes visualize how an agent, of any kind, relates to its environment, how its position is conditional because of the mutual interaction with other agents, and the potential routes towards improved fitness. The allure of fitness landscapes is first and foremost (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. added 2017-01-27
    Review Essays : The Role of Creationism in Evolutionary Theory. [REVIEW]Ron Curtis - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):389-400.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-01-25
    Complex Adaptive Systems and Game Theory: An Unlikely Union.Mirsad Hadzikadic, Ted Carmichael & Charles Curtin - 2010 - Complexity 16 (1):34-42.
  39. added 2017-01-24
    Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of Selection?Jean Gayon - 2011 - Biological Theory 6 (4):320-325.
    The article examines two cases of adoption of evolutionary ways of thinking by modern economists: Nelson and Winter’s (Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 1982), and evolutionary game theory (1990s and after). In both cases, the authors explicitly refer to natural selection in an economic context. I show that natural selection is taken in two different senses, which correspond to two general conceptions of the principle of natural selection, one of which contains reproduction and heredity as key elements, whereas the other (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. added 2017-01-21
    World-Systems Analysis, Evolutionary Theory, Weltliteratur.Franco Moretti - 2011 - In David Palumbo-Liu, Bruce Robbins & Nirvana Tanoukhi (eds.), Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World: System, Scale, Culture. Duke University Press.
  41. added 2017-01-21
    Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms.B. Skyrms & K. J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):265-273.
    In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. added 2017-01-21
    Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society.Enea Pestelacci, Marco Tomassini & Leslie Luthi - 2008 - Biological Theory 3 (2):139-153.
    Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated. Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents’ strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2017-01-21
    Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure:The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure.Matthew Simpson - 2004 - Ethics 115 (1):166-169.
  44. added 2017-01-21
    The (Spatial) Evolution of the Equal Split.Jason Alexander & Brian Skyrms - unknown
    The replicator dynamics have been used to study the evolution of a population of rational agents playing the Nash bargaining game, where an individual's "fitness" is determined by an individual's success in playing the game. In these models, a population whose initial conditions was randomly chosen from the space of population proportions converges to a state of fair division approximately 62% of the time. (Higher rates of convergence to final states of fair division can be obtained by introducing artificial correlations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2017-01-20
    On an Evolutionary Foundation of Neuroeconomics.Burkhard C. Schipper - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):495-513.
    Neuroeconomics focuses on brain imaging studies mapping neural responses to choice behaviour. Economic theory is concerned with choice behaviour but it is silent on neural activities. We present a game theoretic model in which players are endowed with an additional structure nervous system and interact repeatedly in changing games. The nervous system constrains information processing functions and behavioural functions. By reinterpreting results from evolutionary game theory (Germano 2007), we suggest that nervous systems can develop to in exogenously changing strategic environments. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2017-01-20
    Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2017-01-20
    It is Not Evolution, but a Better Game Would Need a Better Agent.Christian Huyck & Ian Mitchell - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):499-500.
    Steels & Belpaeme (S&B) refer to the neural plausibility and evolutionary plausibility of their algorithms. Although this is not central to their goal of effective artificial agents, their algorithms are not neurally or evolutionarily plausible. Their communication games are interesting, and more complex games would lead to more effective agents. However, the algorithms could be improved either by using standard subsymbolic algorithms or by algorithms that are really neurally or evolutionarily plausible.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2017-01-20
    “Was You Ever Bit by a Dead Bee?” – Evolutionary Games and Dominated Strategies.Karl Sigmund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):175-176.
    On top of the puzzles mentioned by Colman comes the puzzle of why rationality has bewitched classical game theory for so long. Not the smallest merit of evolutionary game theory is that it views rationality as a limiting case, at best. But some problems only become more pressing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2017-01-20
    Evolutionary Games Without Rationality?Martin Bunzl - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.
    It is sometimes claimed that evolutionary game theory provides a basis fordoing without rationality. The author defends the thesis that on any plausibleconstrual of the assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory, it cannotprovide a plausible basis for deviations from rationality. But on any plausibleconstrual of rationality, evolutionary game theory cannot provide an alternativethat coincides with the outcomes dictated by considerations of rationality,either. Key Words: evolutionary game theory • game theory • rationality • Skyrms.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2017-01-19
    Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.Rob Boyd - manuscript
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a generous strategy (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 154