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  1. Inquiry in Action: A Problem-Oriented Account of Agency.Nathan Dyck - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, I argue that it is not a necessary condition of intentional agency that agents act on intentions with antecedently clear content. That is, some actions proceed on the basis of intentions which do not initially provide necessary conditions for performing those actions, and instead involve discovering at least some of these conditions in the course of performing them. To do this, I develop an account of problem-oriented agency, according to which agents may act in relation to problems (...)
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  2. Le schème, opérateur de la conception architecturale, II. La conservation du modèle morphologique.Dominique Raynaud - 2008 - Arquitetura Revista 4:15-32.
    This paper is a study of architectural design process. The explanation of an elementary change of state of the project is faced with two cases : (i) change of state transforms the morphological model, in which case schema operator is needed to describe the design ope- ration (Raynaud, 1999); (ii) change of state does not involve such a transformation and just consists in a size adjustment. The present paper examines the second case onto several examples (Gio Ponti, Sebastiano Serlio, Villard (...)
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  3. Arquitectura, esquema, significado. Problemas de semántica de la arquitectura.Dominique Raynaud - 2008 - Vária História 24:483-496.
    O artigo trata da situação específica da arquitetura em relação à semântica. Inicialmente pensado dentro do quadro da linguistica, a semântica foi aplicada a problemas onde não havia linguagem (semiótica). Seus conceitos têm que ser revisados para a aplicação à arquitetura. Propomos aqui o conceito de esquema dinâmico de modo a esclarecer a tese da semelhança semântica. Apesar da grande variabilidade do significado arquitetônico segundo o conceito sócio-histórico, tipos de significados podem ser distinguidos: pirâmides para subir ou descer, plantas em (...)
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  4. Échelles et raisons d’agir dans la conception architecturale.Dominique Raynaud - 2017 - Sciences du Design 5:131-144.
    Cet article compare les modèles explicatifs en architecturologie et en philosophie analytique de l’action, l’une et l’autre postulant l’existence d’actions finalisées. Cette similitude pose la question de l’identité des échelles de référence et des raisons d’agir. On montre que les échelles sont un sous-ensemble des raisons d’agir. Ce résultat a deux conséquences : 1. Le pouvoir explicatif des raisons d’agir est supérieur à celui des échelles de référence. 2. Raisons d’agir et échelles de référence ont un intérêt pour l’explication ex (...)
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  5. Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes?Anders Nes - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Emotions, like actions, this paper argues, are typically embodied processes that are responsive to reasons, where these reasons connect closely with the agent’s desires, intentions, or projects. If so, why are emotions, nevertheless, typically passive in a sense in which actions are not; specifically, why are emotions not cases of doing something intentionally? This paper seeks to prepare the ground for answering this question by showing that it cannot be answered within a widely influential framework in the philosophy of action (...)
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  6. Agentially Controlled Action: Causal, not Counterfactual.Malte Hendrickx - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):3121-3139.
    Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...)
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  7. On the immediate mental antecedent of action.Michael Omoge - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):276-292.
    What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal (...)
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  8. An Algebra for Tracing Categories of Social Processes: From a Surprising Fact to Middle-Range Theory using Categorical-Generative Analysis.Bruno da Rocha Braga - manuscript
    This paper describes a method for the analysis of the evolutionary path of a complex, dynamic, and contingent social phenomenon in an empirical setting. Given empirical evidence of a surprising or anomalous fact, which contradicts the prediction of the wide-acknowledged theory, the goal is to formulate a plausible explanation based on the context of occurrence, taking a holistic and historical point of view. The procedure begins by translating theoretical propositions into grammar rules to describe patterns of either individual action or (...)
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  9. A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action.Xingfei Zheng - 2021 - Journal of Human Cognition 5 (1):58-74.
    Ordinary action explanation formulated as "I am doing A because I am doing B" is explanation of an action in terms of another action-in-progress. According to Michael Thompson, the explained action is a teleological part of the explaining complex action, which is composed of different parts. Thompson's analysis focuses on the part-whole relation between the explained action and the explaining action, thus ignores a possibility: these two actions can be two different parts of a complex action. I shall argue that (...)
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  10. Introduction.Samuel Murray & Paul Henne - 2023 - In Paul Henne & Samuel Murray (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. New York: Bloomsbury. pp. 1 - 12.
  11. Handling og rasjonalitet.Edmund Henden - 2020 - In Dag Jenssen, Monica Kjørstad, Sissel Seim & Per Arne Tufte (eds.), Vitenskapsteori for sosial-og helsefag. Oslo: Gyldendal Forlag AS. pp. 78-100.
  12. Willpower and Well-Being.Daniel Coren - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):114-121.
    How is willpower possible? Which desires are relevant to well-being? Despite a surge of interest in both questions, recent philosophical discussions have not connected them. I connect them here. In particular, the puzzle of synchronic self-control says that synchronic self-control requires a contradiction, namely, wanting not to do what we most want to do. Three responses have been developed: Sripada’s divided mind view, Mele’s motivational shift thesis, and Kennett and Smith’s non-actional approach. These responses do not incorporate distinctions from desire-satisfaction (...)
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  13. Action.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism.Lixiao Lin - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    De se exceptionalism is the view that de se attitudes pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes. A recent argument for de se exceptionalism attempts to prove that the distinctive problem of de se attitudes has something to do with the role of de se attitudes in explaining actions. The argument is based on cases where two subjects appear to hold all the same relevant beliefs and desires but perform different actions. This argument is currently the most (...)
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  15. El bien común desde las causas aristotélicas.Manuel Alejandro Gutiérrez González - 2021 - Metafísica y Persona 1 (25):117-145.
    En el presente texto se analiza el concepto de bien común desde las cuatro causas aristotélicas (material, formal, eficiente y final) a fin de conocer las implicaciones de este concepto en una sociedad, especialmente en un Estado. En un primer momento, se analiza cuáles son los elementos que constituyen el bien común; en un segundo momento, cuál es la esencia del bien común; en un tercero, quiénes y cómo generan el bien común; y, por último, cuál es el fin del (...)
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  16. What does it mean to inhibit an Action? A Critical Discussion of Benjamin Libet’s Veto in a Recent Study.Robert Reimer - 2022 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2021 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 13230.
    In the 1980s, physiologist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of ex-periments to test whether the will is free. Whilst he originally assumed that the will functions like an immaterial initiator of cerebral processes culminating in actions, he later began to think that it rather works like an immaterial veto inhib-iting unwanted actions by preventing unconsciously initiated cerebral processes from unfolding. Libet’s veto was widely criticized for its Cartesian dualist and interactionist implications. However, in 2016, Schultze-Kraft et al. adopted Libet’s idea (...)
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  17. Against the Illusory Will Hypothesis. A Reinterpretation of the Test Results in Danial Wegner and Thalia Wheatley’s I Spy Experiment.Robert Reimer - 2021 - Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2020 Collocated Workshops. SEFM 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
    Since Benjamin Libet’s famous experiments in 1979, the study of the will has become a focal point in the cognitive sciences. Just like Libet the scien-tists Daniel Wegner and Thalia Wheatley came to doubt that the will is causally efficacious. In their influential study I Spy from 1999, they created an experi-mental setup to show that agents erroneously experience their actions as caused by their thoughts. Instead, these actions are caused by unconscious neural pro-cesses; the agent’s ‘causal experience of will’ (...)
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  18. Consistent Desires and Climate Change.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Philosophers have described the human perspective on climate change as a perfect moral storm. I take a new angle on that storm: I argue that our relevant desires feature a particularly problematic case of seemingly consistent but genuinely inconsistent desires. We have, first, non-indexical desires such as a desire to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our environment at some point. We have, second, indexical desires such as a desire not to (make the sacrifices necessary to) stop polluting our (...)
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  19. Indecision and Buridan’s Principle.Daniel Coren - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far (...)
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  20. Intention, Knowledge, and Responsibility.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2022 - In Roger Teichmann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe. Oxford University Press. pp. 53-71.
    To what extent can an agent be held responsible for what he does? According to Aristotle, we are answerable for our voluntary actions, the “voluntary” being “[1] that of which the origin is in oneself, [2] when one knows the particular factors that constitute the location of action.” This question, which was of paramount importance for Anscombe, led her to focus on the second, epistemic condition of responsibility. This chapter suggests that in fact, a large part of her philosophy of (...)
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  21. Individuant accions.Adrián Solís - 2021 - Filosofia, Ara! Revista Per a Pensar 2 (7):26-28.
    Com podem fer per individuar accions? Com determinem quines accions són diferents d'unes altres? El present treball discutirà dues teories sobre la individuaci´ó d'accions: la de Davidson i la de Goldman. Atenent a un clàssic escenari filosòfic sobre la individuació d'accions veurem les virtuds i defectes d'aquestes dues propostes.
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  22. Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):459-485.
    Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both (...)
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  23. Information and Mind.Paul Skokowski - 2020 - Stanford, CA, USA: CSLI Press.
    This volume examines a selection of topics that Fred Dretske addressed in his philosophical career. The topics range from one of the earliest problems Dretske analyzed, the nature of seeing an object, to epistemological issues that he worked on from mid-career onwards, to issues he focused on later in his career, including information, mental representation, and conscious experience. The papers in the volume are by former colleagues and students from the University of Wisconsin and Stanford University, and celebrate Dretske’s life (...)
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  24. Answerability without reasons.Lilian O'Brien - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. New York, NY, USA: pp. 32-53.
    It is widely accepted that we are answerable in a special way for our intentional actions. And it is also widely accepted that we are thus answerable because we perform intentional actions for reasons. The aim of this chapter is to argue against this ‘reasons’ view of such answerability. First, reasons are distinguished from practical standards. Then, it is argued that the best interpretation of the practices in which we treat agents as answerable is that they fundamentally concern practical standards (...)
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  25. Agency in the Space of Reasons. A Comment on The Castle.Josep E. Corbi - 2021 - In Tomas Koblízek and Petr Kotátko (ed.), Lessons From Kafka. Prague, Czechia: pp. 113-140.
    The received view about rationalizing explanations divides our psychological status into two kinds: beliefs and desires. In *The Retrieval of Ethics*, Talbot Brewer makes a case against this view. In this paper, I examine our experience as readers of *The Castle* by Franz Kafka to support Brewer's critical program, that is, his challenge to the received view. I will argue, however, that a proper analysis of this experience poses a serious problem to Brewer's alternative approach, that is, to his attempt (...)
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  26. Lectures on a Philosophy Less Ordinary: Language and Morality in J. L. Austin's Philosophy.Niklas Forsberg - 2021 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book offers a comprehensive reinterpretation of J.L. Austin’s philosophy. It opens new ways of thinking about ethics and other contemporary issues in the wake of Austin’s philosophical work. -/- Austin is primarily viewed as a philosopher of language whose work focused on the pragmatic aspects of speech. His work on ordinary language philosophy and speech act theory is seen as his main contribution to philosophy. This book challenges this received view to show that Austin used his most well-known theoretical (...)
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  27. Bayes, predictive processing, and the cognitive architecture of motor control.Daniel C. Burnston - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96 (C):103218.
    Despite their popularity, relatively scant attention has been paid to the upshot of Bayesian and predictive processing models of cognition for views of overall cognitive architecture. Many of these models are hierarchical ; they posit generative models at multiple distinct "levels," whose job is to predict the consequences of sensory input at lower levels. I articulate one possible position that could be implied by these models, namely, that there is a continuous hierarchy of perception, cognition, and action control comprising levels (...)
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  28. The leopard does not change its spots: naturalism and the argument against methodological pluralism in the sciences.Jonas Ahlskog & Giuseppina D'Oro - 2022 - In Adam Tuboli & Ákos Sivadó (eds.), The History of Understanding in Analytic Philosophy: Before and After Logical Empiricism. Bloomsbury. pp. 185-208.
    This paper sets out to undermine the view that a commitment to the early modern conception of the mind as immortalized in Ryle’s metaphor of the (Cartesian) ghost in the machine and in Quine’s metaphor of the (Lockean) myth of the museum is required to articulate a defence of the sui generis character of humanistic explanations. These powerful metaphors have not only contributed to undermining the claim for methodological pluralism by caricaturizing the arguments for disunity in the sciences; they have (...)
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  29. Limited Conventions about Morals.Marinus Ferreira - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Auckland
    n this thesis I describe how conventions specify how to put normative principles into practice. I identify a class of recurring situations where there are some given normative principles in effect, but they underdetermine what each individual should do, and what is best for an individual depends on what others do. I demonstrate that in such cases, whenever the community develops a response that repeatedly brings them to as good an outcome as is available according to their principles, that response (...)
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  30. Anger and Absurdity.Daniel Coren - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):717-732.
    I argue that there is an interesting and underexplored sense in which some negative reactive attitudes such as anger are often absurd. I explore implications of this absurdity, especially for our understanding of forgiveness.
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  31. Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):103-121.
    In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, unlike (...)
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  32. Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations.Megan Fritts - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12683-12704.
    Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to what (...)
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  33. Kant's Approach to the Theory of Human Agency.Tamar Schapiro - 2020 - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. pp. 160-171.
    This chapter is about philosophical method. The Kantian method in the theory of agency is often characterized as a “first-person” method. But what does this mean? I motivate this question by showing how Kantians and most non-Kantians routinely fail to communicate when debating each other about the nature of human agency. I trace this failure to a more fundamental difference in philosophical method, one that tends to go unacknowledged. Most non-Kantian theories of agency, including belief/desire theories and their variants, address (...)
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  34. Constantine Sandis, Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action (New York-London: Routledge, 2019). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):246-248.
  35. Revisiting the Six Stages of Skill Acquisition.B. Scot Rousse & Stuart E. Dreyfus - 2021 - In Teaching and Learning for Adult Skill Acquisition: Applying the Dreyfus & Dreyfus Model in Different Fields. Charlotte, NC, USA: pp. 3-28.
    The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, (...)
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  36. From Habits to Compulsions: Losing Control?Juliette Vazard - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 28 (2):163-171.
    In recent years, there has been a trend in psychiatry to try and explain disorders of action in terms of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of action. In particular, it has been hypothesized that compulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder are driven by maladaptive habits. In this paper, I argue that this view of obsessive-compulsive disorder does not fit the phenomenology of the disorder in many patients and that a more refined conceptualization of habit is likely to be helpful in clarifying (...)
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  37. From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.
    ABSTRACT A number of authors have recently advanced a ‘disjunctivist’ view of the rationalising explanation of action, on which rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because p’ are explanations of a fundamentally different kind from rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because she believed that p’. Less attempt has been made to explicitly articulate the case against this view. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I develop a detailed version of what I take to be the basic argument against (...)
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  38. Anscombe's Intention: A Guide. [REVIEW]Benjamin Schulz - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):438-440.
    Anscombe's Intention: A Guide. By Schwenkler John.
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  39. Explaining Away Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):991-1011.
    The paradox of rule-following that Saul Kripke finds in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations purports to show that words and thoughts have no content—that there is no intentionality. This paper refutes the paradox with a dilemma. Intentional states are posited in rational explanations, which use propositional attitudes to explain actions and thoughts. Depending on which of the two plausible views of rational explanation is right, either: the paradox is mistaken about the a priori requirements for content; or, a fatal flaw in content (...)
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  40. Book review of Means, ends, and persons: The meaning & psychological dimensions of Kant's humanity formula by Robert Audi. [REVIEW]Susan V. H. Castro - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):491–494.
    Audi's aim in Means, Ends, and Persons is to introduce an ethics of conduct in which treatment of persons features as a central case. The approach to conduct is inspired by Kant, and there are moments of explicit contact, but this book is not meant to be a work of Kant scholarship. The method of argument consists largely in laying out a system of distinctions that are illustrated and defended by simple, familiar examples. Audi's approach here is a continuation of (...)
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  41. Social Practices and Embubblement.Raffaela Giovagnoli & Lorenzo Magnani - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (1):13.
    The present contribution describes the nature of social practices based on habitual behavior. The first part concerns the notion of “habit” from a perspective that crosses philosophy and science. Habits structure our daily life and possess a social nature, as shown by informally shared habits and institutionalized rituals. After a brief reference to the philosophical debate, we point out the fundamental dimensions of habitual behavior, i.e., routine and goal-directed behavior. They also characterize shared social habits like rituals because we need (...)
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  42. Libertad, razón y normatividad La vigencia del pensamiento de G. H. von Wright a cien años de su nacimiento.Daniel Gonzalez Lagier & Sebastián Figueroa Rubio (eds.) - 2018 - Lima: Palestra.
    Tabla de contenidos -/- 1. Presentación, Editores -/- 2. Elementos para un enfoque pragmatista de la responsabilidad en la obra de G. H. von Wright, Matías Parmigiani -/- 3. La filosofía de von Wright y su utilidad en el derecho penal, María Laura Manrique -/- 4. Norma, acción y deber: el modelo del silogismo práctico, Juan Pablo Mañalich -/- 5. Variedades de lo bueno en el razonamiento judicial, Flavia Carbonell Bellolio -/- 6. El problema de la comprensión de la acción (...)
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  43. The Skill of Translating Thought into Action: Framing The Problem.Wayne Christensen - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (3):547-573.
    The nature of the cognition-motor interface has been brought to prominence by Butterfill & Sinigaglia, who argue that the representations employed by the cognitive and motor systems should not be able to interact with each other. Here I argue that recent empirical evidence concerning the interface contradicts several of the assumptions incorporated in Butterfill & Sinigaglia’s account, and I seek to develop a theoretical picture that will allow us to explain the structure of the interface presented by this evidence. The (...)
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  44. Doing without action types.Hein Duijf, Jan Broersen, Alexandra Kuncová & Aldo Iván Ramírez Abarca - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-31.
    This paper explores the analysis of ability, where ability is to be understood in the epistemic sense—in contrast to what might be called a causal sense. There are plenty of cases where an agent is able to perform an action that guarantees a given result even though she does not know which of her actions guarantees that result. Such an agent possesses the causal ability but lacks the epistemic ability. The standard analysis of such epistemic abilities relies on the notion (...)
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  45. Review of Audi (1991): Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]Luis Angel Pérez Miranda - 1995 - Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (1):189-194.
  46. Review of Audi (1991): Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]Luis Angel Pérez Miranda - 1995 - Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (1):189-194.
  47. How thin rational choice theory explains choices.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83:63-74.
    The critics of rational choice theory (RCT) frequently build on the contrast between so-called thick and thin applications of RCT to argue that thin RCT lacks the potential to explain the choices of real-world agents. In this paper, I draw on often-cited RCT applications in several decision sciences to demonstrate that despite this prominent critique there are at least two different senses in which thin RCT can explain real-world agents’ choices. I then defend this thesis against the most influential objections (...)
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  48. Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
    This paper argues that habits, just like beliefs, can guide intentional action. To do this, a variety of real-life cases where a person acts habitually but contrary to her beliefs are discussed. The cases serve as dissociations showing that intentional agency is possible without doxastic guidance. The upshot is a model for thinking about the rationality of habitual action and the rationalizing role that habits can play in it. The model highlights the role that our history and institutions play in (...)
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  49. Is Synchronic Self-Control Possible?Julia Haas - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):397-424.
    An agent exercises instrumental rationality to the degree that she adopts appropriate means to achieving her ends. Adopting appropriate means to achieving one’s ends can, in turn, involve overcoming one’s strongest desires, that is, it can involve exercising synchronic self-control. However, contra prominent approaches, I deny that synchronic self-control is possible. Specifically, I draw on computational models and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience to describe a naturalistic, multi-system model of the mind. On this model, synchronic self-control is impossible. Must we, (...)
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  50. L'Explication ordinaire des actions humaines.Rémi Clot-Goudard - 2015 - 93100 Montreuil, France: Ithaque.
    En quoi consiste l’explication d’une action ? La question, fondamentale pour toute réflexion méthodologique sur les sciences de l’homme, renvoie d’abord à une pratique commune. Dans nos rapports à autrui, il arrive que la compréhension fasse défaut. C’est alors que surgit le besoin d’explication, afin de comprendre la conduite d’autrui ou encore éclairer les autres sur ce que nous faisons… Qu’est-ce qu’une action intentionnelle ? Les pensées d’un agent causent-elles son comportement ? Comment caractériser le savoir qu’un agent possède de (...)
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