Explaining Consciousness?

Edited by David Chalmers (New York University, Australian National University)
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  1. E. Nagel's "The Structure of Science". [REVIEW]Raziel Abelson - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (3):416.
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  2. Explanation and Acceptability.Peter Achinstein - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467.
  3. The Parietal and Occipital Lobes and the Development of Consciousness: Some Preliminary Thoughts.Walter Randolph Adams - 1993 - Anthropology of Consciousness 4 (3):19-22.
  4. Eric Schwitzgebel: Perplexities of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Adrian Alsmith - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):497-501.
    A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspectionist movement (chapter 5), conscious attention (...)
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  5. Review of Mark Rowlands' the Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Torin Alter - manuscript
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands argues that phenomenal properties, which constitute what it is like to have a conscious experience, are “transcendental”: that they are properties by which we are conscious of the nonphenomenal world, but they are not objects of conscious awareness or even linguistic reference. He uses that conclusion to support a mysterian position on the explanatory-gap problem: that it is impossible to understand how phenomenal consciousness arises from physical systems such as the brain.
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  6. The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution.Edward Wilson Averill - 1992 - Philosophical Books 33 (3):168-170.
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  7. Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science.John Barresi - 2004 - In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  8. Owen Flanagan, The Science of Mind Reviewed By.William Bechtel - 1985 - Philosophy in Review 5 (6):249-252.
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  9. Owen Flanagan, The Science of Mind. [REVIEW]William Bechtel - 1985 - Philosophy in Review 5:249-252.
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  10. Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience.Reinaldo Bernal - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):39-49.
    The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...)
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  11. The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2012 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.
    I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views (...)
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  12. Thomas Chalmers and the Communal Ideal in Victorian Scotland.Stewart J. Brown - 1992 - Proceedings of the British Academy 78:61-80.
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  13. The Social Basis of Consciousness.Trigant Burrow - 1927 - New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co..
    Acknowledg ment is made to the Editors for permission to include these papers in the present volume. FRINTFD IN l.
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  14. Matthew ES. Rushworth and Adrian M. Owen.Y. Cambridge - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (2).
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  15. P. Chalmers Mitchell, Evolution and War. [REVIEW]H. Wildon Carr - 1914 - Hibbert Journal 13:906.
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  16. The Problems of Consciousness.V. F. Castellucci & S. Rossignol - 1998 - In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. pp. 77--7.
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  17. Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW]Monima Chadha - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):111-127.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  18. Maintaining the Purple Haze.Graeme Chalmers - 2001 - In Paul Duncum & Ted Bracey (eds.), On Knowing: Art and Visual Culture. Canterbury University Press.
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  19. Interview with David Chalmers (Pt. 1).Andrew Chrucky - 1998 - Philosophy Now 21:7-9.
  20. A a A.Axel Cleeremans - unknown
    While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current (...)
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  21. The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans.Richard P. Cooper, Nicolas Ruh & Denis Mareschal - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (2):244-274.
    Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task-dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top-down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed action (...)
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  22. Freak Observers and the Simulation Argument.Lyle Crawford - 2013 - Ratio 26 (3):250-264.
    The simulation hypothesis claims that the whole observable universe, including us, is a computer simulation implemented by technologically advanced beings for an unknown purpose. The simulation argument (as I reconstruct it) is an argument for this hypothesis with moderately plausible premises. I develop two lines of objection to the simulation argument. The first takes the form of a structurally similar argument for a conflicting conclusion, the claim that I am a so-called freak observer, formed spontaneously in a quantum or thermodynamic (...)
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  23. Consciousness All the Way Down? An Analysis of McGinn's Critique of Panexperientialism.Christian de Quincey - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.
    This paper examines two objections by Colin McGinn to panexperientialist metaphysics as a solution to the mind-body problem. It begins by briefly stating how the `ontological problem' of the mind-body relationship is central to the philosophy of mind, summarizes the difficulties with dualism and materialism, and outlines the main tenets of panexperientialism. Panexperientialists, such as David Ray Griffin, claim that theirs is one approach to solving the mind-body problem which does not get stuck in accounting for interaction nor in the (...)
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  24. Peculiarities in Mind; Or, on the Absence of Darwin.T. de Villiers-Botha - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):282-302.
    A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science has only been (...)
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  25. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World.D. C. Dennett - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):402-406.
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  26. Review of McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - unknown
    In other words, it's a perfect season for naysayers, and philosophers have risen to the occasion. The most radical is Colin McGinn, former Wilde Reader of Mental Philosophy at Oxford, who has recently taken a position at Rutgers University in New Jersey. The Problem of Consciousness is a collection of eight essays, two of which have not previously been published. McGinn's central thesis is that the problem of consciousness is systematically insoluble by us (Martians or demigods might have better luck). (...)
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  27. Nagel's Concept of Science.Jude Dougherty - 1966 - Philosophy Today 10 (3):212.
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  28. Ten Problems of Consciousness.Karánn Durland - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (1):184-185.
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  29. Causal Processes, Semiosis, and Consciousness.Claus Emmeche - manuscript
    The evolutionary emergence of biological processes in organisms with inner, qualitative aspects has not been explained in any sufficient way by neurobiology, nor by the traditional neo-Darwinian paradigm — natural selection would appear to work just as well on insentient zombies (with the right behavioral input-output relations) as on real sentient animals. In consciousness studies one talks about the ‘hard problem’ of qualia. In this paper I sketch a set of principles about sign action, causality and emergent evolution. On the (...)
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  30. Chalmers' What is This Thing Called Science? [REVIEW]James H. Fetzer - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (3):393 - 404.
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  31. Too Hard for Our Kind of Mind?Jerrold A. Fodor - 1991 - London Review of Books 13 (12):12.
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  32. Science and Its FabricationAlan Chalmers.Steve Fuller - 1991 - Isis 82 (4):786-787.
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  33. David Chalmers Interview.James Garvey - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 64:64-71.
  34. The Hard Questions: View From a Science of Consciousness.Amit Goswami - manuscript
  35. Introduction to All My Works 2012.Lorna Green - manuscript
    I am proposing a new Copernican revolution, that Consciousness and not matter is the true basis of the universe. Here is an account of my graduate student days at the Rockefeller University as a woman pioneer in science, and a sense of what I am really about in all of my works. I am giving a woman's take on the universe.
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  36. Beyond Chance and Necessity.Lorna Green - 2003 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (4):270-286.
    These essays propose a new "Copernican Revolution": Consciousness, not matter, is basic in the universe. They are non-technical, simply and clearly written.
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  37. Is Mind Extended or Scaffolded? Ruminations on Sterelney’s Extended Stomach.Jennifer Greenwood - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):629-650.
    In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and suggests that extended mind models seem plausible when a resource is (...)
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  38. Consciousness Reconsidered by Owen Flanagan. [REVIEW]Valerie Hardcastle & Peter Pruim - 1994 - Psyche 1.
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  39. Mortal Questions.R. M. Hare - 1980 - Philosophical Books 21 (3):185-187.
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  40. Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem.Stevan Harnad - manuscript
    Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling? " _Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought? What are the conditions for the_ _possibility of experience at all?_ " That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" but (...)
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  41. Review: Owen Flanagan: The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. [REVIEW]W. Hasker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):469-471.
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  42. Mortal Questions.Gerald C. Hay Jr - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 29:330 - 332.
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  43. Lycan on the Subjectivity of the Mental.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38.
    The subjectivity of the mental consists in the idea that there are features of our mental states that are perspectival in that they are accessible only from the first-person point of view. This is held to be a problem for materialist theories of mind, since such theories contend that there is nothing about the mind that cannot be fully described from a third-person point of view. Lycan suggests a notion of “phenomenal information” that is held to be perspectival in the (...)
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  44. Review of Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness[REVIEW]Terry Horgan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):579–588.
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  45. Questioning Consciousness.Nicholas Humphrey - manuscript
    No one doubts that our experience of phenomenal consciousness—the felt redness of fire, the felt sweetness of a peach, the felt pain of a bee sting—arises from the activity of our brains. Yet the problem of explaining how this can be so seems to many theorists to be staggeringly hard. How can the wine of consciousness, the weird, ineffable, immaterial qualia that give such richness to subjective experience, conceivably arise from the water of the brain? As the philosopher Colin McGinn (...)
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  46. Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads.Daniel D. Hutto - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
    Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, (...)
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  47. The Problem of Consciousness.Andrew Jack & Colin McGinn - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):106.
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  48. David Chalmers, Świadomy umysł. W poszukiwaniu teorii fundamentalnej, przeł. Marcin Miłkowski, Warszawa: PWN 2010, ss. 618. [REVIEW]Jacek Jarocki - 2011 - Roczniki Filozoficzne:379-388.
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  49. Book Review: Bayne, T. And Montague, M. (Eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Marta Jorba - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):883-890.
  50. Owen Flanagan. Self Expression: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life.J. F. Kavanaugh - 1997 - Modern Schoolman 74:161-162.
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