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  1. added 2019-01-15
    Introduction: Beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action.Robrecht Vanderbeeken * & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):197-200.
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  2. added 2018-11-06
    Action.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 78-88.
    What are actions? And how are actions to be explained? These two central questions of the philosophy of action call, respectively, for a theory of the nature of action and a theory of the explanation of actions. Many ordinary explanations of actions are offered in terms of such mental states as beliefs, desires, and intentions, and some also appeal to traits of character and emotions. Traditionally, philosophers have used and refined this vocabulary in producing theories of the explanation of intentional (...)
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  3. added 2018-11-02
    Intending, Acting, and Doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.
    I argue that intending and acting belong to the same genus: intending is a kind of doing continuous in structure with intentional acting. Future-directed intending is not a truly separate phenomenon from either the intending in action or the acting itself. Ultimately, all intentions are in action, or better still, in extended courses of action. I show how the intuitive distinction between intending and acting is based on modeling the two phenomena on the extreme and limiting cases of an otherwise (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-22
    Does Emotion Mediate the Relationship Between an Action's Moral Status and its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence.Liane Young, Daniel Tranel, Ralph Adolphs, Marc Hauser & Fiery Cushman - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):291-304.
    Studies of normal individuals reveal an asymmetry in the folk concept of intentional action: an action is more likely to be thought of as intentional when it is morally bad than when it is morally good. One interpretation of these results comes from the hypothesis that emotion plays a critical mediating role in the relationship between an action’s moral status and its intentional status. According to this hypothesis, the negative emotional response triggered by a morally bad action drives the attribution (...)
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  5. added 2018-05-14
    A Principle of Rational Explanation?Randolph Clarke - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-12.
    This paper addresses an argument from Richard Double to the effect that any libertarian account of free will must attribute to human action a kind of rationality that is impossible. Double's argument relies on an alleged principle of rational explanation. Here it is argued that the proposed principle is false, and hence that Double has failed to show that libertarianism has any problem with rationality. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to how the sort of rationality in question is (...)
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  6. added 2018-03-28
    The Representation of Action.Anton Ford - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:217-233.
    For as long as there has been anything called “the philosophy of action,” its practitioners have accounted for action in terms of an associated kind of explanation. The alternative to this approach was noticed, but not adopted, by G. E. M. Anscombe. Anscombe observed that a series of answers to the reason-requesting question “Why?” may be read in reverse order as a series of answers to the question “How?” Unlike answers to the question “Why?”, answers to the question “How?” are (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-12
    8 Goal-Directed Action and Teleological Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 2007 - In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press. pp. 4--155.
  8. added 2018-03-12
    Intentional Behavior.Frederick Stoutland - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):76.
  9. added 2018-03-07
    Agency and Practical Abilities.Will Small - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:235-264.
    Though everyday life accords a great deal of significance to practical abilities—such as the ability to walk, to speak French, to play the piano—philosophers of action pay surprisingly little attention to them. By contrast, abilities are discussed in various other philosophical projects. From these discussions, a partial theory of abilities emerges. If the partial theory—which is at best adequate only to a few examples of practical abilities—were correct, then philosophers of action would be right to ignore practical abilities, because they (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-07
    Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How.Will Small - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated, and whose positive view (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation.Carlos J. Moya - 1998 - Critica 30 (89):29-43.
    En la concepcion de Davidson, las explicaciones de la accion en terminos de razones incluyen dos aspectos o condiciones independientes entre si: una condicion de racionalidad o justificacion racional y una condicion causal. La satisfaccion de la primera depende de relaciones logicas apropiadas entre las descripciones de la razon y de la accion. La segunda exige unicamente la existencia de un vinculo causal entre razon y accion. Es esta independencia entre las dos condiciones la que, en nuestra opinion, genera en (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-16
    Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Karsten Stueber - 2006 - Bradford.
    In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis.Empathy, (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-02
    What Influences Action is Not Necessary Conscious.Robert F. Litke - 1977 - Philosophy Research Archives 3:274-288.
    It is ccranonly supposed that what we know and believe influences what we do, that knowledge and beliefs provide us with considerations which guide our action. Sane recent discussions of human behavior makes this appear dubious. In particular, by holding that influential considerations must be conscious occurrent events they make it appear that there is substantially less influence than we usually take for granted. In turn, this suggests that in large measure human action is unknowing, that agents often do not (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-02
    Alvin I. Goldman, a Theory of Human Action.Joseph Margolis - 1974 - Metaphilosophy 5 (4):348–364.
  15. added 2017-12-01
    From Anticausalism to Causalism and Back.Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis - 2013 - In Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anticausalism in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave. pp. 7-48.
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  16. added 2017-10-05
    La Théorie de la Décision Et la Psychologie du Sens Commun.P. Mongin - 2011 - Social Science Information 50 (3-4):351-374.
    Taking the philosophical standpoint, this article compares the mathematical theory of individual decision-making with the folk psychology conception of action, desire and belief. It narrows down its topic by carrying the comparison vis-à-vis Savage's system and its technical concept of subjective probability, which is referred to the basic model of betting as in Ramsey. The argument is organized around three philosophical theses: (i) decision theory is nothing but folk psychology stated in formal language (Lewis), (ii) the former substantially improves on (...)
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  17. added 2017-10-03
    Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good.Paul Boswell - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):1-31.
    According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does (...)
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  18. added 2017-09-14
    Anscombe on Intentions and Commands.Graham Hubbs - 2016 - Klesis 35:90-107.
    The title of this essay describes its topic. I open by discussing the two-knowledges/one-object worry that Anscombe introduces through her famous example of the water-pumper. This sets the context for my main topic, viz., Anscombe’s remarks in _Intention_ on the similarities and differences between intentions and commands. These remarks play a key role in her argument’s shift from practical knowledge to the form of practical reasoning and in its subsequent shift back to practical knowledge. The remarks should be seen as (...)
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  19. added 2017-09-04
    Self‐Knowledge and the Guise of the Good.Amir Saemi - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):272-281.
    According to the Doctrine of the Guise of the Good, actions are taken to be good by their agents. Kieran Setiya, however, has formulated a new objection to the DGG based on the distinction between the notions of normative reasons and motivating reasons. Only the latter, Setiya claims, is required for intentional agency. However, I will argue that Setiya’s objection fails because it rests on the implausible assumption that motivating reasons are determined solely in terms of the content of the (...)
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  20. added 2017-06-12
    The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    This work is an attempt to restore volition as a respectable topic for scientific studies. Volition, traditionally conceived as the act of will, has been largely neglected in contemporary science and philosophy. I first develop a volitional theory of action by elaborating a unifying conception of volition, where volitions are construed as special kinds of mental action by which an agent consciously and actively bridge the gaps between deliberation, decision and intentional action. Then I argue that the major skeptical arguments (...)
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  21. added 2017-06-12
    Action Explanation and the Nature of Mental States.Scott Robert Sehon - 1994 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    A developing orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind makes two fundamental claims: that ordinary explanation of action is a species of causal explanation, and that mental states are the theoretical posits of a proto-scientific theory of the mind embodied by our common sense psychological practices. I contend that this approach is wrong on both counts. In the first part of the dissertation I argue against the causal theory of action, and I propose an alternative, teleological construal of ordinary action explanation. (...)
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  22. added 2017-05-29
    Animals: Agency, Reasons and Reasoning.Hans Johann Glock - unknown
  23. added 2017-05-29
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  24. added 2017-05-29
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  25. added 2017-05-25
    Action, Knowledge and Will. ByHyman John . (Oxford : OUP , 2015 . Pp. Xi + 272 . Price £35.00.). [REVIEW]Evgenia Mylonaki - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267).
    In this paper I show how John Hyman takes the traditional question whether we should give a physical, ethical, psychological or intellectual account of human action and stands it on its head. For Hyman argues that the real question is how to distinguish the physical, the ethical, the psychological and the intellectual dimensions of human action, and he thereby changes the landscape in the philosophy of action. Finally, I argue that Hyman's positive proposal fails by the lights of his own (...)
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  26. added 2017-05-24
    Action, Knowledge, & Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions -- psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical -- which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Twentieth-century philosophers criticized the idea that acts are caused by 'willing' or 'volition', but the study of human action continued to be governed by a tendency to equate these dimensions of agency, or to reduce one to another. Cutting across the branches of philosophy, from logic and epistemology to ethics and jurisprudence, Action, Knowledge, and Will defends (...)
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  27. added 2017-05-24
    Sharing and Ascribing Goals.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
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  28. added 2017-05-15
    Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action.Myles Brand & Alan Donagan - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):115.
  29. added 2017-05-15
    Purposive Action.Bernard Berofsky - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):311 - 320.
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  30. added 2017-05-11
    Structuring Mind. The Nature of Attention and How It Shapes Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-13
    Deflationary Pluralism About Motivating Reasons.Daniel Fogal - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    This paper takes a closer look at ordinary thought and talk about motivating reasons, in an effort to better understand how it works. This is an important first step in understanding whether—and if so, how—such thought and talk should inform or constrain our substantive theorizing. One of the upshots is that ordinary judgments about motivating reasons are at best a partial and defeasible guide to what really matters, and that so-called factualists, propositionalists, and statists are all partly right, as well (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-05
    Internalism, Factivity, and Sufficient Reason.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    How radical is the idea that reasons are factive? Some philosophers consider it a dramatic departure from orthodoxy, with surprising implications about the bearing of the external world on what credences it’s reasonable to have, what beliefs are epistemically appropriate, and what actions are rational. I deny these implications. In the cases where external matters imply differences in factive states, there will inevitably be important weaker factive states in common. For example, someone who knows it is raining has many factive (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-12
    What is the Accordion Effect?Michael E. Bratman - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5-19.
    In "Action and Responsibility,'' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.'' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,'' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.'' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is (...)
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  34. added 2016-12-12
    Understanding Action: An Essay on Reasons.Frederic Schick - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is an important new book about human motivation, about the reasons people have for their actions. What is distinctively new about it is its focus on how people see or understand their situations, options, and prospects. By taking account of people's understandings, Professor Schick is able to expand the current theory of decision and action. The author provides a perspective on the topic by outlining its history. He defends his new theory against criticism, considers its formal structure, and shows (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Ex Ante Vs. Ex Post Rationalization of Action.Yujian Zheng - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:137-142.
    This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, (...)
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  36. added 2016-12-08
    Beyond Agency.Stephan Fuchs - 2001 - Sociological Theory 19 (1):24-40.
    The reason why agency/structure and micro/macro debates remain unresolved is the bad essentialist habit of treating such pairs as opposite natural kinds. Once variation is allowed, agency and structure, or micro and macro, are temporary poles bracketing a continuum, with social entities moving along this continuum over time. Explaining these transformations from agency into structure, or micro into macro, and vice versa is the challenge for explanatory theory. This challenge is met by switching to a constructivist level of second-order observing. (...)
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  37. added 2016-12-08
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):637.
  38. added 2016-11-03
    Absichtliches Handeln.David Horst - 2012 - Mentis.
  39. added 2016-09-06
    The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.
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  40. added 2016-09-02
    Handling Og den Praktiske Kunnskapens Metafysikk.Heine A. Holmen - 2016 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift:5-19.
  41. added 2016-08-25
    Belief & Desire the Standard Model of Intentional Action : Critique and Defence.Björn Petersson - 2000 - Björn Petersson, Dep. Of Philosophy, Kungshuset, Lundagård, Se-222 22 Lund,.
    The scheme of concepts we employ in daily life to explain intentional behaviour form a belief-desire model , in which motivating states are sorted into two suitably broad categories. The BD model embeds a philosophy of action, i.e. a set of assumptions about the ontology of motivation with subsequent restrictions on psychologising and norms of practical reason. A comprehensive critique of those assumptions and implications is offered in this work, and various criticisms of the model are met. The model’s predictive (...)
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  42. added 2016-08-25
    Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  43. added 2016-08-25
    Kathleen Lennon, Explaining Human Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (4):263-265.
  44. added 2016-08-21
    Attribution d'états mentaux et justification de l'action.Renée Bilodeau - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (4):639-653.
    Plusieurs auteurs se sont inspirés des thèses du deuxième Wittgenstein pour proposer une nouvelle approche en sciences sociales qui viserait la justification plutôt que l'explication de l'action. Sur la base d'une étude de trois types d'énoncés formulés grâce au langage de l'action (factuels, normatifs et attributifs d'états mentaux), cet article évalue les difficultés et possibilités d'une telle suggestion.
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  45. added 2016-08-11
    A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  46. added 2016-08-10
    Actions.James S. Morgan - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 29:345-348.
  47. added 2016-08-09
    Volition and Action.Douglas Odegard - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2):141 - 151.
  48. added 2016-08-09
    Actions and Results.Fred D. Miller Jr - 1975 - Philosophical Quarterly 25 (101):350-354.
  49. added 2016-07-20
    Wright on Teleological Descriptions of Goal-Directed Behavior.Lowell Nissen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):151-158.
    Larry Wright's analysis of teleological description of goal-directed behavior, though ingenious and insightful, errs in the following ways: it incorrectly claims that intentional human action exhibits consequence-etiology, making it impossible, contrary to his claim, for reference to consequence-etiology to be metaphorically transmitted to teleological descriptions of nonhuman behavior; it does not remove the threat of reverse causation for nonhuman behavior; it assumes in the face of contrary evidence that reference to purpose drops out in metaphorical extension; and it cannot account (...)
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  50. added 2016-06-20
    Intentions and Causes, Actions and Right Actions.Robert N. McLaughlin - 2000 - Ratio 13 (1):54–68.
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