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  1. A Plastic Temporal Code for Conscious State Generation.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2009 - Neural Plasticity 2009 (482696):1-15..
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...)
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  2. A Sketch of a Kripkean Theory of Consciousnes.Federico Zilio - 2021 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 10 (3):273-292.
    In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, (...)
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  3. Color Experience May Be the Phenomenal Dual Aspect of Two-State Quantum Systems.Tal Hendel - manuscript
    Phenomenal color space, which is three-dimensional, contains six unary colors, i.e., colors that are not perceived as being composed of a combination of other colors. These colors are organized into three antipodal pairs which form three orthogonal axes in color space: red–green, yellow–blue, white–black. The three pairs of unary colors divide naturally into two phenomenally distinct groups: an achromatic group and a chromatic group. Here I show that if it is assumed that both the Hilbert space of quantum state vectors (...)
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  4. The Problem of Artificial Qualia.Wael Basille - 2021 - Dissertation, Sorbonne Université
    Is it possible to build a conscious machine, an artifact that has qualitative experiences such as feeling pain, seeing the redness of a flower or enjoying the taste of coffee ? What makes such experiences conscious is their phenomenal character: it is like something to have such experiences. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the question of the qualitative aspect of conscious experiences is often addressed in terms of qualia. In a pre-theoretical and intuitive sense, qualia refer to the phenomenal character (...)
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  5. Consciousness Beyond Neural Fields: Expanding the Possibilities of What has Not yet Happened.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:762349.
    In the field theories in physics, any particular region of the presumed space-time continuum and all interactions between elementary objects therein can be objectively measured and/or accounted for mathematically. Since this does not apply to any of thefield theories, or any other neural theory, of consciousness, their explanatory power is limited. As discussed in detail herein, the matter is complicated further by the facts than any scientifically operational definition of consciousness is inevitably partial, and that the phenomenon has no spatial (...)
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  6. This Quintessence of Dust - Consciousness Explained, at Thirty.Jared Warren - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 50 (1-2):281-308.
    Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained is probably the most widely read book about consciousness ever written by a philosopher. Despite this, the book has had a surprisingly small influence on how most philosophers of mind view consciousness. This might be because many philosophers badly misunderstand the book. They claim it does not even attempt to explain consciousness, but instead denies its very existence. Outside of philosophy the book has had more influence, but is saddled by the same misunderstanding. Now, 30 years (...)
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  7. Consciousness: A Real Mystery.Erhan Demircioglu - 2021 - Editora Fundação Fênix 7:127-138.
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  8. Feeling, Not Sensing, After Death.Dachel Fohne - manuscript
    The question of what happens when we die may just be the most intriguing of them all. Unfortunately, I am not a ghost, and could not tell you what definitely occurs when we sink our lungs in and close our eyes for the last time. However, one can speculate. If the theories of reincarnation, Heaven and Hell, or void of nothingness fail to convince you, surely there are more possibilities to contemplate - especially ones that focus on experiencing the afterlife (...)
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  9. Review of Daniel C. Dennett's From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds. [REVIEW]Hane Htut Maung - 2020 - Synthesis Philosophica 35 (1):267-270.
  10. A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism.Serdal Tümkaya - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should discuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, (...)
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  11. Proximal Experience as an Essential Part of Physics.J. C. W. Edwards - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):76-99.
    Conscious experience has been said to be outside of, or alien to, physics, and unexplained in a physical world. However, it is argued here that experience is entirely expected in a physical world that can only be defined by its power to determine patterns of experience. Something physical is something with the type of causal power that can contribute to determining the content of an experience if a subject is present at the right place and time. Physical powers also interact (...)
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  12. Does Quantum Cognition Imply Quantum Minds?S. Gao - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):100-111.
    Quantum cognition is a new theoretical framework for constructing cognitive models based on the mathematical principles of quantum theory. Due to its increasing empirical success, one wonders what it tells us about the underlying process of cognition. Does it imply that we have quantum minds and there is some sort of quantum structure in the brain? In this paper, I address this important issue by using a new result in the research of quantum foundations. Based on the PBR theorem about (...)
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  13. Does Synchronicity Point Us Towards the Fundamental Nature of Consciousness?: An Exploration of Psychology, Ontology, and Research Prospects.B. Butzer - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):29-54.
    The topic of synchronicity has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. However, to date very little empirical research has explored the underlying mechanisms of synchronicity. In other words, why do synchronicities occur? Are synchronicities random, or do they hold clues about the ultimate nature of reality? Drawing on theoretical and empirical research, the current paper explores the idea that synchronicity might be one way that the fundamental (i.e. ontologically primary) nature of consciousness reveals itself to us in everyday (...)
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  14. Illusionism About Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject (...)
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  15. Reversed Cartesian Theater.Zi-Hao Wang - manuscript
    This paper aims to present a theory of consciousness called the reversed theater theory, which gives the phenomenal consciousness a functional role in cognition. According to the theory, there is a theater in the brain, but a reversed Cartesian theater that the actors are the consciousness and the audience is the unconsciousness; actors mechanically act according to the script, while the audience enjoys its content. When a performance is over, the audience compiles the next script based on their experience so (...)
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  16. Facing Janus: Reflections on Social and Political Change.Nicole Torres & Andrew Gurevich - 2021 - Anthropology of Consciousness 32 (1):107-119.
    This article is based on a conversation between the President of the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness and the Editor‐in‐Chief of its journal. The aim of this conversation is threefold: (1) to engage a broader audience within the field of the anthropology of consciousness, (2) to discuss the recent history of the organization and its current direction, and (3) to recognize why concrete efforts toward a practice of decolonization is essential to maintaining the relevance of an anthropology of consciousness.
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  17. Plant Sentience, Semantics, and the Emergentist Dilemma.D. Brown & B. Key - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):155-183.
    Recent arguments in plant biology that claim to be uncovering the scientific basis for sentience in plants are grounded on assumptions that have not been sufficiently scrutinized. This paper focuses on two assumptions in particular – the semantic assumption that psychological predicates are non-rigid and hence can be extended to plants, and the assumption that Darwinian gradualism is inconsistent with consciousness emerging at a specific place on the phylogenetic tree. We interrogate both assumptions, advocating that a careful semantic analysis of (...)
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  18. The Biomolecular Basis for Plant and Animal Sentience: Senomic and Ephaptic Principles of Cellular Consciousness.F. Baluska & A. S. Reber - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):31-49.
    The defining principle of evolutionary biology is that all species, extant and extinct, evolved from ancient prokaryotic cells. Their initial appearance and adaptive evolution are proposed to have been accompanied by a cellular sentience, by feelings, subjectivity or, in a word, 'consciousness'. Prokaryotic cells, such as archaea and bacteria, have natural unitary, valence-marked 'mental' representations. They process and evaluate sensory information in a context-dependent manner. They learn, establish memories, and communicate using biophysical fields acting on excitable membranes. Symbiotic eukaryotic cells, (...)
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  19. Differentiating Behaviour, Cognition, and Consciousness in Plants.Q. Hiernaux - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):106-135.
    An enquiry into plant consciousness requires, on the one hand, taking into account recent experiments in plant biology and, on the other hand, refining the theoretical framework of behaviour and the various degrees of cognition. The main goal of this contribution is to advance such a framework by comparing classical animal and human cognition approaches with the theories of minimal cognition. This leads us to interpret more carefully the various plant activities and to highlight the limits of classical theories of (...)
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  20. The Indeterminacy of Plant Consciousness.C. Maher - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):136-154.
    Are plants conscious? Most knowledgeable people say they aren't. A small minority say they are. Others say we don't know. Virtually all assume the predicate '– is conscious' is fully determinate; plants are or aren't in its extension. Appealing to Mark Wilson's work on predicates and concepts, I challenge that assumption, proposing that the predicate isn't determinate for plants. I offer the start of an explanation for why this is so. We tacitly rely on many empirical correlations when we correctly (...)
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  21. Information and Integration in Plants: Towards a Quantitative Search for Plant Sentience.P. A. M. Mediano & A. Trewavas - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):80-105.
    Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that highlights the role of complex interactions between parts of a system as the basis of consciousness – and, due to its general information-theoretic formulation, is capable of making statements about consciousness in neural and non-neural systems alike. Here, we argue that a system radically different to a human brain, host to complex physiological and functional structures capable of integrating information, can be found in the meristems and vascular system of (...)
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  22. Sentience With or Without Consciousness.A. Nani, G. Volpara & A. Faggio - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):60-79.
    The study of plant signaling and behaviour, whose aim is to address the physiological basis for adaptive behaviour in plants, is a growing and thought-provoking field of research. In this review we discuss relevant studies that try to interpret in a neurocognitive fashion cases in which plants seem to behave similarly to animals. By comparing observations and experiments about plants and animals, we propose a framework composed of three axes in which interactions of living organisms with the world can be (...)
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  23. Sentience in Plants: A Green Red Herring?S. Ginsburg & E. Jablonka - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):17-33.
    The attribution of sentience or consciousness to plants is currently a topic of debate among biologists and philosophers. The claim that plants are conscious is based on three arguments: (i) plants, like all living organisms, are sentient (biopsychism); (ii) there is a strong analogy between the phloem transport system of plants and the nervous system of animals; and (iii) plants are the cognitive equals of sentient animals. On the basis of a model of consciousness that spells out criteria for assigning (...)
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  24. Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues: Editorial Introduction.V. Raja & M. Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):7-16.
  25. The Delusion of Unconsciousness: Forgetfulness of Consciousness.Saleh Afroogh - 2020 - PhilPapers.
    In Delusions of consciousness, Blackmore supports illusionism on consciousness, using a Humean approach toward "self." First, she tries to explain away the intuitive, realistic viewpoint on self-consciousness; she "explains why some the illusionary self-consciousness is so compelling" by claiming a "simple mistake in introspections" and tries to explain it away. Secondly, she concludes that the idea of illusionary self-consciousness shows the delusion of consciousness per se. In this paper, first, I shall show that her explanation against realism on consciousness (in (...)
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  26. Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to Its Physical Substrate.Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini & Christof Koch - 2016 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17 (7):450--461.
    Uncovering the neural basis of consciousness is a major challenge to neuroscience. In this Perspective, Tononi and colleagues describe the integrated information theory of consciousness and how it might be used to answer outstanding questions about the nature of consciousness.
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  27. Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness?Tomas Marvan & Marek Havlík - 2021 - New Ideas in Psychology 61 (21).
    Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer (...)
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  28. Self, Sense and Autonomy.Matthew Ian Harding - manuscript
    This study advances a refutation of Physicalism. It demonstrates that it cannot, coherently, be maintained. An alternative approach based on Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ is developed. This is an account where the physical world is constituted by a freely acting self from a phenomenology that is ontologically neutral. By doing so, the, so-called, ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is dissolved. It will be shown that the self is compelled to attribute moral and aesthetic value to the world that it has constituted. The (...)
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  29. The Mind-Body Problem(s) in Descartes’ “Meditations” and Husserl’s “Crisis” (Part2).Andrii Leonov - 2020 - Filosofska Dumka 5:117-128.
    The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). (...)
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  30. Instrumentalist Logic of Scientific Discovery: Reflections on Dewey’s Method and its Metaphysical Foundations.Andrii Leonov - 2020 - Actual Problems of Mind. Philosophy Journal 21:2-23.
    In this paper, I attempt to clarify the heart of Dewey’s philosophy: his method (denotative method (DM) / pattern of inquiry (PI)). Despite the traditional understanding of Dewey as anti-foundationalist, I want to show that Dewey did have metaphysical foundations for his method: the principle of continuity or theory of emergentism. I also argue that Dewey’s metaphysical position is better named as ‘cultural emergentism’, rather than his own term ‘cultural naturalism’. What Dewey called ‘common sense’ in his Logic, Husserl termed (...)
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  31. Considering Consciousness, Reconsidering Neuroscience.Biplab Karak - 2019 - In Siddique Alam Beg & Sahabuddin Ahmed Jamader (eds.), Knowledge, Mind and Reality. Kolkata, West Bengal, India: pp. 99-108.
    This paper explores the problematic issue of the theoretical dominance of neuroscience in the discipline of consciousness studies and tries to explain why such a dominance must not be encouraged through the philosophical and logical divulgement of the methodological shortcomings of neuroscience in explaining consciousness. Besides this, the paper also reminds us of the utmost and exclusive importance of 'consciousness' in consciousness studies and rivets our attention to the immense importance of adopting a multidisciplinary ecumenic approach towards understanding consciousness.
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  32. Calculating the Boundaries of Consciousness in General Resonance Theory.T. Hunt - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):55-80.
    When physical structures resonate in proximity to each other they will under certain circumstances 'sync up' in a shared resonance frequency. This is the phenomenon of spontaneous selforganization. General resonance theory (GRT), a theory of consciousness developed by Hunt and Schooler, suggests that consciousness is a product of various shared resonance frequencies at different physical scales. I suggest a heuristic for calculating the boundaries and resulting capacity for phenomenal consciousness in such resonating structures. Shared resonance results in phase transitions in (...)
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  33. Quantum-Level Experience in Neural Dendrites: An Interpretation-Neutral Model.J. C. W. Edwards - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):8-29.
    It is proposed that a human conscious experience of the sort we report to each other reflects a direct causal interaction between a pattern of information about the world, encoded in a field of postsynaptic potentials, and a quantized mode of excitation occupying dendritic cytoskeleton. The requirement for a quantized account is seen simply as the need for an event of experience to be a single indivisible, but richly patterned, causal relation between information and an 'informee'. It is argued that (...)
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  34. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness Are Empirically False.N. Greely - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):30-54.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness come in many varieties, but all adopt the 'transitivity principle' as a central, explanatory premise. The transitivity principle states that a mental state of a subject is conscious if and only if the subject is aware of it. This higher-order awareness is realized in different ways in different forms of higher-order theory. I argue that empirical studies of metacognition have falsified the transitivity principle by showing that there can be awareness of a mental state without that (...)
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  35. Do You Need to Be Conscious to Learn to Be Conscious?Axel Cleeremans, Dalila Achoui, Arnaud Beauny, Lars Keuninckx, Jean-Remy Martin, Santiago Muñoz-Moldes, Laurène Vuillaume & Adélaïde de Heering - 2021 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25 (1):9-11.
    Overgaard and Kirkeby-Hinrup conclude their comment on our Opinion article by asking, ‘Does SOMA entail that animals, children and many adults are not conscious?’ This question is indeed essential, and our answer is a clear: ‘We do not know, nor does anyone else.’ But we want to state right away that we believe they are. In this respect, Overgaard and Kirkeby-Hinrup’s core critique is misguided. We need to carefully distinguish between ethical and scientific considerations. Scientific claims are based on what (...)
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  36. An Introduction to Dualism: The Mental to the Fore?Filippo Pelucchi - manuscript
    The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific current of thought: physicalism, which states that everything in our reality is physical1. In this paper I want to introduce the main points of the opposite view, dualism, according to which there are two different realms of reality: the mental and the physical one. In the introduction I give the main idea and sketch the general intuition behind dualism. In Section 1 I present substance dualism (...)
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  37. How to Study Consciousness Scientifically.John Searle - 1998 - Brain Research Reviews 26:379-387.
  38. Does Your Brain Exist When Unperceived? Review of The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth From Our Eyes by Donald Hoffman.Alex Gomez-Marin - 2020 - Constructivist Foundations 16 (1):124-128.
    Not only does Hoffman claim that we do not see reality as it is, but that unperceived brains, trees and moons do not exist. His “interface theory of perception” is a peculiar blend of metaphorical ontology (objects are icons, space-time is a desktop) and mathematical modelling (the game-theoretical argument that fitness trumps truth. Conflating abstractions with concrete experience, evolution is used to refute everything (including evolution itself. Hoffman’s sweeping iconoclasm then lands where it took off: addressing the problem of consciousness. (...)
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  39. The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):131-148.
    ABSTRACT I begin by developing a challenge for the Higher-Order Thought variant of Higher-Order representational theories of consciousness. The challenge is to account for the distinctive phenomenal character of visual experience—its presentational character. After setting out the challenge, I articulate a novel form of Higher-Order theory that can account for presentational character—the Map Theory of consciousness. The theory’s distinctive claim is that the relevant higher-order representations have a cartographic format.
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  40. Consciousness as a Mode of Being.S. Ginsburg & E. Jablonka - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):148-162.
    We suggest a teleological approach to subjective experiencing or phenomenal consciousness. Like living, subjective experiencing is a teleology-constituting mode of being, which is made up of coupled, functional processes. We explicate our notion of a 'teleological mode of being' and distinguish between three different modes: a living (non-sentient) mode of being, a sentient mode of being, and a rational-symbolic (human) mode of being, which correspond to the three levels of soul suggested by Aristotle. These evolved teleological modes of being are (...)
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  41. Two Objections to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.A. O. Sovik - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):186-201.
    This article discusses two arguments against the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. The first argument says that IIT is wrong in saying that conscious experiences are identical to conceptual structures; they are very different in many ways. The second argument says that the seeming presence of non-conscious integrated information either makes IIT falsified or unfalsifiable. The first argument seeks to show that integrated information is not identical to consciousness; the second argument seeks to show that integrated information is not (...)
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  42. Emotional Consciousness in Autism.S. Arnaud - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):34-59.
    An abundant literature on autism shows differences in emotional consciousness between neurotypical and autistic people. This paper proposes an interpretation of these results through a conceptual clarification of emotional consciousness. It suggests that autistic people generally access their emotions through a thirdperson's perspective whereas neurotypical people's emotions reach consciousness via first-person access. This interpretation is based on a model of 'emotional consciousness' that applies leading theories of consciousness to emotions as well as on research on the way autistic people relate (...)
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  43. Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question.Francis Fallon - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):629-645.
    Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...)
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  44. Integrated Information Theory, Searle, and the Arbitrariness Question.Francis Fallon - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    Integrated Information Theory posits a new kind of information, which, given certain constraints, constitutes consciousness. Searle objects to IIT because its appeal to information relies on observer-relative features. This misses the point that IIT’s notion of integrated information is intrinsic, the opposite of observer-relative. Moreover, Searle overlooks the possibility that IIT could be embraced as an extension of his theory. While he insists that causal powers of the brain account for consciousness, he maintains that these causal powers aren’t tied to (...)
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  45. Consciousness, Conceivability, and Intrinsic Reduction.Jonathon VandenHombergh - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1129-1151.
    Conceivability arguments constitute a serious threat against reductive physicalism. Recently, a number of authors have proven and characterized a devastating logical truth, centered on these arguments: namely, that their soundness entails the inconceivability of reductive physicalism. In this paper, I demonstrate that is only a logical truth when reductive physicalism is interpreted in its stronger, intrinsic sense, as opposed to its weaker—yet considerably more popular—extrinsic sense. The basic idea generalizes: perhaps surprisingly, stronger forms of reduction are uniquely resistant to the (...)
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  46. Why Integrated Information Theory Must Fail on its Own Causal Terms.T. van Stekelenburg & J. C. W. Edwards - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):144-164.
    In defining physical (i.e. causal dynamic) units to which conscious experience is to be ascribed, integrated information theory (IIT) raises three notable requirements: (1) that a unit to which consciousness is ascribed must be defined, or circumscribed, by some intrinsic aspect or property, where intrinsic implies existing 'for itself' or 'from its point of view'; (2) that the intrinsic aspect that defines the unit to which consciousness is ascribed must be dynamic (i.e. involve causal power) rather than purely structural or (...)
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  47. Naturalizing Religion, Spiritualizing Science: The Role of Consciousness Research.H. Walach - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):165-194.
    This paper reviews and discusses empirical evidence from consciousness research, especially research into anomalies, and asks the question what, if taken seriously, would those data mean for our concepts of consciousness, science, and religion. It shows that the process of naturalization, i.e. finding scientific explanations for as yet badly understood phenomena, is not finished yet and could have a profound impact both on science and religion: traditional religious concepts would have to be reconsidered, and the scientistic materialist worldview that is (...)
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  48. Thick NCCs Yield Physicalist Epiphenomenalism.W. S. Robinson - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):77-94.
    'Thick neural event' is introduced to mean an event that requires firings of more than one neuron and a substantive (i.e. additional to merely temporal and spatial) relation among them. It is shown that some well regarded theories (e.g. by Lamme, Koch, etc.) strongly suggest that neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are thick neural events. It is then shown that thin (= not thick) neural events provide sufficient causation for neural events leading to behaviour, and that there are good reasons (...)
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  49. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the (...)
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  50. Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?J. F. Storm - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):174-189.
    Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...)
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