Explaining Consciousness?

ABSTRACTTononi’s Integrated Information Theory explains consciousness as integrated information, that is, the informational state produced by the whole system over the sum of its parts. M...

The Abhidhamma, the third great division of early Buddhist teaching, expounds a revolutionary system of philosophical psychology rooted in the twin Buddhist insights of selflessness and dependent origination. In keeping with the liberative thrust of early Buddhism, this system organizes the entire spectrum of human consciousness around the two poles of Buddhist doctrine - bondage and liberation, Samsara and Nirvana - the starting point and the final goal. It thereby maps out, with remarkable rigour and precision, the inner landscape of (...) the mind to be crossed through the practical work of Buddhist meditation. In this book of groundbreaking essays, Venerable Nyanaponika Thera, one of our age's foremost exponents of Theravada Buddhism, attempts to penetrate beneath the formidable face of the Abhidhamma and to make its principles intelligible to the thoughtful reader of today. His point of focus is the Consciousness Chapter of the Dhammasangani, the first treatise of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. Basing his interpretation on the detailed list of mental factors that the Abhidhamma uses as a guide to psychological analysis, he launches into bold explorations in the multiple dimensions of conditionality, the nature of consciousness, the temporality of experience, and the psychological springs of spiritual transformation. Innovative and rich in insights, this book does not merely open up new avenues in the academic study of early Buddhism. By treating the Abhidhamma as a fountainhead of inspiration for philosophical and psychological inquiry, it demonstrates the continuing relevance of Buddhist thought to our most astute contemporary efforts to understand the elusive yet so intimate nature of the mind. (shrink)

We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal (...) dynamics essential to either. In this paper, we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some others), and evaluate them more completely. (shrink)

Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations (...) in biological approaches to the study of consciousness. Looking past these limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing biological systems. (shrink)

This very short paper provides a panpsychic solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. It was presented to the Philosophical Society of the Oxford University Department of Continuing Education (OUDCE) on 18th August 2019, and posted on Twitter (@ATBollands) on the 20th August, 2019. It solves the Hard Problem by 1) making the case for Panpsychism, and 2) solving the Combination Problem (Panpsychism's equivalent of the Hard Problem). -/- The paper aims to be clear, concise, to-the-point and accessible to the (...) general educated reader. It is short on discussion and elaboration, and does not seek to defend its argument against all reasonable objections. However, by keeping its argument to under 2 pages, it ensures the casual reader is not discouraged from taking a look, allowing them to engage with both the Hard Problem and this Short Solution. (shrink)

Our senses provide us with information about the world, but what exactly do they tell us? I argue that in order to optimally respond to sensory stimulations, an agent’s doxastic space may have an extra, “imaginary” dimension of possibility; perceptual experiences confer certainty on propositions in this dimension. To some extent, the resulting picture vindicates the old-fashioned empiricist idea that all empirical knowledge is based on a solid foundation of sense-datum propositions, but it avoids most of the problems traditionally associated (...) with that idea. The proposal might also explain why experiences appear to have a non-physical phenomenal character, even if the world is entirely physical. (shrink)

Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program explores the nature of consciousness and its place in the world, offering a revisionist account of what it means to say that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical. By synthesizing work in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science from the last twenty years and forging a dialogue with contemporary research in the empirical sciences of the mind, Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove advance and defend a novel (...) formulation of physicalism. Although physicalism has been traditionally understood to be a metaphysical thesis, Elpidorou and Dove argue that there is an alternative and indeed preferable understanding of physicalism that both renders physicalism a scientifically informed explanatory project and allows us to make important progress in addressing the ontological problem of consciousness. Physicalism, Elpidorou and Dove hold, is best viewed not as a thesis (metaphysical or otherwise) but as an interdisciplinary research program that aims to compositionally explain all natural phenomena that are central to our understanding of our place in nature. Consciousness and Physicalism is replete with philosophical arguments and informed, through and through, by findings in many areas of scientific research. It advances the debate regarding the ontological status of consciousness. It will interest students and scholars in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of science. And it will challenge both foes and friends of physicalism. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on a recent debate in extended cognition known as “cognitive assembly” and how cognitive assembly shares a certain kinship with the special composition question advanced in analytical metaphysics. Both the debate about cognitive assembly and the special composition question ask about the circumstances under which entities (broadly construed) compose or assemble another entity. The paper argues for two points. The first point is that insofar as the metaphysics of composition presupposes that composition is a synchronic (...) relation of dependence, then that presupposition is inconsistent with the temporal dynamics inherent in the process of cognitive assembly. The second point is that by developing a diachronic or temporally dynamic ontology for understanding the phenomenon of cognitive assembly, this lends support for a third wave of extended cognition. (shrink)

By reviewing most of the neurobiology of consciousness, this article highlights some major reasons why a successful emulation of the dynamics of human consciousness by artificial intelligence is unlikely. The analysis provided leads to conclude that human consciousness is epigenetically determined and experience and context-dependent at the individual level. It is subject to changes in time that are essentially unpredictable. If cracking the code to human consciousness were possible, the result would most likely have to consist of a temporal pattern (...) code simulating long-distance signal reverberation and de-correlation of all spatial signal contents from temporal signals. In the light of the massive evidence for complex interactions between implicit (non-conscious) and explicit (conscious) contents of representation, the code would have to be capable of making implicit (non-conscious) processes explicit. It would have to be capable of a progressively less and less arbitrary selection of temporal activity patterns in a continuously developing neural network structure identical to that of the human brain, from the synaptic level to that of higher cognitive functions. The code’s activation thresholds would depend on specific temporal signal coincidence probabilities, vary considerably with time and across individual experience data, and would therefore require dynamically adaptive computations capable of emulating the properties of individual human experience. No known machine or neural network learning approach has such potential. (shrink)

Evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz, Vollmer) and value-driven decision theory (Pugh) are used to explain the fundamental properties of consciousness. It is shown that this approach is compatible with global workspace theory (Baars) and global neuronal workspace theory (De Haene). The emotions are, however, that what drives consciousness. A hypothetical evolutionary tree of the emotions is given – intended to show that consciousness evolves and is probably qualitatively different in different groups of animals.

There has been much recent discussion of whether Husserlian phenomenology might be relevant to the explanatory gap—the problem of explaining how conscious experience arises from nonexperiential events or processes. However, some phenomenologists have argued that the explanatory gap is a confused problem, because it starts by assuming a false distinction between the subjective and the objective. Rather than trying to solve this problem, they claim that phenomenology should dissolve it by undermining the distinction upon which it is based. I shall (...) argue that adopting a phenomenological approach does not provide reason to think that the explanatory gap is not a genuine problem. In assessing the assumptions underlying the gap, we must distinguish between objectivity understood as a stance we can take toward the world and objectivity as the world's having a structure independent of any experience. The explanatory gap can be understood as the problem of finding a place for consciousness in this objective structure. This does not force us to take an objective stance or reduce the methods of phenomenology to those of the natural sciences. (shrink)

The author starts from the dilemma, diagnosed by J. Levine and others, that awareness can neither be a relation nor not be a relation. Further developing P. Strawson’s concept of “non-relational ties”, he articulates the notion of ‘sub-categorical referentiality,’ which he characterizes as centric and directional. He then argues that consciousness is constituted by a double structure of such ref-erentialities, wherein one referentiality is straight or non-self-referential and the other one is oblique by being directed towards the first one. However, (...) these sub-categorical referentialities are not quantitatively distinct things. On the contrary, they constitute the double referentiality of one center of awareness: namely, the center of the “for me”-directedness of consciousness. Hence, this center is simultaneously self-referential and allo-referential in the referentialities that make it up, which explains the possibility and irreducibility of knowledge or awareness de se. This basic structure is then further enriched by additional referentialities until intentional consciousness is finally reached. While this latter is the normal form of our everyday consciousness, it is shown how it is not the most fundamental and thus not the only one possible. Inspired by G. Evans, the author distinguishes various forms of intentional awareness. He further distinguishes cognitive from voli-tional and intentional from intensional consciousness. In conclusion, he states that it is only on the basis of all of these referential forms together that the conscious use of language is possible. (shrink)

This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon, incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomena of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases, and visual extinction.

The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...) or creature consciousness. (shrink)

We have yet to develop a theory of explanation that will account for all of consciousness. Recent debate on this topic has been impaired because it has in large part proceeded without any explicit attention to the nature of explanation. On the one hand, the lack of commitment to any well-specified theory of explanation leads to imprecision and vagueness. On the other hand, much of the optimism concerning the possibility of explaining all aspects of consciousness stems from an attachment to (...) the only developed theory of psychological phenomena at our disposal and the belief that all of consciousness can be captured by such a theory. ;Some of the inadequacy in the literature on consciousness is due to a conflation between consciousness construed as mode of presentation , that is, the way content is presented to the agent, and consciousness construed as subjective or qualitative feel. Once the two objects of concern are distinguished, we have a much clearer vision of what needs to be explained, and we can turn our focus on the proper way to do so. I argue that subjective feel is an important aspect of consciousness in need of explanation, and that an explanation of this phenomenon is distinct from an explanation of mode of presentation or representation. Furthermore, while there are well-articulated methods of explanation that properly address mode of presentation and representation, this is not the case for subjective feel. ;I delineate several genera of scientific explanation in an attempt to exhaust the possible methods by which we may be capable of explaining subjective feel. This involves the taxonomizing of types of phenomena that are the targets of our explanatory methods. While one type of explanatory strategy may be adequate when the target explanandum is a property, the same strategy may fall short in explaining a single event, event type, or regularity. Subjective feel is best construed as a property. However, while the method employed by cognitive science to explain mental properties may be adequate for explaining much cognitive phenomena, I argue that it is incapable of explaining subjective feel. (shrink)

The rationale of this paper is to introduce fresh untold concepts that would allow researchers to draw the correct inferences in the realization of a conscious machine. The discoveries of these new concepts, which rooted originally from the derivations of the author's works on (i) Origin of Information, (ii) Acquisition of Information, (iii) Information Materialization, and (iv) Non-Mental Nature of Consciousness, are basically the foundations that alternatively defines the meaning of what it is to be alive or with life. The (...) highlight of the findings surprisingly unfolds the realization of creating a self-conscious machine and the revelation of mankind's greatest mistake ever made. The significance of the result may serve as the catalyst that might change humanity's social and belief systems. <br> The approach of this paper is threefold. First, the introduction to the following revisionist literature: (i) The Caveman in the Box Trilogy (origin of information), (ii) The Human Mental Handicap (acquisition of information), (iii) Material Idealization (information materialization), and (iv) Non-cognitive Consciousness (aneural). Second, the abridged conceptual definitions, distinctions, and clarifications of the following behavioral terms: aliveness, awareness, consciousness, and self-consciousness. And finally, the non-cognitive behavioral computational aspects of consciousness. <br> The core substance of this alternative approach relies on the following evidence: 1. Associative Consciousness 2. Information Animation 3. Scriptional Jump 4. Inherent Laws Integration (laws-in-queue) 4.a. String Telephony 4.b. Mirror Equation / Hello Inversion 4.c. Unmeasurable Pi 4.d. Biotic Wise Sensors 4.e. 121 S2S Test 5. Google VLDB Interface <br> Since Consciousness remains one of the biggest scientific and philosophical challenges among the academic disciplines due to its two fundamental unanswered questions; (1) Why does consciousness (philosophical) exist and (2) How does consciousness (empirical) exist, the counterarguments of the paper will focus on these unexplained theoretical and experimental queries. <br> And to conclude the discussion, the major discoveries in the study will be addressed: 1. Aliveness - energial 2. Awareness - sensorial 3. Consciousness - informational 4. Self-consciousness - experiential 5. Four Marks of a Self-Conscious Machine. (shrink)

In Constructing the World, Chalmers seeks to articulate and defend an important epistemic accessibility thesis, the Scrutability of Truth, which is crucial to Chalmers’ rationalist approach to meaning and modality. Chapters 3 and 4 of the book are devoted to persuading us that the move from weaker to stronger forms of Scrutability is intuitively plausible. In these comments, I want to question this move. The plausibility of strong forms of Scrutability hinges on controversial views about epistemic norms for answering ‘what (...) is x?’ questions that semantic externalists have good reason to reject. (shrink)

Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind.

A glance at the contents of this book might be enough to persuade that it is absolutely required reading for anyone interested in the study of consciousness. The discussion is replete with insight into a number of neglected topics: colour in dream experience (chapter 1), echolocation in auditory experience (chapter 4) and closed-eye visualisations (chapter 8). More familiar themes such as the spatial qualities presented in visual experience (chapter 2), visual imagery (chapter 3), the introspectionist movement (chapter 5), conscious attention (...) and multisensory experience (chapter 6) are given genuinely novel treatment. Chapter 7, titled ‘The Unreliability of Introspection’ is almost a microcosm of the book as a whole; it is not quite representative of the entire book but it gives a strong flavour of the style of argument employed elsewhere, so the half-interested (or hurried) reader would be well advised to take it in as a taster. The book is written in accessible prose suitable for an .. (shrink)

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological (...) relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: It is easy to conceptualize a problem in a way that prevents a solution. If the conceptualization is entrenched in one's culture or profession, it may appear unalterable. But there is so much precedent for the discovery of fruitful reconceptualizations that in the case of most philosophical and scientific puzzles it is probably irrational ever to give up trying. The notion of qualia, understood as phenomenal properties of sensations that can exist as objects of experience for a conscious (...) subject, is too recent in origin and too specialized in usage to warrant concluding that qualia cannot be understood in terms of physical processes. Humphrey offers an analysis of qualitative mental states that purportedly renders them commensurate with brain states, allowing them to be described in terms of the same dimensions. If his attempt is successful the conceptual gap between mind and body could be closed. Is it successful? (shrink)

This paper is a methodological and theoretical meditation on how some research has approached the question of the evolution of human cognitive traits. I discuss views that explicitly or implicitly endorse a view of human cognition as originating from a cause that can be singled out. Following Ross and Ladyman (2010), I suggest that this “singling-out” strategy correlates with a “container” metaphor that doesn’t fit with the interactive process-ontology of modern physics (Campbell 2009). Instead, Ross and Ladyman as well as (...) Campbell recommend the metaphor of ‘emergence’. The logic and ontology of emergent systems finds resonance with developmental systems theory in biology. I suggest in agreement with Stotz (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4), 2010) that we view the origins of human mindedness within such a framework. (shrink)