|Summary||These papers explore many of the traditional topics in the philosophy of mind, such as consciousness, dualism, group mentality, folk psychology, and free will. Experimental philosophers of mind use empirical methods in order to explore the cognitive architecture and processes that underlie and/or influence our philosophical intuitions in these domains. Specific debates within this area cover a wide range of issues, including: whether folk psychology utilizes something like the philosopher's distinction between intentional and phenenomenal states; which sorts of mentality (if any) are the folk willing to attribute to groups; the intuitions underlying folk dualism and the explanatory gap; the extent to which our judgments about free will and moral responsibility might be influenced by irrelevant features, as well as how those judgments interact with individual personality traits.|
|Key works||Josh Knobe and Jesse Prinz (Knobe & Prinz 2008) first introduced empirical data on people's intuitions about consciousness, and proposed that folk psychology includes (something like) the philosophical distinction between phenomenal and intentional states. This claim is subsequently challenged by a number of papers: Sytsma & Machery 2009 and Sytsma & Machery 2010 offer evidence that the folk possess a different notion of subjective experience; Arico 2010 raises some methodological worries and presents contrary results; and Arico et al 2011 introduce an agency model of mind-attribution on which attributions of both intentional and phenomenal mentality are the result of a single cognitive process. Fiala et al 2011 utilizes this model of mind-attribution to explain why dualism is intuitively attractive and why the explanatory gap is so vexing. Robbins & Jack 2005 introduce the "phenomenal stance" (akin to but distinct from Dennett's "intentional stance" and "physical stance") and appeal to those distinct stances to explain why we find it so difficult to reconcile our intuitive dualism with a materialistic worldview. In moral psychology, Gray & Wegner 2009 argues that our perception of moral agency is fundamentally associated with the attribution of intentional mentality, while our perception of moral patiency is fundamentally associated with attribution of phenomenal mentality, and that these two kinds of perception are inversely related (See also Gray et al 2007, Waytz et al 2010, and Arico 2012).|
Experimental Philosophy: Consciousness
Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Misc
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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